Showing posts with label Intel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Intel. Show all posts

Saturday, April 8, 2023

Qualcomm moves for summary judgment against ruins of class action that piggybacked on FTC lawsuit -- Judge Corley mentioned possibility of new class action over exclusive dealing

Class-action lawyers tend to be persistent even when they're losing. They hope until the end that they may get paid. But some large companies--and Qualcomm appears to be one of them--are unwilling to settle for nuisance value. They just defeat them.

Coincidentally, Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California presently has two ultra-flimsy class actions piggybacking on FTC lawsuits before her: the one against Qualcomm I'm discussing here, and one over Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard, which I tweeted about this morning.

In January, Judge Corley further narrowed the scope of the Qualcomm action. It's now down to an exclusive-dealing claim (the Qualcomm-Apple agreement that allegedly kept Intel out of the high-end baseband chipset market), and even that one can only be pursued under California state law, not federal law. The class-action lawyers hoped to get access now to Qualcomm's 2019 settlement agreement with Apple--which they haven't seen because discovery closed in 2018--but that's after the class period. Judge Corley held a hearing on February 23, 2023, where she said she was "not inclined to reopen discovery."

In my commentary on the last order to dismiss certain claims, I already said that the remainder of the case "will hardly survive summary judgment." Actually, if it was up to Qualcomm's lawyers, it wouldn't even have reached the point of a summary judgment: they'd have preferred to defeat the remainder of the case through a motion for judgment on the pleadings. But Judge Corley didn't like that notion, given that the usual purpose of judgment on the pleadings is to obviate the need for discovery--and here, discovery closed years ago ("the record is full"). It's more efficient for the court this way, given that if a judgment on the pleadings was successfully appealed as premature (for failure to consider anything in the record), the case would be remanded and she'd then have to adjudicate a motion for summary judgment.

Yesterday (Friday), Qualcomm filed its motion for summary judgment:

In Re Qualcomm Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:17-md-2773-JSC, N.D. Cal.): Defendant Qualcomm Incorporated's Motion for Summary Judgment (Redacted)

Talking about different types of pretrial motions, large parts of that motion look at first sight like a Daubert motion for taking aim at law professor Elhauge's expert testimony--and quite extensively so. But the argument is not about his testimony being unreliable. It's about relevance to the questions to be decided. The expert testimony was optimized for the original theory, which was that Qualcomm abusively raised standard-essential patent (SEP) royalties to supra-FRAND levels, while the class-action lawyers are now trying to keep the case alive by arguing that Qualcomm's exclusive deal with Apple shut Intel out of the market and thereby made chipsets more expensive. As Qualcomm describes it, the class-action lawyers have "flipp[ed] from arguing that Qualcomm was undercutting competitors on chip prices to arguing that Qualcomm was overcharging OEMs." Here's my favorite sentence from that document:

"In short, there are gaping voids where one would expect evidence of causation to be."

The problem is even more fundamental than shifting from "undercutting" to "overcharging": until the case got destroyed for the largest part, the class-action lawyers insisted on a holistic perspective and the alleged interdependencies and mutually reinforcing effects of Qualcomm's various practices--all of that for the ultimate goal of arguing that the combination of multiple intertwined aspects of Qualcomm's conduct made SEP licenses more expensive. Qualcomm says in its motion for summary judgment that they can't pursue exclusive dealing as a standalone claim now that it's all that's left in the case (and again, for the avoidance of doubt: even that one is already dead under federal law).

At the February 23 hearing, Judge Corley already discussed this problem with the class-action lawyers:

"Well, why not file a new lawsuit? I mean, you had a theory, as I understand it. It was all intertwined. It was all intertwined and it was based, in part, on the FRAND theory, which the Ninth Circuit rejected. Okay. I mean, that’s just what happened. But that -- you could have pursued -- and maybe you’ll tell me and you’re going to say that the evidence is there to support the claim, so maybe you did. You could have pursued a separate exclusive dealing theory that was not dependent upon the FRAND, but maybe you chose not to. Okay. That was just a strategic choice."

There are four named smartphone customers in the current class. The class-action lawyers could just find some others (on whom the decisions in the present case will not be binding) and bring a new complaint, as Judge Corley also explained at the hearing.

In that case they would also get to look at more recent documents, potentially including the 2019 Qualcomm-Apple contracts.

For now, the class-action lawyers don't want to give up on whatever little is left of their original case. But I guess Qualcomm's motion will succeed. Will they choose to file a new lawsuit to pursue a standalone exclusive-dealing claim? I doubt it. They know that the FTC--despite support from Apple (the two had a mutual interest agreement in place)--failed to prove that Intel was ready to compete with Qualcomm at the relevant time (and in 2019 Intel even left that market, sold the chipset business to Apple, and Apple still can't make its own baseband processors for the iPhone). A follow-on class action with a standalone exclusive-dealing claim would be doomed to fail as well.

Thursday, November 3, 2022

Delays of Apple's own modem chip show prudence of 2019 Qualcomm settlement: chipset supply and patent license agreement until 2025, plus option for two-year extension of license

On April 16, 2019, I was in the overflow room of the San Diego courthouse of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California when Apple and Qualcomm--with opening arguments still ongoing--announced the settlement of their global antitrust and patent dispute. In the build-up to that Apple v. Qualcomm trial, the San Diego chipmaker publicly extended an invitation to Apple to help them bring a 5G iPhone to market, and rumors were flying that Apple had lost faith in Intel's ability to deliver a high-quality 5G baseband chip in time.

Delays with a 5G iPhone could have cost Apple some market share to Android. While the vast majority of Apple customers don't switch even when Apple is years behind in other respects (particularly with respect to screens: originally "phablets" and now foldable phones) because Apple manages to make them all believe that it's at the forefront of innovation, even they would have wondered whether buying a 4G iPhone is a good choice when the rest of the industry is already transitioning to 5G. The simple difference between the numbers "4" and "5" would have been too much even for many Apple customers. It would have been a serious threat even to Apple's luxury image. So Tim Cook--who a few months before the settlement had categorically ruled out a deal as he deemed Qualcomm's business model "illegal"--wasn't going to take any chances. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight we can say, 3 1/2 years later, that it was in all likelihood the right decision: Qualcomm announced its numbers and offered a new forecast yesterday according to which it's still going to supply modem chips for the majority of 2023 iPhones (instead of only 20% of all iPhones sold that year, though the operating assumption for now is that Apple will use its own chips in fiscal year 2025.

I just said "in all likelihood" because, of course, we'll never know for sure what would have happened in a but-for world. If Apple had still relied on Intel, and if Intel had kept that cellular baseband chip division, it is theoretically conceivable that it wouldn't have taken that long to become independent of Qualcomm's chips. At least one analyst, Patrick Moorhead, blames Apple:

But another analyst, Roger Entner, emphasizes the magnitude of the task:

If the scenario described by Mr. Entner becomes reality, Apple is still more than two years away from making its own 5G modem chips.

