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Two Predictions about the Distribution of Life in the Universe

There is a rule in software development called the zero one infinity rule, or ZOI, originally formulated by Willem van der Poel, according to which a process should be completely disallowed, or allowed only once, or no limit should be placed on the number of times it occurs. This is a rule of thumb for programming, but it also can be interpreted in a much wider sense. Robert Hazen, despite being the careful scientist that he is, gives a metaphysical spin to the zero one infinity rule:

“In short, ‘zero, one, many’ means either that a natural phenomenon never happens (time running backward, for example), or it happens exactly once (a ‘singularity’ like the Big Bang), or it has happened more times than we can count (perhaps the origin of life).” (Robert Hazen, Symphony in C: Carbon and the Evolution of (Almost) Everything, p. 199)

In the context of the zero one infinity rule, we know that the appearance of life in the universe does not exemplify zero, so either life in our universe is one or many. Taking each the horns of this dilemma in turn, if life on Earth is unique, there is nothing more to say about the distribution of life in the universe: it has a distribution of one, limited to Earth. Any interesting prediction regarding the distribution of life in the universe will either be a prediction of whether our universe exemplifies one or many, or it would be a prediction regarding the distribution of the many instances of life in the universe. My prediction will be concerned with the latter, not the former; I am not going to predict how much life there is in the universe, or the frequency of its appearance in space or time.

If we were to establish that life is unique and distinctive to Earth, there would be as little to say as there would be to say of a universe with zero life, so we begin with the hypothesis that life is sufficiently common in the universe that there are enough instances of independent origins of life events that statistically valid generalizations can be made regarding its distribution. I adopt this hypothesis not because I believe it to be true (at present I have no reason to prefer the hypothesis of the uniqueness of terrestrial life or the prevalence of life in the universe), but only because it is a useful point of departure for thinking about life in the universe.

Supposing, then, that there are many worlds with life, and further supposing that life on these many worlds independently originated (or, at least, mostly independently originated, meaning that panspermia plays little or no role in the large-scale distribution of life in the cosmos, but more on panspermia below), my prediction on these assumptions concerns the distribution of mechanisms by which life arises in this scenario of life being prevalent in the universe.

Suppose further that we make a complete survey of the possible biochemical pathways to life, of which there are many already, and, we can infer, there will be more as origins of life research continues to develop. Again, I cite Robert Hazen, who gave a comic twist to the number of origins of life scenarios that contend for researcher’s attention:

“A popular game in origins-of-life research is to dream up an ‘origins scenario’—an elaborate, sweeping, often untestable story of chemical and physical circumstances by which the living world emerged from a lifeless geochemical milieu.” (Op. cit.)

Given many possible origins of life biochemical pathways, and many worlds with biospheres, it would be reasonable to assume that different biochemical pathways are responsible for the origins of life on different worlds. This is a reasonable assumption, but not a necessary assumption. We do not yet know how tightly constrained life is, but if life is tightly constrained, there may be only a single biochemical pathway to a single kind of life. If this is the case, I predict, on this basis, that life on Earth will be shown to be distinct. (This is yet another prediction, distinct from the two predictions made below, thus not included in the two predictions noted in the subtitle above.) However, there could be a single biochemical pathway to life that is represented on multiple planets throughout the universe.

If life is not tightly constrained, that is to say, if life is loosely constrained, or unconstrained and prolific in the universe, then many biochemical pathways to life will be represented on many different worlds. What kind of distribution of origins of life mechanisms would we expect to see under these circumstances? My two predictions for this distribution are based on two familiar ideas: the bell curve and the Pareto principle:

1. Origins of Life Bell Curve: I predict of the many biochemical pathways to life, that the bump in the bell curve will be filled with the most common mechanisms for the origins of life, representing some degree of mediocrity of the complexity of the process; the left of the bell curve will be sparsely populated by the simplest possible mechanisms, while the right of the bell curve will be sparsely populated by the most complex mechanisms for the origins of life.

2. Origins of Life Pareto Principle: I further predict that about 20 percent of the biochemical pathways to life will account for about 80 percent of instances of planets with biospheres, making these 20 percent of mechanisms literally the vital few, i.e., those mechanisms most responsible for life’s prevalence in the universe.

