Showing posts with label NPEs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NPEs. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 21, 2016

Airbus (the COMPANY, not a plane) hijacked by patent extremists, joined trolls' lobbying entity named IP Europe

With respect to standard-essential patent licensing, my preferred European voice of reason(ableness) is the Fair Standards Alliance, an organization Google recently joined and which I'd like to see Apple and Samsung team up with at some point. On the other end of the spectrum, there's a lobbying group named IP Europe. While I personally know and respect two of the individuals working for that one, I fundamentally disagree with its policy positions and object to its false claim of supporting "innovatives SMEs." IP Europe advances the cause of patent trolls and of businesses that failed in the mobile phone business for a lack of innovation and increasingly resort to patent licensing as a revenue source.

Looking at IP Europe's member list, it's generally easy to see why each of those organizations expects to gain something from overpatenting and from an overcompensation of patentees, with a couple of exceptions, however.

Orange (France Telecom) is a carrier. In the U.S., mobile carriers are usually on the reasonable side (and sometimes go too far even for my taste when making public-interest arguments in amicus curiae briefs). Does the former France Teleom plan to engage in patent trolling like its British counterpart? I don't know, but it was most likely a mistake that Orange joined IP Europe.

The other, better-known and even more surprising member is Airbus Group. The only explanation I have for Airbus's decision to join IP Europe is that an IP-incompetent senior management has allowed the patent professionals running Airbus's IP department to hijack the company in order to advance the interests of their profession rather than defend the interests of their current employer.

In the airplane business, Airbus only stands to lose from excessive patent royalties. In the defense and space businesses, patents won't protect Airbus either. In 2012, Elon Musk already explained why SpaceX (which in a few years of existence has already achieved technically more impressive feats than Airbus in its much longer history) generally doesn't file for patents.

I want my Munich area-based startup to be very innovative in its niche, but generally speaking, Europe has a huge innovation gap versus Silicon Valley. California has Elon Musk. Europe has Tom Enders. Tom who? Well, the CEO of Airbus studied politics, started his career in politics, and at a heavily-subsidized intergovernmental joint venture like Airbus, political connections are more important than anything else. Elon Musk, despite all of his amazing talents, would never get a top job at an organization like Airbus. Fortunately, he doesn't need it.

When the CEO of a company that should be technology-driven is absolutely not a technologist (but a political scientist/historian), it just takes a self-serving IP department to make the company sign up with a lobbying group like IP Europe, thereby teaming up with highly litigious patent assertion entities (PAEs)/non-practicing entities (NPEs).

One of IP Europe's key priorities--if not its number one priority--is to fight against the "smallest saleable unit" approach to FRAND license fees. Do the bureaucrats in charge of Airbus even know what that means for their business? Presumably they don't. What if someone made a Motorola-like patent royalty claim and demanded a percentage of the sales price of an entire Airbus plane over a few WiFi, video or whatever patents?

Do those decision-makers realize that the number of potentially patented "inventions" in an Airbus that third parties hold account for a vast majority of all patentable "inventions" in a modern airplane? It has been estimated that 250,000 patents are embodied in a smartphone. In practical terms, the digital entertainment and communications technology installed in today's planes is increasingly like that, and actually much bigger.

To many of you this may seem obvious, but let me explain this for the rest: there is no such thing as a software patent that guarantees stability and security. The reason: no matter what a patent may describe (with or without specificity), it can always be implemented in an unstable and insecure fashion.

Airbus has a software quality problem. Last year Airbus even admitted that a software configuration error caused the crash of a military transporter, and I vaguely remember a crash of a commercial Airbus plane many years ago that some experts attributed to a software issue. In terms of success factors in the airplane business, that is what Airbus should be focusing on. It has nothing to do with patents. Any code that is stable or unstable, secure or insecure, is protected by copyright (and trade secrets). Any configuration that is stable or unstable, secure or insecure, is a matter of quality assurance.

If Airbus focused on software quality, it wouldn't have to fear copycats. If someone copied great code, copyright (not patent) law would protect Airbus.

Airbus is the craziest example now of a company that builds highly multifunctional products and opposes the "smallest saleable unit" approach to patent license fees. But maybe Airbus is not really a company. It's more of an intergovernmental organization that is detached from economic realities because taxpayers will have to foot the bill if anything goes wrong.

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Tuesday, November 24, 2015

Privateering: UK court holds Ericsson patent valid, essential to LTE in case against Huawei, Samsung

In March 2014, Unwired Planet sued several smartphone makers over various patents it had "acquired" from Ericsson. Actually, "acquired" misses the key commercial point here. In April I took a closer look at the related arrangements and couldn't help but conclude that this was just a pseudo-sale of patents and simply an act of what is commonly referred to as "privateering."

The first decision relating to Ericsson's (technically, Unwired Planet's) infringement claims came down yesterday in the England and Wales High Court. Judge Colin Birss held that EP2229744 on a "method and arrangement in a wireless communication network" is valid (and in the UK) and "infringed by wireless telecommunication networks which operate in accordance with the relevant LTE standard," or more specifically, "essential to standard 3GPP TS 36.322 release 8 version 8.8.0."

This decision came down against Huawei and Samsung's challenges to this patent. According to Bloomberg, "Samsung said it was confident it had not infringed Unwired Planet's patents." I don't know whether this means Samsung will appeal and/or whether Samsung will argue that its own implementations of the LTE standard don't make use of the technique covered by the patent in Judge Birss's opinion.

If the patent was ultimately deemed valid as well as infringed by Huawei and Samsung's LTE devices, there might be equitable defenses (relating to privateering) and there almost certainly would be a debate over what constitutes a FRAND royalty for that patent and possibly some other patents. Privateering and FRAND are the two issue heres that I'm going to be more interested in. Those two parts are intertwined, especially because Ericsson once made a promise not to demand more than a certain royalty rate for all of its LTE patents--a promise Ericsson may have circumvented by "selling" some patents to a privateer like Unwired Planet.

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Thursday, May 21, 2015

Nokia and Ericsson seek to justify their privateering ways, defend patent transfers to NPEs

The debate over privateering (patent transfers by large operating companies to so-called non-producing entities or patent assertion entities) is in full swing, and it will be with us for a while. The week before last I made a call for input in an effort to build a smartphone-related privateering directory. This week, IAM (Intellectual Asset Management) magazine politely disagreed with my approach, and I respectfully disagree with them.

At the heart of that disagreement is the question of whether infringers unwilling to take a license are the real issue. IAM thinks so; I don't. When the "smartphone patent wars" started in 2010, and in the following two to three years, I also believed that more companies should take licenses and felt that certain right holders had a reasonable basis for asserting their IP in court. But what has come out of all those lawsuits so far does not support claims of massive patent violations: most smartphone patent lawsuits go nowhere and even the few assertions that do succeed usually don't have meaningful results. in this field of technology (which is a large one because smartphones are highly multifunctional) I can now understand each and every defendant who isn't impressed by claims to infringe many patents held by someone. I wouldn't have thought back in 2010 that Motorola still hasn't felt forced to take an Android patent license from Microsoft after four and a half years of crossjurisdictional litigation. But that's the way it is (unless there's a reversal of fortunes down the road) and I can't blame others for "doing a Motorola" when they face royalty demands.