Unrelated to modem chips, there is also an interesting development in the relationships that chip design company Arm Ltd. has with component makers like Qualcomm on the one hand and end-product makers like Apple on the other hand. Recent court filings suggest that Arm may increasingly prefer to deal directly with end-product makers rather than the likes of Qualcomm.

It's not easy to tell how innovative Apple is. Relative to its enormous profitability, it certainly isn't: it rakes in most of the profits of the smartphone industry, but it's not ahead of the crowd; instead, one can find interesting innovation (such as foldable phones) in Android devices, often many years before Apple adopts them, too. It's also noticeable that Apple increasingly engages in monopoly rent-seeking in app distribution and other aftermarkets (it isn't growing its advertising business through innovation, but through an abuse of power) and generally monetizes its huge and affluent customer base in ever more ways (last month, Apple started offering a savings account in collaboration with Goldman Sachs and is now even predicted to launch a health insurance offering in 2024. To be clear, a company can pick low-hanging fruit through a partnership with Goldman Sachs and simultaneously still be the industry's most innovative player--the former could help finance the latter. But at this stage I can't see anything in technological terms that Apple could offer me and the Android ecosystem couldn't.

If Apple's success was attributable to the "virtuous circle" of investment in innovation generating returns that are partly reinvested in ever greater innovation, the rest of the smartphone industry couldn't even see Apple's tail lights by now.

During Qualcomm's earnings call, analysts appeared concerned--and Qualcomm's leadership appeared to understand those concerns--that the smartphone device market is ever more concentrated and that Android keeps losing market share to iOS. Android devices are a much bigger revenue opportunity for Qualcomm with its Snapdragon chips--and the moment Apple can make its own modem chips, the only Apple-related revenue source for Qualcomm will be patent royalties. The patent license agreement has the same term as the chipset supply agreement (until 2025), but there is an option for a two-year extension, which is presumably a unilateral option that Apple can exercise--or Apple can say "we don't need your chips anymore and now let's just renegotiate those patent license terms, potentially entailing litigation." The parties are indeed preparing for a mid-term round of renewed patent litigation: Qualcomm openly criticizes Apple for its standard-essential patent (SEP) devaluation efforts, and Apple would have very much wanted to pursue the invalidation of a patent Qualcomm might assert again next time.

Android's weakness especially in the U.S. and some other high-income geographies is indeed alarming. I continue to believe that Google's strategic mistake is to antagonize app developers almost to the same extent that Apple does instead of leveraging the potential of the developer community in a way that would turn the trend around and could erode the iPhone's market share for a change. Google is fighting against app developers side by side with Apple instead of throwing Apple under the bus.

While it is obvious at any rate that Qualcomm has a greater opportunity in the Android ecosystem, it is also reflected by Qualcomm's CEO's tweet in support of Google's #GetTheMessage campaign--an initiative by Google that appears unlikely to move the needle.

Whether Android keeps bleeding market share is not a question of the quality of Qualcomm's products. Qualcomm's growth opportunity in smartphones depends on Google making the right choices. In the short term, Apple's delays certainly help.

Monday, July 11, 2022

For the first time ever, Apple is suing over a standard-essential patent: in a Munich case against Ericsson, Apple is asserting a 4G SEP acquired from Intel

There are more and more firsts in the Ericsson v. Apple 5G patent dispute:

  • the first-ever Colombian standard-essential patent (SEP) judgment (Ericsson is now enforcing a 5G injunction, which Apple desperately sought to prevent),

  • the first-ever "emergency motion" for an antisuit damages order (Apple's reaction to the Colombian decision), and now...

    ...TA-DA...

  • the first-ever SEP lawsuit brought by Apple, which has been on the receiving end of SEP assertions for well over a decade but is only now striking back with a SEP for the first time in its history.

The venue is--of course--Munich, the world's #1 SEP injunction hotspot (while I haven't found out yet whether Apple is seeking an injunction, I'm sure it's either doing so now or would do so a little later).

The patent-in-suit is EP3178199 on "virtualized network function management." The company that filed for it, and obtained it, is Intel. A few months after the application was granted, Apple bought Intel's baseband chipset division, and in a subsequent transaction acquired many of Intel's cellular SEPs, such as this one. The database of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) shows that Intel declared the underlying patent application essential to the LTE (Long-Term Evolution, commonly known as 4G) standard, more specifically to its Evolved Packet System RAN part. RAN stands for Radio Access Network. The relevant 3GPP specification, no. 32.842, is titled "Telecommunication management; Study on network management of virtualized networks." That technical report was approved in 2015. All five IPR (intellectual property right) declarations related to that one were made by Intel, and Intel didn't subsequently declare any of those rights non-essential. So there is a FRAND commitment in place.

The Munich I Regional Court has assigned this case to its 21st Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Dr. Georg Werner). The case no. is 21 O 1970/22, and the first hearing (with the second one being a full trial) slated for February 15, 2023.

The same division will hear another Apple v. Ericsson countersuit on March 1, 2023: case no. 21 O 3471/22 over EP2946486 on an "apparatus, system and method of wireless backhaul and access communication via a common antenna array." This is a homegrown Apple patent, and appears to be a non-SEP.

At least one of Ericsson's cases has also been assigned to the Munich court's 21st Civil Chamber and will be heard in September 2022.

The two Munich complaints by Apple against Ericsson are not the only countersuits--just the most recently discovered ones. There is also a Mannheim case over another homegrown non-SEP, which will go to trial in October 2022, and a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (USITC, or just ITC) seeking an import ban on mobile base stations implementing mmWave, but those patents haven't been declared essential to a standard.

Apple and Ericsson are not the only companies contributing to the continued growth of the Munich patent (and especially SEP) docket. In my next post I'll report on several new automotive SEP assertions that have very recently been brought there.

Wednesday, June 29, 2022

Lessons from rejection of Apple's cert petition against Qualcomm: PTAB IPR can backfire depending on specific terms of patent license

The Supreme Court denies petitions for writ of certiorari without stating the reasons. It has more important things to do. In the Apple v. Qualcomm case--where the Federal Circuit held that Apple lacked standing to appeal decisions by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) due to a portfolio license it had taken from Qualcomm in 2019--we at least know what the Department of Justice (DOJ) thought. The Supreme Court had asked for the views (PDF) of the Solicitor General of the United States, Elizabeth Prelogar.

Central to that remnant from what could have become one of the biggest and longest-running patent spats ever is an inconsistency between standing requirements for PTAB Inter Partes Review (IPR) petitions and any appeals thereof to the Federal Circuit. Once you're past the PTAB, the appellant needs to satisfy Article III standing requirements (but not before). On appeal, the same standing questions as with respect to a declaratory judgment action in district court will be asked.

Article III standing involves the questions of injury, causation, and redressability. If you want to appeal a PTAB decision just to stick a decision invalidating the patent on a wall as a hunter's trophy, that doesn't count. Nor do you satisfy standing requirements if there's just a hypothetical possibility of being sued over the same patent(s) somewhere down the road, subject to circumstances that you may consider foreseeable but which can't be predicted with (near-)certainty.

