Sisvel subsidiary 3G Licensing wins jury verdict against HTC in Delaware: per-patent per-unit royalties of 37 and 43 cents; pool license would have been cheaper

[PRELIMINARY NOTE] Let me note upfront that this is one of the last articles--possibly the penultimate one--that I'll ever publish on FOSS Patents. That doesn't mean FOSS Patents will disappear immediately: it remains available as an archive for a limited transitional period and may very well be used by others than me in the future. Nor will I personally disappear, but in the nearest term I will focus on writing a book about the Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard merger saga, which became the most spectacular turnaround in merger regulation history and gave rise to a decision by a U.S. federal judge that communications between Microsoft and me were not a legitimate subject of pretrial discovery (as I mentioned toward the end of this recent post). I am going to remain interested in patent litigation and patent policy, as I have been for almost 20 years by now, but I have various new ideas and have to decide which ones to pursue, how, and when. I'll say something more in my final FOSS Patents post. As I'm also in the midst of relocation, this is a time of change and fresh new starts for me. [/PRELIMINARY NOTE]

Damages verdicts over standard-essential patents (SEPs) are rare because most SEP licenses are granted without litigation and in the few cases where infringement actions are filed, settlements typically occur ahead of any damages trial. But yesterday was one of those exceptional days: 3G Licensing, a subsidiary of patent pool administrator and licensing firm Sisvel, prevailed in the District of Delaware on two--based on the company's name, guess what--3G patents over mobile device maker HTC.

On a per-patent per-unit basis, the damages figure that was awarded shows that SEP infringement can get a lot costlier than licensing. 3G Licensing prevailed on two patents-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 7,995,091 on a "mixed media telecommunication call manager" and U.S. Patent No. 6,856,818 on a "data store for mobile radio station." The damages verdict is so granular that it makes a distinction for the '818 patent between "Verizon Accused Products" and "Google-Fi [a mobile virtual network operator] Accused Products":

• For the '091 patent, 3G Licensing was awarded $0.37 per product, amounting to $7,228,042.13 for a total quantity of 19,535,249 infringing products.

• For the '818 patent, the royalty is again $0.37 per product with respect to 2,551,265 units of the Verizon Accused Products (a total of $943,968.05), and $0.43 for each of 1,84,295 infringing products that are Google-Fi Accused Products (a total of $795,196.85).

• In total, that's almost exactly $9 million.

• 3G Licensing obviously participates in Sisvel's 3G/4G mobile communications patent licensing program, and the published "compliant rate" (for willing licensees) that applies to 3G UMTS is just €0.35. That's $0.37 for the entire pool (all relevant patents from multiple patent holders)--but here it's the amount that the jury now found HTC owes on a per-patent per-unit basis, with the number being even higher for the Google-Fi Accused Products. The complaint mentioned that 3G Licensing was open to bilateral as well as pool licensing.

That litigation has been going on since 2017, following (according to the complaint) extensive but fruitless efforts to work out a negotiated agreement. I wasn't following it, but now that this interesting verdict has come out, someone may wish to take a closer look at the history of the case. The dispute is also instructive with a view to the debate over the EU SEP Regulation: I've been saying since earlier this year that any attempt by the EU to encourage and enable hold-out in its own courts will make other jurisdictions more attractive, and I mentioned U.S. damages verdicts as another way for SEP holders to stop infringement. There is nothing an EU regulation could lawfully (and without violating international trade agreements) do to prevent patent holders like 3G Licensing from enforcing their rights in the United States, where damages verdicts can become costly for infringers.

For now, let me just show you the public redacted version of the jury verdict. There's actually a typo in the verdict form concerning the number of the '091 patent that I noticed, but it was easy to find the correct one based on the complaint.

3G Licensing v. HTC (case no. 17-cv-83-GBW, D.Del.): verdict form (public redacted version)

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First Ericsson v. Lenovo & Motorola Mobility patent infringement lawsuit found in North Carolina after standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing negotiations failed: multi-jurisdictional enforcement underway

I found out from a Light Reading article that "Ericsson has filed a number of lawsuits against Lenovo and its subsidiary Motorola Mobility for patent infringement in multiple jurisdictions." While I have subscribed to Ericsson's press release on its website, and received an earnings update two days ago, I didn't get that one.

I'll try to find out more about that new cross-jurisdictional patent dispute that appears to involve SEPs as well as non-SEPs. So far I've been able to download from an electronic court docket the following complaint that was filed with the United States District Court for the Western Division of the Eastern District of North Carolina:

Ericsson v. Lenovo & Motorola Mobility (case no. 5:32-cv-570, E.D. N.C.): October 11, 2023 complaint

These are the five patents-in-suit:

• U.S. Patent No. 7,151,430 on a "method of and inductor layout for reduced VCO coupling"; Erisson prevailed on this patent's claim construction in its enforcement effort against Apple last year

• U.S. Patent No. 9,313,178 on a "method and system for secure over-the-top live video delivery" (asserted against Samsung in 2021; that dispute was short-lived)

• U.S. Patent No. 9,509,273 on a "transformer filter arrangement" (Ericsson prevailed on claim construction against Apple and selected four of its claims for the final part of the ITC investigation, which got settled)

• U.S. Patent No. 10,972,654 on "controlling image capturing setting of camera based on direction objected is dragged along touch screen" (not previously asserted)

• U.S. Patent No. 11,122,313 on a "method and system for secure over-the-top live video delivery" (same family as the '178 patent discussed further above, but this particular family member has not previously been asserted)

As for the choice of venue, Ericsson's complaint points (inter alia) to a 2018 pleading in the Western District of Texas in which the Eastern District of North Caoflirna was described by those same defendants as a proper venue and forum conveniens:

"If, however, this Court chooses, in lieu of dismissal, to transfer this case, Lenovo and Motorola respectfully submit that the Eastern District of North Carolina (EDNC), and specifically the Raleigh Division, is both a proper forum for this dispute and the most convenient forum. . . . Under the patent venue statute, the Eastern District of North Carolina is a proper venue for both Lenovo and Motorola. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400.”

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Appeals court rejects Deutsche Telekom's appeal against IPCom: no SEP royalty refund

This is a quick follow-up to yesterday's report on the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court's appellate hearing in Deutsche Telekom v. IPCom. Unsurprisingly, the regional appeals court threw out the appeal as a spokesman for the court told me this afternoon. This means the Mannheim Regional Court's dismissal of the complaint stands.

Deutsche Telekom can try to appeal this matter to the Federal Court of Justice. Presiding Judge Andreas Voss ("Voß" in German) mentioned yesterady that the case has the potential to reach the top court. Whether this means that his court will authorize a further appeal is another question. The reasons for the appellate decision are not known yet. I look forward to a public redacted version of the decision in case it becomes available.

Deutsche Telekom is essentially trying to upend the standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing system--of which license-based settlments are a significant part--and even non-SEP licensing could be affected by extension (though antitrust law rarely applies to non-SEPs).

There are two case-specific factors here that weaken Deutsche Telekom's case:

• They settled for convenience, not for hold-up. No injunction was being enforced. No injunction had been ordered. And no injunction was on the horizon. Now imagine what would happen if companies that took a license after an injunction came down, or on the eve of a likely injunction, sought refunds through antitrust litigation.

• The license agreement in question contains a clause 8.2 according to which IPCom was under no obligation to get other telecommunications network operators to take licenses on comparable terms. Deutsche Telekom argued that this merely meant they could not enforce an obligation on IPCom's part to enforce, but IPCom could have given Deutsche Telekom a refund regardless. Deutsche Telekom also argued that there was no waiver of potential damages claims. That attempt to vitiate an important clause (which had resulted from extensive negotiations, led by Dr. Roman Sedlmaier as outside counsel for IPCom) did not succeed in Mannheim, and I don't know yet whether it also proved dispositive in the appeals court. Be that as it may, if Deutsche Telekom could obtain a refund on antitrust grounds, numerous other licensees who never signed an agreement that contains such a clause--and/or licensees who took a license under the threat of injunctive relief--would bring such cases.

