Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts

Saturday, June 24, 2023

Game over at halftime for FTC: San Francisco injunction hearing in Microsoft-Activision merger case exposes evidentiary and intellectual bankruptcy of misguided agency's case

This week has been as sad as it has been bad for the United States Federal Trade Commission. The FTC v. Microsoft & Activision Blizzard preliminary injunction hearing that started on Thursday (after a status conference the day before) turned out a massive embarrassment for an agency that appears oblivious to its mandate. The purpose of this post is just to summarize some high-level observations, which are complementary to my live tweets from the San Francisco courtroom and my spoken commentary in several Twitter Spaces.

As a litigation watcher for more than a dozen years, I know that it's risky to take a definitive position at halftime. This is, however, a rare exception where it's safe and warranted. The FTC is finished with respect to this case--it has a snow flake's chance in hell now--and must tread much more carefully because its outrageous conduct has institutional implications beyond this one case. If the question wasn't viewed as a partisan matter by Democrats, the FTC's behavior should be the subject of a Congressional investigation. Simply put, instead of protecting American consumers against abusive conduct by corporations, the FTC is failing American consumers and, on top of that, flagrantly acting against American economic interests to the benefit of Japanese and Chinese competitors. The FTC did so this week even to the extent of pressuring a senior Microsoft executive to make commitments to the benefit of Sony, which possibly could be argued to constitute the non-military equivalent of high treason.

Contrary to proving that the proposed merger would result in a substantial lessening of competition, the hearing conducted by Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the United States District court for the Northern District of California has already shown that there would be positive effects in the markets in which the FTC alleges an SLC (consoles and cloud gaming), and also in a third one (mobile game distribution).

If one ignored--as none of us should--the specific circumstances and characteristics of the transaction in question, one might indeed ask a legitimate question: should Big Tech get even bigger? From a policy point of view, reasonable arguments can be made about whether trillion-dollar corporations that still have very significant organic growth rates should additionally be allowed to accelerate their growth by spending billions or, like in this case, tens of billions on acquisitions. I am not saying that such deals should necessarily be prohibited--just that I can relate to a philosophical concern over a concentration of power. and a discussion could be had. There is, however, a right way and a wrong way to tackle that subject. The right way would be to have a political debate and a decision at the end of a democratic process. The wrong way is to stretch and bend (if not worse) the law as it stands.

The FTC brought a motion for a preliminary injunction in San Francisco, not because it wanted to but because the deal might otherwise have been closed without further notice. Microsoft and Activision's joint opposition brief revealed that Sony, which dominates the global market for video game consoles (and certain aftermarkets), was actually not afraid of vertical input foreclosure. That Sony-internal email was read aloud at the start of the San Francisco hearing:

That email exudes the confidence of a company with enormous market power. It is damning for the FTC's "case", which was an ultra-long shot anyway:

  • No vertical merger has been prohibited in the United States in decades.

  • The purpose of antitrust law is not to shield a dominant player (Sony) from competition and to sustain its margins in an aftermarket (distribution of games made for its platform).

  • A theory of harm relating to a nascent market (which in this case is not even a market in a competition law sense, as even one of the FTC's own key witnesses practically conceded) must meet a reasonably high standard, as the alternative would transform merger control into a fantasy game.

The FTC's console market theory of harm and its software variant (multi-game library subscription services) face the first two hurdles, and those are not additive but multiplicative. The regulators in charge of 40 countries--even the UK CMA, which is otherwise the FTC's sole remaining ally--have rejected those console-related theories. Presumably even the FTC would have dropped it, but it made its bed in December (when it brought a complaint with its in-house court) and must lie in it.

For the cloud-gaming theory of harm, which is at issue in the UK (where the CMA is hardly going to be able to defend it in court), the first two challenges as outlined above are joined by the third (nascent-market theories).

After two full hearing days and extensive briefing (the parties also filed the pre-hearing versions of their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which I studied in detail), the FTC has not made headway. It is, in fact, further away from being granted a PI than it was then this started.

The FTC's numerous attempts to disprove Microsoft's defenses have been fairly ineffectual. Microsoft may very well have recognized internally that content is king with respect to consoles and other platforms, but that is like a law of nature and Sony's PlayStation has far more exclusive content than Microsoft's Xbox. There may very well be contexts in which Microsoft focuses more on competition with Sony than with Nintendo, but that will not be outcome-determinative either.

While the FTC needs to make a strong showing and Microsoft (along with Activision Blizzard) would merely have to fend off the PI motion, the first two hearing days (with three more scheduled for next week) have shown that there is no foreclosure intent on Microsoft's part with respect to Call of Duty and that cloud gaming services are not a relevant antitrust market.

On Thursday, Microsoft corporate vice president (Xbox) Sarah Bond explained that Microsoft was limited in its ability to point to Call of Duty in its Xbox marketing efforts due to contractual restrictions that apparently resulted from an agreement between Sony and Activision. Basically, due to the Sony-Activision deal, Microsoft was not able to reference CoD except in places where the audience already had an Xbox, at least for the most part.

The three key takeaways from Friday are the following ones:

  • Shortly before the lunch break, Microsoft Gaming CEO Phil Spencer testified, at the prompting of his company's counsel, that they would not withdraw CoD from the PlayStation. Judge Corley then reminded him of the fact that he was testifying under oath and wanted to clarify again--clearly not because she didn't believe him but because it was so central to this case--that CoD would remain on the PlayStation. Mr. Spencer did not hesitate for even one second: "Absolutely. Will raise my hand."

    Just minutes before that key intervention by Judge Corley, I wrote on Twitter that her questions didn't bode well for the FTC. Not because of a bias but because she clearly identified the issues that have the potential to resolve the case. The FTC would rather want to muddy the water, but that is not working out.

  • The FTC realized that this oath--combined with all of the deficiencies of the FTC's "case"--spelled doom for its console market theory of harm. The agency's Deputy Chief Trial Counsel James Weingarten made the wrong choice, however, when he sought to expose limitations or loopholes in that central promise:

    There was outrage on Twitter that a U.S. government agency acted in court as if it was negotiating a better deal for Sony. Mr. Weingarten asked Mr. Spencer whether that commitment would also be extended to other Activision games than CoD. I want to be fair, and that's why I told people right away that his questions were rhetorical. Mr. Weingarten didn't want Microsoft to make further-reaching commitments: he wanted to salvage his "case" by getting Mr. Spencer to decline to make additional promises or widen the scope of the existing one. That said, the FTC should be held accountable for such outrageous conduct. Even though I am sure Mr. Weingarten wanted a no for an answer, that intense situation in the courtroom could have resulted in a commitment to the benefit of a foreign Microsoft competitor.

    The current FTC has previously been criticized for colluding with foreign regulators (such as the CMA in this context) to scuttle the Microsoft-Activision deal and to torpedo other mergers (Illumina-Grail is a deal that was closed without regulatory approval but still the subject of litigation). It has become known that unusually extensive communication took place between the FTC and the CMA during the Phase 2 investigation of the deal in the UK. Now the FTC has gone considerably further by pressuring a Microsoft executive to make concessions to a foreign competitor. Again, I am saying so even though it was clear to me that the FTC did not really want to optimize the deal terms for Sony. It's bad enough that the FTC recklessly took into account the possibility of damage to the American economy as a result of its litigation tactics.

    When the FTC kept insisting and even wanted Mr. Spencer to make a promise under oath with respect to cloud-gaming services, Judge Corley said she didn't need that and decided to cut off the FTC's questioning.

