BGP in the Data Centerã‚’èªã¿ã¾ã—㟠(1/6) : Chapter 1 - Introduction to Data Center Networks - baron tech blog
BGPを採用ã—ãŸãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚»ãƒ³ã‚¿ (DC) 内ã®IP Fabricã«é–¢ã—ã¦ã€"BGP in the Data Center" ã‚’èªã‚“ã ã®ã§ã€å‚™å¿˜éŒ²ã®ãŸã‚ã«ã¾ã¨ã‚ã¾ã™ã€‚ 書ç±ã¯Cumulus Networksã®ã‚µã‚¤ãƒˆã§ãƒ€ã‚¦ãƒ³ãƒãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã§ãã¾ã™ã€‚ cumulusnetworks.com Chapter 6ã¾ã§ã‚ã‚‹ã®ã§ã™ãŒã€ä»Šå›žã¯Chapter 1ã«ã¤ã„ã¦ã¾ã¨ã‚ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ 今後Chapter 6ã¾ã§ã¾ã¨ã‚ã¦ã„ããŸã„ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ データセンタãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯å…¨èˆ¬ã«ã¤ã„ã¦ã¯ã€â€Cloud-Native Data Center Networking†をèªã‚€ã®ãŒãŠã™ã™ã‚ã§ã™ã€‚ ç†è€…ãŒåŒã˜æ–¹ã§ã€ "BGP in the Data Center" ã«è¨˜è¼‰ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„る内容もå«ã¾ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ ã“ã®æœ¬ã¯Cumulus Networksã«ã‚ˆã‚Šç„¡å„Ÿã§å…¬é–‹ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ ãœã²èªã‚“ã§ã¿ã¦ãã ã•ã„。 Download your copy
JPNAPç¦å²¡ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スをQTnetデータセンターã«ã¦é–‹å§‹ | INTERNET MULTIFEED CO.
JPNAPç¦å²¡ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スをQTnetデータセンターã«ã¦é–‹å§‹ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒžãƒ«ãƒãƒ•ã‚£ãƒ¼ãƒ‰æ ªå¼ä¼šç¤¾ï¼ˆä»¥ä¸‹ã€Œãƒžãƒ«ãƒãƒ•ã‚£ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã€ï¼‰ã¯ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒãƒƒãƒˆã‚¨ã‚¯ã‚¹ãƒã‚§ãƒ³ã‚¸ï¼ˆIX）サービス「JPNAPã€ã«ãŠã„ã¦ã€æ–°ãŸã«ã€ŒJPNAPç¦å²¡ã€ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“ã‚¹ã‚’æ ªå¼ä¼šç¤¾QTnet（以下「QTnetã€ï¼‰ã®ã€Œç¦å²¡ç¬¬3データセンターã€ã«ã¦ã€2021å¹´1月よりæ供開始ã„ãŸã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ マルãƒãƒ•ã‚£ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã¯ã€ã“ã‚Œã¾ã§JPNAPサービスをæ±äº¬ãƒ»å¤§é˜ªã§æä¾›ã—ã¦ãŠã‚Šã¾ã™ãŒã€ä»Šå›žã€æ–°ãŸã«ä¹å·žã‚¨ãƒªã‚¢ã®ä¸æ ¸éƒ½å¸‚ã§ã‚ã‚‹ç¦å²¡ã«æ‹ 