Showing posts with label Apple. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Apple. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 27, 2023

Antitrust class action against Qualcomm (originally related to FTC action) thrown out on summary judgment; same judge previously denied discovery of my communications with Microsoft

In January, I reported on the partial dismissal of an antitrust class action against Qualcomm in the Northern District of California (a case that was brought in the wake of the FTC's ultimately unsuccessful enforcement action against the chipmaker), and at the time I already wrote that the ruins of that complaint "[would] hardly survive summary judgment." In February I agreed with Qualcomm's arguments for not reopening discovery, as did the court. After the SJ motion was filed in April, I "I guess[ed] Qualcomm's motion [would] succeed." And that is what has just happened.

On Tuesday, "[a]fter carefully considering the briefing and conducting oral argument on August 3, 2023," Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Qualcomm's motion for summary judgment in its entirety:

In Re: Qualcomm Antitrust Litigation (case no. 17-md-02773-JSC, N.D. Cal.): Order re: Motion for Summary Judgment (Public Redacted Version)

This here is a legal victory that should put all of that U.S. antitrust litigation from the late 2010s to rest (short of a successful appeal, but chances are so slim that I guess an appeal will not even be brought). In economic terms it is, however, pretty unimportant compared to the fact that Apple, due to its failure to make its own iPhone-grade baseband processor, had to extend the chipset purchasing agreement with Qualcomm by another three years (2024-2026), which presumably means that Apple exercised an option to extend its standard-essential patent royalty payments as well. In the alternative (if Apple had been able to replace Qualcomm's chips), Apple might have tried to renegotiate those SEP licensing terms.

Things are going well for Qualcomm, and ultimately I believe the company will be able to deal with whatever impact the proposed EU SEP Regulation--in whatever form it may or may not be passed into law--will have.

As for Judge Corley's reasoning, the key elements are that there was really not even the slightest substance to claims that an agreement with Samsung had any market foreclosure impact. And even with respect to Apple, there was no credible pass-through theory (of elevated costs). The final part ("Conclusion") of the order granting the motion to dismiss essentially says that the class-action lawyers made their strategic choices. The initial choices (very much about "No License, No Chips" and allegedly supra-FRAND SEP royalties) didn't work out when the Ninth Circuit reversed the FTC's trial win. Later on, they still tried to get something out of this by suing Qualcomm over exclusive dealing. They presented a new expert report "though the Court had expressly declined to reopen expert discovery." Judge Corley declined to "open the flood gates to prolonged do-over litigation" as opposed to the speedy, efficient, and just resolution that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to ensure.

This outcome makes sense to me. As I noted further above, I predicted that the shifting-sands case wouldn't make it to trial.

Class actions can serve useful purposes. They can raise issues and promote justice. However, the vast majority of class actions I see in the technology industry are just opportunistic attempts by lawyers to extract settlements from large corporations. Qualcomm probably could have "settled" that class action at a far lower cost than that of its world-class defense. But once you do that, others will come and sue you as well. Qualcomm made the right choice and has now (again, absent an unlikely reversal on appeal) defeated this class action (or, more precisely, consolidated set of class actions).

The order to dismiss the Qualcomm class action(s) came one day after Judge Corley also made a decision (in a class-action matter that does not involve Qualcomm but also followed an FTC action) relating in part to yours truly's communications with Microsoft:

DeMartini et al. v. Microsoft (case no. 22-cv-08991-JSC, N.D. Cal.): Order Re: Discovery Dispute Joint Letter

Let me just refer you to an article about this odd sideshow of the Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard merger case by Stephen Totilo of Axios Gaming.

Thursday, September 14, 2023

French publishers' U.S. antitrust class action against Apple is largely dismissed, making it economically irrelevant short of successful appeal: Northern District of California

Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California just denied in part--and in economic terms, almost completely--a U.S. antitrust class action brought on behalf of leading French publishers such as Le Figaro and L'Équipe (about that one, see my personal note toward the end).

Here's the decision, which I'll explain briefly:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23977262-23-09-13-order-on-motion-to-dismiss-le-figaro-et-al-v-apple: Société du Figaro et al. v. Apple (case no. 4:22-cv-4437-YGR, N.D. Cal.): Order granting part and denying in part APple's motion to dismiss with partial leave to amend

The court gives the French publishers three weeks (until October 4) to amend their complaint, but they can only amend limited parts that won't change anything about the fact that there's no more serious money left for them to be made even if they won. But in order to turn this into something that has significant economic potential, they need a successful appeal.

In this first reaction, I'm not going to take a position on whether I agree with Judge Gonzalez Rogers. I disagreed with key parts of her Epic Games v. Apple ruling (which is now going to be appealed to the Supreme Court), but her dismissal of Pistacchio v. Apple, a class action over Apple Arcade, was well-reasoned (at least the market definition part).

The introductory part of the decision indicates between the lines a bit of an annoyance with the fact that certain class-action lawyers brought this case shortly after setting a U.S. developer class action against Apple over largely the same issues. This here looked like a double-dipping (as far as the lawyers--not the parties--are concerned). But that does not, in and of itself, render the entire case meritless.

The economically biggest part is that Judge YGR does not allow the French publishers to sue in U.S. court for damages relating to foreign sales. Those publishers obviously have some U.S. revenues, as there are French expats and other people who read one or more of those publications. But obviously most of the money they make is generated in France, followed by other French-speaking parts of the world (such as Québec).

If they go ahead now and take this to trial, the maximum damages award they could ever realistically hope for would still not offset litigation costs. A victory would be somewhat symbolic. The only value they could get value out of a win related to their U.S. revenues would be that this might persuade a French court to rule against Apple in a similar way. But is that going to be worth it? I doubt it.

Earlier this year I highlighted the problem that Apple doesn'T want to be liable in any jurisdiction. Epic Games experienced the same. If app makers sue outside the U.S., Apple says only U.S. courts have jurisdiction, and in the U.S., Apple points to the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), which is a law that was enacted to prevent extraterritorial overreach by U.S. courts.

Based on this U.S. decision, the French publishers and others will find it easier to convince foreign courts that they have jurisdiction over App Store abuse claims relating to those non-U.S. markets, despite a choice-of-jurisdiction clause in the contract Apple imposes on app developers. So there may be something positive here.

Another potential strategy for the French publishers would be to bring in additional plaintiffs on the occasion of the amendment, which could be publishers with very substantial U.S. revenues.

When I first commented on the French publishers' U.S. class action, I found one part of the complaint particularly intriguing: they raised the issue of App Tracking Transparency (ATT), a money and power grab by Apple under the pretext of privacy. Judge Gonzalez Rogers allows the plaintiffs to amend their ATT claim if they bring an amended complaint. That may now be another reason to widen the class definition and include publishers with substantial U.S. sales (an amendmend that Apple would presumably oppose, but the plaintiffs could try to get it approved by the court). For publishers, ATT is a huge problem. So maybe the focus will change a little bit. However, the alternative would be to drop this one and bring a new one with U.S. publishers (or UK and other publishers with substantial U.S. revenues) on board from the start, and with a focus on ATT.

I guess something will happen. I don't expect this complaint to just be dropped at this stage without an appeal, amendment, or a new complaint with an ATT focus (or even a combination of two or more measures of that kind).

Personal note: As I mentioned L'Équipe: while I currently have no paying subscription to any media outlet, simply because there are too many around the globe that are relevant to me at different times, L'Équipe is actually one of two publications I plan to subscribe to for the purpose of brushing up my French. I actually learned most of my Spanish from sports newspapers AS, Marca, and Sport. If I subscribed to it through their Android apps, Google would tax my subscription fees...

Monday, August 21, 2023

UK Competition & Markets Authority rightly declines to support Apple, auto industry efforts to devalue standard-essential patents and legitimize collective holdout through licensing negotiation groups

The Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) of the United Kingdom has recently been in the news primarily for its stance on mergers, particularly Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard (the final order deadline is only eight days away). Horizontal cooperation agreements are actually closer to merger control than any other field of competition law. Major jurisdictions now have more specific rules governing merger reviews (such as the HSR Act in the U.S., certaion sections of the UK Enterprise Act, and the EU Merger Regulation). But a merger is just the ultimate form of cooperation.