  • The Google manager who used to be in charge of the failed Stadia cloud gaming service (a failure primarily due to Google's lack of commitment, which didn't inspire confidence in game makers to support the service), Dov Zimring, was called by the FTC. Unlike Sony, Google is not a vocal complainant, but it is against this deal. It would rather do more $360 million deals with an independent Activision to cement its Android app distribution monopoly. So Mr. Zimring was trying to support the FTC, such as by attributing Stadia's failure to its lack of CoD (when the market leader, GeForce Now, and Microsoft's xCloud service are not currently offering CoD either, though they will be able to stream CoD after the acquisition has been consummated).

    Microsoft's lead counsel is Beth Wilkinson, and a lawyer from her firm, Anastasia Pastan, conducted an extremely effective cross-examination of Mr. Zimring, who denied knowledge of things that he must actually known. Mrs. Pastan was not frustrated: she just kept going. The most important result of Mr. Zimring's testimony was that he said cloud streaming competes with console gaming. That admission completely undermines the FTC's claim that cloud gaming is a market of its own. The fact that not just Microsoft executives and experts, but even someone working for a company opposing the deal--and who was called by the FTC--said so makes it a particularly valuable concession.

There will be further testimony next week, including Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella and Activision Blizzard CEO Bobby Kotick. There will be expert testimony, and it is worth noting that the FTC's economic expert, Harvard professor Robin Lee, published several papers, one of them specifically focused on the videogame industry, in which he argued that exclusive content was good for competition between platforms. Plus, his paper on the videogame industry included Nintendo in his console market definition.

Closing argument will be on Thursday, and late on Friday the parties will have to file their revised proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, reflecting their views of what was and what wasn't proven during the hearing. Seriously, the FTC appears unable to prove anything that really matters. It's a disaster for them. They should never have opposed the transaction in the first place.

Judge Corley will decide soon. I guess the decision will be handed down either shortly after Independence Day or even before. The CMA will then be the sole remaining hold-out, unable to defend its crazy April 26 decision on appeal and facing the risk of being "closed over" by the target date set forth in the merger agreement (July 18).

The FTC and the CMA should work out a solution that benefits gamers and cloud-streaming services. As did the European Commission before them. They are only making things worse by not acting constructively. And why would lawmakers give the FTC more powers if it doesn't even responsibly use the ones it already has? The FTC has made more than one error of judgment in connection with this transaction. What I saw the FTC do yesterday was really disconcerting. They are not going to turn this around next week. It may be unrealistic, but I wish they could just recognize that they are on the losing track and figure out a consumer-friendly solution.

Friday, April 7, 2023

Discovery closes today in two antitrust matters involving Activision Blizzard (FTC merger case and In Re Google Play Antitrust Litigation) while UK CMA is preparing remedies working paper

Coincidentally, today is the cutoff date for fact discovery in two disparate antitrust actions involving Activision Blizzard King (ABK):

  • the FTC's adjudicative proceeding (in-house lawsuit) over ABK's acquisition by Microsoft, and

  • the In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation in the Northern District of California, where Epic Games and Match Group are pursuing a per se violation claim against Google based on its "Project Hug" agreements with game makers. ABK received $360 million, which ensured its loyalty to the Google Play Store for several years. In this particular case, ABK is a third party, but an important one. Because of this new theory, fact discovery in that litigation was reopened.

The purpose of this post is to discuss the next steps in those cases, also in United States et al. v. Google--a case pending in a court on the other coast (D.C.) but with factual overlaps--and the Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard merger review in the UK, where some filings were released yesterday and an important new document is expected to be sent to Microsoft and ABK next week. Let's start with the merger-related parts.

  1. FTC adjudicative proceeding enters expert phase

  2. CMA remedies working paper expected while Sony is panicking

  3. Curative sanctions--and trial date and format--to be determined in Google Play case in N.D. Cal.

  4. Implications for sanctions motion in United States et al. v. Google (D.C.)

FTC adjudicative proceeding enters expert phase

After today's fact discovery cutoff, the focus in the FTC's Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard process shifts to the experts:

  • The FTC is to provide its expert witness reports within four weeks (May 5).

  • A week later (May 12), the FTC has to provide to Microsoft's and ABK's lawyers its final proposed witness and exhibit lists with a view to the August trial.

  • Another two weekslater (May 26), Microsoft and ABK have to provide their expert witness reports.

  • By May 30, the deal parties have to provide their final proposed witness and exhibit lists.

  • June 9 is the deadline for the FTC's rebuttal expert reports that respond to Microsoft's and ABK's expert witness reports.

  • The deadline for expert depositions is two weeks later (June 23).

The most important question, however, is how much taxpayers' money the FTC really intends to waste on this. It's not even going to achieve its objective of moving the legal goal posts.

I've previously argued (mostly on Twitter) that the close of fact discovery is a point at which the FTC could--and in my personal opinion should--think hard about at least that PlayStation theory of harm. It would not be a sign of weakness, but of rationality, to recognize that Sony's theory is unsupported by any facts. There is no shred of evidence, and the numbers just don't work out.

The theory has been rejected or abandoned by a U.S. court and at least seven other regulators so far (Japan's JFTC having been the latest) as I discussed in a recent post. That's 8-0 against the theory. A recent report on the Phase III investigation in China suggests that it's also just about cloud gaming, in which case the score would already be 9-0. It's furthermore highly likely that Australia's ACCC and New Zealand's ComCom will agree with the UK CMA rather than the U.S. FTC. And decisions in some other jurisdictions could also come down anytime.

There could soon be a point at which a dozen or more regulators will have rejected the theory, and the FTC would come across as the "Flat Earth Society" in this regard. That would be bad, especially because America's consumers need a strong FTC to tackle the real issues facing them.

Why produce expert reports when a theory of harm is so clearly untenable? It doesn't even give the FTC any meaningful leverage in remedies discussions because it's just so very weak. Of course, it would be even better if the FTC could settle the entire case. In that case, the expert reports would not just be more focused but they wouldn't be needed anymore at all. If that is not possible in the very short term, I think a voluntary dismissal of Sony's theory--assuming that after today's fact discovery cutoff there simply won't be any evidence to build a foreclosure case--would be a logical thing to do.

Structurally, those FTC adjudicative proceedings are not entirely dissimilar to ITC Section 337 investigations, which I follow all the time. It is common and expected that parties narrow their ITC cases through voluntary dismissals. It's simply necessary to keep those ambitious schedules, and the ITC's ALJs even want to see periodical reports on efforts to streamline a given case. Could there be a clearer case for streamlining an FTC in-house lawsuit than this present situation?

CMA remedies working paper expected while Sony is panicking

The UK Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) amended its provisional findings on March 24 based on a consideration of all of the evidence and arguments before it, and consigned the PlayStation theory of harm to the dustbin of merger review history.

There was a deadline on March 31 for responses to that update, and it appears that Microsoft obtained an extension by a few days. Yesterday the CMA published the public redacted versions of the feedback it received from Microsoft (PDF), Sony (PDF), and UCL researcher Joost Rietveld (PDF).

I commented quickly in the form of a four-part Twitter thread and provided further observations in subsequent tweets.

Microsoft argues that even the updated provisional findings still overstate the incentive for foreclosure (though the result is now that foreclosure is unprofitable), and that the "residual" concerns over cloud gaming are based on a foreclosure theory that isn't any "stronger" only because it has not undergone a similar revision. In any event, Microsoft points to its access deals with Nvidia, Boosteroid, and Ubitus. So even though Microsoft continues to argue for unconditional clearance, remedies are on the table.