点を開è¨ã—ã€JPNAPç¦å²¡ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スをæä¾›ã„ãŸã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ã¾ãŸã€QTnetã®æä¾›ã™ã‚‹ç¦å²¡ç¬¬3データセンターã¯ã€éœ‡åº¦7クラスã®åœ°éœ‡ã«å¯¾ã—ã¦ã‚‚é‹ç”¨å¯èƒ½ãªå»ºç‰©å…éœ‡æ§‹é€ ã‚’ã¯ã˜ã‚ã¨ã™ã‚‹å …牢ã§ä¿¡é ¼æ€§ã«å¯Œã‚€ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚»ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ã§ã‚ã‚‹ã¨ã¨ã‚‚ã«JPNAPç¦å²¡ã¸ã®æŽ¥ç¶šã‚’å«ã‚ãŸæŸ”軟ãªãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯æŽ¥ç¶šç’°å¢ƒã‚’æä¾›ã™ã‚‹ã“ã¨ãŒå¯èƒ½ã§ã™ã€‚ ã“ã‚Œã«ã‚ˆã‚Šã€ä¹å·žã‚¨ãƒªã‚¢ã«ãŠã‘るコンテンツé…
ã€ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒ³ãƒ¬ãƒãƒ¼ãƒˆã€‘FRRouting IS-IS SRv6 Extension è¨è¨ˆã¨å®Ÿè£…ã«é–¢ã—ã¦
ã“ã‚“ã«ã¡ã¯ï¼Œ9月6æ—¥ã‹ã‚‰6週間，Verda室ã®ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯é–‹ç™ºãƒãƒ¼ãƒ ã§ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒ³ã‚’è¡Œã£ã¦ã„ãŸæ©˜ç›´é›ªã¨ã„ã„ã¾ã™ï¼Žã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒ³ã®ãƒ†ãƒ¼ãƒžã¨ã—ã¦LINEãŒãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚»ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ã§æ´»ç”¨ã—ã¦ã„るオープンソースã®ãƒ«ãƒ¼ãƒ†ã‚£ãƒ³ã‚°ãƒ—ラットフォームã§ã‚ã‚‹FRRã®IS-IS daemonã«SRv6機能ã®æ‹¡å¼µã‚’開発ã—ã¾ã—ãŸ. ã“ã®è¨˜äº‹ã§ã¯ãã®æˆæžœã«ã¤ã„ã¦ãŠè©±ã—ã¾ã™. 背景 LINEã§ã¯ï¼Œæ•°å¤šã„サービスã®ã»ã¨ã‚“ã©ã‚’Verdaã¨ã„ã†ãƒ—ライベートクラウドã«åŽå®¹ã—ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ï¼ŽVerdaã§ã¯ï¼Œãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯åˆ†é›¢ã®ãŸã‚ã«SRv6を利用ã—ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ï¼Žè©³ç´°ã«ã¤ã„ã¦ã¯ï¼Œä»¥ä¸‹ã®ãƒ–ãƒã‚°ã‚’御覧ãã ã•ã„． https://engineering.linecorp.com/ja/blog/intern2019-report-infra/ https://speakerdeck.com/line_developers/designing-and-impleme
Update about the October 4th outage
To all the people and businesses around the world who depend on us, we are sorry for the inconvenience caused by today’s outage across our platforms. We’ve been working as hard as we can to restore access, and our systems are now back up and running. The underlying cause of this outage also impacted many of the internal tools and systems we use in our day-to-day operations, complicating our attemp