I furthermore predict that terrestrial life will exemplify the principle of mediocrity, such that the mechanisms responsible for origins of life on Earth will fall close to the center of the bell curve, and these mechanisms will represent those 20 percent of such mechanisms responsible for 80 percent of life in the universe. In other words, life on Earth is in the 80 percent, and therefore typical of life in the universe.

There is much more that could be done to clarify the above predictions, and as further origins of life biochemical pathways are identified and refined, it will become increasingly possible to compare and contrast these mechanisms, and eventually to quantify the degree of complexity of each. The degree of complexity of a biochemical pathway to life is itself an idea in need of clarification. What are the dimensions of complexity of origins of life biochemical pathways? These may include the number of steps necessary to pass from inert chemical reactions to biochemistry, the specific mineralogical prerequisites for biochemistry (and how many steps are necessary for these precursors to evolve), the number and diversity of chemical processes that are required, the amount of time necessary for these processes to converge upon life, and so on.

In the illustration above I have identified the most complex origins of life pathway to be panspermia, but this is ambiguous. However, my reason for doing so is that any origins of life on a planet (or other celestial body, such as a moon) in which panspermia is the mechanism necessarily involves some other origins of life biochemical pathway plus the extra step of a panspermatological vector. It could be argued that a simple biochemical pathway plus panspermatological distribution is likely to be simpler than the most complex biochemical pathways that do not involve panspermia (i.e., all steps of which occur on a single planetary body). This could be factored into a more adequate and refined quantification of the complexity of biochemical pathways to the origins of life.

Needless to say, I will not live to see my predictions either confirmed or disconfirmed. Any survey of life in the universe, even a superficial and perfunctory survey, would require cosmological scales of time to investigate a cosmos filled with potentially inhabited worlds. Also, the effort to confirm or disconfirm such predictions is predicated upon a scientific effort that would also have to be cosmological in scale, and even if life is prevalent in the universe, there is no assurance that intelligent agents descended from any biosphere would take up this task at the requisite scale.

There is a slight possibility that our solar system is filled with microbial life in all manner of unlikely niches, and, if this is the case, and if we were to discover our solar system not only to be rich in life, but also that this life was the result of independent origins, then we could extrapolate from life in our solar system to the mechanisms of the origins of life represented in the wider universe. In this case, our solar system would be a cosmological Petri dish, and it might well be possible that I could see the first results of exploration of our solar system, whether through sample return missions or through boots-on-the-ground research. I make these predictions, then, not with an eye toward being proved right or wrong, but out of disinterested curiosity in what we might call stochastic metaphysics—that is to say, how frequency distributions ought to predict the ultimate constitution of the natural world. Thus naturalistic metaphysics can be speculative as well as descriptive.

In the event that life from multiple origins events is to be found throughout our solar system, the extrapolation of the distribution of its origins of life mechanisms to the wider universe itself would constitute a further prediction: that the distribution of origins of life mechanisms in the small (in our solar system) will be mirrored by origins of life mechanisms in the large (in the universe). I hesitate to endorse this prediction, as the chemical compositions of other planetary systems derived from other proto-planetary discs, and these proto-planetary discs in turn derived from distinct precursor events (viz. the particular chemical composition of supernova events in the stellar neighborhood that would enrich proto-planetary discs with their elements), will be sufficiently distinct from the chemical composition of our solar system that the different abundances of elements and isotopes will likely beget different chemistries.

To recap: I said I would make two predictions about the distribution of life in the universe, but I actually made four predictions: (1) if life is tightly constrained, Earth will be the only living world, (2) the origins of life bell curve, (3) the origins of life Pareto principle, and (4) life on Earth will exemplify the principle of mediocrity based on the distribution of life predicted above. I also suggested a fifth prediction that could be made, but I hedged on that one.

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Institutional Purpose

13 May 2021

Thursday


Taking Prisons and Schools as Case Studies

If we think of institutions at all, we usually assume that they were created to serve a particular purpose, even if they are flawed in fulfilling this purpose. Carroll Quigley postulated the social process of the “institutionalization of the instrument,” according to which institutions are created as instruments to attain a particular end, but these instruments are then transformed into self-serving institutions that are increasingly poor instruments because their purpose shifts from fulfilling its instrumental purpose to fulfilling a self-defined institutional role. I do not disagree with this—Quigley made an important observation—but it isn’t the whole story.