Judge Voss gave Deutsche Telekom's counsel from Clifford Chance every opportunity to make their case. In my recollection, Deutsche Telekom had at least about twice as much speaking time as IPCom, and easily three times as much time as a U.S. federal appeals court would have allotted to them. Frankly, their arguments were exceedingly repetitive.

Quinn Emanuel's Jérôme Kommer didn't want to waste a minute of the court's time. He largely just pointed to his opposition brief, and focused on providing a few clarifications. Less is more in certain situations, and this was one of them.

It would make a lot of sense for that non-case to go away now, but Deutsche Telekom's litigation budget may have room for yet another appeal...

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Governments of three medium-sized EU member states agree: proposed SEP Regulation is overly intrusive and unbalanced

If the decision makers in Brussels knew and understood the facts and the law, they'd realize that the proposed EU regulation on standard-essential patents (SEPs) is misguided and should be tossed (in favor of a complete do-over) regardless of whether one is more sympathetic to one camp or the other. But political dynamics are sometimes detached from reality, especially in the EU, whose economic policy track record is abysmal.

That's why influential voices of reason are needed. Granted, the collective voting weight of the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden falls far short of a blocking minority in the EU Council. But it's a critical mass of member state governments opposing the bill in its current (or any similar) form in order to get the attention of all the experts. Council working groups are composed of experts, who obviously get political directions from above, but the likelihood of them being receptive to technical (in terms of "legally technical") arguments is far greater than when you're dealing with politicans seeking reelection or higher office based on faux achievements.

That also applies to issues concerning fundamental rights. The EP(P) rapporteur on this one, Marion Walsmann MEP (EPP-Germany), even seeks to exacerbate the bill. Mrs. Walsmann's voting record with a view to human rights should be subjected to scrutiny. And just like the totalitarian political system in which she started her career, she seeks to silence and suppress rather than listen to critical voices:

According to what I heard from Brussels sources, Mrs. Walsmann is none too pleased with the draft opinion authored by her party colleague Professor Danuta Hübner (Poland), who is the international trade committee's (INTA) rapporteur. Mrs. Walsmann incredibly argues that INTA oversteps its competency by commenting on a wide range of aspects of the draft regulation, but a WTO treaty named TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) is reason enough for the INTA committee to look at the proposal holistically, with or without Mrs. Walsmann's blessings or misgivings. And if any additional reason was needed (it is not), the perspective of the EU's largest trading partner should be considered as well. INTA has no shortage of reasons to be profoundly concerned and to make its presence felt, for the sake of protecting the EU's reputation on the world trade stage.

Back to the EU Council, which would be in the best position to prevent an idiocy that could even turn out a tragedy.

1. The Netherlands

The Dutch government was the first one to formally voice criticism of the proposal. Others may have previously done so behind closed doors, though.

I'll now quote a few passages based on the English-language summary provided by IP Europe on its live blog (the two original documents--in Dutch--are also available: 1, 2):

• "the intrusiveness of the initiatives relative to the perceived magnitude of the problem"

• "the potentially adverse confluence of the proposal with the launch of the Unified Patent Court and existing (market) mechanisms such as patent pools and existing alternative dispute resolution options"

• "the risk that by regulating the licensing practice for SEPs, the EU loses attractiveness both as a standardization environment and the place to resolve disputes effectively and efficiently"

2. Sweden

The Swedish government--which is not simply in Ericsson's pocket but also has major implementers of all sizes to take into consideration--discussed the EU proposal at a recent parliamentary committee hearing (minutes in Swedish). From a machine translation:

• "the proposal put forward introduces a comprehensive and highly binding regulatory framework in an area where there was previously no regulation and places extensive tasks on the EUIPO, which has not previously handled similar tasks"

• "the background analysis presented by the Commission does not support the view that such restrictive measures are necessary"

• "it seems doubtful whether the proposed limitations on the ability of patent holders to prosecute infringements can be regarded as proportionate restrictions on their intellectual property rights"

• "The Government therefore intends to work to ensure that the proposed regulatory framework is not introduced or, in any case, that the regulation is as limited, flexible and predictable as possible. In this respect, the Government intends, among other things, to work to ensure that patent holders' ability to prosecute infringements is limited as little as possible and that the authorisations granted to the Commission in the Regulation are limited as far as possible."

• Sweden's Social Democrats went even further, saying inter alia that "a proposal as far-reaching and intrusive as the present one should not be used as a basis for legislation."

3. Finland

The Finnish government circulated a "U-letter" that discussed various policy issues including the EU SEP Reg (Finnish document). Based on a translation and a summary that I've obtained, the Finnish government has declared itself "highly critical" of DG GROW's proposal. Here are some key points:

• "the proposed regulation is disproportionately burdensome on the right-holders and thus “likely to discourage European companies from participating in the development of international standards"

• the scope of the regulation - the standards that it will apply to - is left to the Commission to define via a delegated act, which may confer disproportionate, inappropriate and unjustified powers on the Commission

• the FRAND determination process restricts fundamental right to judicial review and thus raises the question of compliance with the WTO-level TRIPS agreement

Here's a translation of a longer passage:

"The Government considers it important that the regulation of businesses is clear, predictable, proportionate, competition-neutral, technology-neutral and innovation-friendly. An environment that encourages and inspires entrepreneurship means that businesses and citizens are not discouraged by excessive regulation. Intangible rights, such as patents, encourage businesses to innovate and promote the use of innovation in society. They are therefore an important part of innovation policy, which aims to build conditions in Finland that encourage companies to innovate boldly, innovate and grow internationally.

"The Government is highly critical of the Commission's proposed regulation on patents essential to the standard. The Council of State considers the objectives of the Regulation to improve the licensing of essential patents and to increase transparency to be important, but considers that the measures proposed by the Commission do not fully comply with the principle of proportionality. The proposed new regulation would create a significant regulatory burden, in particular for holders of essential patents, which is likely to discourage European companies from participating in the development of international standards. As such, the Council of State welcomes the fact that the Commission has taken into account the role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in its initiative. However, the negotiations must ensure that a balance is maintained between taking into account the interests of essential patent holders and users of standards, which promotes the dissemination of standardised technologies and the development of new technologies and products, without placing an unduly burdensome new regulatory burden on enterprises.

"The Government is highly critical of the Commission's proposal that the proposed regulation would also apply, under certain conditions, to standards or parts thereof published before its entry into force and that the Commission would define such standards by delegated act. The negotiations must ensure that the powers conferred on the Commission are sufficiently precise, proportionate, appropriate and justified.

"The Government is highly critical of the Commission's proposal for a compulsory settlement procedure to determine the FRAND conditions for licensing essential patents. Negotiations must ensure that the regulation does not unduly restrict the right to judicial review, which is a fundamental right. The negotiations must also ensure that the proposed procedures comply with the terms of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights."

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License-based settlements of SEP disputes in jeopardy: Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court heard Deutsche Telekom's 'antitrust' appeal against IPCom, anticipates review by Federal Court of Justice

I just attended a two-hour appellate hearing in the German city of Karlsruhe. The Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court is the appeals court that hears all appeals from the Mannheim Regional Court. In this case, the June 2022 decision to throw out Deutsche Telekom's long-shot antitrust lawsuit against standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing firm IPCom.

Given what's at stake, I was surprised to be the only independent person in the audience. Besides the three-judge panel of the Sixth Civil Senate (Presiding Judge Andreas Voss ("Voß" in German), Judge (and rapporteur) Professor Gloeckner ("Glöckner" in German), and Judge Professor Singer) and yours truly, everyone else was counsel for one of the parties (with a multiplicity of intervenors supporting IPCom). One lawyer who represented IPCom in infringement litigation many years back also attended on an informal basis.