Professor Rietveld lays out a "typology" of cloud gaming services, and disputes that such services even constitute an antitrust market. In the following tweet he explained his decision to chime in (and thankfully shared the first tweet of my thread on those submissions):

Sony's submission is the clearest sign yet of the PlayStation maker staring into the jaws of defeat without any realistic chances of snatching victory from them. By calling the evolution of the CMA's take on the console market theory of harm (which was a rational decision in recognition of hard facts) "irrational", Sony invokes the standard for appellate review (by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal).

While some Microsoft submissions throughout the process have also reminded the CMA of the applicable appellate case law, there's a difference between saying at an early stage that a certain potential theory of harm would not be appeal-proof and doing what Sony did on March 31, which is to call an actual procedural step--the fact that the CMA amended its provisional findings-"irrational".

Sony can't prevent the merger from closing through an appeal. It won't achieve a subsequent divestiture either.

I couldn't resist but to do a "how it started / how it's going" tweet (a popular format on social media) to juxtapose Sony's earlier take on the CMA's work and its new aggressive stance. Let me show you the two annotated screenshots here (click on an image to enlarge):

There are five months and three days between those documents. But even at the beginning of March, Sony's position was still that it "welcome[d] the CMAs comprehensive review of the evidence in reaching this conclusion" and "agree[d] with the CMA's findings."

Now Sony slams the methodology and the conclusions, though the CMA had already previously--and rightly--rejected some of Sony's "evidence" for obvious deficiencies.

Sony's "Hail Mary" involves hyperbole so outlandish that parts of the internet are already ridiculing it:

"Any degradation in the price, performance, or quality of play on PlayStation or any delays on release would quickly harm SIE’s reputation and cause a loss of engagement and of players. As SIE’s CEO, Jim Ryan, explained to the CMA at the Remedies Hearing, if PlayStation received a degraded version of Call of Duty, it would 'seriously damage our reputation. Our gamers would desert our platform in droves and network effects would exacerbate the problem. Our business would never recover.'"

How can Mr. Ryan say that with a straight face? He should recognize his error and preserve his reputation. Right now he appears to be doing neither.

It's obviously clear that there would be no irreparable harm. Microsoft's Xbox has a much smaller market share than the PlayStation, and CoD has given Sony's customers some exclusive benefits for a while, yet there are no signs of irreparable harm to the Xbox, as the CMA also indicated in its findings.

Seeking Alpha has picked up a Deal Reporter story according to which the CMA is expected to issue its remedies working paper (the article mistakenly uses the singular form, "remedy") next week. This is what the CMA's guidelines (PDF) say about that document:

4.64 A remedies working paper, containing a detailed assessment of the different remedies options and setting out the CMA’s provisional decision on remedies, will be sent to the merger parties for comment following the response hearings. This paper will also set out the CMA’s views on whether the merger gives rise to RCBs, and if so, whether the proposed remedy should be modified in order to preserve those benefits. The merger parties will typically have at least five working days to respond to the remedies working paper. Third parties may also be consulted about the proposed scope of remedies and their views on any RCBs, and the remedies working paper may in some cases be published on the CMA website, but only if the CMA deems wider consultation to be necessary. In most cases, the remedies working paper is not published.

4.65 Following consultation on the remedies working paper and any further discussions and meetings with parties that the CMA considers necessary, the CMA will take its final decision on both the competition issues and any remedies.

Will this be one of the minority of cases in which the CMA does publish the remedies working paper and allows non-parties to comment?

There would obviously be a lot of curiosity due to the high profile of the case. But there has been so much discussion about remedies already, and why should the CMA invite Sony--especially after its unreasonable and unrealistic March 31 response to the updated provisional findings--to waste more time and insult human intelligence? Given that its console market theory of harm is dead, Sony is no longer important to the remedies process.

So while I would love to see that remedies working paper, I couldn't blame the CMA for concluding that it's now just for the CMA to hammer out the details with the deal parties. Sony may try to appeal clearance decisions in whatever jurisdictions if it wants to waste time, money, and energy, and be ridiculed. I think Sony won't want to do any of that.

Curative sanctions--and trial date and format--to be determined in Google Play case in N.D. Cal.

What makes the fact discovery cutoff in the Google Play Store (Epic Games et al. v. Google) case particularly important is the fact that Judge James Donato of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California has already determined that there will be non-monetary sanctions on Google for its automatic deletion of sensitive chats (on top of some reimbursement of fees, which won't move the needle). So Google's wrongdoing will have consequences for the adjudication of the case. There will have to be some jury instructions that up the ante for Google. But Judge Donato wanted discovery to be completed first so that there would be the most solid factual basis for determining the extent of the prejudice that the plaintiffs have suffered.

We can expect a huge fight over the non-monetary sanctions, and it will be one of the most difficult decisions a federal judge could have to make in commercial litigation. The wrongdoing is massive, but the case should still be decided correctly.

A case management decision will also have to be made in that litigation, and while it's just about the trial format, it involves a complex set of overlaps and interdependencies.

The procedural background is that the Ninth Circuit granted Google's petition for an interlocutory appeal of the certification of a consumer class seeking $4.7 billion in damages over the Google Play app tax, and on that basis, Google argues that the trial (scheduled to begin in early November) should be postponed because the consumer damages theory might not survive, at least not in its current form. As I mentioned in a tweet, which I also incorporated into a blog post, Google's position is not unreasonable.

Meanwhile, there has been further briefing. Epic Games and Match Group (Tinder) oppose Google's motion because the trial has already been pushed back four times (not once because of those plaintiffs) and they argue that in Epic Games v. Apple the consumer claims were also put on a different schedule and will be tried separately:

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:21-md-2981-JD, N.D. Cal.): Epic and Match's Joint Opposition to Google's Motion for a Stay

Epic and Match's desire to go to trial as soon as possible is understandable. While Epic's case was never consolidated into the Pepper consumer class action the way those Google Play Store cases were combined (because it was only about injunctive relief; by contrast, those Google cases are all going to a jury trial), it is true that Apple will now have to deal with some overlaps between those cases.

But there are potential issues because of the relationship between the different claims in the Google cases:

  • The plaintiff states' theory is also about consumer harm. According to Google, the theory is structurally similar to what the Ninth Circuit may overturn now.

  • While Epic's focus is (like in the Apple case) on injunctive relief, Match additionally seeks a damages award. Google is right that Match and consumers (by extension, also the plaintiff states) represent two sides of a two-sided market, and that's why it makes sense to address those claims together so as to avoid inconsistencies. For every cent that was paid, the question is whether it belongs to Google, developers, or consumers.

So there are four types of claim sets: Epic (developer harm, but no damages for now), Match (developer damages), consumer class actions (consumer damages), and plaintiff states (consumer harm). The potential legal ramifications involve that in one or more of the proposed formats, the consumer class may get its day in court without all of them actually having suffered injury (an Article III standing issue), and that there could be Seventh Amendment (right to jury trial in civil litigation) issues because of factually related issues being addressed by different juries in different trials.

For Match this is all about money, while Epic has a more strategic and principled perspective. Let's put it this way: Match is not the perfect match for Epic. But it's the only other major developer at this stage to be prepared to join Epic in suing a gatekeeper.

Google raises potential issues about the proposed formats that can't just be ignored. In my opinion, the only alternative to a complete postponement would be to try Epic's case separately from all others (plaintiff states, Match, consumer class)--and that could actually be done in a bench trial ("injunction prohibiting Google’s anti-competitive and unfair conduct and mandating that Google take all necessary steps to cease such conduct and to restore competition"; "declaration that the contractual restraints complained of herein are unlawful and unenforceable").

I wonder whether Google will also seek appellate review of a sanctions order, and what would happen if such a petition succeeded to the extent that the appeals court would wnt to take a look, but it's too early to tell.