Small institutions can retain a sense of purpose that remains focused and true to the intent of the founders (though small institutions do not invariably retain their purposes intact), but large institutions, or institutions that grow large over time (often as a result of their success as an institution (which could be understood as a refutation of the institutionalization of the instrument, or which could be understood as the success of the institution at the expense of its functionality as an instrument), usually cannot maintain a tight focus on a purpose. As larger numbers of persons participate in an institution, and in doing so bring with them their particular ideologies and biases, institutions sometimes shift their focus, or acquire multiple purposes, some of which are at odds with each other.

A particularly clear example of this is the function of prisons in a large nation-state. Prison systems can be large institutions, employing thousands of persons, and housing millions of inmates, over an extensive and diverse geographical region. A little reading about prisons will make it clear that there is no consensus as to the function of a prison, but there are at least three paradigmatic functions, each entertained by a distinct interest group, and these three purposes are separation, reform, and punishment.

The efficacy of the prison system is reduced by its failure to coalesce around a single purpose; prison is clearly a separation from wider society, but it is not clearly punishment and it is not clearly reform. Some prisons tend more toward punishment, some toward reform, and no doubt there are institutions that try to tread the neutral line of merely separating the prison population from wider society without punishing or reforming inmates. Moreover, it would be entirely consistent to maintain all three purposes at the same time, e.g., if one holds that miscreants must be separated from society so that they may first be punished and later reformed.

While the situation with schools is similar, the entirety of the educational establishment is even larger than the prison establishment, and so the purposes of schools are even more diffuse and difficult to pin down than the purposes of prisons. Ideally, we can summarize in a single word that the purpose of school is education. But what is education?

A little reflection on educational institutions possibly reveals another tripartite division of educational purposes (like the tripartite division of the purposes of prisons), though, again, the situation of schools is less clear than that of prison. The whole problem is wrapped in layers of history and ambiguity that make it difficult to discern the fundamental conception of education implicated in any one school system or any one curriculum at any one time. Despite these ambiguities, we can, in any case, discern idealistic, pragmatic, and traditional purposes in our educational institutions.

The idealistic conception of education is that it is concerned to inspire children to attain their highest potential, to bring out their creativity, and not merely to allow them to express themselves, but actually to facilitate their self-expression, to advance this self-expression and to celebrate it. This idealistic conception of education is usually found alongside the mantra of teaching children how to think, and not what to think. The point here is to develop and event to improve the child’s mind so that child can go on to achieve great things in life.

The pragmatic conception of education can be expressed pragmatically or cynically. Pragmatically, it is about educating children in skills that they will need in the workforce, enabling them to obtain gainful employment and thus to stand on their own two feet. The cynical expression of the pragmatic conception is that the purpose of education is to produce useful drones for society who will work hard, not question their betters, and accept their lot in life meekly. In this conception, the school system also serves as a de facto babysitter as a place for parents to dump their children while they are at work fulfilling their own purpose as useful drones. Thus school “prepares” children for the workforce, not by improving their minds, but by providing them with an analog of adult society: while their parents to go work each day, they go to school each day, drumming into their young minds the lessons of unalterable and unimaginative routine.

The traditional conception of education is to impose the “primary mask” upon young people, that is to say, to force them into conformity with the standards and norms and values of the society into which they are born. Education shapes individuals, and the traditional conception of education seeks to shape them into upstanding citizens who can fulfill their role in society. This conception of education also has its inspiring component, in so far as education is understood as passing along the legacy of a culture to its youngest members, so that they can, in their turn, transmit this legacy to their children. This was powerfully expressed by Matthew Arnold in the 19th century:

“…culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world, and, through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically.”

This conception of the best that has been thought and said in the world thus contains within it a criticism of the pragmatic conception of following mechanically our stock notions and habits, and this is the sense in which the traditional conception, despite its profound conservatism, also involves an inspiring element. In order for a child to eventually pass along the cultural legacy that is made available to them, they must master and understand that legacy, or they are merely parroting back what has been said to them.