Smartphone patent assertions are so vastly unsuccessful that I've arrived at the conclusion the term "intellectual property" is a propagandistic misnomer for smartphone patents. I still like IP as a term for patents in a field where the system may work, for copyright, for trademarks, and for certain other categories of rights that are reasonably reliable. IPRs will never come with the degree of legal certainty that real property provides and I understand that. However, when the vast majority of assertions turn out meritless and the few that have merit in a formalistic, legalistic sense are still unimpressive from a technical/commercial point of view, transaction costs are totally out of proportion and the value of most of those patents is not in the "innovation" they allegedly protect but in the ability to force someone to spend money on legal defense and in the off-chance that one of the asserted patents may beat the odds and have some real impact in the end.

Most right holders and IP professionals still claim that patents, even smartphone-related patents, should be treated like real property, but Congress wouldn't be looking at the reform proposals that are currently on the table if lawmakers truly believed that the patent system was all about the legitimate protection of innovation. No one would seriously make similar proposals with respect to real property. It's just for political reasons that even those favoring far-reaching reform frequently repeat the mantra of how beneficial the patent system is to innovation. Saying the opposite would be unwise with a view to international trade negotiations and would draw massive protest from various large organizations. But when even the largest and most well-known companies in the smartphone industry fail with most of their patent assertions, something is fundamentally wrong, the system is increasingly detached from the notion of protecting true innovators, and more reform is needed.

Just like patent enforcement is structurally different from the enforcement of real property rights, it also makes sense to treat (at least in this field of technology) patent transfers differently from other asset sales.

Nokia and Ericsson have issued statements to IAM (cited in the blog post I linked to in the first paragraph) on their patent transfers to patent assertion entities (PAEs). They basically told IAM that those deals are beneficial, but they don't explain why companies with such vast resources and enormous sophistication (in-house and externally, in legal and in technical respects) need help from little guys with a controversial business model to do license deals with the very same licensees with which they've already done deals before and do deals with all the time.

They also fail to explain why a number of major right holders generally don't sell patents to PAEs. For example, I'm not aware of Qualcomm doing this. Or IBM (all the IBM patent sales I know about were to operating companies such as Google and Twitter). Or even Microsoft. While Microsoft has been criticized by some for providing funding for the Nokia-Mosaid deal, for the way it structured its acquisition of Nokia's wireless devices business (sort of a "reverse privateering" deal) and for funding Intellectual Ventures even at a time when almost everyone else in the industry didn't want to be associated with it anymore, even Microsoft's critics can't deny that it has built an enormously successful licensing business with well over 1,000 licensees--and it runs this business itself, without having to transfer patents to trolls.

Privateering is a huge and important issue, and there's no way to discuss all of its aspects in one post. For the remainder of this post I just want to comment quickly on a few things Nokia and Ericsson said in their statements:

  • Both companies say the acquirers of their SEPs (to the extent that SEPs are involved) have to fulfill their FRAND licensing commitments. The problem is not that the acquirers would claim the patents weren't encumbered. The key issue is that those companies have previously taken positions on the royalty rate for their portfolios. For example, on page 3 of this American Bar Association Document you can see that Nokia and Ericsson publicly announced a 4G (LTE) royalty rate of 1.5% each. But when such right holders sell parts of their portfolio to third parties, there's no longer a guarantee that the collective royalty demand implementers of the standard will face about the patents presently and formerly held by the respective right holder would still not exceed that limit. If a plurality of patent holders of what used to be a single portfolio makes a collective demand that is not FRAND, privateering becomes a means of circumventing or vitiating FRAND licensing obligations.

  • Nokia touts its "relatively young portfolio" and continuing innovation but it has far fewer engineers on staff than it had a few years ago and in its dispute with HTC I saw it assert mostly very old patents.

  • Nokia claims that "the majority [of its patent divestments in recent years] have been to operating companies." That means they must have sold patents to many operating companies since at least ten deals with PAEs are documented. But the only Nokia patent sale to an operating company that I can find on Google is that certain design (not technical) patents were given to Microsoft along with the handset business. So the other deals are either secretive or they aren't talked about because it's the deals with PAEs that raise issues. Even if Nokia had publicly announced patent tranfers to hundreds of operating companies, that fact still wouldn't justify privateering in the slighest.

    (As for transparency, IAM says Nokia and Ericsson have been more transparent than, for example, BT. I don't see any indication for that. It's just that BT transferred patents to privately held entities, which don't have to make SEC filings, unlike Unwired Planet or Mosaid. And some of the transferred patents showed up in litigation or prosecution before any announcement had been made by anyone.)

  • Ericsson says transferring patents to PAEs "is a way for innovators to get a fair return faster on their significant investment and contribution to the eco system." I could see an acceleration of a licensing business in a case where an acquirer makes a substantial upfront payment. But Unwired Planet received thousands of Ericsson patents without having to pay anything initially. Ericsson can't seriously say that this is a faster road to revenues. For example, Unwired Planet sued Samsung after Ericsson had agreed with Samsung on a new license deal. It would undoubtedly have been faster to include those patents in the deal Ericsson did with Samsung directly than to have Unwired Planet assert those patents against Samsung later.

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Tuesday, May 12, 2015

Privateering: let's name and shame companies that feed patent trolls -- please help complete the list

Privateering--the act of large companies giving patents to patent assertion entities (PAEs)--is (unfortunately) not illegal (yet), but it is abusive, antisocial behavior. It pollutes the legal environment and harms the economy. It has nothing to do with protecting legitimate innovation: legitimate innovators suffer from it because it drives up litigation and licensing costs, and deep-pocketed, sophisticated legitimate patent holders don't need third parties to strike deals with their industry peers. Privateering also gives patents in general and patent transfers in particular a bad name.

I'm asking you for your help to shed some light on this problem. Below you can find the first version of my list of known privateering deals, and if you're aware of any other verifiable transactions of this kind, please fill out this blog's contact form. I need a link to a press release or other public statement, a trustworthy media report, or a publicly accessible court filing. Sources won't be disclosed. The industry focus here is on everything relevant to smartphones (including mobile network infrastructure), tablet computers, and the various technologies they incorporate (such as operating systems and multimedia codecs).

There's no deadline for this. Depending on how much input I receive and when, I'll update the list, maybe once, maybe several times. In the very near term I may also add items to the list below.

So far it appears that no company has engaged in troll-feeding to nearly the same extent as Nokia (which celebrates its 150th anniversary today). By contrast, only one sale of Apple patents to a patent troll is known, and that was a long time ago, so privateering is not in Apple's DNA despite this regrettable but apparently isolated incident. So let's build a comprehensive list of privateering transactions.