It would have been somewhat inconsistent for the CMA to hold merging parties to a high standard while condoning cartels, though Apple--which effectively made three submissions to the CMA on its draft horizontal guidance, one of which amounts to deceptive lobbying--and its allies, such as certain automotive industry players, would have liked it to happen. Market forces are not a bad thing only because some companies believe they could otherwise save money (on patent license fees).

What Apple (along with its allies and astroturfers) wanted would also have created a potential conflict between the CMA and UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO). The UK IPO, which is the country's patent and trademark office, correctly notes that SEP licensing is a field in which any potential intervention must be approached with caution, which contrasts nicely with the regulatory activism exhibited by the European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market (DG GROW).

In late January, the CMA published its draft guidance on horizontal agreements and launched a public consultation. In the section on purchasing agreements, there was the following passage that became a bone of contention and has, fortunately, been deleted (final version):

"Groups of potential licensees may seek to jointly negotiate licensing agreements for standard essential patents with licensors in view of incorporating that technology in their products (sometimes referred to as licensing negotiation groups)."

LNGs are a bad idea. I agree with the Qualcomm executive who said that everyone involved with LNGs should go to jail. About two years ago I posted a series of articles (1, 2, and 3) on the subject, which I was happy to see referenced by Acer in a U.S. patent infringement complaint against Volkswagen.

Yet there are some who continue to lobby for the permission to form LNGs regardless of market share. I wouldn't have a problem with a couple of startups cooperating within reason. But an alliance of, say, Volkswagen-Stellantis-Toyota would go too far. Way too far. The risk of group boycott clearly outweighs any purported efficiency gains.

Apple basically made three submissions to the CMA on its draft horizontal guidelines: one in its own name, one through the Fair Standards Alliance (which is at least reasonably transparent), and one through its astroturfing operation named ACT | The App(le) Association. When I reached out to the UK IPO about ACT's lobbying, they acknowledged the ACT-Apple link. The CMA is presumably aware of it as well. Not only is it obvious that (small) app developers have no SEP licensing issues but the CMA also understands the problems app makers have with Apple and Google's mobile app store duopoly. ACT consistently supports Apple against--but falsely claims to defend the interests of--app developers.

Just last month, a Politico Europe newsletter reported on a partial victory scored by watchdog NGOs Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and LobbyControl.

While the EU Transparency Register's secretariat deemed a complaint over ACT inadmissible, it nevertheless got ACT to adjust its register entry. And the following statement by ACT's head of communications, Karen Groppe, is hilarious:

"We do receive approximately half of our support from Apple in the EU. By accepting sponsorship from companies and organizations, we can keep membership from our small business members cost-free."

Again, the CMA is aware of the fundamental conflict between virtually all app developers (case in point, not a single app developer testified for Apple at the Epic Games trial two years ago) and Apple. It's an insult to human intelligence to suggest that a largely Apple-funded organization (and "approximately half" is most likely a gross understatement) would actually represent app makers against the heavyhanded and highly abusive monopolist.

Cleary Gottlieb, a firm with Google and Sony ties, also supported the idea of endorsing LNGs. However, Cleary would have preferred for the CMA to consider LNGs an intellectual property-specific topic as opposed to a joint purchasing agreement. Cleary's argument is that joint purchasing agreements are about physical goods, not non-material property rights. However, that doesn't convince me, given that joint purchasing of IP (such as copyrighted works) is common. The CMA made the best choice anyway by dropping LNGs from its guidelines altogether.

Even if the CMA had indicated that SEP LNGs might be acceptable, the proponents of that collective hold-out vehicle would still have been far from ready to proceed with their plan: it just takes one major jurisdiction to keep such licensing cartels illegal. And right now there isn't a single major jurisdiction, at least in the Western hemisphere, that is prepared to allow LNGs.

But the lobbying effort will continue. Deceptive lobbying included.

Wednesday, June 7, 2023

BREAKING: Mr Justice Marcus Smith has made his Optis v. Apple FRAND determination: only $5M per year for global standard-essential patent license covering all Apple products, even hypothetical Apple Car

BREAKING: Apple has effectively prevailed over the Optis Wireless patent licensing firm in the High Court of Justice (formerly known as the England & Wales High Court, still commonly abbreviated as EWHC). Optis will receive only approximately US$5 million per year from Apple, and we're talking about a worldwide standard-essential (SEP) portfolio license covering all Apple products implementing cellular connectivity, even "a hypothetical Apple car, retailing at a hypothetical US$100,000 and using the Standard for Cellular Connectivity."

Let's face it: London is not the city of milk and honey for SEPholders. After the Unwired Planet v. Huawei decisions by the High Court, Court of Appeal, and UK Supreme Court, some thought the United Kingdom would become one of the world's most attractive SEP enforcement destinations. In March, Mr Justice Mellor--also almost one year after the related trial--handed down his InterDigital v. Lenovo decision, which overwhelmingly favored the interests of the defendant. One could have a debate over whether InterDigital or Optis is now likely more disappointed, but neither of them can be pleased with the amounts.

The decision already came down on May 10, but it has not been published yet. I've been able to obtain some basic information and snippets from a source I must protect. I had no idea that the judgment had already been entered when I wrote on May 27 that it could be further delayed by Mr Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft v. Competition & Markets Authority, over the $68.7B acquisition of Activision Blizzard King). He not only hears patent cases but is also the President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal of the United Kingdom. I live-tweeted about the initial case management conference last week and subsequently blogged about that case. I'll also comment on next Monday's second case management conference, and I'll be speaking about the application of competition law to SEPs at a London conference on Tuesday that is keynoted by Mr Justice Smith and organized by Concurrences together with King's College London. I look forward to meeting some of my readers there. I very rarely attend in-person events.

Getting back to Optis v. Apple:

It's possible that Optis will appeal the decision. If it standards, Apple gets a global lifetime license (including backroyalties) to that patent portfolio for roughly $60M (including interest). Optis wanted a lot more--in fact, so much more that Apple even threatened with leaving the UK market should the UK part of the dispute result in an obligation to take a worldwide license at a rate Apple would have deemed excessive. Apple withdrew the threat, but it shows that they were afraid of a worst-case scenario far in excess of what the High Court has now decided.

Some of Apple's arguments for bringing down the royalty rate were rejected, and that includes Apple's favorite SEP devaluation argument, which is that the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit (SSPPU) should serve as the royalty base. Mr Justice Smith authored an entire section "to explain why the SSPPU approach is, in [his] judgement, indefensible." Wow. "[I]ndefensible."

Interestingly, Mr Justice Smith even agreed with Apple that the baseband chipset "does contain the relevant technology." And Optis did not really dispute that the market value of that one is approximately $25. Then Mr Justice Smith notes that--at that price--"[t]he product is, however, unlicensed." And he rejected the idea that if a baseband chipset maker generates a profit of maybe $5 on the $25 component, it "should pay for the licence out of the US$5 profit, and that this therefore constituted the absolute limit that ought to be paid by anyone."

Mr Justice Smith did not mince words as he criticized Apple's SSPPU argument:

"Indeed, it is quite absurd to presuppose that the manufacturer of a baseband chipset would forego any part of their profit unless absolutely compelled to do so. It is much more likely that baseband chipset manufacturers would increase the price of their product to reflect the added value to purchasers of that product of having a licence to the SEPs comprising the stack. Absent extremely clear market evidence, the assumption that the baseband chipset manufacturer would absorb the costs of the licence and not pass them on is almost certainly both unsafe and wrong. Certainly, it cannot be assumed."

Mr Justice Smith made adjustments to Optis's share of the 4G SEP stack, and (presumably because not all of Optis's infringement assertions succeeded) based that patent owner's share of the total royalty stack on an even lower percentage (we're talking about less than 1%) than its ownership share. He did not find Apple to have been an unwilling licensee who would no longer be entitled to a FRAND license.

