[B! DEP] flatbirdã®ãƒ–ãƒƒã‚¯ãƒžãƒ¼ã‚¯

flatbird id:flatbird

DEPã«é–¢ã™ã‚‹flatbirdã®ãƒ–ãƒƒã‚¯ãƒžãƒ¼ã‚¯ (8)

${{author_name}}$

{{{comment_expanded}}}

{{label}}

{{#is_bookmark}}ãƒªã‚¹ãƒˆ{{/is_bookmark}}{{^is_bookmark}}ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯{{/is_bookmark}}

${{author_name}}$
{{author_name}}{{created}}
{{ #comment }}{{ comment }}{{ /comment }}
- {{ label }}

${{author_name}}$

{{{comment_expanded}}}

{{label}}

{{#is_bookmark}}ãƒªã‚¹ãƒˆ{{/is_bookmark}}{{^is_bookmark}}ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯{{/is_bookmark}}

OSã‚»ã‚ãƒ¥ãƒªãƒ†ã‚£ãƒãƒ¥ãƒ¼ãƒˆãƒªã‚¢ãƒ«
2. Quiz ã‚»ã‚ãƒ¥ãƒªãƒ†ã‚£æŠ€è¡“ã¨å®Ÿè£…åã‚’é–¢ä¿‚ã¥ã‘ã‚ˆã€‚ ã‚»ã‚ ãƒªãƒ† æŠ€è¡“ã¨å®Ÿè£…åã‚’é–¢ä¿‚ã¥ã‘ã‚ˆ æ³¨ï¼šï¼‘å¯¾ï¼‘å¯¾å¿œã§ãªã„ã‚ˆã€‚ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ DEP ASLR CodeÂ Signing Code Signing Sandbox AccessÂ Control EncryptÂ Storage Encrypt Storage IntegrityÂ Check TrustedÂ Computing â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ SELinux Tripwire Ti i ExecÂ Shield W^X TrouSerS T S S BitLocker Jail PAX 3. Quiz ã‚»ã‚ãƒ¥ãƒªãƒ†ã‚£æŠ€è¡“ã¨å®Ÿè£…åã‚’é–¢ä¿‚ã¥ã‘ã‚ˆã€‚ ã‚»ã‚ ãƒªãƒ† æŠ€è¡“ã¨å®Ÿè£…åã‚’é–¢ä¿‚ã¥ã‘ã‚ˆ æ³¨ï¼šï¼‘å¯¾ï¼‘å¯¾å¿œã§ãªã„ã‚ˆã€‚ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ â€¢ DEP ASLR CodeÂ Signing Code Signing S
flatbird 2014/01/23
security

DEP

Windows
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
heise online â€“ IT news, guides and background information | heise online
Discover cutting-edge IT insights from Europe's largest tech editorial team. Explore curated breaking news and expert opinions for tech enthusiasts and pros. Don't miss any news â€“ follow us on Facebook, LinkedIn or Mastodon. French data protection authorities have imposed a fine of 50 million euros on telecommunications giant Orange for inbox advertising without consent. Every year, the state spen
flatbird 2011/01/24
Security

Exploit

DEP
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
Damage limitation - Mitigating exploits with Microsoft's EMET - The H Security: News and Features
by Daniel Bachfeld Security vulnerabilities in applications have become an everyday probl em. Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) activates extra protection mechanisms included in recent versions of Windows, which are able to frustrate many attacks. However, getting the configuration right can sometimes be harder than you might think. EMET is able to thwart or at least reduce
flatbird 2010/12/16
DEP

Exploit

Security
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
Exploit writing tutorial part 10 : Chaining DEP with ROP â€“ the Rubikâ€™s[TM] Cube | Corelan Cybersecurity Research
Exploit writing tutorial part 10 : Chaining DEP with ROP â€“ the Rubikâ€™s[TM] Cube Table of Contents Introduction Hardware DEP in the Win32 world Bypassing DEP â€“ Building blocks What are our options ? The gadget Windows function calls to bypass DEP Choose your weapon Function parameters & usage tips ROP Exploit transportability From EIP to ROP Direct RET SEH based Before we begin Direct RET â€“ The ROP
flatbird 2010/08/31
Exploit

DEP
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
Buffer overflow attacks bypassing DEP (NX/XD bits) - part 2 : Code injection : Marco Mastropaolo
Buffer overflow attacks bypassing DEP (NX/XD bits) - part 2 : Code injection While the attack weâ€™ve seen in the first part are indeed powerful, they are limited to simple calls to functions already linked by the program weâ€™re going to attack. To appreciate full power we should exploit the technique used in the first part for injecting arbitrary code in the program. The first experiment I tried was
flatbird 2010/08/30
Exploit

DEP
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
Blog on Cyberterror: A DEP evasion technique
<script> // policy issue hide_googlead(); </script> In an earlier post, I pointed out a possible way to evade Data Execution Prevention in Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2. I feel this deserves its own blog post, so I've decided to go on here. I'd like to first point out that this is a speculative method to evade hardware-enforced DEP based on various documentation. There is not yet a proof-of-
flatbird 2010/08/30
Exploit