Here's Google's reply in support of its motion to postpone the trial, which will be heard on April 20:

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:21-md-2981-JD, N.D. Cal.): Defendants' Reply in Supprot of Motion to Defer or Stay Trial

Implications for sanctions motion in United States et al. v. Google (D.C.)

This here is just a minor update. The motion for sanctions over Google's spoliation of evidence in the search engine case in the District of Columbia was inspired by the sanctions motion in California, and the United States' reply brief very heavily relies on evidence from the California case.

Judge Amit P. Mehta in D.C. will have to make some procedural decisions now, such as whether (or, more likely, when) to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

Any upcoming filings in California concerning the extent of the prejudice could also be used in the D.C. case. Prejudice is issue-specific, but the search engine case also has an Android component, which is why "Project Hug" was discovered there first (while the California case is ahead with respect to spoliation sanctions).

The final document to show in this post is the plaintiff states' reply in support of their motion for sanctions, which is structurally similar to the DOJ's argument but tackles the issue from partly different angles:

State of Colorado, et al., v. Google LLC (case no. 1:20-cv-3715-APM, D.D.C.): Plaintiff States' reply in Support of Their Motion for Sanctions Against Google, LLC and an Evidentiary Hearing to Determine Appropriate Relief

Saturday, April 1, 2023

U.S. Department of Justice reinforces motion for spoliation sanctions against Google, heavily relies on evidence from Epic Games case and points to Google's untruthfulness

On February 23, the Department of Justice (DOJ) on behalf of the United States brought a motion for spoliation sanctions against Google in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That motion referred to parallel proceedings over the same issue--the automatic deletion of "history off" Google chats after 24 hours and Google's employees' systematic use of "history off" chats for discussions involving allegedly anticompetitive behavior--as a motion by Epic Games and its co-plaintiffs (including three dozen state AGs) in the Northern District of California. In fact, the D.C. motion would likely never have been brought if not for Epic's persistent and investigative efforts.

On March 17, Google filed its opposition brief (which I've uploaded to DocumentCloud). Google argued that the plaintiffs in the D.C. search engine case were not prejudiced and, above all, that the motion was brought way too late.

Only 11 days later, Judge James Donato in San Francisco determined that Google had to be held responsible for spoliation of evidence. The first sanction he imposed is not important per se: just a reimbursement of fees. The big one--which will be non-monetary, but not "terminating"--is to be determined after the close of the (additional) fact discovery (April 7). What was remarkable about that order is that Judge Donato essentially accused Google's lawyers of having lied.

The DOJ reacted swiftly. It notified the California sanctions order to Judge Amit P. Mehta in D.C. on the same day it issued (Tuesday, March 28).

Yesterday (Friday, March 31) the DOJ filed its reply brief in support of its motion for sanctions:

United States of America, et al., v. Google (case no. 1:20-cv-3010-APM, D.D.C.): The United States' Reply in Support of Its Motion for Sanctions Against Google, LLC And an Evidentiary Hearing to Determine the Appropriate Relief

That file has more than 100 pages because I've also uploaded all publicly accessible exhibits. One can see that the evidentiary body here basically comes from the Epic litigation in California. Also, there's an excerpt from a San Francisco hearing transcript.

That reply brief is very well-crafted. I can't imagine that Judge Mehta would throw out the motion, at least not without the evidentiary hearing that the DOJ reasonably requests.

Frankly, the evidence is overwhelming that Google employees--all the way up to CEO Sundar Pichai--purposely used "history off" chats for sensitive discussions. There is even evidence of employees who wanted to act lawfully and have those chats recorded drawing internal pushback.

The evidentiary body for prejudice may become more robust. As I noted in my post on the California order, Google's Revenue Share Agreements (RSAs) with Android device makers are indeed at issue in the D.C. litigation and were mentioned in some of the Epic documents. The DOJ is currently reviewing 20,000 chats that it received after it brought its motion. And "recently produced chats show that Google discusses substantive business over chats with third parties—also instructing those third parties to communicate with care." So there already is quite some evidence, and this here is particularly damning:

"[...] Google’s Finance Director (and a deponent in this case) noted that 'the DOJ case is making the content very sensitive to share via email these days.'"

Like Epic, the DOJ notes that even Google's CEO "regularly turned 'history off so that we can speak (more) freely.'"

The DOJ seeks to dismantle Google's untimeliness argument using two attack vectors. One is that the DOJ argues that spoliation motions are not time-barred. In this context, the DOJ notes that the alternative would mean "flood[ing] courts with sanctions motions over what are often routine discovery conflicts" by filng motions "at the first hint of any potential issue." While it's just an out-of-circuit district court decision, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska stated it quite well when it wrote in a 2016 ruling that "a party need not file a motion at the first inkling of spoliation but is entitled to gather evidence . . . before filing a motion."

There may nevertheless be an untimeliness argument in some cases. But here there's an important factor:

"Google did not fully disclose its chat retention policy until January 2023. Following that disclosure, the United States timely moved for relief. The Federal Rules do not absolve Google’s spoliation because it previously provided partial information about its chat preservation policies.

"Google averred that it 'put a legal hold in place' which 'suspends auto-deletion' in November 2019. [...] The United States relied on that assertion."

Therefore, "it was only after the Epic sanctions motion was filed in October 2022 that the United States began to learn the full scope of Google’s chat preservation policies and its employees’ chat practices."

Google seeks to benefit from misrepresentations and stonewalling. I can't imagine that such a strategy will work. In the end, Judge Mehta will face the same dilemma as Judge Donato: to determine the proper sanctions, taking into account Google's misconduct on the one hand and the enormous implications of those huge antitrust cases--which no one would be comfortable deciding based on spoliation alone--on the other hand.

Wednesday, March 29, 2023

Epic v. Google judge chides Google for unrepentance and lying about chat deletion, non-monetary sanctions TBD after April 7 discovery cutoff: implications for United States et al. v. Google

Two months after I wrote that "sanctions loom large" over Google's systematic deletion of chats about legally sensitive topics, that prediction and the fact that this blog has written about the topic more often than any other (non-paywalled) website--see the link list in this recent post--have been vindicated. Yesterday, Judge James Donato of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, who is presiding over multiple consolidated Google Play Store antitrust cases (brought by Epic Games, three dozen state AGs, Match Group, and class-action plaintiffs), entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law, ordering monetary sanctions first (recovery of attorneys' fees) and announcing that non-monetary sanctions will be determined a little later:

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (case no. 21-md-2981-JD, N.D. Cal.): Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re Chat Preservation

If this was about the actual merits of the case, that order would amount to

  • an entry of liability (Judge Donato finds that Google is guilty of spoliation of evidence),

  • a decision on a first minor remedy (recovery of fees, with the exact amount to be determined now), and

  • a holding that a remedy of a certain category (at an abstract level, comparable to injunctive relief) is warranted, though more information is needed to make that determination.

  • Furthermore, Judge Donato reiterated that a "terminating sanction" won't issue. So what the plaintiffs and Google know now is that there will be a non-monetary sanction that will have an impact on the adjudication of the case (unlike a fee award, which doesn't really matter between those parties), but it won't be fatal to Google's defenses. Comparing this again to a merits decision, it's like a judge saying that an injunction will issue, but it will have to be reasonably narrowly tailored.

Judge Donato notes that "[p]roportionality is the governing concept here." In order to have as solid a factual basis as possible for determining what remedy "fit[s] the wrong," he "would like to see the state of play of the evidence at the end of fact discovery." Fact discovery in this litigation was reopened after Epic and Match were allowed (in mid November 2022) to amend their complaints. As per a stipulation granted by Judge Donato, the cutoff date for that supplemental discovery is April 7 (next week's Friday). Thereafter, "plaintiffs will be better positioned to tell the Court what might have been lost in the Chat communications."