What we know is that Apple's current license agreement with Qualcomm will expire either in 2025 or in 2027 (if a renewal option is exercised), while the two (non-standard-essential, by the way) patents at issue will expire only in August 2029 (U.S. Patent No. 7,844,037 on a "method and device for enabling message responses to incoming phone calls"; originally obtained by Palm) and, respectively, 2030 (U.S. Patent 8,683,362 on a "card metaphor for activities in a computing device"). So even if Apple didn't just breach its obligations under the existing agreement--though, if you ask Qualcomm, that's what it did with respect to the previous agreement, it might face infringement lawsuits over those patents simply as a result of the parties not being able to agree on the terms of a new license.

It's a very significant win for BakerBotts on Qualcomm's behalf, but Apple's arguments for standing (and for why the Supreme Court should have considered the matter worthy of review) weren't all that weak. In fact, compared to what I've recently seen from Apple in the 5G patent dispute with Ericsson or various antitrust contexts, Apple's arguments were pretty strong.

I even consider it quite possible that this--I mean the part on standing without taking a position on patent (in)validity--might have gone differently if Apple had bluntly stated the situation the way it is, but it probably had business as well as litigation-tactical reasons not to tell the whole story.

The peace that Apple and Qualcomm made a little over three years ago was attributable to one--and only one--factor: Apple considered Qualcomm the only reliable vendor from whom to source its 5G chips. Apple didn't see Intel on the right track. A few months prior to that agreement, Tim Cook had categorically ruled out a settlement. In a television interview earlier that year, he said Qualcomm's business model was unlawful, and Apple was going to fight it all the way.

Apple gets away with being a bit behind hardware innnovation. It was still doing extremely well with relatively small screens when comparable Android devices were much larger. It still doesn't have a foldable iPhone, though it's finally getting there. Apple is all about luxury brand image and lock-in. Two L's are the key enablers of a market cap of a couple trillion dollars. But even Apple couldn't have risked falling behind too much with 5G phones. I don't want to get into the question of whether smartphone users really have a major benefit from 5G, or whether those making most of the money from 5G should have to pay more to those making the largest investment (Politico reported on a potential EU initiative). The answer of whether smartphone users really need 5G isn't as clear as it is with respect to connected vehicles (where lower latency plays a role, as was recently discussed in an OPPO v. Nokia case). Regardless, Apple had to fear a loss of market share, and settled.

Cravath had done an incredible job defending Qualcomm against Apple and the FTC. Practically, Apple and the FTC constituted a public-private partnership. It became know that they had a common interest agreement in place. Qualcomm defeated the FTC all the way. Now, if Apple had not settled, it would have continued to support the FTC's case in different ways, and things might have turned out differently. But if the FTC case had ended identically, Apple would have lost its Qualcomm case big-time and might have owed tens of billions in enhanced damages.

The Qualcomm v. Apple infringement cases (for which Qualcomm relied on Quinn Emanuel in the U.S. and Germany) were only a sideshow at that stage and of totally negligible relevance compared to Apple's need for 5G chips, though over time pressure from that front might have piled up on Apple.

The fallout from the Apple-Qualcomm settlement was Intel's exit from the cellular baseband chipset business, with Apple first buying Intel's mobile chip division and then most of Intel's cellular SEPs (a transaction with respect to which Ericsson would now like to conduct discovery, but Apple opposes it). Apple is getting closer to using its own baseband chips. Whether it would at that point make sense for Apple to breach the existing agreement with Qualcomm and stop making royalty payments depends on the undisclosed terms of the contract(s) between them. I doubt it. I'd have doubted it anyway, but even more so now that the two Qualcomm patents at issue here are more formidable than before. What might happen, however, is that the agreement ends regularly in 2025 or 2027, and the parties might then be far apart on patent valuation questions.

Qualcomm's "No License, No Chips" policy has been cleared by the Ninth Circuit, and the FTC didn't even try to appeal it to the Supreme Court. So I'm not implying anything unlawful here. It's just a commercial reality that Qualcomm is in a privileged position among SEP licensors. It rarely ever has to sue to get paid. It has about three times as many licensees as Ericsson or Nokia, as there is a "long tail" of small implementers that wouldn't be worth suing. And from the big ones like Apple, Qualcomm can collect a lot more. The Ninth Circuit basically said that it's up to Qualcomm whether it labels a part of its chip price as a patent royalty.

Once Apple doesn't depend on Qualcomm's chips anymore, that's it for "No License, No Chips" with respect to the most important implementer. And then Qualcomm may have to enforce its patents--SEPs (which it avoided last time) as well as non-SEPs (like in 2017-2019).

In a hypothetical 2025 or 2027 Qualcomm v. Apple infringement litigation, the two above-mentioned patents would most likely be asserted again. Frankly, I'd be surprised if they weren't. The PTAB rejected Apple's validity challenge, and Apple's appeal went nowhere due to a lack of standing. Unless Apple can dig up some previously undiscovered prior art of enormous strength, those patents are going to be hard to challenge. If Qualcomm got to enforce them, especially through injunctive relief (which could also take the form an ITC import ban; indeed, Qualcomm was asserting some other patents against Apple in the ITC), that might put some pressure on Apple. The '037 patent broadly covers a well-known feature: instead of taking a voice call, you can send a (typically predefined) message to the caller to explain your unavailability. The '362 patent may--I'd have to look at it more closely to be sure--read on how one switches between apps on the iPhone.

With the ITC, the effect would be more psychological: it would be quite hard to persuade an Administrative Law Judge--or the Commission, i.e., the five people who make the agency's final decision--to deem those patents invalid. In district court, the problem is that juries rarely consider patents invalid, so you depend on a stay pending a parallel PTAB IPR proceeding.

But how would Apple get a PTAB IPR instituted? First, the most fundamental question has not been--and could not reasonably have been--addressed in the case that was just tossed: estoppel. Apple may simply be estopped from challenging those patents with essentially the same arguments again because it tried and lost. Apple would argue that the previous challenge was somewhat incomplete: Apple lacked standing to appeal. Qualcomm's positions on this are a bit inconsistent: in a parallel case, Qualcomm's counsel argued that Apple was estopped; in this one, Qualcomm said that this was a question of first impression that the Federal Circuit hasn't addressed, and given that the Supreme Court is a court of final appeal, one can't ask the Supreme Court to resolve that question as a prerequisite to addressing the question of whether Apple had standing. The DOJ agreed with Qualcomm that the Supreme Court shouldn't have to take a matter of first impression.

Second, even if Apple wasn't estopped, the PTAB would be fairly likely to decline to institute an IPR, simply because it would doubt the petitioner's chances to prevail.

What could or should Apple have done differently? And what should other licensees and litigants learn from this?

