Showing posts with label SCOTUS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SCOTUS. Show all posts

Thursday, October 8, 2020

Bench reading: what the Supreme Court justices said about APIs being copyrightable in yesterday's Oracle v. Google hearing

Other than a potential remand of the "fair use" question to the Federal Circuit, Google cannot realistically hope for anything positive to come out of yesterday's Supreme Court hearing in Google v. Oracle America (petitioner v. respondent as opposed to plaintiff v. defendant): the Android maker's non-copyrightability defense has a snow flake's chance in hell.

I wrote yesterday's triumphant post on the basis of having listened to the hearing on C-SPAN Radio (over the web). Now I'd like to go over what the justices said in the copyrightability context based on the transcript (PDF). I'll sort this by judge, in the order in which each judge first addressed this subject (seniority). And I'll then provide my interpretation.

Chief Justice Roberts

"Mr. Goldstein, let's say someone copies the headings in your -- your brief and they copy the organization in your brief, which sections you put first and how you organized them. Is your argument -- would your argument say that that's perfectly fine so long as they write their own text?"

This is consistent with how Oracle to the Federal Circuit years ago, with its Harry Potter analogy, which was just genius. The problem this posed to Google is that they'd either have to argue computer programs are different (which they tried yesterday, to no avail in the copyrightability context) or they'd have to take a very expansive view on what's not copyrightable.

"I understand your merger doctrine -- argument is different, but I -- I don't think that was the question I asked."

Google's counsel was being evasive again, so the Chief Justice said:

"Well, if you're talking about necessary to do so, and, again, you're force -- forcing me back to the merger -- to the merger doctrine, and that's -- that's fine, but the only reason that there's only one way to do it is because Sun and Oracle's product expression was -- was very successful. There were a lot of ways to do it when they did it. And the fact that everybody -- programmers really liked it and that's what everybody used, it seems a bit much to penalize them for that."

I love that part. First, the Chief Justice gave up on eliciting a real answer from Mr. Goldstein on the book analogy, which obviously made Google's argument look every bit as weak as it was. Second, the Chief Justice identified the fundamental flaw in Google's reference to the merger (of fact/function and expression) doctrine: while the doctrine applies to the situation at the time something is created, Google wants the court to time-travel and make Oracle, as Sun's acquirer, a victim of its own success with Java by saying that now the structure of those Java APIs is a method of operation and there is, therefore in Google's view, only one way to express them.

"I don't think it's a patent right. I mean, it's the -- it's their particular expression. And you want to -you say the only way for you to say what you want to say in the --the new material that you provide is to copy -- copy theirs. That's not a -- a patent. That's -- that's copyright."

At this point Mr. Goldstein had already lost (and as I wrote yesterday, he's great but Google has no non-copyrightability case by any stretch of the imagination) on three counts: he was evasive on the book analogy; his merger doctrine argument failed because he wants to retroactively apply it; and his claim that Oracle was trying to use copyrighted works to achieve a patent-like monopoly is nonsensical because it's about expression (about something that was written, not about an abstract functionality).

"[B]efore you get into fair use, you say that was the only way for you to do it. But, you know, cracking the safe may be the only way to get the money that you want, but that doesn't mean you can do it. I mean, if it's the only way, the way for you to get it is to get a license."

As came up several times in this ten-year litigation, the makers of Android were even negotiating a license, but decided to go ahead without one.

"Well, all right. I mean, you're --but what about the -the --the combination to the lock on the safe? Can you copy that just because somebody else has it and that's the only way to get in?"

Mr. Goldstein tried to give the "safe" analogy a spin for his purposes, but the Chief Justice didn't buy it that what Oracle was trying to achieve with its copyright assertion was a broad monopoly over how to do something.

"Mr. Rosenkranz, let's say you want to open a restaurant. You've got a great new chef. He's got great new dishes. And you say: Well, we've got to figure out what the menu should look like. You know, of course, you're going to have, you know, appetizers first, then entrees, and then desserts. Now you shouldn't have to worry about whether that organization is copyrighted.

"And I think Mr. Goldstein is saying that that's what's going on --on here. Every restaurant organizes its menu that way, and you don't want to discourage people from opening it because they're going to have to spend their own time trying to figure out what the menu should look like.

"Why isn't that exactly what Google is saying here?"

The Chief Justice used an analogy here that involves a much simpler and smaller structure than the Java APIs. That's why Oracle's counsel then noted the Java APIs "fill the blanks in 30,000 times over, and each item had its own description that no one else was using."

"Well, you say that they did have a choice; in other words, your work did not leave them with no -- no option. Well, what choice did they have without having to spend billions of dollars, which would be wasteful and impede the development of the high-tech business?"

This is now a policy question, and Oracle's response was that Microsoft and Apple (by coincidence, Mr. Rosenkranz has also been appellate counsel to them on various occasions) actually did just that, and that the idea of copyright law is that you do have to come up with your own creation. That applies to all fields of IP law, in fact: patent holders will also argue that someone should just work around (or take a license if available).

"Mr. Goldstein says the most efficient, the best way to do it, the way to keep programmers doing new things, rather than old things, is to use Java."

This question was so broad and general that it wasn't clear whether it was still about copyrightability or whether the Chief Justice had moved on to fair use, especially with the occurrence of the verb "to use." Oracle responded in both respects.

Justice Thomas

He hardly ever asked questions while Justice Scalia was alive. But since then I've heard him ask very interesting questions. He's a great thinker.

"Mr. Goldstein, you seem to rely quite a bit on Section 102. Why don't we rely on Section 101, which is more specific with respect to computer programs?"

This 101/102 distinction reminds me of the Federal Circuit hearing, where Oracle's counsel Joshua Rosenkranz explained, and the appeals court appeared to agree, that Section 101 is where copyrightability is decided, while Section 102 is more about what scope it then has. Interestingly, Mr. Goldstein didn't disagree. He just tried to thread the needle somehow with the help of the merger doctrine, which the Chief Justice had already shot down.

"So at what --at what point should we determine the merger, whether or not there is merger? When Oracle or Sun develops this program or when you decide to use it?"

Google's merger argument again fails because of their time travel type of proposition. But Mr. Goldstein tried nonetheless (as the alternative would have been to just concede the case away, though that would have been warranted) to defend the retroactive approach, and pointed to Baker v. Selden, a case I discussed in 2013. Justice Thomas then came up with an interesting analogy to Google's idea that someone should become the victim of their own success:

"You know, you could --someone could argue, though, that, look, if a -- a team -- if a team takes your best players, a football team, that the only way that those players could actually perform at a high level is if you give that team your playbook. I don't think anybody would say that is --is right."

Mr. Goldstein then tried to drive the point home that Oracle wanted a captive audience in terms of the programmers using Java or, as he called it, "prisoners" and not a "fan base." But that was again just him being evasive, as Justice Thomas obviously noted:

"Well, actually, my concern was having to turn over the playbook. But let's go to fair use briefly [...]"

So far, Mr. Goldstein still hadn't given a single answer in a strict sense to any of the questions that the Chief Justice and by now the most senior Associate Justice asked.

"Mr. Rosenkranz, in your brief, you seem to be arguing for more than the declaring code. If I'm right there, do we need to decide more than that?"

Oracle of course said it was just about the declaring code, but with declaring and implementing code not being practically distinguishable from a copyrightability point of view, it might have seemed that they were going beyond just declaring code.

Justice Breyer

When it comes to patents, he's relatively defendant-friendly. But patents and copyrights are different fields of IP law.

"Well, I have a question for each side that I'm trying to answer in my own mind. For you, I'd --I'd like to ask this: I write down at the computer, I have a computer in front of me, and I put java.lang.math.max(410), okay? And that calls up a certain program, which you did not copy, the one it calls up, which is setting the switches of a computer.

"Well, the thing I --the words I just spoke also call up a particular program, i.e., a set of computer switches that will get me to the program that does the --you know, that does a particular thing.