Understanding how Facebook disappeared from the Internet
Understanding how Facebook disappeared from the Internet2021-10-04 The Internet - A Network of Networks “Facebook can't be down, can it?â€, we thought, for a second. Today at 15:51 UTC, we opened an internal incident entitled "Facebook DNS lookup returning SERVFAIL" because we were worried that something was wrong with our DNS resolver 1.1.1.1.  But as we were about to post on our public status pag
インターãƒãƒƒãƒˆãŒã»ã¼å®Œå…¨ã«é®æ–ã•ã‚ŒãŸã‚¤ãƒ©ãƒ³ã§ã¯ä½•ãŒèµ·ã“ã£ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã®ã‹ï¼Ÿ
2019å¹´11月17æ—¥ã«ã‚¤ãƒ©ãƒ³ã§ã€ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãŒã»ã¼å®Œå…¨ã«é®æ–ã•ã‚Œã‚‹ã¨ã„ã†æ·±åˆ»ãªé€šä¿¡éšœå®³ãŒç™ºç”Ÿã—ãŸã“ã¨ãŒåˆ†ã‹ã‚Šã¾ã—ãŸã€‚折ã—ã‚‚ã€ã‚¤ãƒ©ãƒ³ã§ã¯ã‚¬ã‚½ãƒªãƒ³ä¾¡æ ¼å€¤ä¸Šã’ã«æŠ—è°ã™ã‚‹å¤§è¦æ¨¡ãªãƒ‡ãƒ¢ãŒç™ºç”Ÿã—ã¦ãŠã‚Šã€ä»Šå›žã®ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒãƒƒãƒˆã®éšœå®³ã«ã¯ã‚¤ãƒ©ãƒ³æ”¿åºœãŒé–¢ä¸Žã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã¨ã®è¦‹æ–¹ãŒåºƒãŒã£ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ Internet disrupted in Iran amid fuel protests in multiple cities - NetBlocks https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-iran-amid-fuel-protests-in-multiple-cities-pA25L18b Protests grip major Iran cities over gas prices; 1 killed https://apnews.com/2062
How Verizon and a BGP Optimizer Knocked Large Parts of the Internet Offline Today
How Verizon and a BGP Optimizer Knocked Large Parts of the Internet Offline Today2019-06-24 What happened?Today at 10:30UTC, the Internet had a small heart attack. A small company in Northern Pennsylvania became a preferred path of many Internet routes through Verizon (AS701), a major Internet transit provider. This was the equivalent of Waze routing an entire freeway down a neighborhood street —
ルーティングソフトウェア BIRD ã®ä½¿ã„ã‹ãŸ - Cybozu Inside Out | サイボウズエンジニアã®ãƒ–ãƒã‚°
