Showing posts with label Bosch. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bosch. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 18, 2022

After more than 12 years, HTC and Fortress's IPCom settle standard-essential patent dispute over former Bosch and Hitachi patents

I'm still waiting for an official confirmation of IPCom's recent "eight-figure US$ settlement deal" that IAM mentioned on Twitter, citing to "reports out of China." While I was on the lookout for that, I just spotted the following terse statement on IPCom's website that according to the timestamp went live yesterday afternoon:

"We are pleased to announce that HTC and IPCom have settled their long-running dispute by entering into a license agreement covering all of IPCom's assets."

What an understatement. In the standard-essential patent (SEP) space, any dispute that last more than two years is already "long-running" by my definition--and I doubt anyone watching that space would dispute that a four- or five-year patent spat is "long-running." This one here lasted more than a dozen years--an eternity that has finally come to an end.

Over the years I attended several IPCom v. HTC trials in Germany, mostly in Mannheim, where Deutsche Telekom recently sued for a refund to the tune of 270 million euros. HTC and Nokia were the first two smartphone makers IPCom sued after acquiring a 3G SEP portfolio from Bosch, a company that used to make phones but exited that business even earlier than the likes of Nokia and Ericsson. The fact that HTC and Nokia had to defend against many of the same patents turned those two competitors--otherwise rivals--into brothers-in-arms. In-house and outside counsel of both companies coordinated their defenses like they were one company. Even when Nokia sued HTC over non-SEPs in 2012 (and ultimately got HTC to pay some additional royalties), their friendship survived. They were seen drinking beer on high-speed trains from Mannheim to the Cologne-Dusseldorf region just hours after fighting hard in court.

While I occasionally disagreed with him and disapproved of a couple of remarks he made at the Nokia-HTC settlement party (after inviting me as a surprise keynote speaker), I do wish to give credit to the late Martin Chakraborty, a Hogan Lovells partner and HTC's outside counsel against IPCom and Nokia at the time.

Nokia once claimed that IPCom was seeking a royalty payment of 12 billion euros, which IPCom disputed. The IPCom v. Nokia dispute lost relevance as Nokia's smartphone sales were dwindling, and ultimately Microsoft took over Nokia's handset business. Microsoft told investors that "[i]n November 2014, Microsoft and IPCom entered into a standstill agreement staying all of the pending litigation against Microsoft to permit the parties to pursue settlement discussions," and somehow those talks eventually came to fruition.

Unlike Nokia, HTC even faced contempt proceedings when IPCom was enforcing an injunction. What IPCom demonstrated (and many other litigants don't even seem to know) is that it's far harder to actually enforce a SEP injunction in Germany than to obtain one. In the merits proceeding, you can base your infringement theory on the specification of the standard. At the enforcement stage, you have to prove an actual infringement. HTC had guts.

For IPCom's relatively new management, it's meaningful progress to put some cases behind that it inherited from its predecessors led by Munich-based patent litigator Bernhard "Bernie" Frohwitter. IPCom still has Fortress Investment as its key backer, but it's been noticeable for a couple of years that IPCom's new leadership has taken steps to position the organization--which by the way has its own researchers on staff who keep applying for new patents--as a constructive and solution-oriented licensing firm. They even emphasize corporate social responsibility in such contexts as diversity. The message is like "we're still a non-practicing entity, but don't call us a troll."

IPCom's agreements with HTC and (I'll take IAM's word for it) Apple show that the new IPCom is putting some old problems behind it and focusing on its future in the patent licensing industry. I'll be watching IPCom's activities with interest. There is an interesting parallel: Sisvel, which like IPCom is headquartered in Europe (though it has been around for much longer, and is also a pool administrator) and a "key account customer" of the Mannheim court, also appears to have a new leadership style versus where they were a decade ago. Sisvel announced some interesting settlements last year, most importantly with Xiaomi. Actions speak louder than words. Both IPCom and Sisvel have now demonstrated over the course of several years that their current leaders have nothing to do with exceedingly aggressive--or "trollish" if you will--tactics employed by their predecessors. They still enforce patents if they have to--but with a more constructive attitude.

I believe EU policy-makers have an interest in both Sisvel and IPCom doing well. They are the most prominent European patent licensing firms, and IP licensing is a very high priority when the EU defines its economic policies and strategies. At the same time, the EU also has to take the interests of major SEP implementers into account, of course.

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Thursday, October 15, 2020

Nokia's latest standard-essential patent licensing offer to automotive suppliers is too little, too late to obviate referral of key questions to CJEU

Earlier this year, Nokia made mediation talks with Daimler and various of its suppliers of telecommunications components fail by refusing to grant exhaustive component-level standard-essential patent (SEP) licenses that would have provided suppliers with the operational freedom they need in order to go about their business. This was not only a disappointment but also a major embarrassment for the European Commission, which continues to be driven by regional protectionism rather than consistent enforcement of competition law and had urged the parties to negotiate even though it was a total waste of time, as anyone knowledgeable about the issues would have predicted.