One key overlap between Mr Justice Smith's approach in Optis v. Apple and Mr Justice Mellor's in InterDigital v. Lenovo is that the patent holder's proposed comparable license agreements were rejected because the respective licensees were smaller players:

"[G]iven the nature of Optis’ counterparties to the Optis Comparables – generally small players in the market, with low or at least not massive sales volumes – there is a question whether these licences properly reflect a FRAND rate for a counterparty like Apple."

By contrast, all of the comparable license agreements that Apple asked the court to rely on where agreements between Apple and other parties:

"The Apple Comparables are all licences where the common factor is Apple. Apple sought and obtained licences to different portfolios with different counterparties. This means there is no direct comparable with the portfolio in issue before me (which is a factor pointing away from the usefulness of the Apple Comparables), but some insight is gained into the value of the Stack as a whole, and the value attributed (at least so far as a company the size of Apple is concerned) to different portfolios held by different counterparties. The size and commercial “clout” of the licensee may be (I do not say is) a relevant factor in terms of royalties in any event."

The decision spans almost 300 pages, and I have yet to obtain and digest the document in its entirety. I did, however, want to share some of the most important and interesting aspects of the ruling now--not least also with a view to the Tuesday conference (The Innovation Economics Conerence for Antitrust Lawyers), where Mr Justice Smith may also say something about the valuation of FRAND-pledged SEPs.

As I mentioned in a recent post, several FOSS Patents blog posts were discussed at the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial last year.

Saturday, May 27, 2023

Optis v. Apple FRAND ruling could be delayed by Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard); GenghisComm sues Toyota over SEPs; updates on Nokia-OPPO, KPN-Ericsson

This is a roundup post that discusses four different standard-essential patent (SEP) disputes and multiple jurisdictions. Quick links:

  1. Optis v. Apple FRAND ruling could be delayed by Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard)

  2. GenghisComm (not an Avanci licensor) sues Avanci licensee Toyota over SEPs

  3. Nokia invalidated OPPO patent-in-suit

  4. KPN defended one of patents-in-suit against Ericsson earlier this month

1. Optis v. Apple FRAND ruling could be delayed by Justice Marcus Smith's new merger case (Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard)

It's been almost a year since the Optis Wireless v. Apple trial in the High Court of Justice in London, but no decision has come down yet. In a similar case, InterDigital v. Lenovo, it took Justice Mellor similarly long as those FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) rate-setting cases are incredibly labor-intensive for the courts adjudicating them.

The judge presiding over the FRAND part of the Optis v. Apple case is Mr Justice Marcus Smith, whose reputation extends not only to patent but also competition law: he is the President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CATribunal, or just CAT) of the United Kingdom.

It is not unusual for judges to divide their time between two courts. In fact, numerous European patent judges are doing so now between national courts and the Unified Patent Court (UPC). Since a few days ago, Mr Justice Smith is presiding over an antitrust case that is by far the biggest in the CAT's history, not only in terms of what's at stake (Microsoft's $68.7 billion purchase of Activision Blizzard) but also the enormous public and media attention--and on top of all of that, it's a matter that the UK's Prime Minister (who stressed the CMA's responsibility for growth and investment), Chancellor of the Exchequer, and its Parliament's Business and Trade Committee are concerned about.

Microsoft filed its appeal of a Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) merger-blocking decision on Wednesday evening UK time. Mr Justice Smith published the summary of the grounds of appeal (PDF) approximately 48 hours later and scheduled a case management conference for Tuesday (May 30). I already predicted at the beginning of this month that he would personally preside over that ultra-high-profile appeal. After yesterday's publication of the summary of the appeal, I commented on the grounds of appeal in a 40-part Twitter thread and added some further commentary on the comity part.

I'll live-tweet about the case management conference on Tuesday.

The deal has been cleared by the regulators who decided the matter for 38 countries (30 of them European Economic Area member states), with a collective population of 2.4 billion and aggregate GDP of $45 trillion, so if not for the CMA's absurd ruling, the deal could actually close now. But the CMA's leadership would like their agency--which the CAT has to overrule fairly often if one considers the deferential standard of review called Judicial Review--to be the world's policeman for major mergers, especially major tech mergers. There is profound concern in the UK over the CMA's eccentricities and regulatory overreach, and the CAT is now called upon to restore sanity and curb megalomania.

The CMA is now an outlier on the global stage. The only regulator to agree with them is the FTC, which under its current leadership opposes virtually any merger it gets to review and openly admits it doesn't care about losing in court all the time. The CMA decision is so clearly biased and incorrect that more and more people are wondering whether the reason is not just regulatory hubris or a lack of understanding of the technology markets involved, but whether it is even attributable (at least in part) to bad faith. My personal opinion is that a good-faith merger decision where the regulator looks at all of the evidence with an open mind and strives faithfully to apply the law to the facts definitely looks different.

There are mistakes that can be adequately explained with a lack of diligence (the CMA totally embarrassed not only itself but the UK and its government when the provisional findings--the equivalent of the Statement of Objections in the EU--subtracted only one year of costs from five years of benefits. The CMA corrected that mistake after Microsoft pointed it out, and revised the provisional findings. That was almost certainly just a lack of diligence. But the final decision just showed that before the merger review even started in earnest they must have been hellbent on blocking the merger. After they had to give up their primary theory of harm (vertical foreclosure affecting Sony in the videogame console market) and even prior to that realized they had to drop a "conglomerate" theory (involving Windows (an open platform), Azure (an easily substitutable commodity), the Xbox, and Activision Blizzard's games), they simply shoehorned those failed theories of harm into a "cloud gaming" theory of harm.

Weeks before Microsoft filed its appeal, the gamer community had already identified and discussed plenty of issues on Twitter and discussion boards. The decision is not just flawed or extremely wrong. It's a lot worse than that.

Against that background, gamers and other observers of the process can't be blamed for asking questions about the impartiality of the person who according to what a reporter from a major news agency told me "basically made the decision for the CMA": the agency's Senior Director of Mergers, Colin Raftery. Only because I wanted my many Twitter followers with an interest in that merger topic to understand that an unbalanced panel might respond to a historic speech by EU antitrust chief Magrethe Vestager on the same day, I mentioned--and proved based on a LinkedIn screenshot--that Mr. Rafferty started his career and spent seven years at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, a firm that has been consistently adverse to Microsoft for decades and is representing the most vocal critic of the Activision deal--Sony Interactive Entertainment--in its worldwide complaints, also in the UK. Cleary also advises Google, the other (and less vocal) complainant, but not in this context it seems. That factoid was picked up by Windows Central, and other media reported as well. On social media (Twitter, TikTok etc.) there was widespread outrage. My personal opinion is that none of us knows what Mr. Raftery's personal relationship with the Cleary lawyers opposing the deal on Sony's behalf--and with Sony's executives--is, so the truth could be anything from reassuring to mildly disconcerting to problematic.

It turned out that Mr. Raftery was previously instrumental to a merger-blocking decision that favored a former client. And it doesn't look good that the CMA takes an extreme position on a vertical merger now (Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard) while it allowed Sony to make a horizontal acquisition of particular relevance to the UK market.

It now befalls Mr Justice Smith and his CATribunal to ensure a legally correct outcome and to restore the general public's confidence in the UK regulatory process. The fact that the first case management conference already takes place a few days later suggests that he wants to adjudicate the matter as swiftly as possible, which is in everyone's interest except Cleary and two of its clients, and CMA officials who may hope that the merger will be abandoned before their mistakes and their abuse of power won't be exposed.

People are already talking about a novelization or a documentary about that merger, given that some of what has happened here amounts to truth being stranger than fiction. I guess some of my blog posts and tweets about the case will come in handy if and when that happens. Those of you who have practiced law before Mr Justice Smith, or know him as a colleague, can already think about which Hollywood actor might play him.