Neco プãƒã‚¸ã‚§ã‚¯ãƒˆã® ymmt ã§ã™ã€‚本記事ã§ã¯ Neco ã®ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯ã®å®Ÿè£…ã‚’ç†è§£ã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã«ã€ãƒ«ãƒ¼ãƒ†ã‚£ãƒ³ã‚°ã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢ã§ã‚ã‚‹ BIRD ã®ä»•çµ„ã¿ã¨è¨å®šæ–¹æ³•ã‚’解説ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ å…¬å¼æ–‡æ›¸ãŒã™ã“ã—ã¨ã£ã¤ãã«ãã„ã®ã§ã€ã“ã¡ã‚‰ã‚’èªã‚“ã§ã‹ã‚‰å…¬å¼æ–‡æ›¸ã«ã‚ãŸã‚‹ã¨ã‚¹ãƒ ーズã«ç†è§£ãŒã§ãã‚‹ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚見所ã¯ã€Invalid NEXT_HOP ã¸ã®å·¥å¤«ã‚’ã“らã—ãŸå„種対処方法ã§ã™ã€‚ 以下ã€ç¤¾å†…å‘ã‘ã®è§£èª¬æ–‡æ›¸ã‹ã‚‰ã‚³ãƒ”ペã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã®ã§æ–‡ä½“ãŒå¤‰ã‚ã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚悪ã—ã‹ã‚‰ãšã”了承ãã ã•ã„。 BIRD ã¨ã¯ アーã‚テクãƒãƒ£ é‡è¦ãªæ©Ÿèƒ½ プãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ« トラブルシューティング 備考 ã¾ã¨ã‚ BIRD ã¨ã¯ BIRD 㯠Linux ç‰ã§å‹•ä½œã™ã‚‹ BGP ã‚„ RIP ãªã©ã®ãƒ«ãƒ¼ãƒ†ã‚£ãƒ³ã‚°ãƒ—ãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ«ã‚’実装ã—ãŸãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ ã§ã‚る。2018 å¹´ 10 月時点ã®æœ€æ–°ç‰ˆã¯ 2.0.2 ã§ã€2.0 㨠1.6 ã®ä¸¡ç³»åˆ—ãŒãƒ¡ãƒ³ãƒ†ãƒŠãƒ³ã‚¹ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„る。 本記事ã®
2016.7.6 ã•ãらã®å¤•ã¹ï¼ 沖縄 ã•ãらインターãƒãƒƒãƒˆã®ã€Œé–‰åŸŸç¶²ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スã€ã®è£å´
10. 10 • 石狩第1ゾーン • 石狩第2ゾーン • æ±äº¬ç¬¬1ゾーン • 石狩第1ゾーン • 石狩第2ゾーン • æ±äº¬ç¬¬1ゾーン • ⻄新宿iDC • 代官山iDC • æ±æ–°å®¿iDC • ⻄新宿iDC • 代官山iDC • æ±æ–°å®¿iDC • 石狩リージョン• 石狩リージョン ã•ãらã®ã‚¯ãƒ©ã‚¦ãƒ‰ ã•ãらã®å°‚用サーム• 石狩第1ゾーン • 石狩第2ゾーン • æ±äº¬ç¬¬1ゾーン • 石狩第1ゾーン • 石狩第2ゾーン • æ±äº¬ç¬¬1ゾーン ãƒã‚¦ã‚¸ãƒ³ã‚° リモートãƒã‚¦ã‚¸ãƒ³ã‚° ç¾åœ¨ã€4サービスã€10ゾーンã«å¯¾å¿œã€‚ å¯¾å¿œã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“ã‚¹é †æ¬¡æ‹¡å¤§ä¸ï¼ ç¾åœ¨ã€4サービスã€10ゾーンã«å¯¾å¿œã€‚ å¯¾å¿œã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“ã‚¹é †æ¬¡æ‹¡å¤§ä¸ï¼
BGP leaks and cryptocurrencies
Over the few last hours, a dozen news stories have broken about how an attacker attempted (and perhaps managed) to steal cryptocurrencies using a BGP leak. CC BY 2.0 image by elhombredenegro The Internet is composed of routes. For our DNS resolver 1.1.1.1 , we tell the world that all the IPs in the range 1.1.1.0 to 1.1.1.255 can be accessed at any Cloudflare PoP. For the people who do not have a d