[Update] First, thanks to those who have already proposed additions to the list above (most of which I've already incorporated). Second, I got some reactions on Twitter from IP professionals taking issue with the term "patent trolls" and fearing that this was a "witch hunt." Let me assure you that I used the term "patent trolls" in the headline just to increase the likelihood of people seeing this on Twitter and contributing information to the list. Obviously the patent licensing/assertion entities listed above aren't all the same in terms of how they act. There are differences. As for the operating companies, I've bought products from most of them, used Ericsson products indirectly (their base stations) and have said positive things about another company's products just based on what I learned about them from reliable sources. This blog here is mostly read by people with a strong, typically professional interest in IP issues: an audience that I believe is for the most part interested in shedding light on privateering transactions, not in name calling. This "crowdsourcing" effort was my idea and I didn't even discuss it with anybody before I went ahead and did this post. The idea came up because I had a hard time finding out about how the scope and scale of Nokia's troll-feeding compared to that of others, though it was clear to me from the beginning that Nokia was the worst offender in this respect, by far and away. [/Update]

[Update 2] I've received an email from a reader who said "[a] patent privateer not only receives patents from an operating company to pursue competitors, but also returns money to that operating company." In some cases it is verifiable that this is the case (Unwired Planet, Mosaid). In other cases the contract terms are not known. Feeding "patent trolls" is a bad thing and harms the selling company's peers regardless of specific terms, though I do agree that pseudo-transfers such as in the Unwired Planet case are the most problematic deal type. If you're aware of more pseudo-sale type of deals, please point me to publicly verifiable information and I may (though I can't promise that I'll find the time, or when) talk about them the way I talked about Ericsson's contract with Unwired Planet. [/Update 2]

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Tuesday, April 21, 2015

Ericsson's pseudo-sale of patents to Unwired Planet and the rampant problem of privateering

In the first half of this decade, the biggest and most divisive issue in the information and communications technology (ICT) was FRAND: fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs). That issue hasn't gone away completely. Courts and regulators provided some clarification (in Microsoft v. Motorola, for example). Still, companies will continue to disagree on what constitutes a FRAND offer, on the proper royalty base, on the extent to which standard-setting organizations (SSOs) such as the IEEE should provide guidance, and on circumstances that may or may not warrant an injunction over SEPs. But all of this has a lower profile now.

The biggest ICT patent issue in the second half of this decade is "privateering": the act of large companies feeding trolls with patents in order to maximize their patent monetization income and/or drive up their competitors' total cost of defense. Quite often this raises FRAND issues as well. Many privateering deals involve SEPs and are part of a scheme to circumvent FRAND licensing obligations.

Centuries ago, privateers were pirates who colluded with governments. I recommend two articles, a Bloomberg story from 2013 and a more recent blog post by the von Mises economic institute, that discuss the problem and start with how Queen Elizabeth I of England commissioned Francis Drake to plunder Spanish merchant vessels. Privateers had to share their booty with the governments that backed them.

Today's patent-based privateering is a rampant problem plaguing the industry. The Bloomberg article I just linked to mentioned transactions involving patents held by Alcatel-Lucent, BT, Ericsson, and Nokia--and those are just a few examples. Furthermore, privateering is one of the issues the U.S. Federal Trade Commission is investigating in connection with patent assertion entities (PAEs).

Patents are transferable assets. There are good-faith, genuine patent transfers--and there are transactions of the kind that is styled as a sale but in commercial terms comes down to an arrangement under which a patent assertion entity is essentially a licensing and litigation service provider to the operating company.

Let's start with what a genuine asset sale looks like. If a company or private person sells a used car, it ceases to have any ongoing interest in the car. Such an agreement doesn't restrict the ways in which the purchaser uses the car; it doesn't even prevent the purchaser from selling it to a third party; and the buyer has to pay a (specific) price.

Naturally, a patent transfer has certain additional aspects. If third parties have already been extended a license to a patent or a portfolio, the acquirer must know about and respect those licenses. Also, the seller may want to continue to use the patented inventions. And the purchase price may have a variable component that gives the seller some upside if the patents prove more valuable than originally expected. But apart from that, the structure of a genuine patent sale resembles that of a genuine car sale.

On the website of the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United States I have found a filing--a redacted version of a "Master Sale Agreement" between Ericsson and Unwired Planet over more than 2,000 wireless patents--that is essentially a privateering case study. I looked this up since Unwired Planet's German lawsuits against Google, HTC, Huawei and Samsung over six of the related patents will go to trial in the coming months. It was much easier than I thought to google the deal terms.

I wish to point out that it's not my objective to engage in "Ericsson bashing." Just like last year, when I wrote about an Ericsson slide deck that explains the (bad) reasons for which the Swedish company doesn't extend patent licenses to chipset makers, it's about behavior that is by no means unique to Ericsson. Ericsson (or, in this case, Unwired Planet) just happens to be particularly transparent about it. Even Apple once sold patents to a non-practicing entity (which I believe Apple wouldn't do again since it has meanwhile had to defend itself against at least one privateer). The undisputed number one patent troll feeder in the world is not Ericsson but another Northern European company: Nokia has engaged in various such transactions, and if I were an antitrust regulator, I'd want to ensure that Nokia won't sell any of Alcatel-Lucent's patents to patent assertion entities after the closing of that acquisition. I'll talk some more about Nokia's privateering on another occasion.

I've read the redacted version of the Ericsson-Unwired Planet deal in detail. A couple of structural elements are clearly very different from a traditional sale.

Section 3, Purchase Price, does not state any amount Unwired Planet had to pay upfront. Instead, Ericsson receives a percentage of whatever revenue Unwired Planet will generate with those patents:

(i) 20% of the amount of Cumulative Gross Revenue, until the Cumulative Gross Revenue equals $100,000,000; plus

(ii) 50% of the amount of Cumulative Gross Revenue in excess of $100,000,000, until the Cumulative Gross Revenue equals $500,000,000; plus

(iii) 70% of the amount of Cumulative Gross Revenue in excess of $500,000,000.

The relatively low percentage Ericsson receives on the first $100 million makes it easier for Unwired Planet to recuperate its litigation expenses. Then the percentage goes up to 50%, and above $500 million (i.e., in the event of a significant licensing success), Ericsson receives the lion's share: 70%.

Percentages like that remind me of what I've read about agency deals. For example, when sports bodies commercialize the broadcasting rights related to their events through agencies, this kind of revenue sharing is normal. But this is just not the way a "sale" in the traditional sense works.

The agreement also comes with all sorts of restrictions on the acquirer's business, a right of first refusal on any sale of the patents to a third party, and a "poison pill" for the event of an acquisition: in the event of a change of control of Unwired Planet, Section 3.3 allows Ericsson to terminate the agreement and to demand a "Sale Payment" for its patents, which according to 3.3(c) shall "in no event [...] be less than an amount equal to (x) $1,050,000,000 minus (y) the aggregate amount of all Quarterly Payments actually received by [Ericsson before]." It can be even more based on a valuation of those patents at the relevant time.

Let's connect the dots: Ericsson is convinced that the patents transferred under that agreement are worth, at a minimum, more than $1 billion, but it "sells" them to Unwired Planet based purely on a percentage of future revenues.

If Ericsson had kept those patents, it would have licensed them to other companies as part of its portfolio. That would have been most efficient for everyone, but Ericsson doesn't want to optimize efficiency: it seeks to maximize its patent monetization income, and it apparently believes that even a substantial de facto "agency fee" it pays to Unwired Planet is more than offset by the incremental bottom-line licensing cost to the likes of Google, HTC, Huawei, and Samsung. Ericsson may even think that its portfolio is so large that 2,000 patents more or less don't make any difference for the royalties Ericsson can obtain from licensees, but it's a large enough portfolio that Unwired Planet can go out and demand some additional percentage that is then shared with Ericsson.

Schemes like that give patent licensing--and patent transfers--a bad name.

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Thursday, May 29, 2014

Patent royalties may exceed $120 per smartphone, undermine industry profitability: working paper

A working paper by an Intel in-house counsel and two WilmerHale lawyers, The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, has just been published (direct link to PDF). Intel Vice President and Associate General Counsel Ann Armstrong and WilmerHale's Joseph Mueller and Timothy Syrett have made an invaluable contribution to the debate over reasonable royalties and incentives for innovation in this field.