"Well, it's a computer program, isn't it? And you can copyright computer programs. And so what's the difference between java.lang, et cetera, which sets switches on the computer, and any other program that sets switches on the computer?"

This is a point I've been making for a long time: in order to deprive API-related code of copyrightability, one would have to generally narrow the scope of copyrightable works in the computer software context. As a programmer I know that the java.lang.math.max function requires two parameters to make sense, but that doesn't change anything about Justice Breyer having asked an excellent question that added value to what the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas had said.

"I bet there aren't -- just one way to do it. Why is there just one way to do it? If you spent enough time and you had the most brilliant computer programmers, don't you think they could devise a system of calling up the Java program, though it might be expensive to do and take a long time, that didn't use the word java.lang.math?"

This is also one of the fundamental truths in this case: Google alleges that something is like a real-world fact. It's like talking about the capital of the United States, and of course its name is Washington, so anybody talking about it has no choice about that name. You might be able to use a nickname, or a metonym. Well, you can say "D.C."--a synonym in most contexts. But the API code at issue here was freely defined.

During Oracle's argument, Justice Breyer said the following about copyrightability:

"All right. Please assume with me the following: Assume that the --what you read, the computer --computer programs which do something, after all, are copyrightable, but then it says methods of operation are not, whether they're computer programs or not.

"The problem for us is, is this more like Baker v. Selden, where they said the accounting is not, it's a method of operation? Or is it more like an ordinary computer program?

"All right. Now what I got out of reading through this very good briefing is, look, Java's people divided the universe of tasks, of which there are billions, in a certain way. All the things that tell the computer to do one of those things, we'll do. But that which tells the computer which to do, that's the declaration.

"Here is what it's like. It's like, as Judge Boudin said, the QWERTY keyboard. You didn't have to have a QWERTY keyboard on typewriters at the beginning, but, my God, if you let somebody have a copyright on that now, they would control all typewriters, which really has nothing to do with copyright.

"Or it's like switchboards on old-fashioned telephone systems. You could have done it in 1,000 ways. But, once you did it, all those operators across the world learned that system, and you don't want to give a copyright holder a monopoly of --hmm -telephone systems.

"Or it's like, to use the Chief Justice's example, a chef who figures out brilliant ways of mixing spices and then putting the spices for this and that in a certain order on a shelf, and then he writes something that tells you which shelf to go to and which shelf to pick out and which spice to pick out for which dish.

"Now all those things are somewhat ordinary programs, but they also are doing something. They're giving you an instruction as to how to call up those programs that reflect Java's organization.

"And at this point in time, it's really tough, just like the QWERTY keyboard, to go backwards, and very bad consequences will flow if you don't see that distinction. Okay?

"Long question, but that's what I got out of their method of operation argument. And I wanted you to say what you want about that."

Oracle's counsel was quick to point out that those analogies were more mechanical than the expressive Java API code. Anyway, the long statement Justice Breyer made suggests he understood the problem of Google making a retroactive-retrospective type of argument.

Justice Alito

"Mr. Goldstein, I -- I'm concerned that, under your argument, all computer code is at risk of losing protection under 102(b). How do you square your position with Congress's express intent to provide protection for computer codes?"

This concern is simply damning for Google. And it's consistent with the issue Justice Breyer raised.

"Well, there have been --a lot of questions already about the merger argument, but how do you respond to Oracle's argument that you're -you are arguing in a circle, that there is only one way to write a declaring code like Oracle did?"

If this case had been put before Justice Alito alone, it would have taken him only a few minutes to dispose of the non-copyrightability defense.

Justice Sotomayor

"Counsel, I --I -I go back to the essence of the question that I think my colleagues are asking, is how do you differentiate between declaring codes and implementing codes? Because you agree --you agree that you couldn't have copied their implementing code because there are multiple ways of doing that.

"But you fight the declaring codes because there are multiple ways of declaring as well. Apple has a different way of declaring the same functions. They spent the billions of dollars necessary. Presumably, you could have.

The fact that Apple built a smartphone operating system without doing this was a very strong one. It's just absurd that Google--trying to keep a totally meritless defense alive--then tried to distinguish iOS from Android because they used a different programming language.

"And yet, you spent so much time in your brief convincing me that implementing and declaring codes go together in this hand. They merge. How do we draw the line?"

We can see here that Justice Sotomayor is not willing to weaken copyright protection for computer programs in general only to suit Google's needs.

"May I --may I stop you right there? That's the nub of the problem, which is, what gives you the right to use their original work? What --how do you define 'method of operation' so that there's a clean line between that and when you have to create new code?

"Like an implementing code."

"My problem with your argument is, what's your definition of 'interoperability'? It seems one-directional. You seem to define it as the extent to which existing third-party applications can run on your platform, but not whether apps developed on your platform can run on systems that use Java SE. So it's one way."

Here I think Justice Sotomayor made a very important point (Google wanting to take, not give) but not in the most suitable context. She had actually, inadvertently, already started to talk about something that has no bearing on copyrightability but only on fair use.

"So could people now copy your --your --you now have developed many different packages and platforms and things like that. Can they copy yours now?"

Mr. Goldstein then replied in a way that would keep all options open for Google to sue anybody later, just trying to distinguish the cases. And judges easily see through that.

During Oracle's part, Justice Sotomayor focused on the potential impact of the decision:

"Counsel, at the -in your beginning statement, you had the sky falling if we ruled in favor of Google. The problem with that argument for me is that it seems that since 1992, and Justice Kagan mentioned the case, the Second Circuit case, a Ninth Circuit case, an Eleventh Circuit case, a First Circuit case, that a basic principle has developed in the case law, up until the Federal Circuit's decision.

"I know there was a Third Circuit decision earlier on in the 1980s. But the other circuits moved away from that. They and the entire computer world have not tried to analogize computer codes to other methods of expression because it's sui generis.

"They've looked at its functions, and they've said the API, the Application Programming Interface, of which the declaring code is a part, is not copyrightable. Implementing codes are.

"And on that understanding, industries have built up around applications that know they can --they can copy only what's necessary to run on the application, but they have to change everything else. That's what Google did here. That's why it took less than 1 percent of the Java code.

"So I guess that's the way the world has run in every other system, whether it's Apple's desktop or Amazon's web services, everybody knows that APIs are not --declaring codes are not copyrightable. Implementing codes are.

"So please explain to me why we should now upend what the industry has viewed as the copyrightable elements and has declared that some are methods of operation and some are expressions. Why should we change that understanding?"

When she refers to Google just taking less than 1% of the Java code, it sounds as if she conflated copyrightability and fair use, and maybe that was her intention, or maybe it just looks like it.

I believe some others who listened to that part have attached way too much important to the impact assessment. The law doesn't work that way. Yes, policy matters, but none of what Justice Sotomayor said in that long passage really shows a path under the law as it stands to arrive at Google's desired result, even if she desired it as well, which is not even a given (though she was relatively sympathetic to Google in some contexts).

Justice Kagan

"Mr. Goldstein, I have to confess to being a little bit surprised or confused about some of the arguments you're making this morning. And maybe it's just me and I don't understand it, but I'm hoping you'll explain it to me, because, when I read your briefs, I took you to be making a somewhat different argument, principally, than the one you're making today."

This impression of shifting-sand arguments or even self-contradiction is obviously a lawyer's nightmare.

"I took you to be saying that the declaring code is unprotected because it's a method of operation, that it's what allows Java programmers to operate the computer, and to be setting forth a pretty flat rule on that --of --of that kind.

"And --and I don't hear you saying that today. Instead, I hear you saying, you know, the real question is, are there multiple ways of doing the same thing?

"So are those different arguments? And which one are you making?"

Google's lawyer then wanted to have it both ways. And he tried to appeal to her by saying that his approach was "textualist."