Amazonã®DNSトラフィック乗ã£å–ã‚Šã€ä»®æƒ³é€šè²¨ç›—ã¾ã‚Œã‚‹è¢«å®³
AWSã®ã‚¯ãƒ©ã‚¦ãƒ‰ãƒ™ãƒ¼ã‚¹ã®DNSサービスã§ã‚る「Route 53ã€ã®DNSトラフィックãŒä½•è€…ã‹ã«ä¹—ã£å–られã€ã€ŒMyEtherWallet.comã€ã®ãƒ¦ãƒ¼ã‚¶ãƒ¼ãŒä»®æƒ³é€šè²¨ã‚’ç›—ã¾ã‚Œã‚‹äº‹ä»¶ãŒç™ºç”Ÿã—ãŸã€‚ ç±³Amazon Web Services（AWS）ã®DNSサービスã§4月24æ—¥ã€ãƒˆãƒ©ãƒ•ã‚£ãƒƒã‚¯ãŒä¸€æ™‚çš„ã«ä¸æ£ãªWebサイトã«ãƒªãƒ€ã‚¤ãƒ¬ã‚¯ãƒˆã•ã‚Œã€ä»®æƒ³é€šè²¨Ethereumを扱ã†ã‚¦ã‚©ãƒ¬ãƒƒãƒˆã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“ス「MyEtherWallet.com（MEW）ã€ã®ãƒ¦ãƒ¼ã‚¶ãƒ¼ãŒé€šè²¨ã‚’ç›—ã¾ã‚Œã‚‹è¢«å®³ã«éã£ãŸã€‚ MyEtherWallet.comã¯åŒæ—¥ã€DNS登録サーãƒãŒä½•è€…ã‹ã«ä¹—ã£å–られã€ãƒ¦ãƒ¼ã‚¶ãƒ¼ãŒãƒ•ã‚£ãƒƒã‚·ãƒ³ã‚°è©æ¬ºã‚µã‚¤ãƒˆã«ãƒªãƒ€ã‚¤ãƒ¬ã‚¯ãƒˆã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ãŸã“ã¨ã‚’明らã‹ã«ã—ãŸã€‚DNSサーãƒã®ãƒªãƒ€ã‚¤ãƒ¬ã‚¯ãƒˆã«ã¯ã€å¤ãã‹ã‚‰ã‚ã‚‹ãƒãƒƒã‚ングã®æ‰‹å£ãŒä½¿ã‚ã‚Œã¦ãŠã‚Šã€ã©ã‚“ãªçµ„ç¹”ã§ã‚ã£ã¦ã‚‚被害ã«éã†æã‚ŒãŒã‚ã‚‹ã¨å¼·èª¿ã—ã¦ã„る。 ã“ã®æ”»æ’ƒã«ã¤ã„ã¦ã‚»ã‚ãƒ¥ãƒªãƒ†ã‚£ç ”ç©¶è€…ã®ã‚±ãƒ“
VyOSã§ã¯ã˜ã‚ã‚‹BGPルータ
VyOSã§ã¯ã˜ã‚ã‚‹BGPルータ 2015/9/4 ENOG34 ï¼ˆæ ªï¼‰å‰µé¢¨ã‚·ã‚¹ãƒ†ãƒ å¤–å±± æ–‡è¦ è‡ªå·±ç´¹ä»‹ ïµ Linuxベースã®ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒæ§‹ç¯‰ã€é‹ç”¨æ‹…当 ïµ BGPã¯ã€æ˜¨å¹´ã®ENOG25ã®BGPãƒãƒ³ã‚º オンãらã„（ã ã£ãŸï¼‰ 今日ã®ãŠãªã¯ã— ïµ VyOSã®ç°¡å˜ãªãŠã•ã‚‰ã„ ïµ ã©ã“ã§VyOSを使ã£ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã‹ ïµ BGPã‚’ã¯ã˜ã‚る時ã®æƒ…å ±å…ƒã«ã¤ã„ã¦ ïµ åŸºæœ¬çš„ãªBGPコマンドã®ç´¹ä»‹ ïµ BGP以外ã«ã¤ã„ã¦å°‘ã— VyOSã®ç°¡å˜ãªãŠã•ã‚‰ã„ VyOSã®ç°¡å˜ãªãŠã•ã‚‰ã„ ïµ Vyatta Coreã‹ã‚‰forkã—ãŸDebian ベースã®ã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢ãƒ«ãƒ¼ã‚¿ ïµ BGPç‰ã¯Quaggaã§å‹•ã„ã¦ã„ã‚‹ (Ciscoライクãªã‚³ãƒžãƒ³ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³) ã©ã“ã§VyOSを使ã£ã¦ã„る㋠弊社ã®BGPルータã®çŠ¶æ³ BGPルータã«æ¬²ã™ã‚‹è¦ä»¶ ïµIPv4フルルートをå—ã‘ã¦ãã“ã ã“BGPãŒå®‰å®šã—ã¦ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スã§ã ã‚‹ã“㨠ïµæ€§èƒ½ã¯ãã“ãã“ã§ã‚ˆã„ ピ
SoftLayerã®VyOS/Vyattaã§GRE接続 -> OSPFã§NW間を接続 - Qiita