This first-rate paper finally answers the billion-dollar question everyone with an interest in smartphone patents has been asking for some time: the total licensing cost per device. The authors have thoroughly researched the licensing environment and highlight various key facts that should give policymakers, regulators and courts pause. They note that royalty stacking, "in which the cumulative demands of patent holders across the relevant technology or the device threaten to make it economically unviable to offer the product, [...] is not merely a theoretical concern" (as, by the way, the likes of Qualcomm allege). Based on publicly-available data, these competent authors "estimate potential patent royalties in excess of $120 on a hypothetical $400 smartphone--which is almost equal to the cost of [the] device's components" (estimated to be $120 to $150 in total based on figures published by Nomura Securities in reliance on Gartner data). They conclude that "those costs may be undermining industry profitability--and, in turn, diminishing incentives to invest and compete". I also believe that smartphone-related patent licensing costs, relating to standard-essential as well as non-standard-essential patents, must come down. Policymakers, antitrust enforcers and judges -- Judge Posner certainly did his best in this regard -- will hopefully bring those fees down in the years ahead.

The paper does properly distinguish between royalty demands and actual royalty payments. Patent holders frequently have to lower their demands during the course of negotiation. Cross-licenses and "patent exhaustion arising from licensed sales by component suppliers" can also make a major difference, but the terms on which companies actually agree are usually kept confidential. Royalty demands sometimes surface in litigation.

The authors based their study entirely on public documents. They (especially the WilmerHale lawyers, who, among other things, defend Apple against Samsung's counterclaims) have obviously seen some confidential license agreements, but couldn't make use of any of that information for their working paper. They also don't speak for any particular company or firm. Apple just demanded a "reasonable royalty" of $40 per device from Samsung at the recent California trial, for five software patents. Now a paper authored in part by lawyers representing Apple against Samsung (with a defensive focus, but still) says that $120 per device for everyone's patents, -- hardware and software patents, standard-essential and non-standard-essential patents -- may be "diminishing incentives to invest and compete". This shows independent thinking and writing. I would not be surprised to see Samsung's lawyers quote certain key findings of this study in their U.S. litigations with Apple. The paper appears slightly Apple-friendly to me in the context of the design patents-related part of Apple v. Samsung, but within reason (I agree in principle with what it says about that). The study also notes that UI patents can typically be worked around, and "[a] truly distinctive and innovative user interface--as distinct from a copied or derivative design--may result in minimal or no royalty exposure".

One key characteristic of the study is that it analyzes licensing costs on a component-by-component (including software components) basis: cellular baseband chip, random access memory (different kinds), flash memory (different kinds), WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, battery, power management, audio (different subcategories such as MP3), camera/video (non-standards-based as well as standards-based formats like JPEG and H.264), applications processor, operating system, other pre-installed software, SMS, MMS, email, W3C (royalty-free standards), UPnP (royalty-free), digital media sharing, USB, user interface, outer design (also an area in which the study notes that infringement can be easily avoided).

The study has a much broader focus than my own litigation monitoring in recent years. Its findings appear plausible to me, except that I believe the "operating system" part of the royalty stack is underestimated. No operating system patent holder ever told me what their demands or actual deal terms were, but a couple of years ago I downloaded a litigation-related document that was publicly accessible for less than a day on the ITC document system that mentioned a major operating system patent holder's royalty demands. Against that background I think the study published today is very conservative (to say the least) with respect to operating system patent licensing costs -- but this, if anything, reinforces the overall message.

This is not a policy paper per se, but it does raise and stress policy concerns, particularly about non-practicing entities (NPEs), colloquially often referred to as "patent trolls", and the growing problem of "privateering" (patent transfers from major operating companies to NPEs in order to hide behind others that will assert patents aggressively against the original patent holder's competitors). Certain patent holders' demands, tactics and positions are discussed as examples of factors that exacerbate the royalty-stacking problem. Those patent holders include Ericsson and, to a far greater extent, Nokia, a company that has sold patents to a number of NPEs in recent years and is itself increasinly turning into a patent assertion entity.

This paper is recommended reading for everyone with an interest in smartphone IP issues from a legal and/or economic point of view. It's particularly recommended reading for all those who could, through their actions and decisions, address at least parts of the problem this paper describes. I believe it will be quoted a lot in court documents and academic writings in the years ahead.

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Friday, April 4, 2014

Apple now argues (and Samsung disputes) it practiced 3 asserted patent claims in the PAST

It's an oddity that on the third day of the Apple v. Samsung II trial in California the debate is not about whether Google and Samsung infringe Apple's patents-in-suit but whether Apple itself practices its patents, or more specifically the asserted patent claims. This morning by California time, Apple and Samsung just made submissions in response to Judge Koh's Thursday evening order. The judge presiding over this trial had largely denied Apple's motion for permission to present evidence (and curative instructions) but requested further briefing "as to what timely produced and/or timely disclosed evidence exists in the record as to whether Apple in the past practiced Claim 20 of the '414 Patent, Claim 18 of the '172 Patent, and Claim 25 of the '959 Patent" (emphasis added). The deadline was at 7:30 AM California time today, Friday.

Judge Koh was right to take a closer look given that Samsung's counsel had made statements that involved not only the Apple products at issue in this trial but also earlier Apple products when he said that Apple concededly didn't practice the asserted patent claims. But given that Apple had stipulated that its current products don't practice those three claims (the parties disagree on the other two claims), it's clear at any rate that there are alternative ways to implement the relevant features than the particular claims Apple accuses Samsung of infringing.

Samsung's submission is almost entirely sealed. The public can just see that Samsung makes an argument for Apple's non-practice of those three claims-in-suit, and that it points to various items in the evidentiary record to support that claim. Apple's filing is sealed in part, but at least the main part is available. I will now quote Apple's claim-by-claim response and comment. At first sight I think it's possible that something will be told to the jury about Apple's claim of past use, but what Apple has filed is probably not strong enough, especially in light of the stipulation, to fundamentally change the jury's perception. The jury now knows and will still know, even if Apple makes a past-practice argument, that those three asserted claims are simply not coextensive with the "features" Apple alleges Google and Samsung have copied. This means that the features can be implemented without infringing those claims, and it limits the commercial value of the claims. I think the name of the game for Apple in connection with practice, non-practice and past price is now just to contain the damage.

"Claim 20 of the '414 [Synchronization] Patent: Gordon Freedman, the inventor of the ’414 patent, testified during his deposition that an iPhone synchronization prototype and the original iPhone included 'software that embodied all the ideas in Claim 20 of the '414 patent.' ([...] (identifying 'software on the iPhone in the first release').)"

My take: Of the three past-practice claims Apple makes in its submission, this one is, relatively speaking, the strongest one, but even here the limits of the scope of the claim are visible. The excerpt from the inventor's deposition transcript that Apple submitted shows that he originally discussed claim 11 -- on which claim 20 is dependent, i.e., claim 20 introduces additional limitations:

20. The storage medium as in claim 11 wherein the synchronization software component is configured to synchronize structured data of a first data class and other synchronization software components are configured to synchronize structured data of other corresponding data classes.

The way to look at such claim language is that lawyers find additional opportunities to argue that an implementation of the relevant feature does not infringe because, for example, the synchronization software component in their client's products is allegedly not configured to synchronize structured data of a first data class or, if it is, then other such components are not configured to synchronize structure data of other (this is a formal requirement for something to be different) corresponding data classes. So claim 20 is weaker than claim 11, and easier to work around.

Still, according to the deposed inventor, "it's essentially what was in the shipping product" -- the first iPhone. Whatever "essentially" means.