What Apple could have done--but presumably elected not to do--would have been to declare and potentially proffer evidence with respect to the risks it expects to face from those patents in the future. Apple essentially contented itself with saying that Qualcomm had already picked those patents from a portfolio of tens of thousands of patents, and would likely pick them again. Even if Apple believes (as it very well may) that those patents are commercially essential, that they're still going to be relevant a few years down the road, and that it won't be possible then to worked around them without a temporary quality degradation of its products, it can't say so because it would weaken its position too much. Apple at least wants to have a chance to dispute infringement in the future, possibly after making some technical changes ahead of any renewed litigation with Qualcomm.

Apple also couldn't say now that it was certain the parties wouldn't agree on a new license agreement in 2025 or 2027. Apple's and Qualcomm's positions on what patent royalties are reasonable have historically been far apart. They're not going to close the gap in the coming three or five years. But how could Apple have made those points then without saying here and now that it would simply be infringing those patents in a few years?

So, Apple faced a dilemma, and probably made the right choice. At least Apple has achieved one thing: Qualcomm--in this litigation, though not in another--and the DOJ stated that Apple wasn't necessarily estopped from renewing its validity challenges later. That's better than nothing.

At least with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, it's clear, however, that it was a bad idea for Apple to pursue those PTAB IPRs post-settlement.

It seems Apple was overreliant on the MedImmune precedent in which a party licensed two patents, and royalties were patent-specific, with the net effect of the invalidation of even a single patent being that obligations to pay royalties were reduced or eliminated. By contrast, it can be inferred from the Apple v. Qualcomm documents that Apple wouldn't have saved a cent if the two patents at issue had been invalidated. That distinction also persuaded the DOJ.

What would make most sense to do then?

  • If a party has enough leverage in litigation, and enough of a desire to keep challenging certain patents, it should insist on a clause according to which the outcome of--at least pending--validity challenges will entitle it to an adjustment of the royalty rate. How material that adjustment would have to be to establish standing is then another question that would have to be considered. But even a minor injury is better than none at all.

    While we're talking about non-SEPs here, this situation reminds me of something Presiding Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann (Munich I Regional Court, Seventh Civil Chamber) was contemplating in connection with SEP license deals resulting from a Huawei v. ZTE negotation. He had potential adjustments in mind. In Huawei v. ZTE, the European Court of Justice did place some importance on an implementer's ability to challenge patents.

  • Otherwise, one should withdraw all challenges. That's also what Qualcomm and the DOJ told the Supreme Court Apple should have done. If Apple had withdrawn its petitions prior to a PTAB IPR decision, there would have been nothing to appeal.

From a policy point of view, one may indeed question the wisdom of not allowing a PTAB petitioner to appeal an adverse decision. In that regard, I understand Apple's course of action.

It's interesting to look at what the Federal Circuit decided (PDF) in parallel Intel v. Qualcomm case:

"This is not the first time this court has addressed this standing issue between these parties. In two prior cases, we found Intel had standing on appeal based on the fact that Qualcomm sued Apple Inc. for infringement of the patent at issue, and that a main component of the accused products identified in Qualcomm’s infringement contentions was manufactured by Intel.[...] We see no reason to find otherwise in this appeal. As such, Intel has demonstrated a non-speculative risk of being sued by Qualcomm for infringement and therefore has standing to bring this appeal."

Let that sink in:

Apple was indeed sued by Qualcomm. Intel was only indirectly affected (customer suit). Apple is still in the same business as before (and expanding into more and more businesses), while Intel has exited the business in question.

Still, Intel "has demonstrated a non-speculative risk of being sued by Qualcomm for infringement" but Apple does not--because Apple has a license at this stage, though it will for sure expire before those patents do. One doesn't have to find the combination of these two outcomes perfectly logical.

In the end, what might have played a role here is that Apple v. Qualcomm was simply--as Qualcomm said--a poor vehicle for asking the Supreme Court to address on how to apply MedImmune to portfolio licenses. This here had a lot to do with legal technicalities, and psychologically Apple's primary problem may have been that the Federal Circuit, the DOJ, and ultimately the Supreme Court just couldn't see a pressing and legitimate reason for which Apple kept challenging those patents after the 2019 settlement instead of leaving Qualcomm and its patents alone.

This has been a counterproductive exercise for Apple, and Qualcomm is going to feel even stronger when the parties discuss their next patent license agreement.

Wednesday, June 15, 2022

Qualcomm wins another first-class antitrust acquittal as EU General Court tosses decision by European Commission on exclusive-dealing arrangement with Apple

A few years ago, Qualcomm was being investigated and fined by multiple antitrust authorities around the globe--possibly in more jurisdictions than any tech company before it, but Apple--with new investigations by the UK Competition & Markets Authority and the German Federal Cartel Office having been announced just this week--has meanwhile set a new "record" for drawing worldwide regulatory scrutiny.

In a few Asian jurisdictions, Qualcomm managed to work out settlements. In the United States and the EU, however, it had to fight the antitrust watchdogs in court. In 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overruled the district court on all counts, denied the Federal Trade Commission a rehearing, and in the end the FTC didn't even seek Supreme Court review.

That was a remarkable outcome. Today, Qualcomm has scored another major victory over a competition authority as the EU General Court annuled a European Commission decision that imposed a fine of approximately $1B (EUGC press release (PDF)). The Commission can appeal that decision, but it can only raise questions of law. I, frankly, don't think it would be a good use of Commission resources (its Legal Services have a lot on their plate) to even try. The EUGC made factual determinations that the Commission has to accept as final; it went beyond the call of duty by holding that the decision had to be annulled for more than one reason; and it's hard to see how the Commission could argue the legal reasoning, such as the EUGC's holding that there are no exception to the rule that the Commission must take notes of its interviews with third parties and put them into the case file so the target of an investigation can properly defend itself.

The case was about the potential anticompetitive effects (foreclosure) from an exclusive-dealing arrangement between Qualcomm and Apple during the period from 2011 to 2016. There was a clause under which Apple was going to lose huge discounts in the event of using other baseband chips than Qualcomm's in its products. Apple went ahead and used Intel chips in some iPads anyway (toward the end of that agreement).

That exclusive deal was one of four types of conduct by Qualcomm that the FTC was challenging. In both jurisdictions, an exclusive-dealing arrangement is not per se illegal: it depends on whether the competitive process was actually harmed by foreclosure. If exclusive dealing was per se illegal, a variety of exclusive business relationships that are procompetitive and ultimately in the interest of consumers would have to be prohibited. And both in the U.S. and the EU, there is no harm if no competitor would actually have been able to supply the relevant goods in the absence of the exclusive-dealing arrangement.

Exclusive dealing is not per se illegal because there are plenty of "legit" use cases. For example, in the early part of my professional life I often negotiated exclusive distribution deals between U.S. software makers and European, or specifically German, distributors. The "foreclosure" effect was that other distributors, if they wanted to buy the German version of a given product from the U.S. company, were referred to the exclusive distributor instead of being able to compete, such as by offering a higher price. But in order to be granted exclusive distribution rights, the distributors had to meet sales quotas and/or provide minimum guarantees and/or commit to certain marketing investments. Only an exclusive distributor had the incentive to promote those products (almost) as if they were its own--and the U.S. companies in all those cases didn't have the resources to set up their own subsidiary, at least not initially. So the legality of such exclusive distribution agreements spurred competition between software products, even though each deal, if viewed in isolation, reduced competition between distributors.

