ã¨David Glasnerã書いているã
åå¹´ã»ã©åã«Glasnerã¯ããã¤ã©ã¼ã¯éèæ¿çã«é¢ãã¦ããªã¼ããã³ãå¿ãã¦ãã¤ã¨ã¯ãèªãã¹ããã¨æ¸ããï¼cf. ここï¼ããããç¥ã£ã¦ãç¥ãããããã¤ã©ã¼ã最近のWSJ論説ï¼è¦ãµãã¹ã¯ãªãã·ã§ã³ï¼ã§ãã¤ã¨ã¯ãæ´ç¨ããã®ã ãããã®è§£éãééã£ã¦ãããã¨ããã®ãä»åã®Glasnerã®ææã§ãããããããã®WSJè«èª¬ã¯ããã¤ã©ã¼ãä¸è¨ã®æ¬ã§Manhattan Instituteã®ハイエク賞ãåè³ããæã®記念講演ãåºã«ãªã£ã¦ããã¨ããã
First Principles: Five Keys to Restoring America's Prosperity
- ä½è : John B. Taylor
- åºç社/ã¡ã¼ã«ã¼: W W Norton & Co Inc
- çºå£²æ¥: 2012/01/23
- ã¡ãã£ã¢: ãã¼ãã«ãã¼
- ã¯ãªãã¯: 2å
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以ä¸ãGlasnerã®æå¼¾ãããã¤ã©ã¼è«èª¬ã®ãã¤ã¨ã¯æ´ç¨é¨åã
Hayek argued that the case for rules-based policy goes beyond economics and should appeal to all those concerned about assaults on freedom. He wrote in his classic 1944 book, âThe Road to Serfdom,â that ânothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the former of the great principles known as the Rule of Law.â
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Hayek added, âStripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan oneâs individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.â
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ããã«å¯¾ãGlasnerã¯ã自由の条件(The Constitution of Liberty)ã®17ç« ãã以ä¸ãå¼ç¨ãã¦ããï¼
[T]he case against discretion in monetary policy is not quite the same as that against discretion in the use of the coercive powers of government. Even if the control of money is in the hands of a monopoly, its exercise does not necessarily involve coercion of private individuals. The argument against discretion in monetary policy rests on the view that monetary policy and its effects should be as predictable as possible. The validity of the argument depends, therefore, on whether we can devise an automatic mechanism which will make the effective supply of money change in a more predictable and less disturbing manner than will any discretionary measures likely to be adopted. The answer is not certain. (p. 334)
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éèæ¿çã«ãããè£éã¸ã®å対ã¯ãæ¿åºã®å¼·å¶åã®ä½¿ç¨ã«ãããè£éã¸ã®å対ã¨ã¾ã£ããåãã¨ããããã§ã¯ç¡ãããã¨ã貨幣ã®ã³ã³ããã¼ã«ãå®å ¨ã«ç¬å ããã¦ããã¨ãã¦ãããã®ç¬å åã®è¡ä½¿ã¯å¿ ãããç§äººã¸ã®å§å¶ãä¼´ãããã§ã¯ãªããè£éçãªéèæ¿çã«å対ãã主張ã¯ãéèæ¿çã¨ãã®å½±é¿ã¯å¯è½ãªéãäºè¦ã§ãããã®ã§ãªããã°ãªããªããã¨ããè¦è§£ã«åºã¥ãã¦ãããå¾ã£ã¦ããã®ä¸»å¼µã®æå¹æ§ã¯ãæ¡ç¨ããå¾ããããªãè£éçæ段ã«æ¯ã¹ã¦ãäºæ³å¯è½æ§ãé«ãæ··ä¹±ã®å°ãªãå½¢ã§è²¨å¹£ä¾çµ¦ã®æå¹ãªå¤åãããããèªåçãªã¡ã«ããºã ãæã ãèæ¡ãå¾ãããã«æ¸ãã£ã¦ããããã®è§£ã¯å®ãã§ã¯ç¡ãï¼p.334ï¼ã
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ããã«Glanerã¯ããã¤ã©ã¼ã®ä»¥ä¸ã®æç« ãæ§çã«æãã¦ããã
Rules for monetary policy do not mean that the central bank does not change the instruments of policy (interest rates or the money supply) in response to events, or provide loans in the case of a bank run. Rather they mean that they take such actions in a predictable manner.