#1. ã¯ã˜ã‚ã« SoftLayerã®VyOS/Vyattaã§GRE接続ã®ç¶šãã§ã™ã€‚ å‰å›žã¯ã€Static IPã§æŽ¥ç¶šã—ã¦ã¿ã¾ã—ãŸãŒã€ã“ã‚Œã§ã¯ã‚ã¾ã‚Šé¢ç™½ããªã„（ã¨ã¯ã„ã£ã¦ã‚‚ã€2ノードãªã‚‰ã°ã“ã‚Œã§å分ã§ã—ょã†ãŒï¼‰ã€OSPFã§æ§‹æˆã—ã¦ã¿ã¾ã™ã€‚ 構æˆå›³ã‚’å†æŽ²ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ #2. OSPFã«ã¤ã„㦠OSPFã‚’å‰å›žæ§‹æˆã—ãŸGRE上ã§ãƒžãƒ«ãƒã‚ャストã§å®Ÿè¡Œã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ã¨ã¯ã„ãˆã€ãã‚‚ãも途ä¸çµŒè·¯ã®ãƒ«ãƒ¼ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãŒåˆ©ç”¨è€…ã§ç®¡ç†ã§ããªã„時点ã§ã€è«–ç†çš„ã«éš£åŒå£«ã®VyOSã§ãƒ«ãƒ¼ãƒ†ã‚£ãƒ³ã‚°ã›ã–ã‚‹ã‚’å¾—ã¾ã›ã‚“ãŒãƒ»ãƒ»ãƒ»ã€‚ static routes, OSPF, BGPã¯ã€ãã‚Œãžã‚Œç‹¬è‡ªã«ãƒ†ãƒ¼ãƒ–ル管ç†ã•ã‚Œã¦ãŠã‚Šã€ã“れらã®ç‹¬è‡ªãƒ†ãƒ¼ãƒ–ルã‹ã‚‰æœ€çµ‚çš„ã«IPルーティングテーブルãŒæ±ºã¾ã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚ã¤ã¾ã‚Šã€ä»¥ä¸‹ã®ã‚ˆã†ãªæ„Ÿã˜ã§ã™ã€‚ static routes table --> IP routing table OSPF table --> IP routi
Google誤è¨å®šã«ã‚ˆã‚‹ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒãƒƒãƒˆéšœå®³ã¨BGPルータã®ãƒ¡ãƒ¢ãƒªå•é¡Œ:Geekãªãºãƒ¼ã˜
2017å¹´8月25æ—¥ã®å¤§è¦æ¨¡ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒãƒƒãƒˆéšœå®³ã®ç¶šãã§ã™ã€‚ Googleã®èª¤è¨å®šã«ã‚ˆã£ã¦BGPルータã®æ€§èƒ½ãŒä½Žä¸‹ã—ãŸã‹ã‚‚知れãªã„ã¨ã„ã†è©±ã®èƒŒæ™¯ã‚’紹介ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ BGPã§å¤§é‡ã®çµŒè·¯ã‚’å—ã‘å–ã£ã¦ã—ã¾ã†ã¨å‹•ä½œãŒä¸å®‰å®šã«ãªã‚‹BGPルータãŒå˜åœ¨ã™ã‚‹ã®ã¯ã€BGPルータã«æ載ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã‚‹TCAM(Ternary Content-Addressable Memory)ã¨ã„ã†ãƒ¡ãƒ¢ãƒªã«é–¢é€£ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚フルルートãŒã€BGPルータã«æ載ã•ã‚ŒãŸTCAMã®å®¹é‡ã‚’超ãˆã‚‹è¦æ¨¡ã«ãªã£ã¦ã—ã¾ã£ãŸã®ã§ã€è‘—ã—ãBGPルータã®æ€§èƒ½ãŒè½ã¡ã‚‹ãªã©ã—ã¦ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯ãŒä¸å®‰å®šã«ãªã‚‹ã¨ã„ã†ã‚‚ã®ã§ã™ã€‚ TCAMã¯ã€CAM(Content-Addressable Memory)ã¨å‘¼ã°ã‚Œã‚‹ãƒ¡ãƒ¢ãƒªã®ä¸€ç¨®ã§ã™ã€‚メモリã¨ã„ãˆã°ã€ãƒ‘ソコンãªã©ã§åˆ©ç”¨ã•ã‚Œã‚‹DRAM(Dynamic Random Access Memory)ã‚’æ€ã„æµ®ã‹ã¹ã‚‹æ–¹ã€…ãŒå¤šã„ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ãŒã€DRA
Oracle buys Dyn