"Excuse me. Sorry, Mr. Goldstein. But, if --if --if --if that's your test that you're focusing on today, is that essentially the test that comes out of the Second Circuit Altai case? Is there any difference between what you're saying today and --and --and what Altai says, which is essentially that we have to figure out how to separate out the expressive elements of something?"

This is the filtration approach, and her reference to this makes it a possibility that her understanding of copyrigh case law is particularly deep. The above was the most sophisticated question in my view as far as appellate case law on copyright is concerned. Other questions--asked by other justices--had other strengths, such as Justice Alito being super-efficient and Justice Thomas using interesting analogies.

"And if I could go back to something that I think the Chief Justice was asking about, I mean, suppose I'm --I'm --I'm sitting in a mathematics class and the professor says: Do a proof of --of --of something or other. And, you know, it turns out that 20 people in this mathematics class actually come up with more than one proof, and some are better than others, you know, some are elegant and some are less elegant.

"So there are more than one way of proving whatever proposition there is. How do we deal with that? I would think that that's pretty analogous to the situation here, that there are more than one way and Oracle happened to come up with a particularly elegant one."

Mr. Goldstein then tried to evade that question, and while Justice Kagan thanked her, I doubt he managed to convince her.

"Mr. Rosenkranz, as -as I understand it, there are two features of your declaring code that you think merit copyright. And I want to make sure I'm --I'm --I'm right on this first.

"The --the first feature, and this is pretty basic, is that we need some way of connecting a programmer's inputs, whatever they happen to be, some way of connecting those inputs to implementing code.

"And then the second feature is that there needs to be a way to organize those inputs, those calls, into various classes and packages.

"So one is like the trigger and one is the method of organization. Is that right? Is that the thing that you're saying merits copyright?"

Oracle clarified that it's about the declarations themselves, but also their structure, sequence, and organization.

"Okay. So let's start with that, the taxonomy, the structure, the organization, and we can, if we have time, get back to the other.

"I'll give you an example that's similar to one that the Chief Justice used, but I think you won't be --you won't be able to answer in quite the same way.

"Suppose I own a grocery store and I come up with a really terrific way of organizing all my fresh produce, all my fruits and vegetables, into these categories and sub-categories, very intuitive for the shopper. And this is not the standard way. So it's different from the Chief Justice's hypothetical in that way. It's novel. And it's great. And a rival grocery store, all rival grocery stores want to copy it.

"Do I have a copyright claim?"

Oracle then explained that not every structure, sequence, and organization is copyrightable. It depends on what the structure consists of.

"So why is it worlds different? I mean, it seems to me that there are all kinds of methods of organization in the world. You know, whether it's the QWERTY keyboard or whether it's the periodic table or whether the system of kingdoms and classes and phyla and so forth that animals are organized into.

"I mean, there are a thousand ways of organizing things, which the first person who developed them, you're saying, could have a copyright and then prevent anybody else from using them."

It then appeared Oracle answered the question satisfactorily, especially when reminding the judge that the material in question spans 600 pages in the appendix.

Justice Gorsuch

"Good morning, Mr. Goldstein. If --if I understand the conversation so far, you are moving past, rather rapidly, the --the primary argument in your brief that the code just simply isn't copyrightable.

"And I --I --I think that's probably a wise move given the fact that 101 says computer programs, including statements or instructions, in order to bring about a certain result, may be copyrighted.

"We might not think otherwise that it should be, but there it is. And, normally, the --the specific instruction there in 101 would govern the more general idea-expression dichotomy in 102. So am I right, that we can move past that rather rapidly?"

This question by Justice Gorsuch is an excellent statutory one. And when Mr. Goldstein said he actually argues the merger doctrine, the justice replied:

"So I take that as a yes. I'll be honest with you."

It wasn't good news for Mr. Goldstein, but such forthrightness is actually helpful.

"So, if we're moving straight on to the merger doctrine, there, I guess I'm stuck in a similar place as Justice Kagan, which is the argument strikes me very much me as I wish to share the facilities of a more successful rival because they've come up with a particularly elegant or efficient or successful or highly adopted solution in the marketplace, and --and ride on --on --on their innovation.

"What do we do about the --the fact that the other competitors, Apple, Microsoft, who I know is one of your amici, have, in fact, been able to come up with phones that work just fine without engaging in this kind of copying?"

Apple had been mentioned by Justice Sotomayor. Now Justice Gorsuch adds Microsoft. And in a way Justice Gorsuch created a synthesis of Justice Thomas's statutory approach and Justice Kagan's additional reference to case law.

"[I]sn't it pretty difficult to say that this is an essential facility-type problem when --when others have managed to --to innovate their way around it?"

Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch drew an analogy to antitrust law here. And my position has long been that the problem of access to copyrighted APIs should be solved through compulsory licensing on FRAND terms under an antitrust duty to deal.

"[I]f we're worried about ideas and expressions merging, and --and others have been able to accomplish the task without reliance on what --what you might claim to be the essential facility, where --where do we stand?"

Here, Justice Gorsuch checkmated Mr. Goldstein. Simple as that.

Justice Kavanaugh

"To the extent you're still making the method of operation argument, the other side and the solicitor general say that declaring code is a method of operation only in the same sense that computer programs as a whole are methods of operation and that, therefore, your method of operation argument would swallow the protection for computer programs.

"Your response to that?"

Again the concern I share over copyrighability not being the vehicle for distinguishing between declaring and implementing code.

"On your merger argument, one concern that has been raised already is the timing issue. Another concern that I want you to respond to is that it seems to define the relevant idea in terms of what you copy. You're not allowed to copy a song just because it's the only way to express that song.

"Why is that principle not at play here?"

The reference to a song not being free for the taking "because it's the only way to express that song" again exposes Google's approach of saying that something popular loses copyright protection. Mr. Goldstein then claimed they weren't "defining merger self-reflectively," but not in a convincing way.

"One of the points in some of the amicus briefs, and I want to compliment the briefing of the parties and all the amicus briefs, which have been enormously helpful, of the 83 computer scientists is that the sky will fall, in essence, if we rule against you in this case, threaten significant disruption.

"One question I had about that, though, is the Federal Circuit ruled in 2014, this Court denied cert in 2015 on the first issue. I'm not aware that the sky has fallen in the last five or six years with that ruling on the books.

"I know it's different if we rule here, but can you respond to that?"

I got the impression yesterday, as I also noted in my post right after the hearing, that this impact assessment type of question may play a major role in the discussion between the justices. And it's not just about copyrightability, where Google has no prayer, but even more relevant with respect to fair use, where there isn't a clear majority--however, fair use is so fact-specific (and in this case also a procedural matter--standard of review) that I don't think one needs to be concerned even if one agreed with Google on pretty much everything else. We're not talking about a general finding that APIs can never give rise to a fair use exception. It's about only this (extreme) case.

"And welcome back, Mr. Rosenkranz. I just want you to follow up on two of my colleagues' questions. First, any more you want to say about Justice Breyer's QWERTY keyboard question? And, second, Justice Sotomayor's question about settled expectations and --and I would add the 83 computer scientists' concern about threatening significant disruption. If you could just follow up on those two, and I have no further questions after that."

The way I understood this was that he just wanted to give Oracle's counsel the chance to complete whatever he wanted to say before, or to maybe optimize his argument.

Later, Justice Kavanaugh also gave the Deputy Solicitor General of the United States, Malcolm Stewart, a chance to talk about copyrightability:

"Good morning, Mr. Stewart. One question on merger doctrine and one question on method of operation.

"First, Google says in its reply brief that the dispositive undisputed fact in this case is that the declarations could not be written in any other way and still properly respond to the calls used by Java programmers.

"Are they wrong in saying that?"

And another chance:

"And the method of operation, Google says that the declarations are a method of operation because they are for the developers to use, while the implementing code instructs the computer.

"Your response to that?"