From the beginning, I have considered Deutsche Telekom's complaint facially absurd. They want IPCom to repay all or at least most of a 220 million euro amount plus another 60 million (interest and possibly expenses) because their rivals did not license IPCom's patents, which Deutsche Telekom calls "discrimination." But the license agreement contains a clause (clause 8.2) that specifically says IPCom was under no obligation to get other telecommunications network operators to take licenses to its portfolio.

The fact that Judge Voss had to get Deutsche Telekom to resolve a discrepancy of several million euros between two references to the amount in dispute in an amended appellate filing they made about a month ago is just an embarrassment for a company that tries to bully a small patent holder. Given how much they are spending (and risking, given the German "loser pays" rule), one would think that they can at least get their act together without the court having to ask them at the hearing to reconcile their numbers.

That should not distract us from the real issue. My hunch was right that this appellate hearing was worth attending not because of Deutsche Telekom being likely to win (Judge Voss appeared rather skeptical, though he steered clear of stating a preliminary position on any aspect of the case), but because they try to create massive legal uncertainty for SEP holders of all sorts and sizes with a view to past and future settleements. Deutsche Telekom could lose, but there could be some holding--maybe just a dictum--that could have serious repercussions.

Toward the end, when making a routine check on whether some sort of settlement was achievable, Judge Voss--who personally presided over various of IPCom's infringement actions while he was sitting on the lower court--noted that "this dispute has the potential to be heard by the Federal Court of Justice." Earlier this year, that same court--in practical terms. Germany's top court for patent disputes--shocked the SEP licensing community by expanding the concept of patent exhaustion to covenants to sue last. That's why I believe there should be a lot more interest in that case, and it's astounding that I was the only one to go there. (It was, by the way, the last German court session I got to attend as a resident of Germany at least for the foreseeable future, given that I'll formally leave the country in a little over a week.)

With a view to that contract clause 8.2, Deutsche Telekom reiterated the argument that had failed in Mannheim: they said that private parties cannot enter into a valid and enforceable agreement that goes against antitrust law. What they want is a legal holding according to which (if one thinks it through) any SEP licensee could bring antitrust claims against licensors on the grounds of discrimination just based on their licensing activity that follows the settlement in question. Here, Deutsche Telekom argues that IPCom caused market distortion by not succeeding in getting Deutsche Telekom's German rivals to take a license. In other cases, the argument might as well be about the amount, and Deutsche Telekom's lead counsel specifically said that if IPCom had extended a license to Vodafone for 10 million euros (as compared to the 200-million-euro deal with his client), that would be a clear case of discrimination (Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom have similar market share in Germany).

I struggle with that approach. The practical reality is that patent disputes (not only but also SEP disputes) are always settled on a probabilistic basis: things could go better or worse for a given party if litigation continued. And if some key patents are invalidated, a portfolio may be devalued, possibly become impossible to license to anyone.

In this case, it's even worse: Deutsche Telekom even signed an agreement under which IPCom's subsequent conduct vis-à-vis other telcos wouldn't count. Deutsche Telekom argues that the clause merely does not impose on IPCom a contractual obligation to enforce. They say IPCom could still be liable for failing to enforce if the result is discrimination: unequal treatment without justification. Judge Voss made a good point: Deutsche Telekom's position comes down to requiring a SEP holder to become the "curator" of the downstream market (here, the market for cellular telecommunications networks).

Deutsche Telekom's counsel said that regardless of clause 8.2, IPCom could have avoided or otherwise addressed the alleged discrimination issue: by obtaining injunctive relief against unwilling licensees; by concluding FRAND license agreements with Deutsche Telekom's rivals; or by (proactively!) lowering its royalties when discrimination became apparent.

Those positions are very aggressive. The appeals court will make a decision (which could also just be a scheduling order) later today, and the parties will be able to find out about the outcome tomorrow morning. This is something to watch. If even despite that clause 8.2 Deutsche Telekom succeeded, even if not on the bottom line but in the form of some dictum, that could result in a flood of German antitrust complaints over the terms of SEP license agreements. The impact would far exceed that of the patent exhaustion ruling by the Federal Court of Justice. And maybe one or two aspects of this case will even be referred to the European Court of Justice...

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European Parliament rapporteur proposes further deterioration and radicalization of EU SEP bill, fails to understand issues and to demonstrate professionalism

Unlike those who engage in lobbying, I don't have to mince words when commenting on what's going on in the EU with respect to the proposed regulation on standard-essential patents (SEPs). Among other things, I've saidthat the EU SEP Reg does reinforce my belief that the EU--an economic policy failure, plain and simple--is on the wrong track in many ways. I'm currently moving to a far better-run country that is not an EU member and most likely won't join in my lifetime.

The European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market (DG GROW) has already embarrassed itself with the proposal and with the partly absurd ways in which it has attempted to justify it. While there is a silver lining in the form of a counterproposal by the rapporteur of the EU Parliament's international trade committee (INTA), I've now seen the draft report by the lead committee's (legal affairs, JURI) and therefore the Parliament's rapporteur--and it's an unmitigated disaster.

As I mentioned in the previous post (which I just linked to), the EP/JURI rapporteur on the SEP Reg, Marion Walsmann, started her parliamentary career as an active supporter of East Germany's antidemocratic regime. I'll talk about that some more on another occasion, but based on what I've researched, her party--which was part of the "National Front" bloc led by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany--almost 100% consistently voted in favor of every single proposal by the ruling communist party until the Fall of the Wall (the only significant exception was in 1972, at which point Mrs. Walsmann was a child). If that is true, then she has a consistent voting record of siding each and every time with an oppressive regime that despised democracy and violated human rights--and was rewarded by the regime for contributing to some faux pluralism. One of the most corrupt actions in German history was to merge those bloc parties into West German parties, all of which seized the opportunity to clear their financial debt, except for the Greens, which didn't have a formal sister party in the GDR anyway.

Nowadays there are no more bloc parties, but there's a phenomenon called astroturfing that is not entirely dissimilar. In an annex that lists entities from whom Mrs. Walsmann received input, ACT | The App(le) Association" is also found.

There are some funny typos in that annex ("Philipps" instead of "Philips" and "Xiami" instead of "Xiaomi") and a fundamental error concerning the lobbying entity of her home country's automotive industry: as the long-form name for VDA, the annex states "Verband Deutsche Automobilhersteller", which is not only grammatically incorrect (an "r" at the end of the second word is missing) but simply not the name of the organization. The actual name is "Verband der deutschen Automobilindustrie." The difference is that the former refers to "automakers" while the latter also includes suppliers.

Those are not the only typos and errors. For instance, she espouses amendments to Article 9 of the proposed regulation that refer to determinations "per user case" while the correct term (which is used in many other instances in the same document) is "use case". Also, the German-language "explanatory statement" uses an inconsistent spelling for the German word for "essential": sometimes with a "t", some other times with a "z". And then there's an odd passage that says implementers can hardly find out "whether a standard is actually essential." She must have meant whether a SEP is actually essential to a standard. Then there are grammatical errors in a sentence about applications to which SEPs are relevant: the list of examples starts with the correct grammatical case ("dem Internet der Dinge"), but then switches to the wrong one ("vernetze Fahrzeuge" (which means "connected vehicles" and where a "t" is missing from the first word) and "intelligente Städte".

Why are those typos and other errors worth mentioning? It's just striking that DG GROW and its philosophically-aligned EP rapporteur can't even put out documents of a decent editorial quality when dealing with this subject. Actually, various of Mrs. Walsmann's proposed amendments serve no other purpose than to correct typos found in DG GROW's proposal. That's OK, but then she should get her own act together.

The degree of Mrs. Walsmann's alignment with the EC proposal is close to 100%, just marginally below the level of her alignment with East Germany's Marxist-Leninist dictatorship when she started her parliamentary career in the late 1980s.