Proportionality must go both ways. Judge Donato "fully appreciates plaintiffs’ dilemma of trying to prove the contents of what Google has deleted." So the really tricky part is still ahead of the court and the parties. The remedy--some jury instruction--must not be disproportionate in terms of penalizing Google to an undeserved extent. At the same time, it would also be unfair if the absence of certain evidence that is totally due to Google's misconduct resulted in inconsequential sanctions.

I believe the minimum hurdle for Epic and its co-plaintiffs will be to show that Google employees likely discussed topics relevant to this particular antitrust litigation--such as "Project Hug" (see the previous link)--by chat. The hurdle for that should not be insurmountable.

The order rebukes the way in which Google has been dealing with this issue:

"Google clearly had different intentions with respect to Chat, but it did not reveal those intentions with candor or directness to the Court or counsel for plaintiffs. Instead, Google falsely assured the Court in a case management statement in October 2020 that it had 'taken appropriate steps to preserve all evidence relevant to the issues reasonably evident in this action,' without saying a word about Chats or its decision not to pause the 24-hour default deletion. [...] The Court has since had to spend a substantial amount of resources to get to the truth of the matter, including several hearings, a two-day evidentiary proceeding, and countless hours reviewing voluminous briefs. All the while, Google has tried to downplay the problem and displayed a dismissive attitude ill tuned to the gravity of its conduct. Its initial defense was that it had no 'ability to change default settings for individual custodians with respect to the chat history setting,' [...] but evidence at the hearing plainly established that this representation was not truthful."

In other words, Google's lawyers are liars according to the order. That's harsh, but it doesn't look like this is formally going to have an impact on the severity of the non-monetary sanctions to be ordered in the coming months. It is, however, the kind of stuff that will hurt Google when it appeals the decision, which I'm sure it will. Google even likes to appeal decisions prior to final judgment, and in another context but related to this litigation it succeeded to the extent that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accepted to review a consumer class certification now. On that basis, Google has asked the court to postpone the trial in this litigation (PDF), and in a Twitter thread I agreed that Google had a point:

I want Epic and the other plaintiffs to prevail, and Google is not really concerned about litigation economics, but the fact that the Ninth Circuit is reviewing the class certification decision at this stage does warrant a postponement of the trial in my opinion.

Let's briefly also talk about what this means for the other Google antitrust litigation in which the same spoliation-of-evidence issue is now on the agenda: the first United States et al. v. Google case (in the District of Columbia). A little over a month ago, I commented on the DOJ's motion for sanctions. Meanwhile, Google has filed its opposition brief, which just like in the Northern District of California is the epitome of denial:

United States of America, et al., v. Google (case no. 1:20-cv-3010-APM, D.D.C.): Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Sanctions

Meanwhile the DOJ and the plaintiff states have replied in support of their motion, but those documents are sealed for the time being. Anyway, I doubt that Google will be able to persuade Judge Amit P. Mehta to deny that motion in D.C. without an evidentiary hearing. The San Francisco decision isn't binding on him, but strongly suggests that there is an issue to be addressed.

Interestingly, some of the evidence of Google's systematic deletion of chats that the plaintiffs in the Northern District of California present is actually related to topics at issue in the D.C. litigation over Google's search engine monopoly, such as its revenue sharing agreements (RSAs). The last document I'll show you here was just filed a couple of days ago, and it's an unredacted version of a brief by Epic and its co-plaintiffs. I already published the redacted version in my most recent post on that California litigation, U.S. states, Epic Games, others accuse Google CEO Sundar Pichai of 'routinely opt[ing] to move ... to history-off [c]hats to hold sensitive conversations' in violation of retention obligations. The unredacted document makes it a little clearer what happened there, and the fact that Google's CEO himself sought to delete a message is quite interesting. Also, the unredacted material shows that Google employees were quite aware of what they were doing and why, and in at least one case someone even used a smiley, which is totally inappropriate when enaging in spoliation of evidence. Judge Donato apparently wanted that material to be made public first before issuing his order, given that his order makes even more sense against that backdrop. Here's the unredacted document with lots of exhibits:

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:21-md-2981-JD): Unredacted Version of PLaintiffs' Supplemental Brief on Google's Chat Production

Wednesday, March 15, 2023

U.S. states, Epic Games, others accuse Google CEO Sundar Pichai of 'routinely opt[ing] to move ... to history-off [c]hats to hold sensitive conversations' in violation of retention obligations

Since the "Google Chats" discovery dispute started with a motion by dozens of state AGs, Epic Games, Match Group, and other plaintiffs in October 2022, it has made Google's behavior look worse as more information came to the light of day. The issue has also widened because the DOJ and the same state AGs as in the litigation that was originally started by Epic brought a motion for sanctions in the United States et al. v. Google antitrust litigation in the District of Columbia. Both cases are scheduled to go to trial later this year, and the plaintiffs are seeking trial-related sanctions as opposed to a slap on the wrist.

The latest filing by the plaintiffs in the Northern District of California takes the topic to a new level: Google CEO Sundar Pichai himself is being accused of playing a key role in this. Despite heavy redactions, the following passage is revelatory:

"The newly produced Chats reveal a company-wide culture of concealment coming from the very top, including CEO Sundar Pichai, who is a custodian in this case. In one Chat, Mr. Pichai began discussing a substantive topic, and then immediately wrote: '[REDACTED]' Then, nine seconds later, Mr. Pichai [REDACTED]. [...] When asked under oath [REDACTED]' (Id. Ex. 2, Pichai Dep. Tr. 195:7-12.)

"Like Mr. Pichai, other key Google employees, including those in leadership roles, routinely opted to move from history-on rooms to history-off Chats to hold sensitive conversations, even though they knew they were subject to legal holds. Indeed, they did so even when discussing topics they knew were covered by the litigation holds in order to avoid leaving a record that could be produced in litigation." (emphasis in original)

It's a safe assumption that the above passage tells the story of Mr. Pichai himself having moved a conversation from a history-on to a history-off chat. The first redaction likely means that he realized that the topic should not be discussed with history on, and what he did "nine seconds later" will either have been that he turned history off or that he opened a new chat with history off from the beginning.

This is the filing by Epic and its co-plaintiffs that was made a few hours ago in response to a court order:

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:21-md-02981-JD, N.D. Cal.): Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief on Google's Chat Production

Google was also ordered to make a statement, and unsurprisingly Google continues to deny any wrongdoing or prejudice:

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:21-md-02981-JD, N.D. Cal.): Google's Supplemental Breif in Response to the Court's February 27, 2023 Minute Order

From the outside it appears very, very difficult to imagine that Google will get away with what it's done. The courts in California and D.C. will most likely feel forced to impose sanctions. Let us not underestimate how unpleasant this situation is for the two district judges:

  • Google's systematic avoidance of discovery obligations cannot be tolerated, or draw only symbolic sanctions, without calling the whole system of pretrial discovery and retention obligations into question.

  • Both cases--the Android app store antitrust case in San Francisco and the search engine monopoly maintenance case in Washington--are among the most important U.S. antitrust cases in history. Adverse inferences could make a major impact.

    It would obviously have been preferable for Google not to delete those chats, and then the cases could be decided strictly on the actual evidence. Now it's too late.

Nothing has happened yet about the sanctions motion in the District of Columbia. In California, Judge James Donato has gone to extreme lengths to establish the facts. The discovery dispute there is now getting to the point where a decision will come down.