2. GenghisComm (not an Avanci licensor) sues Avanci licensee Toyota over SEPs

There isn't much happening anymore in terms of automotive SEP litigation. Avanci has licensed the vast majority of car makers, Continental finally gave up its U.S. federal antitrust litigation against Avanci and some of its licensors (continuing only its Delaware state law action against Nokia), and Telit dropped a lawsuit that had been brought by Thales in Munich against Avanci and Nokia.

While the European Commission doesn't seem to appreciate the contribution of patent pools to the licensing process the way it used to do, Avanci's success has made it part of the solution. Recently even Samsung--one of the world's largest implementers of cellular standards--joined Avanci as a licensor at no extra cost to licensees.

A few SEP holders--some of which are non-practicing entities--still aren't Avanci licensors. One such company is GenghisComm Holdings, which on Wednesday filed a SEP infringement lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas against Toyota:

When it comes to comparable licenses, Toyota will be able to point to the license it has taken from Avanci, paying $15 per car for the vast majority of 4G SEPs. GenghisComm is presumably suing for the purpose of extracting a substantially higher royalty rate relatieve to the strength of its portfolio. Maybe the plan is to benefit from the unpredictability of patent damages verdicts.

3. Nokia invalidated OPPO patent-in-suit

About two weeks ago I reported on the (appealable) revocation of two Nokia patents as a result of OPPO's challenges. For the sake of complete reporting, I'd like to add that this month a written decision (PDF) also came down in an opposition proceeding in which Nokia has achieved the (equally appealable) revocation of an OPPO patent-in-suit: EP3563600 on "separate configuration of numerology-associated resources." the oral hearing took place on March 23.

4. KPN defended one of its patents-in-suit against Ericsson earlier this month

Here's a follow-up to the post of a few days ago on Ericsson obtaining the invalidation (by the USPTO's PTAB) of one of KPN's patents-in-suit. I hadn't previously commented on that dispute, so now I'd like to provide a bit more context.

Of the three patents-in-suit from KPN's first case against Ericsson in the Eastern District of Texas,

  • one (RE'089) was invalidated as I reported,

  • one was never challenged through an IPR petition (U.S. Patent No. 8,881,235 on "service-based authentication to a network"), and

  • a third one, U.S. Patent No. 9,253,637 on a "telecommunications network and method for time-based network access", was deemed valid by the PTAB in a May 12, 2023 decision (IPR2022-00069).

A second KPN v. Ericsson case is also pending in the same district (i.e., before Judge Rodney Gilstrap):

Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson and Ericsson Inc. (case no. 2:22-cv-282-JRG): July 25, 2022 complaint

According to the docket, the trial will begin on April 1, 2024 with jury selection.

Saturday, May 20, 2023

Former ACT | The App(le) Association policy officer admits small companies don't pay people like him: panel debate on EU SEP Regulation proposal

It speaks volumes about Apple's values that even after Bloomberg exposed ACT | The App(le) Association as an astoturfing operation, they still attempt to fool policy makers--such as European Commission officials--into believing that ACT represents small app developers and IoT startups. They continue to issue statements, to lobby policy makers, to organize events, and to participate in debates--all of that in the name of small companies, even when they actually work against them, such as on App Store issues.

The European Commission should not invite them to events unless Apple sends them to speak on its behalf, which would be the only honest thing to do. But I may be asking for too much.

Bloomberg's investigative journalism was highly effective regardless of whether the EC turns a blind eye to its results. ACT itself was forced to admit that Apple paid for more than half of its funding, and then Bloomberg managed to talk to four former ACT employees (ACT is, by the way, set up as a company) who said that "more than half" was a gross understatement and that ACT simply takes directions from Apple.

A former de facto ACT employee indirectly and inadvertently threw the organization under the bus on Friday: Alexander Prenter, a Brussels-based native New Zealander who is now a policy officer at the Fair Standards Alliance. I wish to make it perfectly clear that Mr. Prenter is well-respected, as is the Fair Standards Alliance (FSA). I am actually happy for him that he joined the FSA in July 2021 after several ears of working for ACT. Whether or not one agrees with the FSA--and I could have various disagreements with them during the EU legislative process that is about to start--they are transparent about their membership as opposed to just claiming to speak for thousands of companies no one has ever seen or heard of.

At a webinar held by the European University Institute on Friday (May 19), the EC's proposed regulation on standard-essential patents (SEPs) was discussed. Professor Jorge Contreras (Utah), Michael Schloegl (Continental), and Alexander Prenter took pro-implementer positions, essentially saying the proposal doesn't go far enough, while Urska Petrovcic (Qualcomm) and Richard Vary (Bird & Bird, a firm that advises and represents not only SEP holders like Nokia but also implementers) believe it goes too far. What came up in several interventions was the lack of hard evidence for the need to legislate on the subject.

While the Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) seeks to justify this bill with the alleged plight of SMEs forced to deal with SEP licensing and litigation, the impact assessment provides anecdotal evidence (apart from being unverifiable, some of it even implausible) at best. In the end the Commission relies on about three dozen SMEs who have provided input (again, this is totally unverifiable, and last year I debunked a totally made-up SME-SEP story that was paid for by the same lobbying entities pushing for an EU SEP law). But only a couple of them ever actually licensed SEPs.

Mr. Prenter attempted to explain away the conspicuous absence of evidence for actual SEP issues faced by SMEs. He said SMEs don't employ someone like him to fill out questionnaires. That was an interesting admission considering that ACT does claim to represent SMEs, does orchestrate submissions by companies claiming to be SMEs facing SEP issues, and Mr. Prenter worked for ACT from 2017 or (at the latest) 2018 until 2021.

In other words, Mr. Prenter conceded that SMEs don't pay for ACT's work (as Bloomberg had also found out).

A 2018 "Study on safety of non-embedded software" refers to an "Interview [with] Brian Scarpelli and Alexander Prenter, ACT, 16 March 2018."

The SME topic also came up at a recent Brussels presentation of two DG GROW-commissioned "studies" by "researchers". Licensing expert Eric Stasik explained that it simply isn't profitable for SEP holders to approach every small implementer and work out a license deal. As Mr. Stasik explained, you'd like to generate that additional licensing income if you're a SEP holder, but you can't economically justify it.

At least a couple of participants in that event agreed that patent pools could actually help get SMEs licensed to a greater extent. By virtue of transactional efficiencies, pools might make it profitable for SEP holders to grant licenses to SMEs. While that particular pool wasn't mentioned, I think Sisvel's recently-launched NB-IoT pool has the potential to prove helpful in this context.

My own position on this topic is somewhere in the middle between the two camps:

  • Mr. Stasik is right that SEP licensing is not a practical issue for SMEs, simply because SEP licensing is a high-volume business and SEP enforcement is too expensive. As a litigation watcher, I have yet to see a case where a small company actually gets sued over a SEP. The relatively smallest one I've seen so far is AVM, a company that has a 70% market share in the German WiFi router market. Even AVM is not an SME by the EU's criteria.

  • DG GROW should admit that the ones who are really pushing for the EU SEP Regulation are Apple (directly and via entities like ACT) and the automotive industry. They should be honest about it.

  • But I also agree with those who say that infringement--even if tolerated for the reason identified by Mr. Stasik--is not a sustainable basis to do business.

  • I furthermore agree that SMEs are increasingly implementing FRAND standards.

If the Commission wanted to engage in further outreach to SMEs that implement standards, organize events, hold confidential conversations with SMEs about SEP licensing issues, I'd welcome such initiatives in principle. But why legislate now? Why in that particular form that is unbalanced and poorly-thought-out? The more appropriate thing to do would be to keep an eye on the situation and take incisive action only if and when there is hard evidence for SMEs facing serious problems on a significant scale. It will become known if there's a lot of enforcement activity against small companies (which will probably never be the case). If SMEs ever faced a serious problem, the most important question would be how to help them without putting a thumb on the scales in favor of the likes of Apple to the detriment of those who invest in standards-related innovation and need licensing income to fund that effort.