It is ridiculous that she claims in her draft report to seek to strike a balance between the interests of SEP holders and implementers, and her reference to the need to address hold-out is meaningless. She simply wants implementers to be able to use the envisaged process to delay with impunity, which is reflected by various aspects of her proposal, such as the justificatio nof her proposed amendment to Recital 34:

"The parties should be able to wait until the outcome of the FRAND determination procedure in order to decide if they want to be bound by the result."

That is the very opposite of what UK courts expect of the parties. In the UK, one has to accept to be bound by a determination of whatever terms are in fact FRAND. If Mrs. Walsmann got her way, implementers could just say after the end of the lengthy process that a royalty rate isn't low enough for their taste.

Mrs. Walsmann's report clearly reflects that her understanding of how SEP licensing and enforcement work is lacking and wanting. Instead of fixing the problems with the original proposal, she just wants to add more elements that are indicative of incompetence. Three particularly stupid examples:

• She proposes a new Recital 10b that would advocate allowing Licensee Negotiation Groups (LNGs). However, the issue with LNGs is that they are irreconcilable with anti-cartel rules if the collective market share is too high and an actual or threatened group boycott obstructs the licensing process. Possibly influenced by her astroturfer soulmates who falsely claim to represent small and medium-sized enterprises, she then writes that "LNGs benefit SMEs in particular." But SMEs typically won't need an exemption from competition law if they coooperate in reasonable ways: they won't even come close to the market share thresholds where there might be antitrust scrutiny. The ones who need an exemption are the likes of Volkswagen and Toyota.

• Proposed new Recital 10a talks about patent pools. The proposal says pools "should also commit to FRAND terms and conditions." What would be the practical meaning of that commitment? Pools can't enforce directly, so all that matters is that a given pool's licensors are bound by a FRAND licensing obligation.

• The draft report makes an attempt to define the term "patent assertion entity" (in order to then withhold certain SME benefits of the bill from them). The problem is that this is not going to work in litigation. One of the criteria there is that a company "does not engage in [...] the research and development of such inventions"--but it's going to be pretty easy for licensing firms to show at least a small investment in R&D.

The draft report also goes directly against the case law of the European Court of Justice and the courts of various EU member states by imposing obligations on patent holders based on declared--as opposed to actual--essentiality.

Let's look at the bigger picture. As I said last month, DG GROW's proposal is a hot mess that lawmakers can at best dilute, but not fix. We have a proposal on the table now from the trade committee's rapporteur, and that one comes down to dilution. It's like "we should actually vote against it, but let's make it look more constructive and merely strike one part (aggregate royalties) and defang the others." And now we see what the rapporteur wants to do: she seeks to make things worse.

The Parliament shouldn't follow this rapporteur, and not even her own group, the European People's Party, which has a clearly more reasonable alternative to choose that was authored by another EPP MEP, Professor Danuta Hübner from Poland.

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Proposed EU SEP Regulation gets pushback from influential European People's Party MEP: draft opinion of Committee on International Trade (INTA)

Finally, the proposed EU regulation on standard-essential patents (SEPs) has been formally criticized--in the form of a draft committee report--within the European Parliament (EP). Not just from within the EP, but also from within the EPP: that's one more P and stands for European People's Party. The EPP is the largest group in the EP, though with 25% of the votes it's not as powerful anymore as it used to be at its peak where it needed only one other (and reasonably large) political group to form a majority (reasonably consistent voting along party lines provided).

There are many rapporteurs on a dossier (legislative or other matter) in the EP, which made it hard to get anything done against the EPP.

So I have to start with the proceudral context. The EP determines a lead committee on a given dossier. In this case, that's the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI). One member of the lead committee becomes the entire EP's rapporteur. Every other political groups selects a shadow rapporteur, who is also a member of the lead committee. Sometimes shadow rapporteurs disagree fundamentally with the Parliament's rapporteur, whose positions may even be controversial within the same political group.

Here, the EP's rapporteur on the EU SEP Reg is Marion Walsmann, a (German) member of the EPP who started her political career as a parliamentary supporter of the East German communist dictatorship, which is my way to state a simple fact that is mentioned on the German but not the English Wikipedia page. The Christian Democratic Party of the German "Democratic" Republic was not an opposition party: it was part of an effort to pretend pluralism, and its politicians such as Mrs. Walsmann at the time enjoyed privileges for applauding the ruling communist party as it oppressed the true democrats in the country. There were opportunistic reasons for which all major West German parties except the Greens (there simply was no faux Green party in the GDR as the Green movement started toward the end of the GDR's infamous history) merged with their nominal East German counterparts right after reunification: it was mostly about money, and to some extent also about inheriting some existing structures. I'll leave that story for another day.

Mrs. Walsmann is deemed to be in favor of the proposal, or even of amendments that would cause further harm to SEP holders, but that is clearly not a consensus position, not even within her own political group. If one or more other committees are designated to provide an opinion, every such committee also has a rapporteur (and then there are shadow rapporteurs at the committee level). For the Committee on International Trade (INTA), the rapporteur is also a member of the EPP: Polish MEP (and former EU commissioner for regional policy) Danuta Hübner.

On Monday, Professor Hübner submitted her draft opinion: an 82-page document that contains a long list of amendments, the bottom line of all of whic his that SEP enforcement should not be restricted, complicated, obstructed, or delayed in any way, and particularly not the enforcement of non-EU SEPs.

Professor Hübner proposes

• to drop the part about aggregate royalty determinations (for all SEPs related to a given standard) entirely, which is consistent with a proposal by one of the researchers who were commissioned by the EC's Directorate-General for the Internal Market in this context;

• to limit bilateral everything else (which is not the case for bilateral FRAND determinations under the Commission proposal) to patents valid in the EU, which makes particular sense for a trade committee to propose but is equally common sense;

• to define reasonably clearly the scope of the regulation and not to delegate excessive powers to the Commission, an aspect on which she is particularly qualified to opine as a former chair of the EP's Constitutional Affairs Committee;

• to steer clear of disproportionate restrictions of patent holders' rights to enforce their IP, which actually raises international trade (as many patents valid in the EU are held by non-EU companies) and constitutional (fundamental rights) issues at the time; and

• to put more specific and elaborate measures in place to assist SMEs with a view to their participation in standardization as well as with a view to assisting them in their inbound licensing efforts.

The draft committee report coherently and consistently seeks to codify those objectives and to straighten out some other flaws, such as a weak definition of the term "patent family." Professor Hübner's proposal is certainly of a far higher quality than the Commission proposal, which in this case is, however, not a significant threshold.

There are some details I disagree with. In particular, the rationale provided for some proposed amendments is that removal of a patent from the envisioned EU SEP Register would render it unenforceable, but one could even argue that such a patent becomes even more enforceable: national courts or the Unified Patent Court (UPC) could still deem it essential, but it would not fall under the rules of the proposed regulation, and even if courts did not deem it enforceable, it might be a formidable non-SEP. The only respect in which the removal of a declared SEP from the register is certain to adversely affect its owner is that the company's essentiality ratio for the purposes of EU FRAND determinations will go down. Whether national courts will be swayed at all by those EUIPO-led determinations by anonymous "evaluators" is impossible to tell right now. As a litigation watcher, I could easily see lots of situations in which an infringement court would deem a patent essential notwithstanding an EUIPO-led negative determination. If some national courts--as I've just seen in the dispute between Nokia and OPPO--arrive at different conclusions on comparable questions than courts in another EU Member State, why wouldn't they also just use their own judgment instead of adopting the outcome of an opaque and generally low-credibility process?

But let's not get lost in details. A month ago I already said that the EC proposal "is a hot mess that lawmakers can dilute but not fix due to structural issues, fudnamental rights, and international obligations." Looking at it from that angle, I think the most straightforward proposal for Professor Hübner to make would actually have been to propose only one deleting amendment. Strike the whole thing because it's crap. It's easy to see, though, why she didn't do that: while perfectly warranted, it would be viewed by many as not being constructive.