Those questions didn't change anything about my impression that the SCOTUS will either affirm the copyrightability finding unanimously or, less likely but possible, "only" near-unanimously.

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Wednesday, October 7, 2020

Supreme Court inclined to affirm Federal Circuit's copyrightability holding in Oracle v. Google, possibly unanimously--fair use may be remanded

Judge William H. Alsup of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California may go down in history as the only U.S. judge ever to have found that code related to application programming interfaces (APIs) is not copyrightable only because it's related to APIs. Or one of only two judges, should Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissent from what otherwise looks like a unanimous affirmance of the Federal Circuit's copyrightability holding. But even Justice Sotomayor is at best having second thoughts and far from being totally in the tank for Google on this part.

The points that Google's attorney, Thomas Goldstein, made on the copyrightability part were simply ridiculous (he's a fantastic lawyer--the problem is that Google has no non-copyrightability case), and in the first part, every one of the Justices asked questions that suggested a strong inclination to side with Oracle on this part.

There was pretty much a consensus that copyrightability is determined based on the situation when something is written, so the merger and method-of-operation exceptions don't apply if they're basically used as a defense to subsequent infringement (which is where fair use comes into play, but irrelevant to copyrightability). Therefore, Google has no path to victory on copyrightability. Game over in that regard.

I've been saying for about ten years--and this case just celebrated its tenth anniversary in August--that regardless of the Merger Doctrine or any other theory, API declaring code is simply code. The Supreme Court of the United States made it clear today, and will do so in writing. I already considered this outcome quite likely when I looked at a procedural order three months ago.

Words cannot express how much I look forward to the SCOTUS opinion after all of this time and absolutely unjustified attacks. Certain morons will get their comeuppance. But, to be very clear, there are some people who sided with Google on this question whom I respect a great deal. Those people know, or they can figure based on how respectfully I've interacted with them at all times, and because they didn't disparage me regardless of our disagreement on API copyrightability. By "morons" I only meant the unreasonable ones who blamed me in unacceptable ways against the backdrop of what was simply a massive legal error on the district judge's part.

Now, with respect to fair use, the problem is the standard of review because the "fair use" finding was a jury verdict.

Orrick's Joshua Rosenkranz argued that the Federal Circuit applied the "no reasonable jury could have found otherwise" standard, but that the correct standard would be de novo for the legal conclusions that a fair use determination involves.

My feeling is that the Supreme Court may find that the more deferential substantial evidence standard needs to be applied, and that in this case a majority of the justices may very well remand the case to the Federal Circuit. It's also possible that Oracle wins affirmance on "fair use" (especially since a split 4-4 decision would be sufficient for affirmance), but I doubt it. There appears to be some concern among the justices that with all the support Google got from amici curiae warning against the consequences of affirmance they somehow feel they shouldn't decide against what Google managed to present as industry practice and expectation.

Assuming that there is a remand of the "fair use" part, which I consider more likely than the other way round (though nowhere near as certain as affirmance of the copyrightability holding), the Federal Circuit would not be too likely to overrule the jury again. But it would then pick up where it left off last time, and Oracle had strong arguments (that also appeared to get traction with the appeals court) for a retrial. Judge Alsup made some pretrial decisions that unfairly disadvantaged Oracle.

I think is a clear case of unfair use, but I'm like ten times more interested in the copyrightability part, and so happy that this one is going to be clarified for good. I was the only one to openly welcome Google's petition for writ of certiorari despite hoping for affirmance. That's because I'm all about the issues, not about the parties. I wanted the copyrightability part to be resolved for good, and on a nationwide basis. A Federal Circuit decision applying Ninth Circuit law would have been of only limited value--it wouldn't have been binding on anyone, not even on the Federal Circuit itself. The highest court in the land is going to provide definitive clarification that API code is not going to be treated differently from a copyrightability point of view than other program code. It's about original creativity, stupid.

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Tuesday, July 7, 2020

Supreme Court affirmance of API copyrightability ever more likely--deference to jury (with respect to "fair use") is Google's last line of defense

For a few years I've limited my commentary on the Oracle v. Google Android-Java copyright case to procedural matters, without reiterating the reasons for which I believe the thousands of lines of Java API code asserted in that case are protected by copyright, and their use by Google was unfair. While I agree with Oracle on substance, I did publicly support Google's successful cert petition because I care about the key issues far more than about specific cases.

I'm going to continue to steer clear of arguing the issues. But I am still following the proceedings, and I have bad news for those who hated the Federal Circuit's copyrightability holding: with respect to copyrightability, it looks like Google is more likely than not to lose.

Due to the coronavirus crisis, oral argument was postponed on very short notice in mid-March, and later rescheduled for the next term (October 2020 at the earliest). Then, in early May, the following order was entered:

The parties are directed to file supplemental letter briefs addressing the appropriate standard of review for the second question presented, including but not limited to the implications of the Seventh Amendment, if any, on that standard. The briefs, not to exceed 10 pages, are to be filed simultaneously with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 2 p.m., Friday, August 7, 2020.

This is about deference to the jury with respect to "fair use." The jury had found in Google's favor, so this is, per se, a potential Get Out of Jail Free card for Google, and apparently one that a group of law professors had raised in an amicus curiae brief. But it also means Google's non-copyrightability argument is struggling--or may already have failed definitively--to get traction with the top U.S. court for the second time in about six years.

That's simply because the second question ("fair use") won't be reached unless the first (copyrightability) is answered in the negative for Oracle. "Fair use" is a defense to infringement, and you can't infringe what isn't protected in the first place.

It's unclear how many justices proposed the request for supplemental briefing. It might have been only one, but it will have taken support from several others for this order to be entered. There is quite a possibility of multiple justices--potentially a majority--already having concluded that Google can't prevail on its non-copyrightability argument. The hearing was postponed on such short notice that many if not all of the justices are quite informed; at a minimum, their clerks had concluded their analysis at that stage.

If the Supreme Court answered the "fair use" question in Google's favor on the basis of jury deference, it might or might not discuss the standard for software copyrightability in detail. Whether the Federal Circuit's copyrightability holding would be affirmed explicitly or (by reaching "fair use") mostly implicitly, the copyrightability of API code would continue to be a reality in the United States.

In the same scenario (and I'm not suggesting that it's likely--the fact that the SCOTUS requests additional briefing doesn't mean it will necessarily agree with Google on jury deference), those opposing the protection of API code under copyright law wouldn't really make headway beyond this particular case (and even in that one, there'd simply be a remand to the Federal Circuit). It would be a procedural decision, centered around the standard of review, far short of agreeing with Google's "fair use" defense in its own right--and next time a different jury, ideally instructed by a different (more balanced) judge, might simply find otherwise. It wouldn't be precedential with respect to the substantive issue.

After Oracle won the first of two rounds in the Federal Circuit (with Orrick Herrington Sutcliffe's Joshua Rosenkranz as lead counsel), Google already requested certiorari, but the Supreme Court declined. That fact, combined with the May 4, 2020 order that implies copyrightability, suggests quite strongly that Google is facing an uphill battle in that regard.

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Thursday, September 6, 2018

Apple, Foxconn et al. want to end Qualcomm's double-dipping practice (chips and patents) once and for all

The previous post was about a magistrate judge's annoyance at Qualcomm's gamesmanship. But what's sure to cause Qualcomm and its lawyers a lot more headache is the pressure from two important summary judgment motions: the FTC's motion in the Northern District of California seeking to clarify Qualcomm's self-imposed obligation to license rival chipset makers and--which is what this present post is about--a motion by Apple and four contract manufacturers (Foxconn, Compal, Wistron, and Pegatron) in the Southern District of California, leveraging the Supreme Court's 2017 Lexmark ruling against Qualcomm's double-dipping practice (this post continues below the document):

18-08-31 Apple Et Al. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Florian Mueller on Scribd

For a recap of something discussed in greater detail last year, Qualcomm's business model is basically like this:

  • As Judge Koh recalled in a recent order, "an analysis conducted by Qualcomm in 2015 showed that revenues from Qualcomm's licensing program were 'equivalent in size to the sum of ~12 companies with a form of technology licensing,' including leading cellular SEP licensors such as Ericsson, Nokia, and Interdigital."