I also have a brief update on a third Google antitrust case: the ad tech case that was filed in the Eastern District of Virginia in January. Google has requested that the case be transferred to the Southern District of New York, where a multidistrict litigation panel decided to consolidate various other ad tech cases (compared to which Google claims the DOJ's case adds nothing new, though it comes years after some others). Google acknowledges, however, that the DOJ's cases are immune to consolidation. It's just that Google sees no particular reason why that case should be litigated in the Eastern District of Virginia, and it argues that the DOJ's convenience (owing to geographic proximity) is not a major factor. Google may indeed win that venue transfer, given that there is a district judge in New York who's already very familiar with the issues.

Friday, February 24, 2023

DOJ seeks sanctions over Google's systematic deletion of chats: more cross-pollination between United States et al. v. Google (D.C.) and In Re Google Play Antitrust Litigation (N.D. Cal.)

In the first of its two (possibly soon to be three) Google antitrust lawsuits, the Department of Justice filed a motion yesterday with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, requesting that Judge Amit P. Mehta impose spoliation-of-evidence sanctions on Google over its systematic deletion of "history off" Google Chats after 24 hours. The motion proposes an evidentiary hearing over this issue.

This is only the latest example of United States et al. v. Google (in the District of Columbia) and In Re Google Play Antitrust Litigation (Northern District of California) being two highly interdependent cases--with some of the interdependencies being more than just procedural in nature. This blog has talked more about the Google chat preservation issue than any other (at least any other non-paywalled) website because the issue first arose in San Francisco (where the plaintiffs are three dozen state AGs, Epic Games (Fortnite), Match Group (Tinder), and some class-action lawyers). The DOJ motion explicitly refers in its D.C. motion to the California case, where an evidentiary hearing over this same issue was already held last month. The DOJ makes it clear that the developments in California inspired the motion in Washington. For example, two of the headlines speak for themselves:

"After The Epic Sanctions Motion, The United States Raised Concerns Regarding Spoliation In This Case"

"The Subsequent Epic Evidentiary Hearing Reveals Document Destruction"

Here are some previous FOSS Patents post on the Google Chats sanctions process in California (in reversely chronological order):

There have previously been at least two other overlaps, connections, and interdependencies between those two Google antitrust cases:

Back to the Google Chats discovery dispute: Let me first show you the DOJ's motion and then also the most recent minute order by Judge Donato in San Francisco, which shows that the noose may be tightening quickly around Google's neck now.

United States of America et al. v. Google (case no. 1:20-cv-3010-APM, D.D.C.): Memorandum in Support of the United States' Motion for Sanctions Against Google, LLC And an Evidentiary Hearing to Determine the Appropriate Relief

In my interpretation, the motion suggests that the DOJ has drawn a similar conclusion from watching the sanctions process in California as I did when I said (in one of the posts I linked to further above) that Epic and its co-plaintiffs had presented smoking guns. But the DOJ also had to act now with a view to the September trial date. The motion assures the court that the sanctions process does not require postponing the actual trial, and that makes sense--but they couldn't wait forever.

Last spring, Google came away unscathed in D.C. over another discovery issue: its "Communicate with Care" policy, which in the DOJ's opinion abused the attorney-client privilege. Some reference to "Communicate with Care" is also made in the latest motion, but the case for sanctions is now a lot stronger, and the key difference actually relates to what the consequences should be: if evidence has been destroyed, for which there is an extremely strong case here, the solution can't just be to go over a bunch of emails again and revisit privilege assertions like in the "Communicate with Care" context. There has to be an inference.

The DOJ says "Google’s daily destruction of written records prejudiced the United States by depriving it of a rich source of candid discussions between Google’s executives, including likely trial witnesses." Also: "Google destroyed written records covering nearly four years of employee communications, and those records likely would have been especially probative."

More specifically, the DOJ describes the potential impact of Google's systematic-automatic deletion of chats on the D.C. case by pointing to testimony according to which two Google executives chatted--with "history off"--about "Project Banyan, ... a potential collaboration with Samsung on app stores" that according to the DOJ was "worth hundreds of millions of dollars." That Project Banyan is at issue in both the California case over the Google Play Store and the D.C. case. A footnote of the DOJ's motion notes that "[Google executive] Mr. Rosenberg was shown Project Banyan documents during his deposition in [the D.C.] case."

The sanctions process in San Francisco is already at an advanced stage. It seems to me--and I say this with caution because I didn't attend any of the hearings (and the most interesting parts may have happened behind closed doors anyway)--that Judge Donato in California managed the sanctions process very well with his iterative approach. Step by step he obtained clarifications and asked the parties to make their arguments. Last week he entered the following minute order, which suggests that sanctions indeed loom large:

ORDER. For Google's production of additional chats, see MDL Dkt. Nos. 440, 451, Google must at minimum produce all chats that have been preserved for Custodians 1 through 383 (as identified in Dkt. No. 429-2) that are: (1) responsive to any search term the parties have agreed to in this litigation (as proposed by Google in Dkt. No. 451 at 6), OR (2) responsive to these additional terms: "sensitive," "history off," "history is not off," "history on," "history is on," "off the record," or "on the record."

To be clear, for the latter set of terms, Google may not limit its production to only those chats that discussed "turning history 'on' or 'off' in connection with the topics of this case or in connection with [a] legal hold, investigation, regulatory proceeding, or litigation." Dkt. No. 451 at 8. The responsive chats must be turned over without the additional limitation of being responsive to the search terms in this case or being connected to a legal hold, investigation, regulatory proceeding, or litigation.

Google must complete the production of these chats by February 24, 2023, at 5:00 p.m. California time at the latest. This deadline will not be extended. Google may conduct a responsiveness and/or privilege review only to the extent it can do that and still meet this deadline. To the extent Google decides against a privilege review, including for any subsets of custodians, plaintiffs will agree to a "broad non-waiver agreement allowing the clawback of any privileged material," as they have proposed. Dkt. No. 451 at 4.

Signed by Judge James Donato on 2/15/2023.

That's a rather strict tone. Google's lawyers have been trying for a while now to downplay the issue and to put up smokescreens, but Judge Donato wants the truth to come out--and as far as I can see, he's not asking for too much (such as a manual review of millions of documents).

Finally, a quick follow-up to the substantive issues in the D.C. case (United States et al. v. Google I):

Five days ago I wrote about the DOJ's and the state AGs' opposition briefs to Google's motion for summary judgment (U.S. states liken Google's various anticompetitive actions to octopus tentacles; DOJ says 'Google has bought, not earned, at least 33% of all U.S. searches'. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp commented on that, highlighting the key question, which is that defaults are not ties (defaults can be changed by customers, ties cannot):

Google's argument is that this is not really foreclosure, and if it is, then only to a negligible extent because most users would choose Google anyway. But there is evidence that Bing--Google's only competitor (and now even more so than ever)--gets far more usage where Google is not the default search engine. Shortly after the DOJ's and the state AG's opposition briefs, two amicus curiae briefs were filed. The American Antitrust Institute supports the plaintiffs, but what I find more interesting is the following amicus brief by three behaviorial economists (including one from Munich by the way) about the immense Power of Default:

United States of America et al. v. Google (case no. 1:20-cv-3010-APM, D.D.C.): Brief of Behavioral Economists George Loewenstein, Klaus M. Schmidt, and Paul Heidhues as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs

There'll be more discussion about the Power of Default--in both of the Google antitrust litigations discussed in this post.

Sunday, February 19, 2023

U.S. states liken Google's various anticompetitive actions to octopus tentacles; DOJ says 'Google has bought, not earned, at least 33% of all U.S. searches'

On Tuesday, Google will--according to MLex--participate in the European Commission's Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard hearing as a complainer. On Twitter you can find my comments on that (1, 2).