What would the net effect of those amendments be? Dilution and delay (the latter because she'd extend the initial implementation period from 24 to 36 months).

Would the proposal--regardless of the proposed INTA position being consistent and coherent--serve any purpose? No, with just one exception: the part about helping SMEs might make sense, though that one is so small that it wouldn't warrant an entire legislative measure in its own right. There wouldn't be much else left. The aggregate royalty determinations would be thrown out; the bilateral process would be voluntary, and while there are strong reasons for limiting the scope of the regulation to SEPs valid in the EU, global licensing disputes result in global license agreements, so it is doubtful that the FRAND determination process would play much of a practical role.

I hope that some political group(s) will ultimately propose an amendment that enables MEPs to vote down the proposal as a whole. But at this stage, all that people can do is propose countless amendments. This is still an early stage of the process.

The EP votes on each amendment separately, though the non-binding voting lists provided to MEPs seek to ensure consistency. If just some of Professor Hübner's amendments got support in the further process (be it a parliamentary vote or a so-called trilogue where representatives of the EP, the EU Council, and the EC try to broker a deal that an EP majority typically rubberstamps), the regulation could become toothless. It can't be reduced to absurdity because it already is absurd, but something absurd that may not even benefit implementers as much as some of them hope might be defanged.

The intellectually most honest and generally most rational outcome would be for the EU not to pass anything into law based on the current proposal. They should send the EC back to the drawing board, and maybe there would never be a second proposal. But it could be that some people just want to have some outcome so they will (rightly or not) claim victory as they seek a nomination for reelection or audition for higher office or whatever.

It would be a waste of time, money (particularly taxpayers' money), and energy. Sadly, the EU's economic policy initiatives don't work very often, yet there are always politicians who put their weight behind them and hope for political gain from them. Maybe that's the inevitable fate of this proposal, but I'm not ready to give up yet. Rationality could still prevail, and Professor Hübner's draft opinion is, by and large, a silver lining.

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USPTO invalidates Nokia patent as per OPPO's PTAB IPR petition: Nokia is appealing parallel decision by European Patent Office

Bring the popcorn. The seemingly neverending, multijurisdictional patent dispute between Nokia and OPPO continues to make news. Earlier this week, I reported on a decision by the European Patent Office (EPO) to uphold an OPPO patent in an amended form, and now let'see how the modified claim language will fare at a Mannheim infringement trial in early December and/or in a preliminary injunction proceeding before the Unified Patent Court (UPC). Now there's news from the U.S., a jurisdiction in which the parties don't have any infringement actions pending against each other, but where the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) instituted an inter partes review (IPR) roughly a year ago relating to U.S. Patent No. 10,701,588 on "methods, apparatuses and computer program product for PDU formatting according to SDU segmentation."

On Thursday, the PTAB granted the petition and held all challenged claims unpatentable:

Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecommunications Corp., Ltd., v. Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy (IPR2022-00632, Patent 10,701,588 B2): Final Written Decision Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable

Nokia can appeal the PTAB decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, just like it also appealed in September a decision made by the Opposition Division of the European Patent Office (EPO) in May, which declared the European equivalent of that patent, EP3395029, invalid. Now that both the USPTO and the EPO have sided with OPPO in the first instance, any appeal seeking to salvage one of those patents is going to be an uphill battle.

It's been 27 months since the previous cross-license agreement between the two expired and Nokia sued without delay. OPPO's resilience is admirable. They're giving one of the very best in-house patent litigation teams out there a run for the money to say the least. It's become clear in recent years that some German judges have an anti-Chinese bias (which is not a conspiracy theory but was evidenced by problematic public statements as well as rather divergent decisions in neutral jurisdictions), without which the situation would look even more favorable to OPPO.

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OPPO defends another 5G patent against Nokia's opposition: Mannheim trial scheduled for December, UPC PI motion conceivable, and what would the EUIPO do under the proposed regulation?

Nokia and OPPO are giving each other a hard time in different patent validity fora. Recently, even some Nokia patents that gave rise to German injunctions have been deemed invalid in other--but definitely reputable--jurisdictions. It's a monumental, earth-spanning dispute. There hasn't been anything so large and long-running in the wireless sector for years.

The latest development involves OPPO's EP3624524 on "wireless communication methods, network device, and terminal device." It's a 5G declared-essential patent that OPPO asserted against Nokia in Mannheim, with a trial scheduled for December 5, 2023. In early February, an opposition panel of the European Patent Office (EPO) declared the challenged claims non-novel, but did not take a specific position on (non-)obviousness. Yesterday, the panel upheld the patent in an amended form.

The Bardehle Pagenberg patent attorneys who achieved that partial victory are Tobias Kaufmann and Dr. Nikolaus Buchheim.

In June, another OPPO patent-in-suit was also defended in an amended form, and a modification of the claim language that looked like a minor clarification to me resulted in a non-essentiality determination by the Mannheim Regional Court. So I want to be careful about any predictions at this point. The patent may or may not be standard-essential in its narrowed form. And if it's not essential, then it may or may not be infringed, but an infringement allegation would have to be based on what Nokia's baseband stations actually do as opposed to a (rebuttable) presumption that what reads on the standard is infringed by a product that has been declared standard-compliant. As there is no pretrial discovery in Germany (in fact, nothing even remotely like U.S. discovery), it is far easier to properly plead an infringement case over a SEP than over a non-SEP.

I've recently attended several preliminary injunction hearings before Local Divisions of the Unified Patent Court (UPC): two in Munich (with Bardehle Pagenberg having won one case while the other is under advisement), and one each in Vienna and Helsinki. Companies are increasingly concerned about the implications of a patent surviving, in one form or another, a validity challenge, as the UPC appears rather willing to grant preliminary injunctions over such battle-tested patents, provided (of course) that other requirements, such as urgency, are met.

The Nokia v. OPPO/OPPO v. Nokia dispute showcases various of the things that can happen in SEP enforcement, raising the question of what would happen--or would have happened--if the proposed EU SEP Regulation was already in force.

With respect to what implications the amended claims of EP3624524 would have under the EU SEP Regulation, there are at least two interesting questions:

• If there had been an essentiality check based on the patent as originally granted, would the EUIPO routinely perform a new one in a situation like this?

• If the claim amendments pushed the patent out of the area of essentiality, but the patent could still be asserted as a non-SEP, wouldn't the patent holder actually be in a stronger position than if it was deemed essential for purposes of the EU SEP Regulation?

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Antitrust class action against Qualcomm (originally related to FTC action) thrown out on summary judgment; same judge previously denied discovery of my communications with Microsoft

In January, I reported on the partial dismissal of an antitrust class action against Qualcomm in the Northern District of California (a case that was brought in the wake of the FTC's ultimately unsuccessful enforcement action against the chipmaker), and at the time I already wrote that the ruins of that complaint "[would] hardly survive summary judgment." In February I agreed with Qualcomm's arguments for not reopening discovery, as did the court. After the SJ motion was filed in April, I "I guess[ed] Qualcomm's motion [would] succeed." And that is what has just happened.

On Tuesday, "[a]fter carefully considering the briefing and conducting oral argument on August 3, 2023," Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Qualcomm's motion for summary judgment in its entirety:

In Re: Qualcomm Antitrust Litigation (case no. 17-md-02773-JSC, N.D. Cal.): Order re: Motion for Summary Judgment (Public Redacted Version)

This here is a legal victory that should put all of that U.S. antitrust litigation from the late 2010s to rest (short of a successful appeal, but chances are so slim that I guess an appeal will not even be brought). In economic terms it is, however, pretty unimportant compared to the fact that Apple, due to its failure to make its own iPhone-grade baseband processor, had to extend the chipset purchasing agreement with Qualcomm by another three years (2024-2026), which presumably means that Apple exercised an option to extend its standard-essential patent royalty payments as well. In the alternative (if Apple had been able to replace Qualcomm's chips), Apple might have tried to renegotiate those SEP licensing terms.