The dispute resolution mechanisms proposed by the Commission will be too costly even for most SMEs. I would expect the average SME to simply decline to participate in any FRAND conciliation proceeding for cost reasons.

Europe--like the rest of the world--has enough problems that are real. It's better to focus on those issues instead of listening to fake SME organizations or SMEs who may be real but whose SEP stories would be debunked as nonsense or insane exaggerations if only they were scrutinized by experts.

Monday, May 1, 2023

Antitrust & patent judge Mr. Justice Marcus Smith will hear Microsoft's appeal of UK CMA's irrational decision to block Activision Blizzard purchase: Apple, Optis waiting for his FRAND ruling

Chances are you've heard of Mr. Justice Marcus Smith--at minimum, of some of his decisions--whether you read FOSS Patents primarily for its coverage of patent litigation (the original focus), its commentary on select antitrust matters, or a combination of both. At least two of his cases will be of particular relevance to this blog in the near term:

  • The standard-essential patent (SEP) ecosystem is anxiously awaiting his Optis v. Apple FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms) judgment in Optis v. Apple (Claim No. HP-2019-000006). That part is called Trial E. Most of the trials were technical, and Trial E is about license fees. While that case is at the intersection of patent and antitrust law, Justice Smith also hears purely technical patent cases (see this article by law firm Simmons & Simmons).

    In addition to Oxford, he studied at the University of Munich. Munich is now a major patent litigation hotspot.

  • It is a given that Justice Smith will preside over a three-judge panel that will adjudicate the impending Microsoft v. Competition & Markets Authority appeal of what is probably the most illogical decision not only the CMA but any competition authority of a civilized country ever made in a merger case. That ruling came down on Wednesday. Based on what Activision Blizzard CEO Bobby Kotick told CNBC, I wouldn't be surprised to see that appeal lodged even before the end of this week, though Microsoft has time until later this month.

Justice Smith is the President of the Competition Appeal Tribunal ("CATribunal" or "CAT"), which he has been since 2021, as well as one of the judges of the Patents Court, which is part of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice (previously known as England & Wales High Court, thus still abbreviated as EWHC).

There is another UK judge with a dual antitrust/patent focus many of my readers know--and some even personally know as a former colleague (patent litigator)--Mr. Justice Richard Meade. He is the judge in charge of intellectual property, but he's also a member of the CAT bench. While it's almost inconceivable that Justice Smith would not be involved with the "ABK" (for "Activision Blizzard King") case, Justice Meade may or may not be on that panel as well.

It bodes well for Microsoft's appeal that at least one judge with patent expertise will be involved. That's because the CMA's decision gets technology and technology markets completely wrong. The CMA's Inquiry Group was biased, incompetent, and did not even get basic math right (which is why they had to amend their provisional findings and drop the primary of theory harm after Microsoft pointed out they had subtracted only one year of costs from five years of foreclosure benefits). The members of that group--mostly with a financial services background--don't understand technology in the slightest. Some of what they've written in their ruling has made the CMA the laughing stock of gamers on social media and discussion boards. Patent-specialized judges are jurists, not engineers, but they develop a good understanding of technology and that's why it would be great if not only Mr. Justice Smith as the President of the Court but also Mr. Justice Meade became involved. I don't think any CAT judge will buy the Inquiry Group's absurd vision of the future of cloud gaming, but judges with a strong grasp of technology will find it even easier to see that the CMA ruling is plain stupid.

In September 2021, I commented on Justice Meade's presentation at a Chinese conference and noted that "Justice Meade stole the other European judges the show in terms of content, structure, and presentation (despite not switching into full-screen mode): low-key but world-class."

Justice Meade is also involved with the remedies part of the Optis v. Apple dispute. Equally in September 2021, he ordered an injunction that will, however, not be enforced if Apple takes a license to the Optis portfolio on the FRAND terms that are being determined as we speak by Justice Smith. I commented on a remark by Justice Meade on Apple's threat to exit the UK market depending on the global terms to be set in the UK (I expressed an understanding for both his and Apple's views).

In the Microsoft-ABK context, no one has threatened to leave the market, but the CMA decision has apparently forced Microsoft to ask the UK government for a ministerial override of the CMA decision. Microsoft's relevance to the UK economy and national security is key in that context because at least one of three statutory criteria for such an override (impact on financial stability, security, or media plurality) must be met. I discussed that in an #UnblockABK blog post, which outlined various possible ways forward for that transaction. For now there is every sign that Microsoft wants--and is highly likely--to get the CMA decision overturned. There can be no reasonable question whether the CMA's blocking decision is wholly unreasonable, just how close it is to an act of malfeasance or whether the CMA merely suffers from institutional schizophrenia (contradicting itself even within a one-page statement) or megalomania.

We're not at the point where an Illumina-Grail approach--closing the deal without regulatory approval--would merely be contemplated. That scenario is not on the agenda here, but Illumina did it, and Apple, in a SEP context, said that at some point it would be unprofitable to operate in the UK. Only if Microsoft decided to disregard the CMA's unlawful decision, they would face sanctions that based on my research could theoretically reach about $20B, though that would clearly be disproportionate when Microsoft's entire UK sales are just a fraction of that number and the theory of "harm" is about roughly 1% of the total gaming market. While the CMA's bizarre approach to enforcement has not yet forced a company to leave the UK, the agency is increasingly a liability comparable to a Disinvest in Britain campaign:

  • Microsoft's president told the BBC that the English Channel never seemed wider as there is greater legal certainty and a better climate to do business in the EU. As a result of the CMA's blatant abuse of power, he found it increasingly difficult to grow a technology business in the UK.

  • Activision Blizzard's CEO also indicated that the CMA's outrageous behavior would impact his company's job creation in the UK.

  • Not only the parties (Microsoft and ABK) but also some of their "coopetitors" (rivals, but also partners) find the CMA decision nonsensical and counterproductive in terms of having anticompetitive effects as opposed to defending competition. While I'm sure British Telecom subsidiary EE is also angry, it's a bit more difficult for them to call out the CMA. But other cloud-gaming providers who entered into agreements with Microsoft (subject to the condition precedent that the acquisition is closed) are at liberty to speak out. The most important one of them is Nvidia, the world's leading Artifical Intelligence chipset maker and also the market leader in cloud gaming. Clearly, Nvidia is hoping the CAT will swiftly reverse the CMA:

    Nvidia had to cancel its own acquisition of UK-based semiconductor design company Arm, but in that context the CMA had a UK-specific reason to be particularly concerned (unlike in the ABK case) and, more importantly, it was simply in the global antitrust mainstream. But Nvidia--I repeat, the world's leading AI chipset maker--can now see that the CMA will also make crazy decisions when other jurisdictions simply clear the deal (apart from the U.S., but the FTC doesn't matter because they can't block without a court ruling).

  • Arm is now going public in the U.S., not on the London Stock Exchange. A dual listing would have been difficult due to special circumstances, but the signal that this sends out is terrible for "the City": London's financial district. It's not just that Arm, a logical candidate for the LSE, is not going public in London. There are companies that are delisting from the LSE in favor of the U.S. stock market. Just on Friday, Reuters reported that "Kingspan plans to quit London listing in latest blow for LSE." The post-Brexit situation for the UK's financial services industry is difficult enough, and the CMA's anti-business stance and its current legal philosophy, characterized by contempt for logic if not even for the law, further complicates the situation.

  • A British games journalist told GBNews (videos embedded in tweet below) that the UK is now officially closed for business and this is terrible for its games industry:

  • By coincidence, just one day prior to the CMA's ABK insanity, the founder of Deliveroo told the Business Studies podcast that his company had to lay off 30% of its staff a few years ago because the CMA (whose current and irresponsible CEO was the agency's General Counsel) delayed a foreign minority investment (13% with no special rights) for 18 months. He is still so angry he called "total bullshit" on the CMA and used the F-word.