Whether Qualcomm really needed to preclude Apple from buying chipsets from other companies is a difficult question, but not a relevant one in a scenario in which no similarly or more efficient rival would have been in a position to meet Apple's requirements. If any company had been a serious contender during the relevant period, that would have been Intel. By now, Intel's chipset division and most of its cellular standard-essential patents have been acquired by Apple, and Apple hopes to be able to make its own 5G chips in the not too distant future.

Today's Qualcomm decision by the EUGC concludes that Qualcomm's rights as a defendant were not fully respected by the Commission. The Commission held meetings with stakeholders but didn't take notes that Qualcomm's lawyers could have reviewed, which would have enabled Qualcomm to present countervailing evidence. Qualcomm had to aim at a moving target as the Commission's finding of an abuse of a dominant market position was exclusively related to 4G (LTE) in its decision, but the Statement of Objections (SO; a preliminary decision) involved that market as well as the UMTS (3G) chipset market. Only if the SO and the final decision had been consistent in their market definition would Qualcomm have had a fair chance to dispute the alleged foreclosuer effects of the exclusive agreement with Apple. Also, the EUGC believes the Commission failed to take into consideration that Apple didn't really have a technically viable alternative to Qualcomm's chipsets for at least some of its products. The contract at issue may have reduced Apple's incentives to switch to another supplier, but that is not sufficient in its own right to establish actual foreclosure effects, as it doesn't matter if there are no suitable alternatives anyway.

I don't disagree with the EUGC's strict--actually, extremely strict--perspective on the rule of law. It's like that old Roman concept of "in dubio pro reo": in case of doubt, decide for the defendant. But the Court's press release makes it all sound more dramatic than it is. Beyond shortening and simplifying the court's reasoning, the press release borders on Commission-bashing. DG COMP has some lessons to learn from the ruling, and DG&COMP can do better--and in other contexts has done way better--than in the Qualcomm case. That said, it's neither fair nor was it necessary for the court to issue a press release that sounds like the Commission had committed a major wrongdoing. The press release refers to "a number of procedural irregularities." By contrast, the actual ruling mentions the word "irregularities" only once (where it summarizes Qualcomm's appellate argument).

Qualcomm has a reason to celebrate. The Commission has other priorities at this stage, and the EUGC recently upheld the Commission's far, far more important Google Shopping decision (judgment (PDF)). Those are the kinds of the cases for the Commission to focus on. European taxpayers' money would be wasted by appealing today's decision.

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Saturday, April 2, 2022

Microsoft rightly withdrew support for ACT | The App(le) Association (which it once created) -- why are Verizon, Intel, AT&T, Verisign still behind advocacy against 99.9% of app developers?

It's getting lonely around Apple. No one loves the Hermit App Kingdom. Still worse, hardly anyone even wants to be associated with it anymore in industry policy contexts--because of its App Store monopoly. This also weakens Apple's advocacy efforts around standard-essential patents (SEPs), despite the fact that the positions the Hermit App Kingdom takes in the SEP context are overwhelmingly shared by the likes of Samsung, Xiaomi, and OPPO, as well as all car makers and also companies like Intel and Cisco. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Apple on SEPs, there can be no question that it's merely the most powerful exponent of certain views on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms, but far from the only one. When it comes to mobile app distribution terms and policies, however, the only party that has mutual interests with Apple is Google, as evidenced by this week's amicus curiae briefs in Epic Games v. Apple, where virtually all of the support for Apple came from entities backed by Apple itself and by Google, though even Google has issues with Apple (game streaming and messaging, for instance).

It is high time for Verizon, Intel, AT&T, and Verisign to reconsider their status as "sponsors" of ACT | The App(le) Association unless they believe it is conducive to their business to position themselves as co-sponsors of advocacy that goes against the interests of roughly 99.9% of the digital economy, which is now very much an app economy. I understand that they may all share Apple's views on SEP enforcement and licensing. But the end doesn't justify the means, guys. If Apple wants to astroturf, let Apple astroturf, but let Apple do it alone.

I applaud Microsoft for finally (I had been waiting for this for about a year) having withdrawn its support for ACT | The App Association, which by now should more accurately be called ACT | The Apple Association.

This is extremely significant because ACT was essentially founded by Microsoft more than two decades ago. When Microsoft got into antitrust trouble (over conduct that was laughably negligible compared to what we've seen from Apple and Google in recent years), it set up ACT according to none other than The New York Times, which wrote in June 2000 (according to a Wikipedia article): "[...] Microsoft has also created new trade groups, the Association for Competitive Technology (ACT) [now called ACT | The App Association] and Americans for Technology Leadership (ATL), to generate support for the company through Web sites and a sophisticated and largely hidden grassroots lobbying campaign."

Dr. Roy Schestowitz is the #1 Microsoft hater. I sometimes agreed with him on particular industry issues but he is really obsessed with Microsoft, while other companies are now the problem and Microsoft is on the right side of history with respect to app distribution. Dr. Schestowitz has written extensively about ACT's (past) ties with Microsoft. On this page of his TechRights blog you can find a number of links going back to the late 2000s. For him it must be like hell freezing over to see Microsoft abandon ACT.

I first encountered ACT when I was campaigning against a piece of software patentability legislation in Europe. At the time, Microsoft was very much in favor of strong patent enforcement, even including SEPs--but a few years later I already noticed that Microsoft was becoming more and more balanced, especially with respect to injunctive relief and, generally speaking, the balance between patent plaintiffs and defendants. As Microsoft became a moderate in patent policy, ACT changed direction, too, and warned against SEP abuse--after many years of taking a "the stronger, the merrier" position on anything involving patents, regardless of whether they are standard-essential or not.

That about-face on SEPs must have attracted Apple to the group. Intel already had an interest in ACT's advocacy when it faced some antitrust issues itself, and Intel--like Apple, to be fair--has also been very consistent about patents on industry standards.

At some point, ACT renamed itself. ACT (Association for Competitive Technology) became ACT | The App Association--and in such contexts as Philips v. Thales they make submissions to courts that suggest it's an IoT startup group. In reality, the way all those "members" became members appears to be that they just signed up for a newsletter, never paying any dues or undergoing the slightest vetting.

Without specifically mentioning ACT, Politico.eu's Samuel Stolton discussed the problem of Big Tech Astroturfing in an excellent article in November 2021. Politico quoted German Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Alexandra Geese (Greens): " [M]any tech associations in Brussels, even those purporting to represent small- and medium-sized enterprises, are often bankrolled by Big Tech." The article discusses the problem of genuine small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) organizations being sidelined by deep-pocketed astroturfers.