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ããã«å¯¾ãGlasnerãåãããèªç±ã®æ¡ä»¶ãã®17ç« ããå¼ç¨ããã®ã¯ä»¥ä¸ã®æç« ã§ããï¼
There is one basic dilemma, which all central banks face, which makes it inevitable that their policy must involve much discretion. A central bank can exercise only an indirect and therefore limited control over all the circulating media. Its power is based chiefly on the threat of not supplying cash when it is needed. Yet at the same time it is considered to be its duty never to refuse to supply this case at a price when needed. It is this problem, rather than the general effects of policy on prices or the value of money, that necessarily preoccupies the central banker in his day-to-day actions. It is a task which makes it necessary for the central bank constantly to forestall or counteract development in the realm of credit, for which no simple rules can provide sufficient guidance.
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The same is nearly as true of the measures intended to affect prices and employment. They must be directed more at forestalling changes before they occur than at correcting them after they have occurred. If a central bank always waited until rule or mechanism forced it to take action, the resulting fluctuations would be much greater than they need be. . . .
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[U]nder present conditions we have little choice but to limit monetary policy by prescribing its goals rather than its specific actions. The concrete issue today is whether it ought to keep stable some level of employment or some level of prices. Reasonably interpreted and with due allowance made for the inevitability of minor fluctuations around a given level, these two aims are not necessarily in conflict, provided that the requirements for monetary stability are given first place and the rest of economic policy is adapted to them. A conflict arises, however, if âfull employmentâ is made the chief objective and this is interpreted, as it sometimes is, as that maximum of employment which can be produced by monetary means in the short run. That way lies progressive inflation. (pp. 336-37)
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ç¾å¨ã®ç¶æ³ã«ããã¦ã¯ãéèæ¿çãå¶ç´ããéã«ããã®ç¹å®ã®è¡åãè¦å®ããã®ã§ã¯ãªãããã®ç®çãè¦å®ãã以å¤ã®é¸æè¢ã¯ã¾ãåå¨ããªããä»æ¥ã®éèæ¿çã®å ·ä½çãªèª²é¡ã¯ãéç¨ã®å®å®ããä¸å®æ°´æºãç¶æãã¹ãããããã¨ãç©ä¾¡ã®ä¸å®æ°´æºãç¶æãã¹ãããã¨ããç¹ã«ãããéèã®å®å®åã¨ããè¦æ±ã第ä¸ã®åªå 課é¡ã§ãããä»ã®çµæ¸æ¿çã¯ããã«é©å¿ãããã¨ãããã¨ãåæã¨ãããªãã°ãåççãªè§£éã«åºã¥ãããã¤ãæä¸ã®æ°´æºã®å¨ãã®ä¸å¯é¿çãªå°å¤åãå½ç¶ã®ãã¨ã¨ãã¦è¨±å®¹ããéãããã®äºã¤ã®ç®çã¯å¿ ãããç¸çç¾ãããã®ã§ã¯ãªãããããããããå®å ¨éç¨ãã主ç®çã¨ãªããç¾å®ã«ãã°ãã°ãªãããããã«ãçæçãªéèçæ段ã«ãã£ã¦éæãããæ大éã®éç¨ã¨è§£éããããªãã°ã両è ã®éã«çç¾ãçããããã®å ã«ã¯ç´¯é²çãªã¤ã³ãã¬ãå¾ ã£ã¦ãããï¼pp. 336-37ï¼