  • In a decision in which Mr. Justice Smith participated, he saw that the CMA broke the law in a case against Apple. While I actually agreed with the CMA's objective in that case, I also saw the problem with clear statutory deadlines. The CAT was able to quickly overrule the CMA.

  • One of the oldest technology companies--the one that created the world's first mobile phone--is Motorola. A few weeks ago, Motorola Solutions announced the intent to appeal an "unprecedented final decision" by the CMA. Right below the headline, Motorola says that "the CMA’s egregious overreach cannot be justified on competitive, economic or legal grounds." I don't know the details of that case (Mobile Radio Network Services market investigation). But I read announcements of antitrust appeals all the time, and a mature company like Motorola wouldn't use language like "egregious overreach" in an average case.

There are only two ways in which Sarah Cardell's CMA, which is currently out of control, can be reined in. The government could override CMA decisions and replace people. And the CAT can quash CMA decisions or parts thereof. The standard of review is way too high. That was no problem as long as the CMA didn't go off the deep end, but now the CMA behaves as if it's above the law, only because of the legal framework. In the Microsoft-ABK case, however, the CMA decision is simply nuts and that's why the "irrational or unlawful" standard will be easily met by the forthcoming appeal.

The CMA will learn now--or, depending on whether the UK government has made its presence felt, may already have realized--that Microsoft-ABK is not a case like Meta-Giphy, where the CMA made an aggressive decision (though easily distinguishable) that the CAT--again with Justice Smith presiding--quashed and referred back. On remand, the CMA arrived at the same conclusion, and the deal fell through. But in the Microsoft-ABK case, there's just one laughable theory of "harm" left, and if that one is quashed for fundamental reasons, the CAT may be able to resolve the case right away. It's interesting to see that the CMA doesn't really respect the CAT: in its Microsoft-ABK decision, it cites all sorts of input from industry players making predictions for how important cloud gaming will be in "7-10 years" or in "10-15 years" despite the CAT clearly having told the CMA the following in the Meta-Giphy case:

105. Assessment of impairment to dynamic competition will almost always involve consideration of expectations (i.e. an outcome with a more than 50% chance). Clearly, that outcome will involve consideration of multiple factors, but we doubt very much (although of course every case must turn on its facts) if an impairment to dynamic competition that is not thought to manifest itself within five years at the outside can be considered to be an expectation. The world is simply not that predictable.

The CMA just tries to navigate around the Giphy decision without admitting that they don't respect it:

"Based on this evidence, we consider that cloud gaming will continue to grow and is likely to become profitable in the next five years. Although it is difficult to predict exactly how big cloud gaming will eventually become, the evidence supports the conclusion that it is a growing and promising market in which several market participants are investing considerable amounts."

"[...] cloud gaming users and revenue will increase substantially in the next few years."

The mere fact that cloud gaming could become profitable still doesn't mean it's a reasonably large market (it's tiny and it's going to remain small in the years ahead) based on which a UK regulator can reasonably block a global acquisition that is much more about mobile gaming than the cloud. While the CMA claims it has to protect competition in the cloud gaming market, the real players like Nvidia or European startup Boosteroid are for the deal and against the CMA decision.

This case will be the most important one in the CAT's history. It's going to be an easy one to decide, though. By now, gamers discussing the decision and comparing the actual facts to the Inquiry Group's alternative universe have already identified utter absurdities. Let me just show you two more tweets here, both by a Twitter user named PeterOvo, one of which has a tweet of mine attached:

The FRAND rate-setting decision in Optis v. Apple that Justice Smith is working on is much more complicated. It's about what license fees Apple should pay for the use of the former Ericsson patents belonging to Optis, a group of patent licensing firms. In a structurally parallel case, InterDigital v. Lenovo, Mr. Justice James Mellor largely agreed with the defendant. But this is very much a case-by-case thing.

Justice Smith presided over the Optis v. Apple FRAND trial last year. It started in June 2022. I was even considering flying to London to follow it, but ultimately obtained only indirect information. During that trial, I received an email from someone actively involved with the proceedings:

"I have been sitting in on the Optis v. Apple 'Trial E' in London all this week and thought you might like to know your name and your blog has been mentioned repeatedly during the trial."

I understand that both Optis and Apple made references to different FOSS Patents posts. On June 20, 2022, another person directly involved with the case told me that "[my] Foss posts around the time of the Unwired Planet v. Huawei Sup. Ct. opinion [we]re now being discussed in the trial." My reaction was that they should actually have more important issues to sort out than discuss my posts, but pride in authorship is a fact of life and that's why I'm now particularly interested in the forthcoming Optis v. Apple "Trial E" judgment by Justice Smith. Even more so, however, I look forward to the appeal of the CMA's irrational--if not unlawful--merger block.

Monday, April 17, 2023

ETSI asks European Commission to reconsider SEP regulation -- Apple protests as it stands to benefit from SEP enforcement complications more than any European company

BREAKING NEWS:

  1. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has urged senior European Commission officials to reconsider a regulation on standard-essential patents (SEPs) that the European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market (DG GROW) has drafted and would like to put on the table as a formal legislative proposal next week (you can find a list of my previous writings on that topic toward the end of this post).

  2. Apple has formally objected to ETSI's letter to the Commission, making it clear who hopes to benefit from the measure more than any European company: the world's richest company, which spends only about 1-2% of the price of an iPhone on SEP royalties.

As always, I must protect my sources, but I can assure you that the following document is authentic and was sent by ETSI to cabinet-level EU Commission officials on Friday (April 14):

April 14, 2023 letter by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to Mr. Anthony Whelan (Digital Adviser, Cabinet of European Commission President) and other cabinet-level EC officials

The letter, signed by ETSI's Director-General (Luis Jorge Rmoero Saro), is addressed to Anthony Whelan, EC President Ursula von der Leyen's Digital Adviser. Mr. Whelan has also been in charge of competition policy and enforcement. Copied are members of the cabinets of commissioners Thierry Breton (Internal Market), Margrethe Vestager (Digital Agenda, Competition), and Valdas Dombrovskis (Trade).

It is hard to overstate the significance of that letter, given that ETSI is essentially a creation--or brainchild--of the European Commission. While Europe's global market share in wireless devices is negligible, ETSI remained as important as ever, but its role is now under threat by not only the draft SEP regulation but also other Commission ideas.

ETSI's letter stresses that ETSI already maintains its own database that contains not only essentiality declarations (as the EU's envisaged SEP register would) but also technical specifications:

"This system in ETSI and 3GPP puts Europe on the global standards map and constitutes an undeniable competitive asset for Europe." (emphasis added)

The second concern raised in ETSI's letter is that the draft regulation would impose "an obligation on SDOs, such as ETSI, to provide certain information to the Competence Centre (the EUIPO)." ETSI explains that this would "place[] a significant burden on SDOs, in particular the requirement to provide details of “known implementations of the standard." Even ETSI--a major standard-setting organization--"does not have the tools or resources to comply with such an obligation." And the contemplated requirement makes no sense "as those who wish to implement ETSI’s standards will be more aware of the relevant implementations than [ETSI's] members or [ETSI itself] would be."

ETSI therefore asks the European Commission not to put out the proposal on April 26, but to organize "an in-depth dialogue to find a modus operandi to keep European innovation capability at its best."

If there was any doubt about the weight that ETSI's message to the EC will presumably bear, Apple eliminated it.

Earlier today, an Apple lobbyist expressed concern over ETSI's letter to the Commission:

From: ETSIBOARD: Board distribution list ETSIBOARD[REDACTED] on behalf of Helene Workman [REDACTED]@APPLE.COM

Date: Monday, 17 April 2023 at 04:02

To: ETSIBOARD@[REEDACTED]

Subject: Re: Draft EU SEP regulation - ETSI letter to the European Commission

Dear Luis and colleagues,

I am very surprised and concerned to see this letter to these EC Cabinets stating that the letter provides ETSI’s views on a leaked draft version of the EU’s proposal for a regulation on SEPs. This letter takes extreme positions on topics for which there are diverse views amongst the ETSI membership going so far as to request that the EC not release the SEP Legislation. As you may be aware, there are sharply divided views among ETSI’s membership on the topic of SEPs, the proposed EU regulation, and whether it should promptly be enacted. I’m concerned that the ETSI Director Genera commented on a leaked draft that is not even an officially released proposal and that it purports to express ETSI’s views on this topic without consultation of the Board, ETSI IPR SC or the general ETSI membership. Accordingly, I am respectfully requesting that the ETSI Secretariat retract the letter and provide the Board with an explanation as to how this letter was developed and who was involved.