I hadn't even noticed Microsoft's withdrawal from ACT until I saw a tweet by Epic CEO Tim Sweeney challenging ACT's claim that Epic Games never had small developers in mind. I replied with only a screenshot (the bottom section--because they try to hide those disclosures--of ACT's About page) to which I added an arrow):

As I was producing that image, I noticed that Microsoft was no longer listed. So I checked on the Internet Archive (Wayback Machine), where I found a January 24 capture of the same page. At that point, Microsoft was still listed between Apple and Verizon:

Microsoft's withdrawal from ACT is a reason to celebrate--and should really give Verizon, Intel, AT&T, and Verisign pause.

It's not a question of where one stands on SEPs. I'm pretty implementer-friendly, which is why I often agreed with Apple and even with ACT on specific SEP-related issues, but I look at it case by case, dispute by dispute. It's not that everything ACT said about SEPs is wrong--but to date I haven't seen a single statement by ACT on mobile app stores that wasn't an insult to human intelligence because no genuine representative of small app developers would ever say anything like the things they say.

What is also an insult to human intelligence is the suggestion that small app developers care about SEPs. Hardly any small app developer ever implements an industry standard: that's typically done by the platform itself. The iPhone implements 5G; an iOS app simply runs on the iPhone.

In February I commented on the most absurd thing ACT | The App(le) Association has ever done. It sponsored a "poll" that produced results like this:

"More than 60 percent of voters favor the federal government setting clear guidelines on what [FRAND] terms are for [SEPs] (61 percent favor / 32 percent oppose)."

You'd be lucky if even 0.61% of the general electorate (that's like 200 million people in the U.S.) knew what a SEP is.

I urge the likes of Verizon and Intel to take the following into consideration: It's one thing to lend support to organizations or academics because they take positions you like. That's par for the course in tech advocacy. It's another when an organization claims to speak for the victims of the app store tyranny but gets paid for it by the very tyrant. That's where every reputable and honorable company should draw the line. It's like setting up a pseudo-PETA, funded by the cosmetic industry, to defend animal testing, arguing that it actually benefits small animals.

Google--Apple's only ally (with limitations) in the app store context--has its own ACT called Developer Alliance. That's another story.

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Saturday, October 9, 2021

Monopolistic patent aggregation can give rise to antitrust liability, Judge Chen clarifies in dismissal of Intel's (and previously also Apple's) antitrust case against Fortress Investment

On September 28, 2021, Judge Edward M. Chen of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a motion by Fortress Investment and certain entities funded by Fortress to dismiss with prejudice an antitrust complaint that Intel was still pursuing and from which Apple withdrew in June as this blog was (to the best of my knowledge) first to report.

Meanwhile, a public redacted version of the order has become available (this post continues below the document):

21-10-07 Public Redacted Ve... by Florian Mueller

From the beginning I've looked at this case--with or without Apple being involved--as a test case for whether antitrust claims could still be brought in the United States against anything involving patents. The year after the dispute started, the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district court's FTC v. Qualcomm judgment was in part based on a reasoning that appeared to generally raise the bar for antitrust theories targeting patent licensing and litigation practices. I never thought that the door was entirely closed to such claims, and that's why I'm glad to see that Judge Chen--a very well-respected district judge in that same circuit--carefully distinguished the specific problems facing Intel's complaint from what would otherwise amount to antitrust immunity for patent holders.

The key passage begins on page 11 of the above order:

"In so holding, the Court does not take issue with the general theory being put forward by Intel – i.e., that aggregation of substitute patents could, in theory, harm 'competition in the same way as any merger or combination of competitors that lessens competition.' [...] The narrative told by the operative complaint, in principle, is compelling. It is not hard to imagine that a person or entity could accrue market power by obtaining a dominant share of substitute patents and threaten a barrage approach to litigation wherein an imperfect civil justice system may yield an erroneous outcome, thus allowing legally unjustified leverage over licensees, a result which could well constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade." (emphases added)

Judge Chen goes on to note:

"The problem for Intel is that the SAC lacks sufficient facts to demonstrate the narrative has been carried out against the company, at least at this juncture." (emphases added)

The last part--which other passages of the order are totally consistent with--makes this a semi-prejudicial dismissal. At first sight the type of dismissal is binary: if the court dismisses a case with prejudice, you can't refile, and if it's without, the court either means to send you back to the drawing board to do a better job or just wants to give you the opportunity to try again some other time. Here, however, the prejudice is only to the combination of the theories Intel presented with the lack of facts that would allow the court to consider it a possibility that, as Judge Chen put it, "the narrative has been carried out against [Intel]." There isn't much left of the original allegations, especially as Judge Chen rejected the idea that complementary patents could be in a patent-based antitrust market (as complements can only form part of a common market when this reflects commercial realities), but there still are some substitute patents in a few markets left, and depending on whether substitutes would be asserted against Intel, they could refile. That doesn't mean there'd automatically be an antitrust violation, but at least there would be a basis for a new complaint.

This may serve to dissuade Fortress from asserting certain combinations of patents in court, in which case Intel would have actually accomplished something of tangible value despite the dismissal. Moreover, Intel may gain mileage out of this case at the policy level, especially now that the Biden Administration appears to be more sympathetic to makers of innovative products.

The key takeaways are that patent aggregation is not without antitrust risks. But if you, as an alleged infringer of aggregated patents, want to bring an antitrust complaint over patent aggregation in the Northern District of California, you can give it a try, but you must plead specific patent markets consisting of substitutes (not complements), and you better do so only when any potentially abusive behavior has actually occurred.

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Wednesday, August 11, 2021

VLSI inches closer to $2.2B final judgment as Judge Albright denies Intel's motion for new trial

Things are moving forward again in VLSI v. Intel. Judge Alan Albright of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas has denied the first of several post-trial motions with which Intel is challenging the record $2.175B verdict. The following screenshot shows that a sealed order denying Intel's Rule 59 motion for a retrial has come down (click on the image to enlarge):

A new trial would have been a difficult choice for the nation's busiest patent infringement court. Presumably we will see decisions on the other post-trial motions (motions for judgment as a matter of law) in the coming days or weeks. The likelihood of a final judgment by the district court based on the March jury verdict has increased. Short of a settlement, it looks like this one is soon going to be appealed to the Federal Circuit.

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Thursday, August 5, 2021

Intel points Judge Albright to developments in Delaware: does the chipmaker have a license defense to the $2.2B patent damages verdict?

VLSI Technologies won a patent infringement trial against Intel in the Western District of Texas in March, and lost (because it failed to establish infringement) another one in April. A third VLSI v. Intel trial has been pushed back from the summer to December.

Judge Alan Albright has not yet entered a final judgment further to the March and April jury verdicts. In the first case (the one with the $2.2B record verdict), Intel is fighting hard and has raised a number of issues in its post-trial motions, demonstrating to the trial court that it can easily be reversed on appeal if it doesn't order a retrial or make similarly impactful decisions now. In the second case, VLSI would like another chance to prevail.