Things are going well for Qualcomm, and ultimately I believe the company will be able to deal with whatever impact the proposed EU SEP Regulation--in whatever form it may or may not be passed into law--will have.

As for Judge Corley's reasoning, the key elements are that there was really not even the slightest substance to claims that an agreement with Samsung had any market foreclosure impact. And even with respect to Apple, there was no credible pass-through theory (of elevated costs). The final part ("Conclusion") of the order granting the motion to dismiss essentially says that the class-action lawyers made their strategic choices. The initial choices (very much about "No License, No Chips" and allegedly supra-FRAND SEP royalties) didn't work out when the Ninth Circuit reversed the FTC's trial win. Later on, they still tried to get something out of this by suing Qualcomm over exclusive dealing. They presented a new expert report "though the Court had expressly declined to reopen expert discovery." Judge Corley declined to "open the flood gates to prolonged do-over litigation" as opposed to the speedy, efficient, and just resolution that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to ensure.

This outcome makes sense to me. As I noted further above, I predicted that the shifting-sands case wouldn't make it to trial.

Class actions can serve useful purposes. They can raise issues and promote justice. However, the vast majority of class actions I see in the technology industry are just opportunistic attempts by lawyers to extract settlements from large corporations. Qualcomm probably could have "settled" that class action at a far lower cost than that of its world-class defense. But once you do that, others will come and sue you as well. Qualcomm made the right choice and has now (again, absent an unlikely reversal on appeal) defeated this class action (or, more precisely, consolidated set of class actions).

The order to dismiss the Qualcomm class action(s) came one day after Judge Corley also made a decision (in a class-action matter that does not involve Qualcomm but also followed an FTC action) relating in part to yours truly's communications with Microsoft:

DeMartini et al. v. Microsoft (case no. 22-cv-08991-JSC, N.D. Cal.): Order Re: Discovery Dispute Joint Letter

Let me just refer you to an article about this odd sideshow of the Microsoft-ActivisionBlizzard merger case by Stephen Totilo of Axios Gaming.

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Avanci 5G doubles number of licensees, quadruples number of licensed brands as BMW signs up: Volkswagen/Audi next?

The Avanci 5G automotive standard-essential patent (SEP) pool revealed Mercedes-Benz as its first licensee last month. Today the licensing program announced that BMW has joined as well, which takes the number of licensed brands from one to four: Mercedes, BMW, MINI, and Rolls-Royce. Today's press release also indicates that the number of licensors has increased from 58 to 61.

By now, almost the entire automotive industry has an Avanci 4G license. But back in 2017, BMW became Avanci's first 4G licensee. It took a while for that pool to be widely adopted. Things appear to be going significantly faster with Avanci 5G now.

In retrospect, BMW's decision made business sense unless one believes in the illegal concept of group boycott: Mercedes (then named Daimler) and Volkswagen did not save money by opposing the Avanci model. They ended up choosing the pool license over bilateral licensing negotiations and disputes, but unlike BMW they incurred litigation expenses (in Volkswagen's case, the dispute was short-lived and due to the fact they licensed only 3G patents for most of the cars the group makes). BMW saved money, time, and energy. They stayed above the fray.

While I have not yet seen a German SEP infringement case targeting BMW, they are clearly not a soft target for non-SEP holders. Typically represented by Bardehle Pagenberg's Professor Tilman Mueller-Stoy ("Müller-Stoy in German), BMW is known to defend itself vigorously against patent infringement assertions, though most of the time the outcome is, obviously, a license agreement. If such a company takes a license without litigation, it must have concluded that the licensed patents are valuable.

Germany's remaining three automotive brands are Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche, all of which belong to Volkswagen Group. Audi and Porsche clearly compete in some of the same market segments as BMW and Mercedes. It would make a lot of sense for VW to join the pool now. Sooner or later, some 5G SEP holders will start to enforce their rights against unwilling licensees. Just like German judges pressed Mercedes (then named Daimler) to explain why a license that had been taken by their closest (and equally German) competitors: BMW and Audi. I doubt that Audi would want to have to justify--particularly in front of the same judges who heard Nokia v. Daimler--a refusal to take a license that Mercedes and BMW deem to make economic sense.

Just like actions speak louder than words, real-world license deals are way more meaningful than spin doctoring and political propaganda. Mercedes-Benz told the EU that the proposed SEP regulation (or something even more lopsided) was badly needed, yet became the first Avanci 5G licensee because they deemed it prudent. Similarly, BMW Group is now an early adopter of the Avanci 5G license, yet it is a member of the Fair Standards Alliance and of certain automotive industry organizations that take similar positions.

There's nothing difficult to understand: every company would like to bring any cost category--here, cellular SEP license fees--down, even if such costs are already fair and reasonable. Automakers are no different. That is unrelated to the merits of Avanci providing a one-stop solution that Mercedes and BMW have twice (4G and now 5G) considered superior over dozens and dozens of bilateral deals. And opportunism by some car makers certainly doesn't make the EU proposal any less misguided. Case in point, a single Nokia v. OPPO decision in Sweden (which went in the defendant's favor) showcases at least four of the countless flaws of that bill.

Accurate and holistic analysis needs to look at what those companies say and what they do. License deals that are concluded in the absence of litigation--and presumably even without the slightest threat of litigation other than the fact that any infringement may sooner or later become the subject of enforcement action.

Europe's and particularly Germany's automotive industry is facing undeniably large problems. Cellular SEP licensing is none of them, though. Even if those costs were reduced through political intervention (which I don't see happening, though it is some people's agenda), that wouldn't help to address any of the fundamental challenges facing the European auto sector, particularly because there's no comparative advantage for companies selling cars in a given target market in which certain patents must be licensed.

Today's Avanci-BMW announcement is good news for those who argue that the market can and will find solutions, as are other recent license deals such as Huawei's recent agreement with Xiaomi.

Patent pools exist to simplify licensing--which must have been the reason why BMW entered into one agreement rather than 60+ bilateral deals--while some EU officials and politicians are trying to complicate the process and mistakenly view pools as part of the problem, not part of the solution.

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Four of numerous flaws of proposed EU SEP Regulation are illustrated by OPPO's Swedish victory over Nokia: binary register won't reflect non-binary world, and jurisdictional differences matter

This is a follow-up to my Thursday post on a Nokia v. OPPO decision by the Swedish Patent and Market Court that held a pair of declared-essential patents (from the same family) invalid, but also an addition to my commentary (since March) on the unbelievable fundamental flaws of the proposed EU regulation on standard-essential patents (EU SEP Regulation).

The two SEPs in question were deemed invalid by the Swedish court, which was a major win for OPPO, but Nokia had obtained and enforced a German injunction over them. Due to Germany's bifurcation system, the infringement ruling came down prior to the resolution of a parallel nullity action. Nokia had also successfully asserted those patents against OPPO in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, two jurisdictions where a full invalidity defense is available. Nevertheless, the four-judge panel in Sweden made its own decision and begged to differ from their colleagues in a couple of other countries.

Let's briefly look at this from the EU SEP Reg angle--actually, from four angles related to that ill-conceived legislative proposal:

1. If the EU SEP Reg was already in force, and if the envisaged SEP Register had been implemented, those two patents would have to be removed from the register if Nokia made a request pursuant to Art. 25(1)(b): "invalidation of the patent by a competent authority" (which the Swedish Patent & Market Court undoubtedly is).

   The proposal does not say anything about how to resolve conflicting decisions from different jurisdictions.

   As a result, Nokia would be allowed to enforce those patents without having to comply with any of the provisions of the EU SEP Reg. Simply put, those patents would be treated as a non-SEPs with a view to the regulation, though national courts might nonetheless apply Huawei v. ZTE. The patent holder might consider that flexibility gain to far outweigh the negative effect of a lower essentiality rate and reduced number of declared-essential patents. Here, with Nokia having a huge SEP portfolio, the removal of a couple of patents from the database wouldn't adversely impact the overall valuation of the relevant portfolio.