Additionally, I would note that the letter requests that the EC not release the SEP legislation based largely on implementation details that could be discussed with the EC and EUIPO later during the development of the Implementation Plan and as the EUIPO Competence Center is established. The fact that ETSI has a database does not preclude the EC from setting up a more general registry through the EUIPO. The specifics of how the EU registry will run are not even in the leaked draft regulation, so any concerns as to the interaction with the ETSI database are no reason to delay the regulation.

Thanks.

Best regards,

Helene

The above makes it clear that Apple--while even itsown astroturfers don't deny that some issues need to be addressed--wants the EU Commission to take an anti-SEP-holder initiative sooner rather than later. "SEP devaluation now!"

No company in the world would benefit from the EU initiative more than Apple. It doesn't even matter whether the proposal is workable. What Apple wants is a political statement that will weaken patent rights and which Apple's lobbyists around the globe would use to push for similar (and potentially more well-thought-out) initiatives in other jurisdictions.

In its own country, Apple was unable to persuade the federal government to adopt a SEP policy statement favoring net licensees.

The Chairman of ETSI's Board, Dirk Weiler, responded to Apple today:

Dear Helene,

ETSI is not a lobbying organization. Therefore, such a topic is not up for developing ETSI membership position statements as it happens in industry associations.

There have been many statements from industry, academia and others on this draft regulation, and mostly very negative on several elements.

The letter from the Director-General addresses only issues which clearly would cause substantial problems for ETSI itself. These are topics which have been extensively discussed in ETSI, where ETSI has invested a lot of efforts and money to make ETSI the role model for SDOs with regard to the handling of patents in areas at the forefront of technology.

And it is the role of the Director General to speak up on such topics which threaten ETSI.

I am therefore grateful that Luis has swiftly reported these points to the European Commission.

On a personal note, I have not been involved in the development of this letter.

Best regards

Dirk

While Mr. Weiler works for Nokia, he wrote that email in his capacity as Chairman of the Board, representing ETSI's institutional interests.

It shouldn't be hard for the EC to discern which side--Apple or ETSI--is more likely to promote European economic and strategic interests...

Links to prior FOSS Patents posts on the envisaged EU SEP regulation

In chronological order:

  1. March 29: European Commission departs from best practices in hasty preparation of standard-essential patent policy proposal that is fundamentally flawed and unbalanced

  2. March 31: Table of contents and synopsis of European Commission's draft proposal for standard-essential patent regulation

  3. April 2: Proposed EU SEP regulation will also harm net licensees: implementers of standard-essential patents must be careful what they wish for

  4. April 3: In draft EU SEP regulation, appeals are not even an afterthought: what if owners or implementers of standard-essential patents disagree with decisions?

  5. April 5: EU Commission contradicts itself in attempted justification of SEP regulation in light of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: 'uniform and predictable outcome' but 'not ultimately binding'?

  6. April 11: Is the EU becoming hostile to standards-related innovation, standards development, and the enforcement of standard-essential patents?

  7. April 12: Definitive issues: draft EU regulation on standard-essential patents fails to properly define 'SEP' and 'enforcement', and encourages antitrust violations

  8. April 14: Stakeholder reactions to draft EU SEP regulation: both licensors and licensees identify issues that counsel against premature proposal

  9. April 16: European Commission's take on patent pools has turned negative: draft impact assessment makes up and distorts facts, relies on conflicted "researcher"

Saturday, April 8, 2023

Qualcomm moves for summary judgment against ruins of class action that piggybacked on FTC lawsuit -- Judge Corley mentioned possibility of new class action over exclusive dealing

Class-action lawyers tend to be persistent even when they're losing. They hope until the end that they may get paid. But some large companies--and Qualcomm appears to be one of them--are unwilling to settle for nuisance value. They just defeat them.

Coincidentally, Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California presently has two ultra-flimsy class actions piggybacking on FTC lawsuits before her: the one against Qualcomm I'm discussing here, and one over Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard, which I tweeted about this morning.

In January, Judge Corley further narrowed the scope of the Qualcomm action. It's now down to an exclusive-dealing claim (the Qualcomm-Apple agreement that allegedly kept Intel out of the high-end baseband chipset market), and even that one can only be pursued under California state law, not federal law. The class-action lawyers hoped to get access now to Qualcomm's 2019 settlement agreement with Apple--which they haven't seen because discovery closed in 2018--but that's after the class period. Judge Corley held a hearing on February 23, 2023, where she said she was "not inclined to reopen discovery."

In my commentary on the last order to dismiss certain claims, I already said that the remainder of the case "will hardly survive summary judgment." Actually, if it was up to Qualcomm's lawyers, it wouldn't even have reached the point of a summary judgment: they'd have preferred to defeat the remainder of the case through a motion for judgment on the pleadings. But Judge Corley didn't like that notion, given that the usual purpose of judgment on the pleadings is to obviate the need for discovery--and here, discovery closed years ago ("the record is full"). It's more efficient for the court this way, given that if a judgment on the pleadings was successfully appealed as premature (for failure to consider anything in the record), the case would be remanded and she'd then have to adjudicate a motion for summary judgment.

Yesterday (Friday), Qualcomm filed its motion for summary judgment:

In Re Qualcomm Antitrust Litigation (case no. 3:17-md-2773-JSC, N.D. Cal.): Defendant Qualcomm Incorporated's Motion for Summary Judgment (Redacted)

Talking about different types of pretrial motions, large parts of that motion look at first sight like a Daubert motion for taking aim at law professor Elhauge's expert testimony--and quite extensively so. But the argument is not about his testimony being unreliable. It's about relevance to the questions to be decided. The expert testimony was optimized for the original theory, which was that Qualcomm abusively raised standard-essential patent (SEP) royalties to supra-FRAND levels, while the class-action lawyers are now trying to keep the case alive by arguing that Qualcomm's exclusive deal with Apple shut Intel out of the market and thereby made chipsets more expensive. As Qualcomm describes it, the class-action lawyers have "flipp[ed] from arguing that Qualcomm was undercutting competitors on chip prices to arguing that Qualcomm was overcharging OEMs." Here's my favorite sentence from that document:

"In short, there are gaping voids where one would expect evidence of causation to be."

The problem is even more fundamental than shifting from "undercutting" to "overcharging": until the case got destroyed for the largest part, the class-action lawyers insisted on a holistic perspective and the alleged interdependencies and mutually reinforcing effects of Qualcomm's various practices--all of that for the ultimate goal of arguing that the combination of multiple intertwined aspects of Qualcomm's conduct made SEP licenses more expensive. Qualcomm says in its motion for summary judgment that they can't pursue exclusive dealing as a standalone claim now that it's all that's left in the case (and again, for the avoidance of doubt: even that one is already dead under federal law).

At the February 23 hearing, Judge Corley already discussed this problem with the class-action lawyers:

"Well, why not file a new lawsuit? I mean, you had a theory, as I understand it. It was all intertwined. It was all intertwined and it was based, in part, on the FRAND theory, which the Ninth Circuit rejected. Okay. I mean, that’s just what happened. But that -- you could have pursued -- and maybe you’ll tell me and you’re going to say that the evidence is there to support the claim, so maybe you did. You could have pursued a separate exclusive dealing theory that was not dependent upon the FRAND, but maybe you chose not to. Okay. That was just a strategic choice."

There are four named smartphone customers in the current class. The class-action lawyers could just find some others (on whom the decisions in the present case will not be binding) and bring a new complaint, as Judge Corley also explained at the hearing.

