HTTP! Encrypted! Information can be! Stolen through! TCP-windows by! Mathy Vanhoef & Tom Van Goethem HEIST Agenda ⢠Technical background! ⢠Same-Origin Policy! ⢠Compression-based attacks! ⢠SSL/TLS & TCP! ⢠Nitty gritty HEIST details! ⢠Demo! ⢠Countermeasures 2 HEIST Same-Origin Policy 3 Mr. Sniffles https://bunnehbank.com GET /vault HEIST Same-Origin Policy 3 Mr. Sniffles https://bunnehbank.com
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This document defines a mechanism which allows authors to instruct a user agent to upgrade a priori insecure resource requests to secure transport before fetching them. This is a public copy of the editorsâ draft. It is provided for discussion only and may change at any moment. Its publication here does not imply endorsement of its contents by W3C. Donât cite this document other than as work in pr
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HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) HTTP Strict Transport Security, or just HSTS, is a security mechanism for websites and browsers. HSTS is used when web servers want to tell its clients that they should only use HTTPS, and not HTTP. This mechanism is useful, because loads and loads of websites have a lazy encryption discipline, and while most of the website is loaded with HTTPS, some resources
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