"Claim 18 of the '172 (autocomplete) Patent: Kenneth Kocienda, an inventor of the ’172 patent, testified during his deposition that Japanese, Chinese, and other non-English language keyboards for the iPhone 'employ' claim 18 of the '172 patent. [...] He also testified that he built a prototype in the 2005-2006 time period that met all the elements of claim 18. [...]"

A pre-release iPhone prototype is not a product that was ever shipped, so it doesn't really count, though in a very legalistic sense one could argue that it was also a way to "practice" the patent claim. It doesn't help Apple in front of the jury because it means that they temporarily implemented the feature based on that claim, but not when they released the product. It underscores the limited scope and strength of the claim.

As for "employ[ing]" claim 18 in products that ever shipped, the discussion is just about Asian-language keyboards, which is not a strong point to make at a U.S. trial. And the inventor just said "I believe that the languages which I listed earlier, Japanese, Chinese, et cetera, do employ this" (emphasis added). To "believe" is not hard evidence.

"Claim 25 of the '959 [unified search] Patent: In Apple's Response to Interrogatory No. 42 dated June 13, 2013 and Apple's Third Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 25 dated June 19, 2013, Apple identified specific source code files with respect to iOS version 6 as implementing the feature or functionality that practices the asserted claims of the '959 patent, which included claim 25. (Krevans Decl., Ex. 3 at 17-18; Krevans Decl., Ex. 4 at 16.)"

That response Apple cites to is not publicly-accessible. Apple's filing refers only to "specific source codes files with respect to iOS version 6", so this sounds to me like code that the developers created for purely internal purposes but the compiled, executable version of which was never shipped to customers. The iPhone 5 is one of the accused products in this case, and according to Wikipedia, "the iPhone 5 came installed with iOS 6 starting September 21". But Apple stipulated that its products (the ones at issue in this case) don't practice this patent claim. So this looks like the weakest one of Apple's we-do-practice claims in the latest filing.

With the '959 unified search patent there are two other issues that call into question its strength and value. As I explained when I commented on Apple's motion (which I considered reasonable at the time and still consider reasonable to some extent), Apple filed the related patent application ten years before acquiring Siri Inc., so this is not a case of a company making an invention and then, right away, building a product on its basis. And when Apple sought and temporarily (until it was lifted by the appeals court) obtained a preliminary injunction against the Galaxy Nexus, it relied on another patent from the same patent family, the '604 patent. If you want to obtain a preliminary injunction, you pick your strongest patent (because you don't have a full trial to argue your case), and that one failed because the appeals court concluded that Apple, besides not meeting the requirements for injunctive relief, was not likely to succeed on its infringement theory based on the appeals court's reversed claim construction.

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Monday, March 10, 2014

Unwired Planet sues Samsung, Google, Huawei, HTC over six former Ericsson wireless patents

Unwired Planet, a patent licensing firm that has acquired more than 2,600 patent assets, today announced the filing of parallel patent infringement lawsuits in London and Dusseldorf involving six former Ericsson wireless patents. Samsung, Google, and Huawei have to defend themselves in the UK and in Germany, and HTC only in Germany.

In January, Samsung signed a new patent license agreement with Ericsson, but it appears that patents previously divested by Ericsson were not included because Ericsson presumably could, at that point, not have done anything to prevent Unwired Planet from asserting them against a third party. Transactions such as Ericsson's sale of patents to Unwired Planet, which in turn asserts them against other companies, are sometimes referred to as "privateering". Such agreements frequently come with deal terms under which the NPE and the former patent holders share the royalty income. Buy-back provisions are also common.

Today's UK and German filings by Unwired Planet were made by EIP's Benjamin Grzimek, a patent litigator based in Dusseldorf. Unwired Planet's patent attorney in the German cases is David Molnia, who is also licensed as a U.S. patent agent and counts IPCom, another NPE holding wireless patents that once belonged to a device maker that has meanwhile exited the handset market (Bosch), among his clients.

The press release states that the two venues, London and Dusseldorf, where chosen because they "are among the fastest and most efficient ways to protect intellectual property rights" and "offer strong remedies if a license cannot be reached on FRAND terms, including the potential for injunctive relief". This statement is very interesting when considering that three of the defendants (Samsung, Google, Huawei) are among the members of an industry coalition urging European policy-makers to ensure that Europe's future Unified Patent Court won't have rules of procedure that make it an exceedingly attractive venue for NPEs because of easy access to injunctive relief, coupled with German-style bifurcation (i.e., no full invalidity defense in an infringement proceeding because infringement and validity are determined separately). I guess these companies and their allies in the push for balanced rules, such as Apple, Microsoft and some major European mobile network operators, will point the European Commission and the governments of the EU member states to Unwired Planet's European lawsuits as yet another example of NPE litigation in Europe.

The EU's Internal Market Commissioner, Michel Barnier, did not appear to be impressed by that alliance's first open letter on the subject, but in response to the second one he wrote the following on Twitter: "[I]ndustry letter Unified #Patent Court: We share goal, balanced system closing gap that give way to #trolls. Confident we'll achieve that"

I'm not sure that Mr. Barnier is truly behind the cause of a balanced system, but I'd be happy to see some progress in the months ahead. The European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market is, among other things, responsible for intellectual property policy, and it regrettably has a long-standing tradition of favoring the interests of the patent system (more patents, stronger enforcement) over those of the economy at large (higher-quality patents, balanced enforcement). But I'd be happy to be proven wrong and to see Mr. Barnier deliver on the tweet I just quoted...

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Wednesday, November 6, 2013

Dell, Ford, Google and HP file submissions to up the ante for patent trolls at the ITC

Google, HP, Ford and Dell have filed statements (which are not themselves publicly accessible, but which are referenced by a public filing by Nokia, Huawei and ZTE) in connection with an ITC investigation of a complaint by non-practicing entity InterDigital.

In parallel to a political debate and legislative process on U.S. patent reform, some companies are also trying to achieve fundamental change through amicus curiae briefs. As a general rule, you really need to change the law for major change. On key issues, limited progress -- moving the goalposts just a little bit in your preferred direction -- is all you can realistically hope to achieve if you raise a policy argument with a court.

One of the topics in the patent reform debate is the ITC's immense popularity with patent trolls. In the headline of a Wall Street Journal op-ed, a former ITC commissioner even referred to the U.S. trade agency as the "International Trolling Commission". Without a doubt, the ITC is under pressure and may see its jurisdiction over patent infringement cases restricted.

There are three ways in which lawmakers or the ITC itself could make it harder, or even impossible, for patent trolls to obtain ITC exclusion orders (import bans). Some argue that an eBay v. MercExchange type of equitable standard should be imported into the ITC's governing law. I don't consider this a promising approach because the ITC has only one remedy, which is a form of injunctive relief, but eBay is all about deciding whether legal remedies (monetary compensation) are sufficient or an injunction is warranted. Also, I believe that ITC exclusion orders are a special kind of remedy. The second approach would be centered around public interest considerations. I can see how this works for certain issues, such as FRAND-pledged standard-essential patents (SEPs), but doubt that it's an answer to the problem of rampant, increasingly industrialized patent trolling. The third approach is the ITC's domestic industry requirement (DIR): you don't have access to an exclusion order without proving that a domestic industry exists or is in the process of being created in the U.S. with respect to the asserted patent(s). And that's the one I'm going to focus on for the remainder of this post.

