BIND DNSSEC Guide
AbstractThis is version 0.5 of the DNSSEC deployment guide for BIND.BIND is open source software that implements the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols for the Internet. It is a reference implementation of those protocols, but it is also production-grade software, suitable for use in high-volume and high-reliability applications.Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) extends standard DNS
RFC 6698: The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Hoffman Request for Comments: 6698 VPN Consortium Category: Standards Track J. Schlyter ISSN: 2070-1721 Kirei AB August 2012 The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA Abstract Encrypted communication on the Internet often uses Transport Layer Security (TLS), which depends on third parties to certify
RFC 6394: Use Cases and Requirements for DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Barnes Request for Comments: 6394 BBN Technologies Category: Informational October 2011 ISSN: 2070-1721 Use Cases and Requirements for DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Abstract Many current applications use the certificate-based authentication features in Transport Layer Security (TLS) to allow clients to verify that a connected server pro
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JPRSã§ã¯ã€2013å¹´11月17日（日）よりã€JP DNSサーãƒãƒ¼ã«è¨å®šã•ã‚Œã‚‹DSリソースレコード（以下ã€ã€ŒDS RRã€ï¼‰ã®TTLè¨å®šå€¤ï¼ˆä»¥ä¸‹ã€ã€ŒTTL値ã€ï¼‰ã‚’従æ¥ã®86400（1日）ã‹ã‚‰ã€7200（2時間）ã«å¤‰æ›´ã„ãŸã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ ã“ã‚Œã«ã‚ˆã‚Šã€JPRSã¸ã®ä¸æ£ãªDS RRã®ç™»éŒ²ãƒ»å…¬é–‹ã«èµ·å› ã™ã‚‹DNSSEC検証失敗ã‹ã‚‰ã®å¾©æ—§ã€ç™»éŒ²æ¸ˆJPドメインåã®KSKãƒãƒ¼ãƒ«ã‚ªãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ã«å¿…è¦ãªç·ä½œæ¥æ™‚é–“ã®çŸç¸®ãŒæœŸå¾…ã§ãã¾ã™ã€‚ DS RRã¯è¦ªã‚¾ãƒ¼ãƒ³ã«ã®ã¿è¨å®šã•ã‚Œã‚‹ãŸã‚ã€ä»Šå›žã®è¨å®šå¤‰æ›´ã¯JPRSã®ãƒ¬ã‚¸ã‚¹ãƒˆãƒªã‚·ã‚¹ãƒ†ãƒ åŠã³JP DNSサーãƒãƒ¼ã«ãŠã‘ã‚‹ã‚‚ã®ã®ã¿ã¨ãªã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚今回ã®å¤‰æ›´ã«éš›ã—ã€JPドメインåã®ç™»éŒ²è€…・利用者や権å¨DNSサーãƒãƒ¼ï¼ã‚ャッシュDNSサーãƒãƒ¼ã®ç®¡ç†è€…ã€æŒ‡å®šäº‹æ¥è€…ã«ãŠã„ã¦å¿…è¦ãªä½œæ¥ã¯ã”ã–ã„ã¾ã›ã‚“。 詳細ã¯ã€æœ¬ä»¶ã‚’解説ã—ãŸæŠ€è¡“文書「JP DNSサーãƒãƒ¼ã«è¨å®šã•ã‚Œã‚‹DS RRã®TTL値ã®å¤‰æ›´ã«ã¤ã„ã¦ã€ã‚’ã”
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VerisignãŒDNSSECドメイン移管特許申請:Geekãªãºãƒ¼ã˜
VerisignãŒDNSSECã«ãŠã‘るドメイン移管手法ã«é–¢ã™ã‚‹ç‰¹è¨±ç”³è«‹ã‚’è¡Œã£ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã¨ã„ã†è¨˜äº‹ãŒDomain Name Wireã§ã‚ã‚Šã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ Verisign files patent application for way of transfering hosting on DNSSEC Domains 特許ã«é–¢ã™ã‚‹è©³ç´°ãŒè¨˜è¼‰ã•ã‚ŒãŸPDFã‚‚Domain Name Wireã§å…¬é–‹ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ United States Patent Publication : TRANSFER OF DNSSEC DOMAINS (PDF) 特許ã®æ–‡ç« ã‚’ã‚ã¾ã‚ŠçœŸé¢ç›®ã«èªã‚“ã§ã„ãªã„ã®ã§ã€å½±éŸ¿ç¯„囲ãŒå¤§ããã†ãªç‰¹è¨±ãªã®ã‹ã€ãã‚Œã¨ã‚‚使ã‚ã‚Œãã†ã«ãªã„é‡ç®±ã®éš…系特許ãªã®ã‹è‰¯ãã‚ã‹ã‚‰ãªã„ã®ã§ã™ãŒã€ã¨ã‚Šã‚ãˆãšã”紹介ã¾ã§ã€‚ (ã¨ã„ã†ã‹ã€DNSルートサーãƒã‚„TLDã‚’é‹å–¶ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹VerisignãŒãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³ç§»ç®¡ã®ç‰¹è¨±ã‚’申請ã™ã‚‹
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普段考ãˆã¦ã„る事やらã€ä½•ã‚„ら特定ã®ãƒˆãƒ”ックã¯è¨å®šã›ãšã«ã€å°†æ¥èªã¿è¿”ã™è‡ªåˆ†ã«å‘ã‘ã¦ä½•ã‹æ›¸ã„ã¦ã‚†ããŸã‚ã®ã‚¹ãƒšãƒ¼ã‚¹ã§ã™ã€‚ ã¨ã¯ã„ãˆæ›¸ãã‹ã‚‰ã«ã¯å†åˆ©ç”¨ã—ã‚„ã™ã„ã‚‚ã®ã‚’目指ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ コメントã¯å„記事ã¸ã®æŠ•ç¨¿ã‹ã€Google Groups "Yasundial/Yadiary Forum"ã¸ã©ã†ãž Debian 6 (Squeeze)ã§é‹ç”¨ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹DTIã®VPSサーãƒãƒ¼ã¯DNSサーãƒãƒ¼ã¨ã—ã¦ã‚‚å‹•ã„ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ 今回ã¯ã“ã® DNS - bind9 9.7.3 ã‚’DNSSEC対応ã«ã—ã¦ã¿ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ 別途ã€èª²é¡Œã®é …ç›®ã«æŽ²è¼‰ã—ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ãŒã€DNSSECã«å¯¾å¿œã™ã‚‹ã ã‘ã§ã¯ä¸å分ã§ã€å®Ÿç”¨ã«ã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã«ã¯DSレコードã®å…¬é–‹ãŒå¿…è¦ã§ã™ã€‚ã“ã‚Œã«ã¯ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚’登録ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹RegistarãŒDNSSECã«å¯¾å¿œã™ã‚‹å¿…è¦ãŒã‚ã‚‹ã®ã§ã€å›½å†…ã§ã¯ã»ã¼JPRS系列ã®JPDirectãŒã‚µãƒãƒ¼ãƒˆã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹.jpドメインã®ã¿ã§ã¯ãªã„ã‹ãªã¨æ€ã‚ã‚Œã¾ã™ã€‚ ド