2. The fact that the Swedish decision differs from the ones in the UK and the Netherlands, and from the probability assessment of the Mannheim Regional Court, doesn't make it necessarily wrong. But it clearly cannot be ruled out that a Swedish appeals court might overrule the Patent and Market Court, given that some other judges have also deemed those patents valid. I personally believe the Swedish decision is very well-reasoned and other jurisdictions should be persuaded by it, but you don't know until they have all decided. Assuming only for the sake of the argument that the decision was reversed, the EU SEP Reg--based on the current proposal--would not even have a mechanism in place for putting those two patents back.

3. When criticizing the EU SEP Reg, I've said repeatedly that the outcome of essentiality checks can depend on what jurisdiction's claim construction and other legal standards are applied. The proposal does not specify that, and there is no uniform standard across the EU. The Swedish decision was based on validity, and an invalid patent is by definition non-essential. What happened here can also happen in connection with an infringement analysis. The starting point is always claim construction. And after that one, there are other steps that can differ between countries.

   It doesn't make sense to assume that a patent is essential or not. It's not binary. It may be essential in some jurisdictions and non-essential in others.

   While I agree with the criticism voiced by one of the researchers commissioned by the EC's Directorate-General for the Internal Market, Dr. Justus Baron, of the aggregate royalty determination part of the proposal, Dr. Baron and I have expressed different views on whether jurisdictional differences make a practical difference for the envisioned essentiality checks of samples of patents. The fact that a Swedish court invalidated two SEPs deemed valid in a couple of other European jurisdictions supports my view that jurisdictional differences pose a confidence problem: you need even larger samples then, and even the assessment of all patents of a given portfolio may be unacceptably unreliable if each European patent is analyzed under only one jurisdiction's standard while in litigation you may get one outcome in the Netherlands and another in Sweden.

4. At a recent SEP conference in Warsaw, Bardehle Pagenberg's Professor Tilman Mueller-Stoy ("Müller-Stoy" in German) said something I also mentioned in the post I just linked to: essentiality determinations are not too meaningful if validity isn't analyzed as well. The Swedish Nokia v. OPPO situation is now the latest example.

An EU proposal that treats a dynamic environment as static and a non-binary world as binary is not going to do any good. It's going to be a waste. The courts of law may in the end not be persuaded that the EU's essentiality checks, essentiality ratios, aggregate royalty rates, and bilateral FRAND determinations are relevant or helpful. If something flies in the face of what the real experts (as opposed to those who drafted the proposal) know, the actual decision makers may mimimize the impact of the EU SEP Reg, just like the 2021 patent injunction "reform" in Germany has made no real-world impact.

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OPPO wins in Swedish court as two of Nokia's standard-essential patents (on which it prevailed in Mannheim) are declared invalid; also, Nokia's UK SEP injunction can't be enforced pending appeal

More than two years have passed since Nokia sued OPPO, and more than one year since OPPO was forced out of the German market by the enforcement of various patent injunctions, at least some of which were dubious from the beginning. Nokia still doesn't have leverage over OPPO. In the foreseeable future, there will be only one FRAND determination in place between these parties, and that one will be made by a court in Chongqing, China.

In the first part of this post I have an update on the Swedish part of the earth-spanning set of disputes. Subsequently I'll also discuss the UK situation, which is pretty good for OPPO in practical terms.

In June 2022, it became known that Nokia filed complaints in Finland and Sweden over two patents from the same patent family: EP2981103 and EP3220562, both on an "allocation of preamble sequences." For the avoidance of doubt, Nokia asserted both patents in both jurisdictions.

Over those patents, Nokia won its first standard-essential patent (SEP) injunction against OPPO in Mannheim last year. The Mannheim Regional Court interestingly agreed with Nokia that it was un-FRAND-ly for OPPO to offer a lump-sum royalty, but the same Nokia took the very opposite position later in a UK litigation where it argued that only a lump-sum was acceptable.

In retrospect the Mannheim rulings against OPPO appear more questionable than ever. In July, a French court invalidated two Nokia patents, one of which is a non-SEP that I considered very clearly invalid, but over which the Mannheim court nevertheless granted an injunction (which its appeals court, the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court, inexplicably allowed to be enforced).

Today the Swedish Patent and Market Court declared the two SEPs underlying the June 2022 injunction--EP'103 and EP'562--invalid with respect to its juridiction (Sweden). And it even did so on three independent grounds relating to partly different claims:

1. The original patent applications lacked support for the combination of cyclic interpretation and the second embodiment described iin the specification. Therefore, claim 1 of EP'103 and claim 4 of EP'562 were deemed to contain impermissibly added subject matter.

2. Either patent's claim 1 is a device claim with method features, but those method features do not affect the properties or the configuration of the device, which is why the court found they must be disregarded in the novelty analysis. As a result, the patents are invalid based on anticipation.

3. Claim 8 of EP'103 and claim 9 of EP'562 are independent method claims, but the Swedish court found them to cover a purely intellectual aact (as opposed to performing a specific technical function).

To be fair, the Mannheim court was not alone in siding with Nokia over those two SEPs. A Dutch court and a UK court did so, too. But now there is a very well-reasoned pair of rulings from the Swedish Patent and Market Court that states three reasons for invalidation when any single one of them would have been sufficient. It remains to be seen whether those patents will at some point be invalidated elsewhere.

EP'103 and EP'562 are now going to be harder for Nokia to enforce, as there is a possibility of courts in other jurisdictions being persuaded by the Swedish court's reasoning. This shows that Nokia is paying a significant price for its protracted dispute with OPPO.

Not only is this becoming ever more costly (including hard-to-quantify costs such as the invalidation of key patents) but the question of the "end game" must be asked as well. At this point it appears that the key jurisdiction is going to be China. That's because the Chongqing court's FRAND determination will be made soon, and while the Chongqing decision cannot be enforced during an appeal, it will most likely become enforceable prior to any other FRAND determination anywhere in the world that Nokia could point to.

I have now obtained copies of Mr Justice Richard Meade's latest Nokia v. OPPO decisions relating to remedies. He's given the topic a lot of thought and arrived at a position somewhere in the middle between the two parties' views:

• While Nokia technically has a UK SEP injunction against OPPO now (based on Mr Justice Meade's application of existing appellate case law in the UK), that one has been stayed pending OPPO's appeal. The balance of hardships weighed against forcing OPPO out of the UK market the way it was forced out of the German market last year.

• A very interesting question in that appeal is whether OPPO's willingness to take a license on whatever terms are in fact FRAND, but based on the upcoming Chongqing rate-setting decision, is a sufficient basis for not enjoining OPPO in the UK. A second point is that OPPO argues it actually already has a license under French law (based on Nokia's ETSI FRAND pledge), just that the exact financial terms have not been set. That argument had also been made by Xiaomi in the dispute with Philips. The question about whether OPPO is a willing licensee based on its commitment to take a license on the terms to be decided in Chongqing appears more likely to succeed as far as I can tell. And Mr Justice Meade takes that question seriously enough that he even authorized "leapfrogging" over the Court of Appeal and going straight to the UK Supreme Court (a decision that also has to do with the Optis v. Apple dispute, where the UKSC accepted to hear an appeal by Apple).

• It's interesting how the parties' perspectives have changed in both Nokia v. OPPO and Optis v. Apple. The plaintiffs brought their UK actions because they hoped to be able to force the defendant into a global portfolio license on terms that would be reasonably attractive to the respective right holder. But after the actual FRAND determination was made in Optis v. Apple, and also in light of the prior InterDigital v. Lenovo decision by Mr Justice James Mellor, it's now actually the defendants who are more interested in taking a global license on UK-determined terms than the plaintiffs are in granting one. As a result, OPPO would actually be quite happy now to get a UK FRAND decision, but Nokia would rather wait.