Just like Congress liberalized the DIR in 1988 by enabling complainants to satisfy it through the proof of licensing activities (as opposed to the manufacturing of products implementing the patents in question), it could again narrow it. It's like "Congress giveth, Congress taketh away". But at this point there doesn't seem to be momentum behind legislative change in that regard (for as much as I would prefer a stricter DIR over an attempt to make eBay work for the ITC). So some of the companies who are generally critical of the ITC, and particularly of the many ITC investigations instituted at the request of patent trolls, hope that ITC rulings and, especially, appellate opinions can result in a more exacting DIR. Unfortunately for them, this is a steep challenge because Section 337, the statute governing the ITC's unfair import investigations, defines the DIR very inclusively.

In January 2013, Dennis Crouch wrote on his PatentlyO blog that "NPEs [Non-Practicing Entities] Solidify Enforcement Jurisdiction at USITC". That post discussed the Federal Circuit's order denying a petition by Nokia for a rehearing of a decision relating to InterDigital's first ITC complaint against Nokia, holding that InterDigital satisfied the DIR. The following passage from the Federal Circuit's opinion supports PatentlyO's assessment:

"Under the clear intent of Congress and the most natural reading of the 1988 amendment, section 337 makes relief available to a party that has a substantial investment in exploitation of a patent through either engineering, research and development, or licensing. It is not necessary that the party manufacture the product that is protected by the patent, and it is not necessary that any other domestic party manufacture the protected article. As long as the patent covers the article that is the subject of the exclusion proceeding, and as long as the party seeking relief can show that it has a sufficiently substantial investment in the exploitation of the intellectual property to satisfy the domestic industry requirement of the statute, that party is entitled to seek relief under section 337."

Let's take a quick look at the relevant part of the statute:

(2) Subparagraphs [regarding import bans against infringing products] apply only if an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned, exists or is in the process of being established.

(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), an industry in the United States shall be considered to exist if there is in the United States, with respect to the articles protected by the patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned --

(A) significant investment in plant and equipment;

(B) significant employment of labor or capital; or

(C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and development, or licensing.

I'll further enhance legibility now by replacing "patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design" with "IPR" (for "intellectual property right"):

(2) Subparagraphs [regarding import bans against infringing products] apply only if an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the [IPR] concerned, exists or is in the process of being established.

(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), an industry in the United States shall be considered to exist if there is in the United States, with respect to the articles protected by the [IPR] concerned --

(A) significant investment in plant and equipment;

(B) significant employment of labor or capital; or

(C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and development, or licensing.

Item (C) is the one that patent trolls invoke -- in particular, the last item ("licensing"). For example, litigation expenses can constitute a substantial investment in licensing. Without litigation it's probably hard to satisfy the DIR on a licensing basis.

The structure of the statute has a major flaw. It lumps together all the criteria for satisfying the DIR through a product business with those that apply to a licensing business. It would have been better to have a clear set of criteria for product-based DIR arguments, and another set for licensing-based DIR theories. But the statute is what it is, and various companies are now arguing that even a non-practicing entity like InterDigital, which relies on licensing, must show "articles protected by the [asserted IPR(s)]". In the case of an NPE, such articles would be products made by licensees.

For product-based business, the DIR has an economic prong (investment, employment) and a technical prong (a showing that the products the investment and/or employment relate to actually implement an asserted patent). The statutory basis for the technical prong is the term "articles protected by the [IPR] concerned". Does this even make sense for licensing firms? Or should there be no technical prong at all in their case? That's the question the ITC recently asked parties and third-party stakeholders in connection with its ongoing review (which does not, at least not yet, involve FRAND issues) of a preliminary ruling clearing Nokia, Huawei and ZTE of infringement of various InterDigital patents. This is the Commission's request for input in its September 4, 2013 review notice:

"Please discuss, in light of the statutory language, legislative history, the Commission's prior decisions, and relevant court decisions, including InterDigital Commc'ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 690 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and 707 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2013), whether establishing a domestic industry based on licensing under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(3)(C) requires proof of 'articles protected by the patent' (i.e., a technical prong). If so, please identify and describe the evidence in the record that establishes articles protected by the asserted patents."

This question about whether there is any technical prong of the DIR for licensing-based businesses was interesting enough all by itself. But those advocating a strict, NPE-unfriendly DIR saw another invitation to make submissions to the ITC in last month's Federal Circuit opinion on Microsoft's appeal of certain unfavorable parts of the ITC ruling on its complaint against Motorola. On page 11 of that opinion, there's the following passage that stresses the need to show articles protected by an asserted IPR (and that these must be the ones that a domestic industry is established for):

There is no question about the substantiality of Microsoft's investment in its operating system or about the importance of that operating system to mobile phones on which it runs. But that is not enough under the statute. Section 337, though not requiring that an article protected by the patent be produced in the United States, unmistakably requires that the domestic company's substantial investments relate to actual 'articles protected by the patent.' 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a)(2), (3). A company seeking section 337 protection must therefore provide evidence that its substantial domestic investment—e.g.,in research and development—relates to an actual article that practices the patent, regardless of whether or not that article is manufactured domestically or abroad. InterDigital Commc'ns v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 707 F.3d 1295, 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

So there's the above passage, building on and citing to the earlier decision in the InterDigital case, and it emphasizes the reuqirement to show articles protected by an asserted patent. The respondents in the InterDigital investigation that is at the review stage -- Nokia, Huawei, and ZTE -- have tried to capitalize on this in their reply briefs. But I don't agree with them (not because I don't like what they want to achieve, but because I don't think they provide a compelling logic) that the Microsoft decision clarifies/modifies the InterDigital opinion to the effect that a licensing firm needs to show actual products. In the InterDigital opinion, the Federal Circuit actually declines to go into much detail on decisions relating to product-based DIR cases. I'm sure the reference in Microsoft to InterDigital is only about the part that clarified once again a domestic industry article doesn't have to be manufactured domestically but can also be imported.

Still, some companies now hope to up the ante for patent trolls by requiring them to show DIR products (and, even though InterDigital appears to suggest the opposite, those would obviously have to be other products than the accused devices). Nokia (which is in the future going to be more of a patent licensing firm than a product business), Huawei and ZTE try to defeat InterDigital's ITC complaint, in the event any of the preliminary findings on (non-)liability is reversed, just on the basis of the DIR.

In a reply brief (the public redacted version of which just became available this week) they also point to positions taken by third-party stakeholders that are allegedly consistent with their own opening brief on domestic industry:

"Respondents [Nokia, Huawei and ZTE] were also served with filings from non-parties Hewlett Packard, Dell, Ford and Google that address the domestic industry issue identified in the September 4 Notice. These submissions largely are consistent with the positions taken by Respondents in their initial brief."

Those submissions have actually not appeared on the ITC document system yet.

Now that briefing on the Commission's DIR-related review question is complete, it's clear that there are basically three positions: InterDigital argues that there is no technical prong and it also wants to have an extremely low hurdle as far as the economic prong is concerned. Respondents and third-party stakeholders opposing patent trolls' access to ITC exclusion orders want there to be a technical prong, which would not make it impossible for NPEs to win ITC cases, but it would be too late for InterDigital in this case and it might discourage some other NPEs from bringing ITC complaints. The Office of Unfair Import Investigations (commonly referred to as the "ITC staff"), which is participating in this investigation with respect to only two of the patents-in-suit and overall FRAND issues, has stated a position that is closer to InterDigital's -- no technical prong -- but still comes down to a more exacting standard: the ITC staff would like to see proof that a substantial investment in licensing relates to the asserted patents. The ITC staff says that InterDigital failed to provide such proof. Presumably InterDigital just argued based on licensing activities relating to its overall portfolio. The ITC staff wants a more granular showing of substantial investments relating to particular patents out of a large portfolio. It's not clear to me how this would work in practice.