  • Customers have to accept an out-of-this-world royalty rate in order to be able to buy Qualcomm's chips.

  • Those who don't want to buy Qualcomm's chips must still pay patent license fees and will sooner or later be "persuaded" to enter into exclusivity arrangements under which their total cost (the sum of chip supplies and patent royalties) is reduced (but apparently still very high).

The above sounds like a "great" (for Qualcomm, not for the economy at large or for society) deal. However, Apple and its four contract manufacturers say that "Lexmark forbids this double-dipping."

The doctrine of patent exhaustion, which the Supreme Court clarified, upheld and reinforced in Lexmark, is fundamentally irreconcilable with the notion of a company selling chipsets and collecting patent license fees from the customers buying its chips. But Qualcomm appears to have believed for a long time that it would get away with it. One, because no one would dare challenge it. Two, by virtue of three structural elements that the summary judgment motion addresses:

  • "Qualcomm divides the chipset sales and software license across two agreements"--one for the purchase of the chipsets and another one, named Master Software Agreement, for the software license.

  • Foreign sales (such as to Asia-based contract manufactures) don't help as Lexmark clear stated that "[a]n authorized sale outside the United States, just as one within the United States, exhausts all rights under the Patent Act."

  • The motion labels as "corporate shell games" a structure under which different Qualcomm entities sell certain products and technically own certain patents. More than six years ago I already reported and commented on a related restructuring.

The motion invites Judge Gonzalo Curiel to take a Lexmark attitude and focus on a simple commercial question: are we talking about authorized chipset sales or not? If authorized, there's exhaustion; if Qualcomm wants to argue that exhaustion doesn't kick in, it has to show that something was unauthorized about the sale.

The most technical question here ("technical" in a literal sense, not legally technical) is whether, as the motion says, "Qualcomm’s chipsets and software indisputably are a matched pair by design, each intended to be used with, and only with, the other." The moving parties describe this as an undisputed fact. It will be interesting to see whether (and if so, how) Qualcomm will seek to raise doubts about it, but absent a single reasonable use case for that software outside of Qualcomm's chipsets and for Qualcomm's chipsets without the related software license, I guess it just can't deny what matters here.

Exhaustion can only be determined on a patent-by-patent basis (even if certain key questions, particularly anything related to Lexmark, will overlap). It's not a portfolio question.

That's because it must be shown for each patent that it is practiced by Qualcomm's chipsets. It wouldn't be practical to have one or more courts make this determination for thousands of patents. And a motion for partial summary judgment is subject to rather strict page limits--the whole idea of summary judgment is that you raise an issue that the court can easily decide. Apple and the likes of Foxconn therefore picked three exemplary patents (from the ones Apple and the contract manufacturers tackled before). Footnote 1 says that "[a] favorable ruling on this motion would inform the parties as to the exhaustion issues for the other patents." In other words, the parties need some guidance, but then they should be able to figure out exhaustion for numerous other patents.

Footnote 6 explains, in other words, that the movants are simply in their right to present alternative claims: should they prevail on exhaustion, infringement won't be reached. While the motion doesn't say so, this would even apply in a case where the theories aren't just alternatives but where they would be contradictory. Here, however, it's technically still possible that Qualcomm's chips practice a patent (thereby triggering exhaustion, provided that a sale is authorized and a court is underwhelmed by an attempted end-run based on a separate software license and a nested corporate structure) while, for an example, Intel's chips don't. However, to the extent that a patent is truly standard-essential, it may be practiced by Qualcomm and infringed by everyone else--but who cares if it's exhausted?

The FTC's motion for partial summary judgment in San Jose has the potential to force a settlement of that entire antitrust matter. If the San Diego motion on exhaustion succeeds, there will still be a host of financially and strategically important issues to resolve, but the case would be streamlined in a highly important way and, in a best-case scenario, it's possible that no (alternatively, fewer) patent infringement questions would have to be taken to trial. And above all, either motion would have major impact on the market.

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Saturday, June 30, 2018

Tech industry should lobby President Trump to nominate Senator Mike Lee to succeed Justice Kennedy on the Supreme Court

While Justice Anthony Kennedy has decided to retire from the Supreme Court after 30 years, his concurrence in eBay v. MercExchange, which stressed the unreasonableness of injunctive relief over a minor feature of a multifunctional product, will be a lasting legacy for which the tech sector (apart from patent trolls and companies that used to make or are still making devices, but largely or entirely relying on patent licensing revenue) will be forever grateful.

With this voice of reason in connection with patent enforcement leaving the Supreme Court, and with someone like Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim mislabeling as "the United States' policy" an unFRANDly agenda hostile to innovators focused on making actual products, the product-making, truly innovative majority of America's technology industry should make an effort to ensure that Justice Kennedy's successor will have a very balanced approach to patent enforcement. Where the rumored candidates stand on patent policy is usually unknown: you'd only have a clue if they had previously served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or maybe if they had demonstrated a certain approach to patent cases at the trial stage (Judge Rodney Gilstrap--obviously not a candidate--is undoubtedly unbalanced). But that's rarely the case. For an example, no one really knew where Justice Gorsuch would stand, but he's a judge whom I would always trust that he'll go to extreme lengths to interpret the law correctly and reasonably (and to explain his reasoning in an intelligible way).

At this stage, there is a high-potential candidate we should rally behind: Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah).

He's on the President's shortlist of about two dozen potential nominees. Senator Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), himself often considered a potential Supreme Court nominee and probably one of the smartest jurists ever to hold elective office, vouches for his colleague's judicial conservatism. As does Mark Levin. Or the Hoover Institution's Adam White. And Senator Lee would gladly accept.

There are, however, two obstacles, apart from the fact that there are many other impressive people on the list of potential nominees. They aren't insurmountable, but they are significant. One is that Senator Mike Lee is not a sitting judge, unlike other recent nominees. The other issue is that he called on then-candidate Trump to withdraw before the general election when the "p***y-grabbing" recording came up. I must admit that even I, as a longstanding Trump supporter (even on this blog I voiced support for him in early 2016), was very concerned at the time that the recording would cost him too many female votes. Fortunately, he won anyway, and more and more people believe that he may go down in history as one of the most impactful presidents ever. But in that situation so close to the election, Senator Lee was skeptical, for understandable reasons.

I'm reasonably optimistic that President Trump will let bygones be bygones, and that he's not too much bound to this conventional thinking that only a sitting judge should be nominated. He's the first president never to have held political office or to have been a general.

Silicon Valley, and Microsoft and Amazon up north, and many other tech innovators across the United States, should support Senator Lee. The Supreme Court will continue to hear many patent cases in the coming years and beyond. Sooner or later, a FRAND case will reach the Supreme Court, given all that is going on with the controversy surrounding Qualcomm's business practices (most recently, an extremely interesting motion for an anti-enforcement injunction brought by consumers) or the patent dispute between the world's two leading Android device makers (Samsung v. Huawei), and numerous other issues and disputes. If Apple and then-Google's Motorola hadn't settled, even Judge Posner's historic FRAND decision could have gone all the way up to the top U.S. court.

There also is some potential for legal questions involving the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) and its sole remedy (equivalent to injunctive relief) reaching the Supreme Court in the not too distant future.

A hypothetical Justice Mike Lee would understand how to strike a reasonable balance between the interests of right holders and those of innovators who don't intend to infringe but simply implement industry standards or independently create products. He's knowledgeable on antitrust as well, and patent and antitrust matters overlap ever more often.

I've previously mentioned Senator Lee's advocacy of reasonableness in patent enforcement:

Please support him if you can.