In both cases, Intel filed a "notice of subsequent developments" on Monday (this post continues below the document):

21-08-02 Intel Notice of Su... by Florian Mueller

Intel's legal position is that final judgment cannot enter while a motion to amend its answers and defenses is pending. The critical part appears to be a license defense.

As Intel's notice says, the Silicon Valley company "filed a Complaint in the Delaware Court of Chancery against VLSI Technology LLC ('VLSI'), among others, for equitable and other relief relating to its license rights." That happened in January. VLSI brought a motion to dismiss in March, which was heard in May, with no decision having been entered yet by the Delaware state court.

But there is also some VLSI v. Intel patent infringement litigation pending in Delaware--in the District of Delaware, as patent law is federal law. Like in Texas, Intel also filed a motion to amend its answer and defenses in the Delaware patent infringement case. A United States Magistrate Judge held a motion hearing on July 6, 2021, and what Intel wanted to show to Judge Albright is that the Delaware judge "found that Intel's license defense is not futile."

Here's the relevant excerpt from the hearing transcript (this post continues below the document):

21-08-02 Intel Exh1 Hearing... by Florian Mueller

This here is the key passage from what Magistrate Judge Hall said:

"VLSI argues that Intel should not be granted leave to amend under Rule 15 because Intel's license defense is futile and because VLSI would be prejudiced if Intel is allowed to amend.

"Let's talk about futility first. If a proposed amendment is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally insufficient on its face, the Court may deny a leave to amend.

"VLSI makes two arguments about futility. VLSI's first argument has multiple parts, but essentially it argues that Intel could not possibly have obtained a license to the asserted patents under the Finjan settlement.

"At its core of its argument VLSI points to a number of facts that according to VLSI demonstrate that the agreement did not grant Intel a license.

"However, at this stage and without the benefit of a full factual record, I'm not prepared to say as a matter of law that there was no way that Intel could have obtained a license to VLSI's patents pursuant to that agreement.

"VLSI is free to reraise its challenge to Intel's license defense at the summary judgment stage.

"Turning to VLSI's second argument about futility, it argues that Intel's license defense is futile because Intel has conceded that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the license defense.

"I don't see a concession. Intel has maintained that it wants to litigate the license issue in the Court of Chancery, but I don't read that as a concession that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Intel's license defense.

"In sum, VLSI has not shown that Intel's defense is frivolous or otherwise legally insufficient on its face. I therefore find that it is not futile at this stage."

If Judge Albright ordered a retrial, the license defense might be adjudicated in Delaware in the meantime. If he decides to enter final judgment, however, he will have to somehow rule on Intel's motion to amend its answer and defenses.

Since Apple's $1B trial win in 2012, which even went up to the Supreme Court (disgorgement of profits for design patent infringement), I can't remember a damages verdict having been challenged like Intel is fighting to get VLSI's $2.2B win vacated. Intel leaves no stone unturned. Meanwhile, the busiest patent court in the world (which gets about 20% of all U.S. patent infringement cases) barely finds the time to enter final judgment.

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Friday, July 9, 2021

Fortress Investment once again urges district court to dismiss Intel's antitrust case over patent aggregation by non-practicing entities

In mid-June, both Apple and Intel opposed Fortress Investment's motion to dismiss their second amended antitrust complaint in the Northern District of California. A week later, Apple withdrew from the case, allowing Apple to take a purely defensive perspective on antitrust law (case in point, Apple just lost an appeal to Epic Games in Australia).

Last night, Fortress filed its reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss (this post continues below the document):

21-07-08 Fortress Reply ISO... by Florian Mueller

My impression was that some of the arguments in favor of dismissal are more like summary judgment than motion-to-dismiss arguments. I will give this more thought, and if there are any other observations worth sharing, I may do a follow-up post. What I found most interesting at first sight is that Fortress argues that, after Apple's withdrawal, "five out of the nine alleged 'markets' now contain no Defendants or patents that have ever been involved in a lawsuit against Intel." According to Fortress, the complaint failed to properly allege antitrust injury even while Apple was a party to the case, but Fortress believes it is now in an even stronger position.

Fortress makes a similar argument in connection with supracompetitive royalties (which are key to the complaint's theory of harm):

"[...] Intel does not dispute there is no allegation that it has ever paid any royalties to any Defendant ('supracompetitive' or otherwise). Intel states that 'Plaintiffs have 'engaged in licensing negotiations' with Defendants,' [...], but the only 'negotiations' alleged in the [Second Amended Complaint] occurred between Inventergy, INVT, and Apple, who is no longer a plaintiff in this case. [...] There are no allegations that Intel has been involved in any licensing negotiations with any Defendant, let alone any that would be likely to result in a deal."

The Fortress-funded companies mentioned in that passage--Inventergy and INVT--also made a separate filing (Scribd, PDF) arguing that there is no patent aggregation issue with respect to the standard-essential patents those entities hold.

Fortress also replied to amicus curiae briefs filed in support of Intel (and, at the time, Apple) by ACT | The App Association and Unified Patents (this post continues below the document):

21-07-08 Fortress Reply to ... by Florian Mueller

Fortress disputes that ACT | The App Association's members have actually experienced any problems with patent assertions by Fortress-funded NPEs:

"Notably, the App Association does not name a single 'small company' out of its 5,000 members that has supposedly been 'abused' by any of the Defendants. Thus, whatever the merits of the App Association's arguments about supposed abusive patent assertions against small companies, they are simply irrelevant here."

The motion-to-dismiss hearing will be held in San Francisco in a couple of months.

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Thursday, July 1, 2021

Don't mess with the Western District of Texas: Judge Albright's strictness in fracking patent case may be justified by egregious misconduct

Over the last couple of years, two courts have emerged as the world's patent litigation hotspots--the places to be if you're a plaintiff, and the places to watch regardless of whether you assert or defend against patent: the Waco division of the Western District of Texas, where Judge Alan Albright now gets about 20% of all U.S. patent infringement complaints, and the Munich I Regional Court, which will add a third patent litigation division next month. I don't mean to downplay the significance of other venues. In particular, the Eastern District of Texas continues to be pretty significant; proceedings before the U.S. International Trade Commission often drive settlements; and in Germany, the Mannheim Regional Court (once dubbed "the Eastern District of Mannheim") has a lot in common with the Munich court.

Through the Expose Patent Trolls newsletter, my attention has been drawn to an oil industry case--pretty remote from what I'm normally interested in. Expose Patent Trolls pointed to a recent JD Supra article entitled West Texas plaintiff-friendly patent decisions keep coming, discussing a "death-penalty sanction" ruling in Performance Chemical v. True Chemical (or just Performance Chemical v. TrueChem) that "may further help fuel the rush of patent plaintiffs to the Western District of Texas, a district quickly gaining in popularity for its plaintiff-friendly discovery rules." Of course, "death penalty" is figurative in this context, just in case anyone was wondering. What happened is that Judge Alan Albright of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas vacated a trial date after identifying extensive discovery misconduct on the defendant's part, and entered a preliminary injunction and a ruling on the merits, leaving only damages to be determined by a jury (or by another court order, which is what the plaintiff would prefer).