DEP
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
Windows XPã®ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿å®Ÿè¡Œé˜²æ¢: FFR Blog
ã¯ã˜ã‚ã¾ã—ã¦ã€ãƒªã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒãƒ¼ãƒ ã®æœ¬éƒ·ã§ã™ã€‚ æ—¥ã€…ã®ãƒªã‚µãƒ¼ãƒã®ä¸ã§æ°—ãŒã¤ã„ãŸã¡ã‚‡ã£ã¨ã—ãŸã“ã¨ã‚’ç´¹ä»‹ã—ã¦ã„ããŸã„ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ ã©ã†ãžã‚ˆã‚ã—ããŠé¡˜ã„ã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ ä»Šå›žã¯Windows ã®ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿å®Ÿè¡Œé˜²æ¢(Data Execution Prevention ä»¥ä¸‹DEP)ã«ã¤ã„ã¦è©±ã—ãŸã„ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ DEPã¯Windows XP SP2 ãŠã‚ˆã³ Windows Server 2003 SP1ã‹ã‚‰å°Žå…¥ã•ã‚ŒãŸWindows ã®ã‚»ã‚ãƒ¥ãƒªãƒ†ã‚£æ©Ÿæ§‹ã®ä¸€ã¤ã§ã™ã€‚ DEPã«ã¯ã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢DEPã¨ãƒãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢DEPãŒã‚ã‚Šã¾ã™ãŒã€ä»Šå›žã¯ãƒãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢DEPã«ã¤ã„ã¦å–ã‚Šä¸Šã’ã¾ã™ã€‚ ãƒ¡ãƒ¢ãƒªå†…éƒ¨ã®ã‚»ã‚¯ã‚·ãƒ§ãƒ³ã«ã¯å¤§ããåˆ†ã‘ã¦ã€ã‚³ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã‚»ã‚¯ã‚·ãƒ§ãƒ³ã¨ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚»ã‚¯ã‚·ãƒ§ãƒ³ãŒã‚ã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚ã‚³ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã‚»ã‚¯ã‚·ãƒ§ãƒ³ã§ã¯èªã¿ãƒ»å®Ÿè¡ŒãŒè¨±å¯ã•ã‚Œã¦ãŠã‚Šã€ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚»ã‚¯ã‚·ãƒ§ãƒ³ã§ã¯èªã¿ãƒ»æ›¸ããŒè¨±å¯ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™(ã“ã“ã§ã¯ãã†ã„ã†è§£é‡ˆã§è©±ã‚’é€²ã‚ã¾ã™)ã€‚ DEPã¯ãƒ¡ãƒ¢ãƒªå†…ã®å®Ÿè¡Œä¸å¯é ˜
flatbird 2010/08/20
DEP
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
ãƒãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢DEPæ©Ÿèƒ½ã®èª¿æŸ»
ã¯ã˜ã‚ã« ã“ã®è¨˜äº‹ã§ã¯ã€Windows XP SP2ï¼ˆä»¥ä¸‹ã€ã€ŒXPSP2ã€ã¨ç•¥è¨˜ï¼‰ã‚ˆã‚Šå®Ÿè£…ã•ã‚ŒãŸDEPæ©Ÿèƒ½ã«ã¤ã„ã¦è€ƒå¯Ÿã‚’è¡Œã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ ä»Šå›žã€ãƒ‡ãƒ¢ãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ ï¼ˆchecknxï¼‰ã‚’ä½œæˆã—ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ã“ã®ãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ ã‚ˆã‚Šã©ã®ã‚ˆã†ã«DEPæ©Ÿèƒ½ãŒåƒã„ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã‹ã‚’ç¢ºèªã—ã€å®Ÿéš›ã«ãƒ¡ãƒ¢ãƒªãŒä¿è·ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã‚‹ã‹ã‚’è€ƒå¯Ÿã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ å¯¾è±¡èªè€… CPUã®åƒãã€ç‰¹ã« NX-bitãŒã©ã®ã‚ˆã†ã«åƒãã®ã‹èˆˆå‘³ãŒã‚ã‚‹æ–¹ Visual C++ ã«ã‚ˆã‚‹ã‚¤ãƒ³ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ã‚¢ã‚»ãƒ³ãƒ–ãƒ©ã®å®Ÿè£…ã«èˆˆå‘³ãŒã‚ã‚‹æ–¹ å¿…è¦ãªç’°å¢ƒ Visual C++ version 6 SP6ï¼ˆMFCï¼‰ã§é–‹ç™ºã‚’è¡Œã„ã¾ã—ãŸãŒã€ä»–ã®é–‹ç™ºç’°å¢ƒã§ã‚‚ç°¡å˜ã«ç§»æ¤ã§ãã‚‹ã¨æ€ã£ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ã§ãã‚Œã°ã€ŒNX-bitã‚’ã‚µãƒãƒ¼ãƒˆã—ãŸã‚·ã‚¹ãƒ†ãƒ ã€ï¼‹ã€ŒXPSP2ã€ä¸Šã§ãƒ†ã‚¹ãƒˆã—ã¦ãã ã•ã„ã€‚ NX-bit/XD-bitãŒæœ‰åŠ¹ãªã‚·ã‚¹ãƒ†ãƒ XPSP2/Windows Server 2003 SP1 ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿å®Ÿè¡Œé˜²æ¢ï¼ˆDEPï¼‰æ©Ÿèƒ½
flatbird 2010/08/20
DEP
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
1