My guess is that if the Commission, the six-member decision-making body at the top of the ITC, reaches the domestic industry question at all instead of just throwing out InterDigital's complaint for failure to prove infringements of valid patents, it will rule more or less consistently with InterDigital's position. Maybe it will agree with the staff that the economic prong, which would be the only relevant prong for NPEs, must be satisfied on a patent-by-patent basis. But I doubt that it will agree with the likes of Google. Companies like Google will, however, continue to lobby Congress for a reform of overall patent law and also the statute governing the ITC.

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Monday, September 9, 2013

Radio campaign against patent trolls funded by tech companies with questionable agenda

Last week I read a headline saying that "US shops and restaurants fight patent trolls" with print and radio ads in more than a dozen states. I looked up the campaign site and saw that the campaign website runs on a subdomain of the Internet Association's website. The Internet Association's members include, among others, Google and Rackspace. According to Wikipedia, Google was one of only four founding members.

I'm not going to defend the trolls, nor would I deny that there are too many "bad patents" (which the campaign asks politicians to "stop") out there. But there are certain aspects of this campaign that I find confusing at best and disingenuous at worst.

It appears that the Internet Association is really the driving force behind the campaign and may be its primary source of funding. But the campaign talks about the economic impact of patent trolls on "supermarkets, restaurants, retailers and startups". Startups are a more complex issue that I'll talk about on some other occasion (here's a link to a recent story of a patent troll and an app developer). Let's focus for now on "supermarkets, restaurants, retailers". The NPR report on this campaign contains an interesting quote from someone claiming to represent at least one of those categories of stakeholders:

"We are not for the most part developing these technologies," he says. "We're simply using them."

If the problem is that they are sued over technologies they use (but which others developed), wouldn't it be the most logical demand for them to make to insist that their technology vendors defend them in court against the trolls? If the asserted patents are "bad patents", sophisticated and deep-pocketed technology companies should be able to shoot them down, wouldn't you think?

This would have a self-regulatory effect: if tech companies fight back, trolls asserting weak patents would lose lawsuit after lawsuit, patent after patent, and only legitimate intellectual property claims would remain.

From the perspective of shops and retailers it would make a whole lot more sense to campaign for indemnification by vendors (or simply to refrain from buying products if their vendors don't indemnify), which is an option under the law as it stands, than to push for ambitious, far-reaching changes to the legal framework.

It's also a non sequitur that the way to combat "trolls" (whatever definition one may use) is to "stop bad patents" ("Congress must act now to stop bad patents and stop the trolls"). Studies have shown that non-practicing entities are reasonably choosy when buying up patents that they later assert. There are certainly some bad patents out there asserted by trolls, and fighting bad patents is never a bad idea -- but there's no evidence of trolls holding, on average, more dubious patents than other patent holders do (the opposite could even be true).

Let me be clear: the question of who funds this campaign wouldn't matter if this campaign didn't try to create the impression that restaurants and retailers suffer so much under trolls that they pour many millions into an anti-troll, anti-bad-patents, anti-all-bad-stuff campaign. And it would matter much less (or maybe not at all) if it advocated, with a reasonable degree of particularity, the most logical solution to a pressing problem. But when I look at this campaign, I see a disconnect between the problem(s) it raises and the broad, vague and general solution ("stop bad patents") it proposes; the claim of trolls costing the economy $80 billion a year does not convince me; and these substantive concerns of mine are reinforced by a closer look at who's behind this campaign and what the real agenda may be.

Google and Rackspace, the two Internet Association members I mentioned further above, jointly submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Federal Circuit arguing that Apple should not be allowed to stop Samsung's blatant copying. Rackspace also signed an amicus brief supporting Google against Oracle in the Android/Java copyright infringement case. These two companies are close anti-IP buddies, plain and simple. They have in common a business model that's more about exploiting other parties' IP than about creating their own (Rackspace is more extreme in this regard than Google, but Google is more reckless in its approach to other companies' IP).

Google is still asserting, in the U.S. and (especially) in Germany, a patent that different judges have already found to be a "bad patent": Motorola's push notifications patent. For further detail, see last week's post on a recent decision by an appeals court to lift an injunction because the patent is clinically dead.

A federal jury last week found Google's Motorola to have breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing in connection with its H.264 (video codec) and IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) declared-essential patent portfolios, effectively exposing it as a patent troll and finding it guilty of egregious conduct that none of the companies typically referred to as "patent trolls" has been convicted of to date.

There's obviously a narrower definition of "patent troll" that Google doesn't meet. But there are interesting connections between Google and more narrowly-defined "patent trolls". A company that Ars Technica simply calls "'shopping cart' patent troll" uses the very same law firm as Google does in most of its patent lawsuits.

Isn't a "shopping cart patent troll" what the retailers whose interests the campaign claims to represent are particularly concerned about?

Using again a definition of "patent troll" that isn't limited to non-practicing entities, the world's first "shopping cart patent troll" was Amazon back in 1999, with a clearly anticompetitive and anti-innovative agenda. Oh, wait. Amazon is one of Google's Internet Association co-founders. Pot, meet kettle. In some cases, you use the same lawyers, who may be happy to introduce you to each other. But don't expect sophisticated policy-makers in Washington DC to be fooled by a campaign like this one. They'll figure you out, and they'll ask some of the questions I raised in this post (such as whether indemnification couldn't take care of the problem of lawsuits against retailers and restaurants for the most part).

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Thursday, June 20, 2013

FTC preparing broadbased Section 6(b) cost-benefits analysis of patent assertion entities

I just listened (via webcast) to a special keynote address by FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez on "Competition Law & Patent Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do". As previously reported by the New York Times, the Chairwoman made clear that there will soon be a Section 6(b) study of activities by patent assertion entities (PAEs). Section 6(b) inquiries are all about information gathering, though the collected information may be used in different ways ranging from competition enforcement to policy-making. And indeed, this is going to be a broadbased investigation that can have all sorts of direct and indirect effects further down the road.

Chairwoman Ramirez's speech included various data points that suggest harm to consumers and innovation from PAE activities, and her agency clearly sees more evidence of negative than positive effects. While the starting point is clear (it can be described as profound skepticism), the official focus is that the agency wants to analyze the "costs and benefits" of PAEs and their activities because there's still not enough information available (which I guess is the agency's justification for using its investigative powers). Based on today's speech it's still a foregone conclusion that the ultimate finding will be that the costs caused by PAEs outweigh their benefits as monetizers helping inventors obtain fair compensation.

There were many statements and opinions in the Chairwoman's speech that I like and share, but there are also some parameters and positions on which I tend to disagree based on my monitoring of intellectual property enforcement surrounding smartphones and tablet computers.

In this post I'm going to focus on items I view differently. Those of you who have read other posts of mine will already know the ones on which I agree (patent quality, transparency in ownership etc.). It would be great if the study contributed to a further increase in patent quality and in more transparency (the Chairwoman noted the practice of using shell companies for patent assertions, but transparency is also an issue with operating companies that don't disclose their holdings).