• Mr Justice Meade already had everything set to hold the UK FRAND trial in a few weeks' time. The parties have obviously already made quite an effort preparing for that trial. But all things considered, including that the FRAND terms to be decided there would presumably not result in a near-term license agreement and would become known close to the end of the relevant license period (which is mid-2021 to mid-2024), he decided to stay that trial.

• Time will tell whether it was the right decision on Nokia's part to request a stay of the UK FRAND trial. While perfectly understandable in light of the recent outcomes in InterDigital v. Lenovo and Optis v. Apple, that tactical decision now enables OPPO to argue that it was quite willing to obtain useful guidance from the UK court.

• Nokia can enforce a UK non-SEP injunction, but OPPO will apparently just work around it, rendering that Nokia win inconsequential in practical terms.

Again, I have great respect for Mr Justice Meade's thoughtful approach and balanced decisions. The question is not whether any of the parties or I would agree 100%. On this set of issues, you may get as many opinions as the number of people you ask. But this judge tried to be fair, and the outcome is a nuanced one.

If Nokia doesn't have a strategy that is likely to give it decisive leverage over OPPO (interim payments etc. are just symbolic), it should try to settle this dispute. OPPO has surprised a lot of people, including me, with its determined and sophisticated defense. At some point the U.S. also pulled out of Vietnam.

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Huawei and Xiaomi sign patent cross-license agreement

This article was delayed by the fact that I attended a Unified Patent Court hearing in Vienna yesterday (which was really interesting and I'll write about it later). That same day, Huawei and Xiaomi announced a global patent cross-license agreement that covers, among other things, 5G. They provided the following quotes:

Huawei IP chief Alan Fan:

"We are delighted to reach this licensing deal with Xiaomi. This licensing agreement once again reflects the industry's recognition of Huawei's contributions to communications standards and will help us enhance our investment in researching future mobile communications technologies."

Xiaomi IP chief Ran Xu:

"We are glad to reach a patent cross-licensing agreement with Huawei. This shows that both parties recognize and respect each other's intellectual property. As part of our commitment to our values around IP, Xiaomi will, as always, respect IP, seek long-term and sustainable IP partnerships for shared success, drive technology inclusion with IP, and allow more people to benefit from technology."

It was reported a while ago that Huawei had requested a special Chinese proceeding that was not tantamount to infringement litigation, but designed to give the parties valuable guidance so they could strike a deal. That objective has clearly been accomplished.

In December 2022, Huawei already announced an agreement of this kind with OPPO.

Neither Xiaomi nor OPPO can be blamed for the geopolitical aberrations that have effectively forced Huawei out of the handset market. And the vacuum created by those circumstances was an opportunity for device makers anywhere on this planet. But it's also true that Xiaomi and OPPO benefited from that development, and some people would argue that Xiaomi did so to an even greater extent.

While Huawei is an Avanci licensor, Xiaomi is not (and OPPO only for 4G so far, but they can still join 5G and I guess they will sooner or later).

Huawei remains consistent with its approach that IP absolutely must be respected--but not overleveraged.

Last month Huawei also announced a cross-license agreement with Ericsson.

While the EU focuses on complicating the standard-essential patent licensing process (see 1, 2, 3), key market actors such as Huawei continue to work out solutions. EU policy makers should ask themselves how Chinese companies manage to agree on cross-licensing terms with each other in the absence of what the kind of register and FRAND determination proceedings the proposed EU SEP Regulation would put in place in Europe.

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Standard-essential utility models are major loophole in proposed EU SEP Regulation, presumably because of fundamental rights issues: structural problems

At this week's Warsaw conference on standard-essential patents (SEPs), Professor Jorge Contreras (Utah)--who is generally in favor of the proposed EU SEP Regulation, which I attribute to his well-known preference for softer SEP enforcement rather than unbiased analysis of the bill's incurable flaws--criticized one major loophole: the draft regulation doesn't cover standard-essential utility models.

That is indeed a loophole, and quite a big one. The version that leaked in late March actually defined SEP in a way that explicitly also covered utility models (SEUMs), which are registered--but not examined--property rights covering technical inventions and available in certain jurisdictions, particularly Germany, but also Spain and Italy. The current proposal does not pertain to SEUMs.

SEUMs are not just a hypothetical possibility. They do exist and actually get enforced. In December 2018, I attended a SEUM trial in Munich, where the defendants were represented by Professor Peter Chrocziel (one of the best patent litigators Germany ever had; at the time of that SEUM trial, he was a Bardehle Pagenberg partner, and now running his own IP and antitrust law boutique in Munich, focusing on strategic advice).

If the EU SEP Regulation entered into force, contributors to standards could easily work around it by obtaining German utility models and enforcing those, without enforcement being delayed or the commercial terms being impacted by the envisioned FRAND rate determinations. German national courts would presumably apply the Sisvel v. Haier standard, but that is--relatively speaking--the best a defendant to a SEUM assertion could hope for.

Utility models come with two key limitations. One is that they will be enforceable for only 10 years, not 20, from the priority date. The other is that there is no presumption of validity, so the hurdle for defendants seeking a stay pending a parallel validity determination is rather low. However, if there already is some case law relating to a patent based on the same original invention, or if there is no reasonably strong invalidity argument, German courts will order injunctions. And in Spain, it appears that it is even harder to invalidate a modelo de utilidad than a patent (it must be very obvious--not merely obvious--over the prior art).

There's an independent second reason for which contributors to standards may be more interested than ever in additionally obtaining utility models: they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) (this week I attended the first-ever preliminary injunction hearing in the UPC). For right holders who want to hedge their bets in enforcement, it's a major opportunity to be able to seek national (particularly German) injunctions in parallel to enforcing European patents in the UPC. A complementary utility model is often a superior alternative to opting out a patent. You can ha

While Professor Contreras accurately identified the loophole and the potential for circumvention of an EU regulation, the solution is not the one he suggested.

Putting back the definition that originally leaked wouldn't work. I attribute it to a conscious decision--not an oversight--that DG GROW removed utility models from its definition of the term SEP. There are two possible factors here:

• The delays and restrictions of enforcement that the proposed regulation would impose are highly problematic with a view the EU's charter of fundamental rights as well as international obligations such as TRIPS. That is also an issue with a view to patents, but what exacerbates the problem in the case of utility models is that a delay by about a year is far more harmful when an IPR expires after 10 years (not 20). Given how much time it takes from the creation of a standard to its commercial adoption, the enforcement window is extremely short for SEUMs, so it would be very difficult to justify a delay of enforcement by roughly a year.

• There may also be limitations on the EU's ability to regulate utility models, while there already is some EU primary law relating to patents.

So what is the solution? As often in life, the roadmap to a solution starts with being honest and realistic:

There are numerous details to criticize about the proposal, and the SEUM loophole is another one to add to the list. But as I explained in a recent post, the problems are fundamental. They're structural. It's not going to get us anywhere to try to address them one by one because fixing some of those issues will create others, and in some cases the choice is between having a regulation that makes no sense or to get into serious conflicts with fundamental rights, international obligations, and the constitutions of one or more EU member states.

That's why we should all be able to agree that DG GROW's proposal is--as Mr Justice Marcus Smith accurately noted--"a wholly bad idea." The solution is not to turn left or right, but a 180-degree turnaround. Go back to Square One and devise something workable and reasonable. When computer programmers find that a certain problem-solving strategy won't work, they will at some point throw away an entire code segment and start again from scratch.

The Warsaw conference put on full display that those who drafted the bill lack regulatory humility. Their attitude is irresponsible; their competence must be questioned in light of such unbelievable stupidities as suggesting that an entire SEP family is either essential or non-essential based on the assessment of a single patent; and there is no evidentiary basis for doing what they propose to do. Those who defend the proposal resort to disingenuous methods such as incorrectly limiting the fundamental rights issues to a mere delay of enforcement.

The net-licensee camp needs some voices of reason now.

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