While each of these conceptions of the purpose of education can be found in isolation—in its pure form, as it were—we are more likely to find some admixture, and probably there are even those who combine all of these conceptions of education into one vision: inspiring young minds, preparing them for the world, and conveying to them the legacy of tradition.

In the American tradition of the one-room schoolhouse, in which multiple age cohorts were educated side-by-side, we can most readily see the traditional and the pragmatic functions of education in action. This was always an institution that was jealous of retaining local control, and was directly responsible to parents in the area whose children attended the school. These parents would be eager for their children to be acculturated into their tradition as well as preparing them for their roles in society. However, the idealism of teaching and education was always present, on the part of the teachers if for no one else, and this vision could be said to have triumphed insofar as it is the “official” purpose of education, however far actual education departs from this ideal.

As the US school system has grown to gargantuan dimensions, all of the features of traditional American education have been lost. Curricula are adopted on a national level, parents often have no idea what their children are being taught in school, local school boards no longer have the power they once wielded, and the schools and the educational responsibilities now resemble a highly-specialized industrial facility in which children are broken down into single age cohorts, and different specialized subjects are taught in different areas of a rambling building usually covering several acres—with children’s lessons almost perfecting mimicking the division of labor that their parents experience in their employment. Thus while the idealistic doctrine has triumphed in the vision of professional educators, the actual practice of education today most closely resembles the pragmatic conception.

In this dystopian reality of contemporary educational institutions, not only has the instrument of education been institutionalized, but the tightly-focused purposes of small schools have been replaced by slogans, ambiguity, and diffuse efforts that point in no one particular direction. As with prisons, schools are less effective as a consequence of having many different purposes, some at odds with each other, driving competing educational agendas. Just as there are fundamentally different conceptions of what a prison is, what it is for, and what its role in society is, so too there are fundamentally different conceptions of what a school is, what education is for, and what the role of education ought to be in society.

What is true of prisons and schools is also true for other large institutions, especially for the largest of the institutions that human beings have created—civilizations. Civilizations are informal institutions in contradistinction to the formal institutions of prisons and schools, but all institutions are of the same genus, whether formal or informal.

I often say of civilizations that it is difficult to discern their purposes (which I call the central project of a civilization), and it is especially difficult to discern the purpose of our own civilization, partly because we cannot see clearly something so close to us—we look upon our own civilization from the inside out, as it were—and partly because we cannot be objective and impartial about something that constitutes our identity. I also sometimes define a civilization as an institution of institutions, i.e., civilization is an institution comprised of a multitude of subsidiary institutions. Given that these subsidiary institutions are often large institutions like prisons and schools, which themselves cannot be clear about their purposes, it holds a fortiori for civilization, the sum total of a multitude of institutions, that it cannot be clear about its purposes.

It would probably be true to say that individuals within a given civilization may hold fundamentally different conceptions of their civilization of which they are a part. Moreover, it is likely that, because of this failure of reflexive self-understanding of civilization, our interpretations of other civilizations—both past civilizations and other civilizations today, as well as future civilizations distinct from our own—are probably faulty. That is to say, we probably project purposes upon other civilizations that do not reflect the actual purposes of these civilizations.

If we are to understand civilization to any extent, we must have recourse to the scientific use of the appearance/reality distinction, recognizing that civilizations may have a certain appearance of purpose, whereas their true purpose may be difficult to discern, hidden as it is behind the veil of appearances.

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Friday


A Century of Industrialized Warfare:

Nikola P. Pašić, several times Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Serbia, including the period 1912-1918.

Nikola P. Pašić, several times Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Serbia, including the period 1912-1918.

Serbia Orders General Mobilization


Saturday 25 July 1914

As the July Crisis slowly progressed from the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand through a labyrinthine diplomatic process that finally delivered Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum to Serbia on Thursday 23 July 1914, very little happened other than consultations, warnings, drafting of documents, and the like. The day after the ultimatum from Austria-Hungary was delivered to Serbia, Serbia made the ultimatum public. The ultimatum had been crafted purposefully to be unacceptable. One could argue that the war already started with the writing of an intentionally unacceptable ultimatum, but the actual military wheels of the conflict began to turn with mobilization.