Most of the time, Google is a defendant to competition enforcement actions. The United States Department of Justice and various states filed a second antitrust lawsuit against Google. And a couple of days ago, the public redacted versions of the DOJ's and the plaintiff states' responses to Google's summary judgment motions (see my commentary on those Google motions) became available. Technically, those are two cases consolidated into a single one, with substantial overlap.

I'll publish the new filings further below. First, a few observations and "soundbites":

  • The most important legal argument raised in both parts of the case is that the plaintiffs urge Judge Amit P. Mehta of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to focus on the entirety of Google's allegedly anticompetitive actions as opposed to looking at individual agreements with other parties in isolation.

    That argument comes up many times in either opposition brief, and the plaintiffs refer to the 2001 Microsoft decision that is controlling case law in the D.C. Circuit.

    The opposition brief filed by the Colorado Plaintiffs (dozens of states led by Colorado) is generally more colorful than that of the DOJ, but I don't mean that negatively--just two different styles. The Colorado Plaintiffs then liken Google and its different anticompetitive methods to an octopus and its tentacles:

    "More than a century ago, journalistic cartoons depicted monopolies using separate tentacles to harm competition in different ways while controlled by the single mind of a single octopus. In 1911, the Supreme Court recognized combined competitive harm arising from a monopoly’s “resistless methods,” which included multiple products, places, and forms of conduct. [...] Much has changed in the economy in the last hundred years but not this simple precept: a company that has harmed competition in multiple ways must face responsibility for the full and cumulative effects of all of its anticompetitive conduct, without regard to which tentacle it employs."

    The Colorado Plaintiffs even point the court (via a footnote) to a cartoon from 1899.

  • A second legal question is particularly key to the DOJ's filing. Google argues that its various agreements (such as the default-search-engine deals with Apple and Mozilla) had only a negligible foreclosure effect because it was all merits-based and customers would predominantly use Google anyway. The plaintiffs, however, point to case law and literature (such as Areeda-Hovenkamp) according to which the foreclosure effect is measured based on the part of the market that becomes practically incontestable, not on what choices end users would have made anyway.

    Applying that standard and referring to an expert report by Professor Michael Whinston, the DOJ says that "50% of all U.S. searches covered by the challenged terms of Google’s contracts are well protected by the power of defaults," but users who are not affected by the defaults "are rare":

    "33% of all U.S. searches are covered by the challenged terms of Google’s contracts and conducted by users who follow the default, whatever it is. [...] Thus, Google has bought, not earned, at least 33% of all U.S. searches"

  • A feedback loop further cements Google's market leadership. The DOJ quotes from Google-internal documents to explain how it works:

    "One can regard each [results page] as a massive multiple-choice test. Each day, we get to ask humanity a billion questions of the form, ‘Which of these 10 documents is most relevant to your query?’"

    "With every query, [Google gives] some knowledge, and get[s] a little back. Then we give some more, and get a little more back. These bits add up. After a few hundred billion rounds, [Google] start[s] lookin’ pretty smart! This isn’t the only way [Google] learn[s], but the most effective."

  • Concerning the Power of Default, the DOJ's footnote 18 is interesting:

    "For example, on Windows PCs, where Bing is the leading default, Bing’s market share is more than seven times higher than on Mac PCs, where Google is the default."

Now that the integration of ChatGPT makes Bing so much more interesting than it used to be, the question of whether Google's default-search-engine deals are legal is even more relevant. There's more to say about the DOJ's and the plaintiff states' opposition to Google's summary judgment motions, and The Register reported on Friday that the UK Competition & Markets Authority is looking into a revenue share agreement between Apple and Google for the iOS version of Chrome, but I'll leave that for another day. You can find the two court filings below.

United States et al. v. Google (case no. 1:20-cv-3010-APM, D.D.C.): [DOJ] Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Google's Motion for Summary Judgment

United States et al. v. Google (case no. 1:20-cv-3010-APM, D.D.C.): Plaintiff States' [i.e., Colorado Plaintiffs'] Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Google LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment

Tuesday, February 14, 2023

Sony, Microsoft to clash at European Commission's Activision Blizzard merger hearing on Tuesday, February 21: PaRR found out about hearing date

The Policy and Regulatory Report (PaRR) has just informed me that "[t]he European Commission (EC) will hold an oral hearing next week as part of its market investigation into Microsoft’s [NASDAQ:MSFT] acquisition of Activision Blizzard [NASDAQ:ATVI]" and refers to confirmation by "a spokesperson for Microsoft." The exact date is Tuesday, February 21. The venue will be one of the Commission buildings in Brussels. A courtroom-style clash between Microsoft and Sony is virtually certain to happen on that occasion.

It became known two weeks ago that the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) had sent Microsoft a Statement of Objections (SO) over its proposed acquisition of Activision Blizzard King.

An SO is a preliminary antitrust ruling. Reporters often refer to an SO as an "antitrust warning" that can come down in different categories of competition cases. For instance, about two years ago the EC issued an SO against Apple's abuse of App Store market power against Spotify and other music streaming services, but an actual decision has yet to be made in that unilateral conduct case.

In the Microsoft-ABK merger case, there is a clear deadline: April 11, 2023. After an SO, a party gets access to the case file and can--as Microsoft apparently did--request a merger hearing in Brussels. This means Microsoft will be able to read--and respond to--Sony's submissions to the EU Commission. Sony could request that some or all of its submissions be kept confidential, but the Commission could not rely on confidential facts in its decision (and any potential appeal of such a decision to the Court of Justice of the EU).

As PaRR notes, such merger hearings are attended not only by the Commission's case team working on a merger but also by other Commission officials and third parties.

I have no doubt that Sony--which is fighting Microsoft's subpoena in the U.S. FTC proceeding--will participate, and the question is whether Google and/or Nvidia will do so as well. Sony is the only vocal complainer, and Nvidia is not a complainer in a strict sense (as its position is not that the merger should be prohibited) but merely seeks to opportunistically benefit from those merger review processes in the form of a license deal that might benefit its GeForce NOW cloud gaming service.

I attended an EC merger hearing in 2009 (Oracle-Sun Microsystems) as a complainant, so I know how those hearings go. The case team presents its theories of harm, the parties get to respond, and third parties can intervene (as Sony undoubtedly will) to urge the Commission to block the deal or insist on drastic remedies.

The EC officials who attend such hearings include representatives of other DGs (directorates-general), who may or may not agree with the case team. Close aides to the competition commissioner are also present. I can't imagine that European Commission EVP (and antitrust chief) Margrethe Vestager won't send a member of her cabinet. Given the high profile of this case, even Mrs. Vestager's Chef de Cabinet Stina Soewarta may attend the hearing in whole or in part. Again, this is all speculation based on my own past experience with how those merger hearings work.

Third parties who wish to attend will now have to reach out to one of the EC's Hearing Officers and explain why they believe they have a right to be heard.

Representatives of national competition authorities of EU member states, such as Germany's Bundeskartellamt (BKartA, Federal Cartel Office) or the French Autorité de la concurrence (Adlc), also have the right to attend.

A merger hearing is very similar to a trial, but it is not public. A decision is not announced immediately, but the case team working on this particular merger review may state its recommendation (such as whether the deal should be cleared unconditionally, with conditions, or not at all) at the end of the day.

After the hearing, negotiations between the Commission and the acquirer typically continue.

Microsoft has repeatedly and consistently stated its interest in addressing any potential competition concerns and finding solutions. Working out an agreement with the European Commission--one of the world's most well-respected antitrust enforcers--could be an inflection point and lead to settlements in other jurisdictions.

The Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) of the United Kingdom may soon hold a similar hearing. Last Wednesday, the CMA issued its provisional findings, which are the UK equivalent of a DG COMP SO (initial reaction, observations on full 277-page document, and further analysis of the remedies notice). According to its administrative timetable, the CMA will hold "[r]esponse hearings (if required)" in late February or early March. Whether such hearings will indeed take place has not been announced yet, and that's why the exact date is unknown.

I have updated my timeline chart to reflect the EC merger hearing (click on the image to enlarge):

Other changes since the previous version of that chart include that I have grayed out the motion process for the protective order (i.e., rules for the protection of confidential documents) in the Northern District of California, given that the parties recently submitted a negotiated proposal.

Here's a table of the key acronyms:

N.D. Cal.United States District Court for the Northern District of California
MTD(Microsoft's) motion to dismiss (the so-called gamers' lawsuit)
prot orderprotective order (i.e., protection of confidential business information)
PIpreliminary injunction
FTC(United States) Federal Trade Commission
CMA(UK) Competition & Markets Authority
DG COMP(European Commission's) Directorate General for Competition
NZ ComComCommerce Commission of New Zealand

Note that all of this is in flux and some of those events may not (have to) happen. For instance, if the motion to dismiss is granted in California, even if only in part, this may have implications for the preliminary injunction (possibly even obviating any PI hearing).

Friday, February 10, 2023

Google's Android compatibility rules likely dictate patent infringement by device makers: patent trial scheduled for late June has ecosystemic implications

It's been about eight months since I reported on K.Mizra v. Samsung, a patent infringement case pending with the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Dusseldorf Regional Court) over a patent on a method to predict the remaining battery runtime of a mobile device.

I've checked on the status of that litigation again, and a spokeswoman for the Dusseldorf court has meanwhile confirmed that the trial (case no. 4c O 27/22; Presiding Judge: Sabine Klepsch) will be held on June 29, 2023. I would recommend to Samsung's competitors--other Android device makers--to dispatch lawyers and keep an eye on this case. Samsung may be the first company that has to defend itself against this patent, but my research indicates that Google requires all Android device makers to implement that kind of power consumption analysis.

The patent licensing firm that is asserting EP2174201 on a "method and system for predicting the power consumption of a mobile terminal" means business: last summer they won an infringement ruling in Munich against Niantic, the Google-Nintendo joint venture behind the popular Pokémon GO mobile game, over another patent that equally resulted from the research efforts of a reputable and sizeable Dutch organization named TNO (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek; Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research).

What I find particularly interesting here is that Google contractually obligates Android device makers to take certain technical measures that--according to my understanding of the patent--likely result in acts of infringement. Google's Android compatibility rules have drawn regulatory scrutiny, particularly in the EU and India. The Competition Commission of India put it bluntly: device makers choose "between signing a non-negotiable [contract] and commercial failure." This blog is critical of Google's abuse of market power in various ways, but with respect to compatibility rules, I've consistently advocated distinguishing between specifications that clearly are in the interest of consumers and/or app developers, and those that use "(anti-)fragmentation" or other pretexts for exclusionary practices, such as by disadvantaging rival app stores, search engines, or map services.

The compatibility rule at issue here is non-abusive: no exclusion, self-preferencing, tying, or other market distortion. Apart from the infringement problem I'll discuss below, its effects are purely positive:

  • Users want to plan when and where to recharge their phones.

  • Device makers strives to provide the best user experience (UX) possible.

  • Google's Android competes with Apple's iOS on UX.

  • App makers like me know that if our software is a "power hog" (a term also used by Qualcomm in an interesting paper on the subject), some users may find out about it or read or hear about it, and delete our apps for that reason. In the worst case we face a stern warning from the gatekeeper--Google--that an app will be ejected from the Google Play Store unless a problem of excessive power consumption is addressed.

    When we make apps, we obviously take a look at power consumption as we test pre-release versions of our software. It's pretty normal that an app is a power hog during the early stages of development, but energy efficiency is one of the most important aspects of optimization. As developers we know that our own usage pattern may differ greatly from real-world usage. That's why it's important that what the actual end users do is analyzed locally by Android. Google's Android Compatibility Definition (ACD) says:

    A more accurate accounting and reporting of the power consumption provides the app developer both the incentives and the tools to optimize the power usage pattern of the application.

Google ensures that Android device makers measure and provide data points relating to power consumption. It's about the power drain (per unit of time) of what in the claim language of the patent-in-suit is called a "terminal activity", such as WiFi data transfers, cellular data transfers, CPU usage for certain computations, or using a display in ambient mode. Device makers presumably perform such measurement under laboratory conditions and generate a "per-component power profile" as Google calls this in its Android Compatibility Definition (ACD).

Those data points are then used on a device for the purpose of predicting the remaining battery runtime based on a user's particular usage pattern, which naturally evolves as a given user's preferences change and new apps (or new version of existing apps) may drain more or less battery power. Android keeps track of what in the claim language is called "user activities" such as watching a video, downloading a document, placing a voice call, or playing a particular game. Android also knows what terminal activities a given user activity involves. Based on

  • the terminal activities that different user activities entail,

  • a given user's usage pattern, which will trigger a particular mix of terminal activities, and

  • the power consumption of the various hardware components (found in the per-component power profile I mentioned before),

Android can then estimate the per-time power consumption during the remainder of the current battery cycle and, ultimately by a simple division, derive the remaining battery runtime.

Those non-negotiable Android compatibility rules are publicly accessible:

Handheld device implementations:

  • [8.4/H-0-1] MUST provide a per-component power profile that defines the current consumption value for each hardware component and the approximate battery drain caused by the components over time as documented in the Android Open Source Project site.

  • [8.4/H-0-2] MUST report all power consumption values in milliampere hours (mAh).

  • [8.4/H-0-3] MUST report CPU power consumption per each process's UID. The Android Open Source Project meets the requirement through the uid_cputime kernel module implementation.

  • [8.4/H-0-4] MUST make this power usage available via the adb shell dumpsys batterystats shell command to the app developer.

  • [8.4/H] SHOULD be attributed to the hardware component itself if unable to attribute hardware component power usage to an application.

If Handheld device implementations include a screen or video output, they:

  • [8.4/H-1-1] MUST honor the android.intent.action.POWER_USAGE_SUMMARY intent and display a settings menu that shows this power usage.

A section of the Android documentation is dedicated to Power Profiles for Android. Among other things, it says:

"Resource consumption is associated with the application using the resource. When multiple applications simultaneously use a resource (such as wakelocks that prevent the system from suspending), the framework spreads consumption across those applications, although not necessarily equally."

Further above I mentioned last year's Pokémon GO (Niantic) patent infringement ruling. That game is a good example of an app that uses multiple hardware components: data transfers (sometimes WiFi, sometimes cellular), camera, display, sound. Augmented reality is a resource-intensive type of application, so the makers of such an app must to make a significant optimization effort to prevent it from becoming a power hog. They need the kind of data that Android can provide by virtue of apparently implementing what the patent-in-suit covers.

While Samsung and Niantic are not affiliated, there are some interesting parallels. Both cases were brought by K.Mizra, both patents were originally obtained by TNO, and Google makes the allegedly infringing software (Android in the Samsung case, the cloud components at issue in the Niantic case). The relationship between Google and either defendant is different, however: Google is a major shareholder in Niantic, while it has imposed its compatibility rules on Samsung, including the mandate of power consumption profiles that has apparently given rise to the Dusseldorf patent enforcement action.