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Adverse demographic factors may also negatively affect the natural rate of interest owing to lower potential growth, thereby constraining the role of monetary policy in supporting the economy. While the natural rate cannot be observed and its estimation is subject to a large degree of uncertainty, estimates based on various methodologies point to a significant decline in Japanâs natural rate since the 1990s (Sudo et al., 2018). Estimates of the natural rate were in the range of 4-5% in 1990, but they have declined to around 0% by 2017, with some measurements even suggesting a negative rate. While changes in neutral technology and, to a lesser extent, the functioning of financial intermediation following the banking crisis are likely to explain a large part of the decline in the natural rate, Han (2019) estimates that demographic changes have had a significant (and gradually increasing) negative impact on Japanâs natural rate of interest in recent years (about -0.3 percentage points on average since the global financial crisis). Moreover, as demographic headwinds are projected to worsen further, the negative demographic impact on the natural rate may increase under current policies, further limiting the role of monetary policy in supporting the economy.35
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Faced with a lower natural rate of interest and increased fiscal strains, analysis of the Japanese experience suggests that structural reforms may be key to tackling the challenges presented by ageing. Higher labour force participation by women and the elderly has recently offset, at least in part, the decline in the prime age population. However, given that pressures on the labour market are likely to continue under current demographic trends, additional efforts to mitigate its effects may be needed. These include initiatives to further remove obstacles and disincentives that hamper an increase in labour supply, particularly of female and older workers. Furthermore, after a period of weakness, business investment has picked up recently (before the start of the pandemic), driven, to a certain extent, by investment aimed at increasing efficiency through the use of labour-saving technologies. Automation, artificial intelligence and robotics might also form a crucial part of the countryâs response to ageing. Against this background, and in view of the limited policy space, labour, product market and corporate reforms might be essential to increase productivity and growth, together with regulatory and fiscal reforms (including pension reform), in order to offset the impacts of ageing. The IMF suggests that making headway on the implementation of structural reforms could offset as much as 60% of the demographically-driven slowdown in real GDP growth (IMF, 2020).
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*2:å注ï¼Demographic headwinds are also believed to have raised challenges for the financial system, and hence for macroprudential policy (see, for example, Gelos and Muñoz, 2017). For instance, they add downward pressure to the profits of financial institutions (namely banks and insurance companies) through lower growth and interest rates, which has, to a certain extent, encouraged risk-taking among financial institutions.
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