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Wednesday, April 25, 2018

Supreme Court SAS ruling: higher principles decide, patent review efficiency suffers collateral damage

Someone wrote on Twitter that patent holders had something to celebrate yesterday: After the Supreme Court's Oil States (7-2 confirming constitutionality of PTAB inter partes review) and SAS (5-4 holding that PTAB must render decision on all challenged patent claims after granting review), patent holders were allegedly in a stronger position than before, which--as the same tweeter (I forgot the name) noted--is rarely the case when the Supreme Court overrules the Federal Circuit as it did in SAS.

Classical spin doctoring? A comparison of the number of amicus briefs filed shows where most of the attention was. 54 briefs in Oil States vs. only 2 in SAS. If patent holders at large had cared a lot about SAS, more of them than just the Intellectual Property Owners Association (amicus brief, PDF) would have chimed in. However, many of those who'd have preferred to have done away with PTAB IPR in the first place presumably welcome anything that adversely affects PTAB's operational efficiency--and even when (as is the case here) it's not easy to predict the fallout, someone who hates PTAB probably just thinks it can hardly get worse from that particular vantage point.

It is perfectly plausible that many experts believe the USPTO, which on average grants IPR under the America Invents Act with respect to not even half of all the claims that are challenged, may now have to hand down decisions on twice as many claims and may, in order to keep its workload at the same level, simply deny a lot of petitions that might have previously succeeded because they raised issues worthy of review with respect to one or more, but not all, challenged claims.

That would be understandable, but not desirable. At the same time, under a Republican administration and a Republican Congress it would be hard for PTAB to get a whole lot more resources. Unfortunately, some of what's going on politically aims to weaken PTAB.

The PTAB IPR timeline is tight. The AIA says a final written decision must come down within one year of instituting a review. For good cause, this can be extended by up to six months. That framework doesn't lend itself to simply taking twice as much time per case while waiting for more resources.

Whether PTAB will need to spend about twice as much time per review is, however, far from clear:

First, if challenges to claims are so weak that those claims wouldn't have been reviewed in the past, the average per-claim effort to uphold those claims on review should be less--the question is, however, how much less--than a rejection decision. Also, while the number of claims to rule on may (more than) double, all challenges already had to be looked at in the past to form an initial opinion. More work for PTAB for sure--but probably not twice as much.

Second, a much bigger factor than the previous one. It's not a static environment where all players will behave just as before, except that PTAB has to make an all-or-nothing review decision. Different types of petitioners will pursue different tactics, and as PTAB reactively (but probably rather quickly) adapts to the effects of numerous tactical decisions, the players will adjust their tactics.

In the "smartphone patent wars" I've seen some of the most extreme stalling efforts one could imagine. There was one Android device maker that had hardly any patents (especially not patents of the kind that would scare anyone) to countersue, but its lawyers were stalling artists on both sides of the Atlantic. Then there was Apple, which generally had a great deal of urgency in cases in which it was the only part asserting offensive claims, or was asserting more or potentially more impactful ones, while taking its time when defending itself--but nowhere near as extreme as some Android companies. Microsoft was pretty unique because it tried to accelerate pretty much everything (except maybe ITC proceedings in which it was the respondend). For an example, Microsoft went to a UK court to obtain a quick ruling on a Motorola patent in order to influence some German decisions, and it obtained an antisuit injunction to prevent Motorola from enforcing two German patent injunctions (arguably, an antisuit injunction is a form of stalling, but unlike traditional stalling, it requires speed in one jurisdiction).

PTAB IPR petitioners are also diverse. Some primarily want to slow down infringement proceedings, which often get stayed. Others are more focused on strategically striking down certain claims.

Some "stallers" may like parallel proceedings where they challenge some claims before PTAB and others in district court. Post-SAS, if more claims of a patent are reviewed than would have been reviewed before, litigation estoppel may result in some consolidation. That was a policy argument made by those advocating all-or-nothing. In my opinion, that was a far weaker policy argument than efficiency, especially in light of all the positive effects of PTAB on "patent hygiene," but we'll get to what the case turned on in a moment.

Statistics will show some SAS effects, but I'm quite sure many petitioners will now choose more wisely--especially once the percentage of granted petitions goes down. No one will act in the interest of the collectivity of all petitioners; as always in litigation, each party will do what serves its own interests. But sometimes that does, in the end, also serve a greater good.

If even outsiders like me can sometimes (especially if we take the necessary time for research) figure out which invalidity contentions are relatively strongest, petitioners and especially their counsel should have a clear idea of realistic priorities in most cases. Probably not immediately, but after a year or two, I guess the number of claims challenged on a per-patent basis will drop significantly.

PTAB efficiency wasn't really the Supreme Court majority's primary concern here. The Supreme Court does usually promote balance in patent litigation. But here, the efficiency impact of the procedural question at issue was of limited importance, and absolutely not outcome-determinative (as the result shows).

In Oil States, the Supreme Court had only two dissenters (Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts). All others supported PTAB IPR, with some left-wingers (Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor) filing additional thoughts in concurrence. By contrast, SAS resulted in an ideological 5-4 right-left split. The tweeter I mentioned further above would undoubtedly have preferred it the other way round: a 5-4 decision against PTAB in Oil States (then SAS would have been moot).

Justice Gorsuch has now been on the opposite side of my desired outcome in three cases (Dimaya, Oil States, and SAS) in short succession. I still like his judicial style very much--including his highly explanatory writings that others mock as #GorsuchStyle. He's an independent thinker, and despite his great background (including his family) and career, he's absolutely not an "elitist" of the kind that Trump supporters like me view skeptically. I wouldn't describe him as anti-elitist, but his take on Chevron (deference to government agencies) shows that he has less trust in unelected elites in government agencies than in elected lawmakers. And that's what SAS ended up being about more than anything else.

The Ginsburg-Breyer style is reflected by their dissenting opinions: the majority's literal reading of the statute in question is deemed "wooden," the statute is allegedly "difficult" (while to Justice Gorsuch and his entire camp its language is crystal clear), the USPTO should have the wiggle room to second-guess lawmakers (it's not just "what" Congress wanted and "why," and it comes across as extremely liberal when they suggest judges should simply take the position of "reasonable" legislators). By contrast, the majority opinion, while the outcome is inefficient, is a principled one. It's almost like saying "stupid but constitutional" (three words that Justice Scalia told his clerks and other jurists). The first Chevron hurdle requires a lack of clarity: lawmakers' intent must not be discernible. Only then can a government agency adopt its own rules, provided those are reasonable.

I honestly wish the intent of Congress had not been perfectly discernible in this context. Then the more efficient PTAB approach (reviewing only claims that face a credible challenge) could have been affirmed. But while I agree with the left wing on policy, after reading everything I can appreciate why no conservative judge would have been prepared to concur for a different set of reasons with the left camp and affirm the Federal Circuit majority.

The sole linguistic argument for a lack of clarity was centered around the reference to claims challenged in the "petition" in one place and "by the petitioner" in the relevant statute here, but that is a small difference and justified by the fact that initially there's a petition, but later the petitioner might have dropped challenges (under a settlement). The legislative record provides a few quotes from Capitol Hill lawmakers that really support the idea that all claims challenged by a petitioner should be reviewed, or none at all.

Ultimately it came down to how high the first Chevron hurdle should be. No conservative judge could have set the hurdle low enough for affirmance in SAS without spill-over effects on numerous other cases in which government agencies set their own rules.

Justice Gorsuch has a history of expressing a critical perspective on Chevron. The following passage from page 11 of yesterday's SAS decision is more than telling:

"But whether Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another day. Even under Chevron, no affirmance]."

It's just an occasional remark, so it may not mean too much that no member of the majority dissented from it. But imagine a patent ruling in which the Supreme Court would say: "But whether eBay should remain is a question we may leave for another day. Even under eBay, [...]"