3. Requests directed based on load, location, and source Distribute and direct requests across multiple regions based on the destination, the health of the destination, and the location of the source. This image shows four common use cases for OCI Domain Name System, commonly abbreviated as DNS. These use cases are: Public DNS Private DNS Traffic load balancing Traffic steering Public DNS In this
2017å¹´8月25æ—¥ã®å¤§è¦æ¨¡ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ¼ãƒãƒƒãƒˆéšœå®³:Geekãªãºãƒ¼ã˜
先週ã®é‡‘曜日ã€GoogleãŒèª¤ã£ãŸçµŒè·¯ã‚’インターãƒãƒƒãƒˆã«æµã—ãŸã“ã¨ã«ã‚ˆã£ã¦ã€å¤§è¦æ¨¡ãªé€šä¿¡éšœå®³ãŒç™ºç”Ÿã—ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ 大ããªå½±éŸ¿ã‚’å—ã‘ãŸã®ãŒæ—¥æœ¬ã®OCNã¨KDDIã ã£ãŸã¨ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ãŒã€æ§˜ã€…ãªäº‹æ¥è€…ãŒå½±éŸ¿ã‚’å—ã‘ãŸã‚ˆã†ã§ã™ã€‚ ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯éšœå®³ グーグルãŒè¨å®šèª¤ã‚Šã§è¬ç½ª グーグルãŒè¬ç½ªã€€å¤§è¦æ¨¡ãƒãƒƒãƒˆéšœå®³ã€è£…ç½®ã®èª¤æ“作ãŒåŽŸå› ニュース解説 - 米グーグルã®è¨å®šãƒŸã‚¹ã€ãªãœæ—¥æœ¬ã®å¤§è¦æ¨¡ãƒãƒƒãƒˆéšœå®³ã‚’引ãèµ·ã“ã—ãŸã®ã‹ï¼Ÿï¼šITpro BGP leak causing Internet outages in Japan and beyond 8月25æ—¥ã«ç™ºç”Ÿã—ãŸå¤§è¦æ¨¡é€šä¿¡éšœå®³ã‚’ã¾ã¨ã‚ã¦ã¿ãŸ 今回ã®éšœå®³ã¯ã€ä¸–ç•Œä¸ã®çµ„ç¹”ã¨BGP(Border Gateway Protocol)ã§ç¹‹ãŒã£ã¦ã„る巨大ãªãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯ã‚’æŒã¤ã€ŒGoogleã ã‹ã‚‰ã“ãã€ã®äº‹ä¾‹ã¨è¨€ãˆãã†ã§ã™ã€‚ ã“ã“ã§ã¯ã€ãã®ç†ç”±ã‚’紹介ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯ã®ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯
ãŠçŸ¥ã‚‰ã›
障害
ランã‚ング
リリースã€éšœå®³æƒ…å ±ãªã©ã®ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スã®ãŠçŸ¥ã‚‰ã›
最新ã®äººæ°—エントリーã®é…ä¿¡
j次ã®ãƒ–ックマーク
kå‰ã®ãƒ–ックマーク
lã‚ã¨ã§èªã‚€
eコメント一覧を開ã
oページを開ã
The Compelling Case for Open Networking
BGP super-blunder: How Verizon today sparked a 'cascading catastrophic failure' that knackered Cloudflare, Amazon, etc
Update: Facebook, Instagram and Messenger were down for many users | TechCrunch
大è¦æ¨¡ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スを支ãˆã‚‹ãƒãƒƒãƒˆãƒ¯ãƒ¼ã‚¯ã‚¤ãƒ³ãƒ•ãƒ©ã®å…¨è²Œ
{{#tags}}- {{label}}
{{/tags}}