The term "patent hold-up" came up, and the cost of defending against claims. In my opinion the FTC's proposed Google (Motorola) consent decree is an example of a context -- standard-essential patents -- in which there's a massive hold-up problem, but the FTC could have come up with a more efficient solution. The decision of the ITC -- one of the FTC's sister agencies -- to order an import ban against older iPhones and iPads over a Samsung standard-essential patent and Google's continued pursuit of injunctive relief against Apple raise serious issues and show that a lot more work needs to be done to combat SEP abuse before the focus can shift to PAEs. I hope that PAEs won't serve as an excuse for less enforcement in connection with SEPs.

I struggle with terminology. It's hard to see a distinction between patent assertion entities and non-practicing entities. The way the FTC tries to define the term PAEs, if I understood it correctly, is that the "business model" is about "asserting" patents. This doesn't make sense to me, at least not without further explanation. I watch a lot of litigation but I've never seen any entity that truly considers the "assertion" of patents a "business model" -- but anyone (whether we're talking about an operating company fighting reckless copycats or a university-owned research firm or a "troll") will always prefer that the target of a patent assertion settles on the patentee's preferred terms. Going to court is always just a means to an end. The end is licensing most of the time, and in a minority of cases in which operating companies want to ensure product differentiation, it's exclusivity. Licensing and even exclusivity can be achieved without litigation. There's really only one category of patent troll lawsuits in which assertion itself is the "business model", and the Chairwoman mentioned nuisance lawsuits that are "cheaper to settle than to litigate". But the FTC's definition of PAE is not limited to such nuisance lawsuits, and then I wonder how they're going to distinguish PAEs from other NPEs.

The Chairwoman pointed to something I also dislike: patent infringement lawsuits against little guys such as "coffee shops", "retailers that do business online", and "restaurants with websites". But what's the right answer? In my view, the solution is that large players whose technology is at issue in such infringement actions stand by their customers and developers. I consistently demanded that Apple and Google do more than just intervene and seek patent reexaminations with respect to Lodsys, but they didn't. I think the solution must come from companies (and from customers who demand indemnification from their vendors) and so far I can't see an antitrust approach to this problem.

In connection with "privateering", it's simply a fact that many patent transfers are formally structured as purchases but make mockery of the concept of a sale or purchase. But is this problem PAE-specific? Google did such a deal with HTC, and neither company meets the FTC's definition of a PAE (nor mine). This is, interestingly, the only case so far in all of the patent lawsuits I watch in which a patent transfer was agreement found by a judicial authority (in this case, the ITC) to be anything but a genuine patent sale/purchase.

I may talk more about patent purchases on some other occasion. I think there would be fewer such deals if large companies could enforce legitimate IP more effectively in the U.S., where plaintiffs often see their lawsuits transferred to and consolidated in a single venue, where they are then forced to focus on a small number of patents-in-suit or else they won't get their day in court anytime soon. I'm convinced that this sometimes leads patent holders to partner with NPEs for the purpose of monetization.

It's too early to tell whether the FTC will actually identify anything in a Section 6(b) study that will give rise to competition enforcement activities. I may or may not change my opinion on this as the process unfolds, but in today's speech I saw signs that this is very much a political initiative, at least for the most part and possibly in its entirety. For example, there were multiple references to functional claiming. In my view this is a question of patent quality, not of competition enforcement. There's nothing the FTC can do about the patent granting process other than provide ammunition to policy-makers.

Such a study can also result in some surprises. So let's stay tuned.

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Monday, February 18, 2013

HTC gadgets held at airport by German customs officers over alleged 3G patent infringement

At a 3G patent damages trial held in Mannheim on Friday afternoon, counsel for HTC told the most popular court in the world for wireless patent disputes that some of the Taiwanese device maker's shipments into Germany were held during the previous week (week of 2/4/13-2/10/13) by customs officers at Frankfurt-Hahn airport after patent monetization entity IPCom had applied for border seizure of HTC's 3G-compatible devices.

HTC's lawyer, Dr. Martin Chakraborty of Hogan Lovells, mentioned this fact as well as a failed attempt by IPCom to have HTC devices seized by the police at last year's CeBIT trade show (held in Hanover, Germany) as examples of IPCom's tireless and unrelenting efforts to force HTC to accept its terms. In 2007 IPCom had acquired a portfolio of wireless patents from Robert Bosch GmbH, a company that used to build wireless handsets but exited the market approximately 10 years ago. Most if not all of the Bosch patents IPCom purchased were declared essential to cellular telecommunications standards, particularly 3G (UMTS). The Munich-based patent firm's lead counsel, Dr. Wolfgang Kellenter of Hengeler Mueller, did not comment on the enforcement measures allegedly taken but claimed that HTC had been unwilling to come to the negotiating table.

It is unclear whether the goods seized had been released ahead of last week's damages trial. At this point there are no reports of a shortage of HTC devices in Germany. Nor did HTC's lawyer specify whether IPCom had requested customs action under

An application for customs action under the aforementioned EU regulation could have Europe-wide effects and result in the seizure of HTC shipments in other EU member states (though possibly with some delay).

IPCom has been suing Nokia and HTC for about five years. IPCom still hasn't been able to successfully enforce an injunction. In the meantime, dozens of its patents have been declared invalid as granted (which usually means that they had to be narrowed through amendments). A recent ruling by Justice Floyd of the UK High Court mentions that shortly before a mid-January hearing, "Nokia and IPCom announced that they were close to a settlement of the disputes between them".

Last spring HTC had to postpone the launch of two products in the U.S. market after customs officers seized shipments for alleged violation of an import ban ordered by the ITC further to a complaint by Apple. The overall dispute between Apple and HTC was settled in November. HTC could have avoided the temporary seizure of products in the U.S. by requesting an advisory opinion from the ITC on its modified products. European and German customs actions are not comparable to ITC import bans. While the ITC holds evidentiary hearings (trials) before ordering an import ban, seizure can be requested in Europe merely on the grounds of suspected infringement. Improper requests for customs action can result in substantial liability for the disruptions caused to an alleged infringer's business.

IPCom's unilateral action against HTC's importation of gadgets into the German market appears daring against the background of the European Commission's efforts to give meaning to FRAND licensing pledges. Less than three weeks ago, European Commission Vice President Joaquín Almunia told reporters at a press briefing that more companies than Samsung, which received a Statement of Objections (preliminary ruling) over its past pursuit of SEP-based injunctions against Apple, may face formal investigations and, ultimately, fines. More than three years ago IPCom avoided formal EU antitrust investigations by declaring itself bound to the FRAND licensing pledges Robert Bosch GmbH had made prior to selling its wireless patents to the patent monetization entity.

Tensions between HTC and IPCom rose in late 2011 after HTC withdrew, on the eve of an appellate hearing, its appeal against a 2009 Mannheim injunction over a patent that had in the meantime been declared invalid as granted (but valid in an amended form) by the Bundespatentgericht (Federal Patent Court). This delayed resolution of IPCom's claims over two patents that it had added to its complaint only at the appellate stage. A few weeks later, IPCom sued dozens of German retailers for continuing the resale of HTC gadgets despite a cease-and-desist order sent by a law firm on IPCom's behalf.

Global market leader Samsung is licensed to IPCom's patent portfolio. It made a lump-sum payment of $12.5 million to Bosch approximately 10 years ago. IPCom is known to demand far higher royalties now. One industry player that is known to have taken a license from IPCom itself (rather than Bosch prior to the sale of the portfolio) is the BlackBerry maker formerly known as Research In Motion. The terms of that deal have not been disclosed.

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