Chevron may be history at some point as the friends of Big Government and DC elites don't have a majority on the current Supreme Court. With such a strategic target in mind, there was no way that conservative justices could have widened the applicability of Chevron in a patent case that wasn't really about life or death of the innovation economy (unlike eBay, or even the Samsung design patent damages case, by way of comparison).

Justice Gorsuch has finally positioned himself as the thought leader of the Chevron-critical movement. What's remarkable is that Chevron upheld an air quality standards regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which at the time was headed by Anne Gorsuch Burford, Justice Gorsuch's mother. The Chevron opinion by the Supreme Court refers, in the context of the history of the case, to Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, an appeal (of an EPA decision, thus Mrs. Gorsuch was formally the defendant) decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

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Thursday, October 5, 2017

DoJ backs Apple, says Supreme Court should deny Samsung's most recent cert petition

Just this week, the Wall Street Journal reported on the high-volume business Apple is doing with Samsung, a key supplier of components for various products including the new flagship iPhone, the iPhone X, on which Samsung will reportedly make $110 per unit. But as device makers, the two remain fierce competitors--and adversaries in court.

A few months after the Supreme Court of the United States requested the Trump Administration's perspective on Samsung's most recent petition for writ of certiorari, the Solicitor General of the United States, Noel Francisco, has expressed the views of the U.S. federal government (this post continues below the document):

16-1102 Views of the United States by Florian Mueller on Scribd

The short version is this: the DoJ tells the Supreme Court to deny all three parts of Samsung's petition, but it's not a ringing endorsement of the Federal Circuit's controversial en banc decision. Not at all. It's completely based on procedural and standard-of-review considerations.

The following passages show that the DoJ doesn't necessarily agree with the Fed. Cir. majority:

"The sufficiency-of-the-evidence question presented on appeal was a close one, and the court of appeals may have erred in concluding that substantial evidence supported aspects of the jury's verdict."

"If the Federal Circuit continues to develop and enforce rigid rules for demonstrating obviousness, this Court's review may ultimately be warranted. This case, however, would be an unsuitable vehicle for addressing that issue. Because petitioners did not preserve any objection that the jury instructions [...]"

"Although the phrase 'some connection' may be infelicitous, [...]"

In the famous design patents case, the DoJ agreed with Samsung on the key legal question (article of manufacture). It additionally brought up a procedural question that could have enabled Apple to defend the original damages award. Now, with respect to the more recent petition relating to invalidity, injunctive relief, and infringement, the DoJ cautiously distances itself from the en banc opinion and indicates only between the lines that it may disagree, to some extent, from a policy perspective ("rigid rules for demonstrating obviousness" etc.). It would have been nice if the DoJ had been clearer about the implications of this for U.S. tech companies and for the work of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, which is supposed to protect real technological progress, which is hard to do if even weak evidence of non-obviousness gets a lot of weight. The DoJ could have expressed more clearly a concern over what this means for patent quality, but unfortunately it didn't.

So what does this mean for the prospects of Samsung's cert petition?

The George Mason Law Review published an empirical analysis of cert procedures (PDF), according to which the Supreme Court became more likely to grant certiorari in a case where the Solicitor General was invited to file a brief regardless of whether the SG recommended cert or not. It's a fact that the Supreme Court grants more petitions following a Call for Views of the Solicitor General than the SG recommends should be granted.

Of course, it's too early to have statistics on how the Supreme Court views Solicitor General Francisco's recommendations. But it's not like it's over for Samsung. It's a setback for them and, conversely, a significant intermediate victory for Apple, but the Supreme Court can still decide either way.

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Monday, June 26, 2017

Supreme Court requests U.S. government's input on Samsung's petition (2nd Apple case)

As the docket overview now indicates, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided to ask for the views of the Solicitor General of the United States on Samsung's petition for writ of certiorari relating to the second California Apple v. Samsung case. To be precise, this CVSG (Call for Views of the Solicitor General) is a CVASG--currently there is an Acting Solicitor General, Jeffrey Wall.

This means the Supreme Court's summer recess will be a busy period for the parties--and other stakeholders--as they will both be lobbying the Department of Justice.

Just last week, a Reuters story had the following headline: "RPT-U.S. Supreme Court and top patent court rarely see eye to eye" It is true that the relationship between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit is, well, special. That Reuters article is about a rare case in which there was affirmance, but high-profile reversals, such as recently on patent exhaustion in the Lexmark case, are more common.

This is nice progress for Samsung. The likelihood of certiorari being granted has increased substantially.

In connection with design patents (and involving the same two litigants), the DoJ filed an amicus brief that philosophically agreed with Samsung while procedurally leaving the door open for Apple to prevail regardless. After the DoJ had taken a clear position on the high-level issue (article of manufature), the whole argument was more focused on other questions. Some may view it as an exaggeration, but one could make a defensible case that the DoJ actually did a fair amount of the Supreme Court's job in that case.

It's too early to tell what positions the DoJ is going to take here. Once we all learn more about it, I'll comment. I'm cautiously optimistic, though. This case never was the kind of slam dunk that the design patents issue represented, but what the Federal Circuit did (and how it did it) was rather strange. That's not just my opinion. Mr. "Chisum on Patents" said so. And Samsung got fairly broadbased support from amici. There obviously are stakeholders who are against Samsung's petition, and while they didn't file an amicus brief since it would have been counterproductive (it would only have raised the profile of the issues), some will probably try to influence the DoJ now in ways that would benefit Apple (with a view to this case; in the long run Apple would probably benefit from reversal, possibly even in connection with any infringement claims by Qualcomm).

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Tuesday, June 6, 2017

Samsung urges Supreme Court again to overrule Federal Circuit on key patent litigation questions: Apple v. Samsung

With last week's wonderful Lexmark decision, the Supreme Court again turned out to be the guardian of sanity in the patent litigation context. Presumably in an effort to get earlier and ultimately more attention from the Supreme Court clerks evaluating cert petitions, Samsung yesterday filed (once agai well ahead of a deadline) an optional reply brief in support of its request that the Supreme Court review the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in the second Apple v. Samsung case (this post continues below the document):

17-06-05 Samsung Reply Brief Iso Cert Petition by Florian Mueller on Scribd

Obviously, Apple would like to avoid Supreme Court review and just get the most favorable outcome. In some cases, what's good for Apple is also good for the industry at large. Not so here. If the Supreme Court granted Samsung's petition from writ of certiorari, the outcome could have similarly positive effects as the recent Lexmark decision. (In the long run, that would also benefit Apple, which is a defendant in the vast majority of patent cases that it's a party to.)

Samsung's reply brief stresses the importance of the issues and particularly emphasizes that all three issues Samsung submits for review involve legal, not merely factual questions. At the end of the reply brief, it becomes clear that Samsung's short-term priority is the "quick links" patent, which the Federal Circuit patent held not to be infringed but the other circuit judges, in their controversial en banc decision, reinstated the district court ruling and jury verdict.

The Supreme Court will consider the petition at its June 22 conference.

Rather than go into more detail here (since I've already blogged about all of the issues and also this cert proceeding on multiple occasions), I'd like to point you to a great source of information: a YouTube video of a recent Public Knowledge Foundation conference in Washington, DC. Here I have some highlights from the event--select quotes from each of the panelists with a focus on (non-)obviousness, one of the three parts of Samsung's petition:

Ellen Schrantz, Senior Director of Government Affairs & Counsel, the Internet Association:

  • "What the Court essentially did was take a legal determination of obviousness and make it into a factual determination for the jury, and then just presumed that the jury resolved facts that it wasn’t even charged with solving in the first place."

  • "Given the speed which with the marketplace is moving and the complex issues across circuits and courts on obviousness as well as the very strange procedural history here of there not even being a briefing ahead of the en banc decision, this really is prime for Supreme Court consideration."