Due to the nature of the ultimatum, it was already clear that whatever response Serbia gave to Austria-Hungary would be unacceptable. Knowing this, Serbia ordered general mobilization at 3:00 pm on Saturday 25 July 1914. An official response was given to the ultimatum at 5:55 pm — five minutes before the deadline for a response would pass. Emperor Franz Josef signed the mobilization order for Austria-Hungary at 7:23 pm the same day, although it would not begin to take effect for another two days on “Alarm Day” — a preparatory day to give troops time to get ready — with troop movements scheduled to begin on the following day. From this point forward, events would begin to move much more rapidly, pushed along by “boots on the ground.”

In Carte blanche for Austria-Hungary I discussed the continuum of escalations that led to the outbreak of the First World War as an unprecedented global industrialized conflict, any one of which episodes of escalation could be identified as the beginning of the First World War. Certainly the mobilization of Serbia and Austria-Hungary could be identified as the unique moment when the war “really” began, but there are many other contenders for that claim. For a war as catastrophic as the First World War, a sequence of escalations is necessary to pass from an assassination to a global war.

What I find particularly interesting about the mobilizations of Serbia and Austria-Hungary on 25 July 1914, and the many mobilizations that would follow — Russia on 30 July, France on 31 July, Germany on 01 August — was the role played by mobilization in the First World War. On the eve of the First World War, Europe was an armed camp that had been preparing for the next war for decades, and with particular intensity during the immediately previous years. Mobilization plans were a central fact of the war that was expected by everyone.

Planning a major war for years entails a major effort, and for the growing, industrialized nation-states of Europe, with their cities expanding with industrial workers, the grandiose plans for war had to be executed with grandiose means, and this meant the full mobilization for war of an entire society. While in classical antiquity entire societies had been mobilized for war, this took place under very different socioeconomic conditions — the city-state, i.e., the polis, rather than the nation-state was the locus of political and military power. During the medieval and early modern periods, Europe’s wars had largely been fought between professional armies and only rarely with conscripts. When conscripts were used, they were used only in so far as their fighting did not interrupt the centrality of agriculture in agrarian-ecclesiastical civilization. Peasants would plant in the spring, go to war as conscripts in the summer, and then had to return to their fields in time to harvest. If they failed to do so, everyone would starve.

All of this changed with the industrial revolution and the advent of industrial-technological civilization. The First World War was the first great armed conflict of industrial-technological civilization, and that is why I have been calling it the first global industrialized war in this series of posts. Not only was the new technology of weaponry produced by new industries, but the social organization of war changed radically. Professional armies were seen as the nucleus of a much larger force that could be rapidly expanded on demand. This is the efflorescence of the idea of every man a soldier — i.e., the idea that any citizen of the nation-state could be called away from their plow, lathe, hammer, or desk, put into a uniform, given a rifle, and sent to war to defend the nation.

In order to implement the idea of every man a soldier, it was necessary to mobilize the whole of society for war. This is exactly what all the nation-states of Europe had been planning and preparing to do. Men left their occupations, showed up at a depot where they were issued uniform and arms, given their orders where to report, and the whole of the mobilization for war became an extension of war plans on the battlefield that reached back to the homefront and into the lives of the people. Mobilization, like the war plans of the time, were planned to elapse like clockwork — once put into action, they were widely believed to be irrevocable and unalterable, so that a formal mobilization order was almost equivalent to a declaration of war.

It is possible that the role of mobilization was larger in the First World War than in any war before or after, though it is arguable that at the height of the Cold War the whole of society was continually mobilized for war, as with the famous readiness of the Strategic Air Command. In this instance, mobilization has ceased to disrupt society because mobilization is the social order around which society is constructed. However, this level of readiness is impossible to maintain indefinitely, and is likely to deteriorate. The mobilization of the First World War had the virtue of signaling society at large of a radical shift from business as usual; to this end, disruption served a purpose.

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1914 to 2014

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A Century of Industrialized Warfare

0. A Century of Industrialized Warfare

1. Assassination in Sarajevo

2. Headlines around the World

3. The July Crisis

4. A Blank Check for Austria-Hungary

5. Serbia and Austria-Hungary Mobilize

6. Austria-Hungary Declares War on Serbia

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