In that case they would also get to look at more recent documents, potentially including the 2019 Qualcomm-Apple contracts.

For now, the class-action lawyers don't want to give up on whatever little is left of their original case. But I guess Qualcomm's motion will succeed. Will they choose to file a new lawsuit to pursue a standalone exclusive-dealing claim? I doubt it. They know that the FTC--despite support from Apple (the two had a mutual interest agreement in place)--failed to prove that Intel was ready to compete with Qualcomm at the relevant time (and in 2019 Intel even left that market, sold the chipset business to Apple, and Apple still can't make its own baseband processors for the iPhone). A follow-on class action with a standalone exclusive-dealing claim would be doomed to fail as well.

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

AliveCor's patent litigation against Apple is on wrong track regardless of President Biden's decision not to veto ITC's hypothetical U.S. import ban--Apple Watch not affected, but antitrust case remains interesting

E-health device maker AliveCor yesterday announced that the company has been informed of the White House not having vetoed a hypothetical U.S. import ban on the Apple Watch. Apple sought a presidential override of the U.S. trade agency's patent infringement ruling on public-interest grounds.

AliveCor is rather unlikely to get leverage over Apple from its patents, but its story makes Apple look bad in other ways as I'll explain further below. At this point, the noise that AliveCor is making about the White House decision looks like it's just an attempt to pressure Apple into some kind of settlement based on the hypothetical possibility of an import ban entering into force further down the road.

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC, or just ITC) has quasi-judicial powers. It can impose what is called a limited exclusion order and amounts to a U.S. import ban on "unfair imports", with the (alleged) unfairness most of the time consisting in (alleged) patent infringements. The Apple Watch is not affected for now, and may never be. The ITC's notice of final determination (PDF) (i.e., summary of final--though appealable--ruling) clearly states the following:

"The enforcement of these orders, including the bond provision, is suspended pending final resolution of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“PTAB”) Final Written Decisions finding the asserted patent claims unpatentable."

An infringement of an invalid patent is an infringement only in an academic sense, but has no practical implications. There's no liability. And for now, the relevant patent claims are deemed invalid, meaning the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) itself has concluded that those patents should never have been granted in the first place. The two relevant patents on heart-rate measuring techniques are close related, which is why the prior art references cited by Apple's (thus far successful) validity challenges partly overlap: U.S. Patent No, 10,595,731 on "methods and systems for arrhythmia tracking and scoring" and U.S. Patent No. 10,638,941 on "discordance monitoring".

On December 6, 2022, the same panel of Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) judges declared either patent invalid (case nos. IPR2021-00971 and IPR2021-00972). There are two prior art references that are key to either decision. One of them is a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent application from 2012: WO 2012/140559 A1 on "pulse oximetry measurement triggering ecg measurement" by inventors Ram Shmueli and Nimrod Sandlerman. In the PTAB decisions, that one is briefly referred to as Shmueli. The other is U.S. Patent Application No. 2014/0275840 on a "pathological state detection using dynamically determined body data variability range values" by inventor Ivan Osorio. That one is briefly referred to as Osorio. Most of the PTAB's invalidity holdings are based on combinations of Shmueli and Osorio, potentially with some other prior art.

So what is required before AliveCor will actually gain leverage over Apple?

AliveCor appealed the two PTAB rulings to the Federal Circuit, raising a multitude of questions. While it cannot be ruled out that one or more patent claims might ultimately be deemed valid, the much more likely scenario is that the PTAB is affirmed, either 100% or to an extent that the net effect won't be different from the current situation. And at the same time, Apple can try to get the ITC's infringement decisions overturned.

AliveCor, which even used a Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge President Biden not to veto the ITC ruling, looks a little bit desperate. It may also have a resource problem as the small company is trying to assert its rights against the world's richest corporation, but that David-versus-Goliath situation doesn't make those patents any more valid.

In retrospect, AliveCor should probably have focused on enforcing some European patents in Germany, where obviousness (as opposed to anticipation) arguments often don't dissuade courts from entering an injunction under the country's bifurcation regime (i.e., validity determinations are made in separate proceedings). In the U.S., it is a bit odd that AliveCor first filed lawsuits in the Western District of Texas--a venue that was extremely popular at the time for patent damages claims--in late 2020, and then brought its ITC complaint a few months later. Normally, litigants file ITC complaints and federal companion complaints at the same time.

The history of interactions between AliveCor and Apple is, hoever, interesting. Here are some passages from the ITC complaint:

"35. After AliveCor presented KardiaBand publicly, its founder Dr. Albert was invited to Apple's campus by Dr. Michael O'Reilly, Apple's Vice President of Medical Technology, to present to Apple on KardiaBand. Dr. Albert demonstrated KardiaBand's operation to Apple engineers and Apple's COO, Jeff Williams. Mr. Williams told Dr. Albert that Apple wanted to figure out how to work with AliveCor.

"36. A few months later, Dr. Albert and AliveCor's then-CEO met with Phil Schiller, Apple's SVP of Worldwide Marketing, in order to further demonstrate the KardiaBand product. Unbeknownst to AliveCor, however, Apple was using these meetings to gather information on the operation of KardiaBand. Apple recognized the value in the combination of AliveCor's KardiaBand and SmartRhythm products and wanted to take those ideas as their own and eliminate AliveCor and everyone else as competition.

"37. In fact, after seeing the utility of KardiaBand and SmartRhythm, Apple decided to copy these features and introduce a version of an Apple Watch with its own ECG and AFib analysis and reporting functionality. In late 2018, Apple announced that it was introducing its own ECG app and irregular heart rhythm notification feature as part of an update to the Operating System for the Apple Watch Series 4."

Now, the above sounds like Apple stealing IP--but if AliveCor's patents are invalid, then there was no actual IP, and what Apple did may have been a way of taking advantage of AliveCor's interest in discussing a business relationship, but wasn't illegal.

It's possible that after the initial discussions with AliveCor, Apple performed a check on what IP AliveCor actually owned, and concluded that any issued patents or pending patent applications belonging to AliveCor and relevant to what Apple wanted to do were weak.

But now comes the part that I find more interesting than AliveCor's patent infringement assertions:

"38. After Apple introduced its KardiaBand and SmartRhythm competitor products, it decided to eliminate AliveCor as a competitor. Specifically, with the Apple Watch series 4, Apple updated the watch operating systems from OS4 to OS5. This operating system update included changes to the algorithm the Watch OS used to report heart rates in specific ways that made it impossible for KardiaBand and SmartRhythm (as well as other third party heartrate analysis app providers) [emphasis added] to identify and predict unexpected heartrates and arrhythmias and suggest users record an ECG for confirming potentially [sic] occurrences of AFib.

"39. Ultimately, the changes Apple made to its operating system in OS5 and the introduction of Apple's copycat ECG watches compelled AliveCor to pull the KardiaBand product and SmartRhythm from the market in 2018. [...]"

That, however, is just stated in the complaint to make Apple look bad and not the basis on which AliveCor wanted an ITC exclusion order. AliveCor is, however, pursuing antitrust claims against Apple in the Northern District of California. In an October 2022 post on an antitrust litigation in the same district brought by credit card issuers against Applem I quoted from Judge Jeffrey S. White's March 21, 2022 order that granted in part--but also denied in part--Apple's motion to dismiss AliveCor's original complaint. The most important part was that Judge White held "AliveCor has plausibly alleged an aftermarket for watchOS apps"--i.e., the court may ultimately find that there is a single-brand market under Kodak/Newcal.

Apple filed a motion to dismiss AliveCor's first amended complaint. A hearing that had been postponed to January 27, 2023 was vacated. The court "will issue a written decision on the papers." That case continues to be interesting, but it could be that AliveCor will somehow have to settle because it might otherwise run out of cash. The antitrust case is another potential risk for Apple, but if Epic Games prevails on a single-brand market definition, AliveCor's case is going to be considered a small problem.