ä»å¹´åãã«å¤å·£ã®å¤äº¤åé¡è©è°ä¼ã«æ»ããå æããããã7å¹´ã¶ãã«åè©è°ä¼ã®ãFollow the Moneyãããã°ãåéããBrad Setserãã表é¡ã®ã¨ã³ããªï¼åé¡ã¯ãJapanâs First Consumption Tax Hike Was a Demand Disasterãï¼ã§ãæ¥æ¬ã®æ¶è²»å¢ç¨ãå·¡ãç¶æ³ã«ã¤ãã¦ç°¡æãªæç« ã§まとめているã
Abeâs rhetoric has not been German. Especially not recently.
But his policies over the last two years have been. At least until recently.
The International Monetary Fundâs fiscal department estimates that Japan did a consolidation of over 2 percentage points in 2014 and another half point or so of fiscal consolidation in 2015, net of any gains from lower interest payments.*
Japan has a history of passing lots of highly hyped stimulus packages. But in many cases those stimulus packages just offset the roll-off of past stimulus packages, without generating much net fiscal impulse to the economy.
Postponing the consumption tax hike consequently makes a great deal of sense. Japanâs economy—the domestic side at least—never recovered from the last hike.
...
The tax hike came at the zero bound, so there was limited capacity to offset using conventional monetary policy tools.
That is precisely the circumstance when macroeconomic theory would suggest that a broad based tax hike would harm growth.
But the large drag was not necessarily what many forecast at the time.
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Using changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance in the IMFâs Fiscal Monitor. The structural primary deficit fell by 2.3 percentage points of GDP in 2014 and another 0.6 percentage points in 2015. The changes in the structural fiscal balance, which includes interest payments, in the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) are similar.
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