  • "By lowering the bar for non-obviousness, there's a real risk that patents will issue that don't deserve patent protection, that there will be additional litigation. And ultimately, it's the consumers that are going to bear the brunt of this because they will be subsidizing the litigation costs for innovators, and suffering as a result."

Carl Cecere, Attorney for the Hispanic Leadership Fund and the National Grange:

  • "You're asking the jury to evaluate the state of the art in technologies as diverse as biotechnology, space telescopes, and evaluate whether this is a step beyond what was already there."

  • "Deferring to juries creates a lot of problems. It runs the risk of allowing a lot of obvious inventions that may not be obvious to a jury, to be validated. It also runs the risk of invalidating some good inventions."

Derek Dahlgren, Attorney, Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, PC:

  • "By lowering the bar for non-obviousness, there's a real risk that patents will issue that don't deserve patent protection, that there will be additional litigation."

Matthew Levy, Patent Policy Consultant and former Patent Counsel at the Computer and Communications Industry Association:

  • "It's not just the twisting of obviousness law and it's not just trying to go back to the pre eBay injunction rule. It's this whole, the battle is really for what is patents going to cover? Are they going to cover what they say they cover or are we going to allow the conflation of the tiny with the entire thing?"

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Tuesday, May 30, 2017

Supreme Court rules against Lexmark on patent exhaustion, strengthening FTC/Apple cases against Qualcomm

The long-awaited Supreme Court ruling in Impression Products v. Lexmark International (PDF) has just been handed down. It deals with two questions related to patent exhaustion, and I was aware of it before but wanted to wait until the implications of that dispute on the smartphone cases I'm primarily interested in would be clearer. The good news is that the Supreme Court has once again overruled the Federal Circuit in a way that strengthens those defending themselves against attempts to gain excessive leverage and extract overcompensation from patents. The Supreme Court is staying its course with respect to patent matters, regardless of some patent troll lobbying groups suggesting that all those decisions would result in the demise of the American inventor (quite the opposite is the case).

Lexmark tried to leverage its patents on toner cartridges against various so-called remanufacturers (companies that buy up empty toner cartridges, refill them, and then sell the refilled cartridges). Impression Products was the last man standing at some point and took this to the Supreme Court after the Federal Circuit had decided completely in--surprise, surprise--the patent holder's favor. Of the three different levels of the federal court system, the Supreme Court took the strongest and clearest position against overleveraging/overcompensation of patents; the Federal Circuit took the very opposite position; and the district court (Southern District of Ohio) had agreed with Lexmark that exhaustion didn't apply to cartridges sold in other countries, but had sided with Impression at least with respect to cartridges Lexmark sold in the U.S. and on which it sought to impose certain restrictions.

As today's Supreme Court decision explains, the Federal Circuit "started from the premise that the exhaustion doctrine is an interpretation of the patent infringement statute, which prohibits anyone from using or selling a patented article 'without authority' from the patentee." In this statutory context, "without authority" just serves the purpose of clarification: if you have a license, you don't infringe. That's self-explanatory, if not tautological. But it's also the weakest basis on which the doctrine of patent exhaustion could stand: the Federal Circuit wanted to reduce exhaustion to merely a presumption of the patent holder granting customers and the entire downstream "authority" to use and resell a product. It would have been a weak basis for the all-important concept of patent exhaustion since patent holders could then navigate around it by just imposing some restrictions. Exhaustion would have worked in a similar way to promissory estoppel: if you don't say the wrong thing, or if you say the right thing to overcome a presumption, you're not estopped.

The Supreme Court has now made it clear that exhaustion is much stronger and much more comprehensive:

"The problem with the Federal Circuit's logic is that the exhaustion doctrine is not a presumption about the authority that comes along with a sale; it is a limit on the scope of the patentee's rights. The Patent Act gives patentees a limited exclusionary power, and exhaustion extinguishes that power. A purchaser has the right to use, sell or import an item because those are the rights that come along with ownership, not because it purchased authority to engage in those practices from the patentee."

On that basis, the Supreme Court basically held that Lexmark couldn't impose the restrictions it relied upon in this litigation, and that this wouldn't work for Lexmark even if the first sale occurred outside the United States (the one scenario of the two in which the district court sided with Lexmark). The Supreme Court's disagreement with the Federal Circuit is very visible in this passage, too:

"The Patent Act promotes innovation by allowing inventors to secure the financial rewards for their inventions. Once a patentee sells an item, it has secured that reward, and the patent laws provide no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the product."

No overcompensation. No overleveraging. No double-dipping. No restrictions that go beyond what the Patent Act allows. That's the message here.

Presumably, some people in another Washington DC building are now reading the Supreme Court decision: the lawyers working on the FTC's case against Qualcomm. The FTC argued in its January complaint, under a headline that describes Qualcomm's "no license-no chips" policy as "anomalous among component suppliers," that "when one of Qualcomm's competitors sells a baseband processor to an OEM, the OEM can use or resell the processor without obtaining a separate patent license from the competitor—just as a consumer buying a smartphone does not have to obtain a separate patent license from the seller of the smartphone." The FTC went on to explain that "Qualcomm is unique in requiring an OEM, as a condition of sale, to secure a separate patent license requiring royalty payments for handsets that use a competitor's components." For example, this would apply to a situation in which a device maker is a customer of Qualcomm and, say, Intel or Samsung's component business.

The FTC still has to make an antitrust argument here (tying), which includes that it has to prove Qualcomm's monopoly-like power in the baseband chipset business, but at least Qualcomm can't just point to the (now-reversed) Federal Circuit decision in disputing the FTC's exhaustion argument.

Patent exhaustion as a concept has been strengthened today, and its profile in certain other cases will likely be even higher now. While Apple takes certain positions when it enforces its own patents (and would rather avoid Supreme Court review of a highly controversial Federal Circuit decision in its favor), exhaustion is not an issue in Apple v. Samsung but it does play a role in Apple v. Qualcomm: Count XXIII of Apple's antitrust complaint against Qualcomm is a request for judicial "declaration of unenforceability [of Qualcomm's patents in certain contexts] due to exhaustion." Apple alleged in its January complaint that "Qualcomm has sought, and continues to seek, separate patent license fees from Apple's [contract manufacturers] for patents embodied in the chipsets Qualcomm sells to Apple's CMs, a practice that is prohibited under the patent exhaustion doctrine." In the past, Apple had to pay those license fees indirectly (via its contract manufacturers), which it is no longer prepared to do, and that's why Qualcomm is now suing four Apple contract manufacturers and seeking a preliminary injunction against them.

Apple also wrote that "[b]y requiring Apple's CMs to take a separate patent license for the same components that they purchase, Qualcomm is double-dipping." That term is an accusation against Qualcomm that I previously heard from other industry players, so I wasn't surprised to also find it in Apple's complaint. If the Federal Circuit ruling in Lexmark had been affirmed, Qualcomm might have been able to defeat that particular count of Apple's complaint. Apple's complaint already anticipated that Qualcomm would point to its corporate structure: "Qualcomm has attempted to evade the patent exhaustion doctrine by selling baseband processor chipsets to Apple's [contract manufacturers] through QTC, which is operated by QTI, which is in turn a wholly owned subsidiary of Qualcomm." Apple then points to Qualcomm's 2012 restructuring, which I already blogged about back then with a focus on open-source licensing issues. The Supreme Court's broad and inclusive approach to exhaustion simply doesn't allow any kind of end-run around the exhaustion doctrine through a first sale outside the United States as in one of the two issues relevant in the Lexmark case. Philosophically, this also makes it hard to imagine that an end-run could be achieved through a sophisticated corporate structure.

As the district court cases in Northern (FTC v. Qualcomm) and Southern (Apple v. Qualcomm) California unfold, patent exhaustion is going to be a very interesting part of the debate. And in many other cases, though the Qualcomm cases are currently the highest-profile smartphone-related cases in which exhaustion plays a role.

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