I've repeatedly written about the situation in the Western District of Texas, and I recently made the right call with respect to a likely trial outcome (Intel being cleared of infringement in the second VLSI case). No avid reader of this blog would consider me to be hostile to defendants. But I'm also a conservative in many respects. I believe in law and order, and in the deterrent effect of penalties. In the U.S., deterrence still matters, though there is a certain trend toward the more European laissez-faire and in a couple of decades the U.S. perspective on penalties will probably be similar to that European softness.

If only a third of what has allegedly happened in this Texas patent case is true (such as that stuff was removed right before site visits), Judge Albright has a point here, and he would actually be a bad judge if he condoned it. Winston & Strawn's WacoWatch blog discussed the cancellation of the trial on March 31, and less than two weeks later reported on the "death penalty sanctions." It really does seem that this is an extraordinary case.

Meanwhile, the plaintiff--knowing that W.D. Tex. is the nation's busiest patent court--would like to take another shortcut and just have a $5M+ damages award (which would be tripled) entered, either as a default judgment (which was the procedural basis of the previous decisions in the case) or as a summary judgment. TrueChem is now represented by new counsel (which may be an attempt to put the blame for previous wrongdoings at least in part on former counsel), and opposes that damages motion (this post continues below thed document):

21-06-25 Cv222 TrueChem Opp... by Florian Mueller

Damages determinations are really at the heart of the constitutional right to a jury trial in civil proceedings, and Judge Albright himself felt before that the only question left for the jury to decide is damages. He also noted a few months ago that there is a public interest in determining the validity of a patent, given that it could also be asserted against other parties. That position shows he's not simply going to do whatever suits a plaintiff. He may be plaintiff-friendly in many ways, possibly more so than any other U.S. patent judge, but I've seen judges, particularly in one outrageous German case almost ten years ago, who--unlike Judge Albright--even feel that patent invalidation runs counter to the public interest. Former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader referred to the PTAB as "patent death squads." Even Judge Lucy Koh of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, with whom I otherwise agreed on a lot of questions over the year, gave an interview a long time ago and said (which she might not say anymore with all of the experience she has gained since) that defendants had too many opportunities to shoot down patents.

Even though Judge Albright had qualms about throwing out TrueChem's invalidity defense, he ultimately did so. But TrueChem brought a motion for reconsideration of that particular aspect of the default judgment a few days ago (this post continues below the document):

21-06-28 Cv222 TrueChem Mot... by Florian Mueller

On this one, I definitely agree with TrueChem. I don't know whether it is very likely that Judge Albright will change mind on an issue he weighed and decided a few months ago, but the discovery misconduct at issue is all about infringement, and invalidity should still be decided. It's actually quite hard to persuade juries of an invalidity defense, but at least TrueChem could then take it up directly with the Federal Circuit instead of firstly having to ask the appeals court to set aside the default judgment that precluded the invalidity defense altogether.

Whatever the outcome of that fracking case may be, I don't think that one calls Judge Albright's judicial style into question.

He does have a "what's mine is mine" attitude toward patent cases and declines venue transfer motions all the time. Yesterday, Expose Patent Trolls tweeted about a case in which Samsung and LG succeeded in the Federal Circuit:

The VLSI v. Intel cases are the most important set of W.D. Tex. patent disputes at the moment, and that's because of that $2.175B record verdict. We'll see how Judge Albright adjudicates Intel's post-trial motions. As I wrote a couple of weeks ago, a retrial in that first case may be a possibility, and otherwise it's rather unlikely that the judgment would be affirmed by the Federal Circuit. In the second case, in which VLSI couldn't persuade the jury that Intel was infringing two patents, VLSI is seeking a judgment as matter of law in its favor, or alternatively a retrial. Last week Intel filed its opposition to the retrial motion as well as to the JMOL motion. VLSI will get to reply to those filings, but so far I don't have reasons to assume that VLSI can turn Intel's successful defense in that case around.

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Wednesday, June 23, 2021

Apple withdraws from antitrust action against Fortress Investment and multiple Fortress-funded companies--now Intel is the sole remaining plaintiff

After reporting last week on Apple and Intel's response to Fortress Investment's motion to dismiss their second amended antitrust complaint in the Northern District of California, I noted on Twitter that "[t]his is that (nowadays quite rare) case in which Apple is an antitrust plaintiff, not defendant." Since then, Apple has had another antitrust investigation to add to the list of cases in which it's being investigated: the German Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) is looking into the App Store's gatekeeper position.

At this point, Apple is exclusively an antitrust defendant. On Monday, Apple filed the following notice of dismissal with the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (this post continues below the document):

21-06-21 Apple Notice of Di... by Florian Mueller

The actual notice is so short--just two paragraphs--that I'll also provide it here:

"Plaintiff Apple Inc., pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), hereby gives notice that it (1) dismisses from this action with prejudice its claims against defendants Fortress Investment Group LLC; Fortress Credit Co. LLC; Uniloc 2017 LLC; Uniloc USA, Inc.; Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.R.L.; INVT SPE LLC; Inventergy Global, Inc.; and IXI IP, LLC, and (2) dismisses from this action without prejudice its claims against defendant VLSI Technology LLC.

"None of the defendants have filed an answer to the Second Amended Complaint (or as to any prior complaint) or for summary judgment as to these claims. Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(i) is therefore appropriate."

The fact that only the claims against VLSI are dismissed without prejudice, but all others with prejudice, makes it a possibility that some infringement disputes have been settled. It could also be that Apple determined it simply had no antitrust claims against those other entities, but is not so sure about VLSI.

One important Fortress-funded company is presumably still suing Apple in Munich: VoiceAge EVS. But VoiceAge wasn't a party to the California antitrust case anyway.

For Apple, the key benefit from this strategic retreat is that it's now consistently an antitrust defendant that argues intellectual property right holders should not be restricted in how they exploit their assets. That's what we heard from Apple's lead counsel toward the end of the recent Epic Games v. Apple closing arguments. In that case, Apple attempts to draw an analogy to FTC v. Qualcomm, as does Fortress in the case from which Apple is now dropping out.

Intel was prepared to take on Fortress all by itself: it sued in October 2019. Then Intel withdrew that complaint only to refile a joint complaint with Apple the following month. Now Intel is the sole plaintiff again, more than a year and a half later.

Apple's withdrawal from the Fortress case is just the latest example of partnerships between Apple and Intel coming to an end. The two companies were the key U.S. complainants over Qualcomm's business model until Apple felt it couldn't rely on Intel's ability to deliver competitive 5G baseband chips in time. Intel still filed an amicus brief in FTC v. Qualcomm at a time when Apple had settled. Apple then bought Intel's baseband chipset division and many related patents. In late 2020, "Apple began the transition from Intel processors to Apple silicon in Mac computers."

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