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Webサービスã«ãŠã‘る安全ãªé€šä¿¡ã‚’実ç¾ã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã«TLS（Transport Layer Security）プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ«[1]ã§ã¯é€šä¿¡ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã®æš—å·åŒ–ã¨é€šä¿¡ç›¸æ‰‹ã®èªè¨¼ãŒè¡Œã‚ã‚Œã¦ã„る。本稿ã§å–り上ã’ã‚‹DANE（DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities）ã¯ã€ã“ã®TLSã«ãŠã‘る通信相手ã®èªè¨¼ã®ãŸã‚ã«ã€èªè¨¼å±€ã§ã¯ãªãDNSを使ã†ä»•çµ„ã¿ã§ã‚る。本稿ã§ã¯ã€2011年度上åŠæœŸã®ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒãƒƒãƒˆã«ãŠã‘ã‚‹ã‚»ã‚ュリティ技術ã®å‹•å‘ã¨ã—ã¦DANEを紹介ã™ã‚‹ã€‚ DANEã¯ã€2010å¹´8æœˆé ƒã€KIDNS（Keys in DNS）ã¨å‘¼ã°ã‚Œã€IETF（Internet Engineering Task Force）ã®ãƒ¡ãƒ¼ãƒªãƒ³ã‚°ãƒªã‚¹ãƒˆ1ã§è°è«–ãŒå§‹ã¾ã£ãŸä»•çµ„ã¿ã§ã€2010年末ã«ãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚ンググループãŒè¨ç«‹ã•ã‚Œã€ãƒ—ãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ«ã®ç–定ã«å‘ã‘ãŸè°è«–ãŒæ´»ç™ºåŒ–ã—ãŸã€‚DANEã¯ã€DNSを使ã£ã¦ã€é›»å証明書をé…
RFC4641_and_I-D2.pdf
1 RFC 4641 SWG 2 Appendix A. Terminology • Anchored key – DNSKEY – hard anchor (ed) • Bogus – RFC 4033 5 – RRSet DNSKEY RRSet Bogus 3 Appendix A. Terminology • Key Signing Key KSK – Key Signing Key(KSK) zone apex key set – KSK • Key size – key size’ modulus size’ – modulus size key size – modulus n. pl. moduli [-lai] , ; absolute value. (Infoseek ) 4 Appendix A. Terminology • Private and public ke
DNSSEC.jp プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ«ç†è§£SWG RFC4035.ppt
1 1 DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp DNSSEC.jp プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ« プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ« プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ« プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ«ç†è§£ ç†è§£ ç†è§£ ç†è§£ プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ« プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ« プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ« プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ«ç†è§£ ç†è§£ ç†è§£ ç†è§£SWG SWG SWG SWG SWG SWG SWG SWG RFC 4035 RFC 4035 RFC 4035 RFC 4035 RFC 4035 RFC 4035 RFC 4035 RFC 4035 2 2 1. Introduction 2. Zone Signing 3. Serving 4. Resolving 5. Authenticating DNS Responses 6. IANA Considerations 7. Secur
HOME | YADIFA
A TRUE NAME SERVER ALTERNATIVE YADIFA® is a name server implementation developed from scratch by .eu. It’s clean, small, light and RFC compliant. And just like other implementations, YADIFA is portable across multiple operating systems, including Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Solaris. PERFORMANCE YADIFA® is designed specifically for the efficient management of large Internet zones and uses dynamic u
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IPv6, DNSSEC, Securing BGP, Anti-Spoofing & Using TLS | Internet Society
ION Tokyo: The Business Case for DNSSEC and DANE, Dan York
DANE: Taking TLS Authentication to the Next Level Using DNSSEC
DANE Protocol: DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities | Internet Society
DANE SMTP Validator
ICANN DPSã®æ¦‚è¦
Internet, TV, Phone, Smart Home and Security - Xfinity by Comcast
http://dnssec.jp/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/20101122-techwg-registrar-transfer-guideline.pdf
Knot DNS
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