Roughly eight months later, I have to grant Nokia and its attorneys that they have made some limited adjustments to their position, and that fact appears attributable to last month's Dusseldorf trial more so than to anything the EU Commission has done. Some key players in Brussels are beholden to Nokia, even to the extent that postfactual commissioner Thierry Breton parrots some outdated Nokia-funded propaganda by making an incorrect claim (of Europe being the #1 continent in 5G SEP ownership) from which Nokia's lawyers had already distanced themselves by way of an updated study.

The Dusseldorf Regional Court's strong inclination to refer certain component-level licensing questions to the top EU court--Daimler's lead counsel in the Nokia infringement cases, Quinn Emanuel's Dr. Marcus Grosch, told the Munich I Regional Court last month that he'd be very surprised if it didn't happen--appears to be scaring the living daylights out of Nokia. The decision is scheduled to come down on November 12, and at least the German appeals courts--the lower courts in Mannheim and Munich are too obsessed with forum-selling to do the right thing--will then likely be hesitant to enjoin end-product makers if their suppliers were denied SEP licenses on FRAND terms.

In an apparent effort to dissuade the Dusseldorf court from that CJEU referral, the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court (which hears all appeals of Mannheim judgments) from staying the enforcement of ill-gotten injunctions against Daimler, and to further encourage the Munich I Regional Court to grant Nokia an injunction against Daimler, Nokia sent new licensing offers to several Daimler suppliers (including BURY Technologies, Continental, Valeo/Peiker, Huawei, Harman, and Renault, which builds an entire vehicle for Daimler) about two weeks ago. At the time Nokia also intended to make such an offer to Bosch, but was waiting for a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) to be concluded.

NDAs didn't prevent all sorts of information to leak from the failed mediation process, and I've been able to find out more about its current maneuvering than Nokia would have liked me to.

The structure of Nokia's latest offers still comes with significant field-of-use restrictions that cannot be reconciled with the principle of the free movement of goods in the EU's Single Market and the fact that under the CJEU's Huawei v. ZTE case law, Nokia owes implementers a license on FRAND terms.

Furthermore, Nokia wants to charge royalties based on the value of the end product--a car--as opposed to a reasonable royalty rate. As a result, component makers simply couldn't afford such a license.

But even if one elected to ignore those major issues, Nokia still refuses to extend licenses to certain levels of the supply chain. Its current offers are limited to telematics control units (TCUs) and don't cover network access devices (NAD, often also referred to as connectivity modules) and baseband chips. By contrast, Sharp granted Huawei a license covering all three tiers (tier 1: TCUs; tier 2: NADs; tier 3: baseband chips.

Huawei is a tier 2 supplier to Daimler and suing Nokia in order to secure an exhaustive component-level SEP license on FRAND terms. That case is also pending before the Dusseldorf Regional Court. I don't think Nokia's latest round of offers would obviate a referral of component-level licensing questions to the Court of Justice of the EU with respect to Nokia v. Daimler, but a tier 1 license would certainly not moot the legal issues in Huawei v. Nokia.

Not only is it urgent to refer the question of component-level licensing to the top EU court but there are some worrying developments in SEP case law in Germany that actually require the referral of further questions to the CJEU. One of the two patent infringement panels of the Mannheim Regional Court has recently decided to gut Huawei v. ZTE by focusing on the implementer's counteroffer; the Federal Court of Justice of Germany held in Sisvel v. Haier that SEP holders no longer need to present claim charts to implementers (which particularly disadvantages small companies, but the last thing a dogmatic judge in Germany would care about is the economy); and the Munich I Regional Court applies the Sisvel v. Haier guidance in such extreme ways that it's hard to see how any implementer could actually defend itself there short of simply capitulating and taking a license on the terms dictated by the SEP holder. Most recently, the Munich I Regional Court has practically waived the requirement to provide collateral (bond or deposit) if an injunction is enforced during the appellate proceedings. They still determine an amount that needs to be posted, but it's typically negligible. I'll talk about that some more on another occasion. For now I merely wanted to underscore the necessity to get certain German courts overruled by the CJEU before more damage is done to innovation and competition.

If Nokia keeps improving its offers at the snail's pace we've seen from the failed handset maker in recent years, the CJEU will likely provide further clarification before Nokia ever makes a truly fair and reasonable licensing offer to automotive suppliers.

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Thursday, October 1, 2020

AT&T, Sprint, Verizon sued in Texas by German patent troll IPCom over wireless patents allegedly infringed by Nokia, Ericsson, Mavenir infrastructure products

The previous post was about Nokia trolling Lenovo, and now Nokia itself is getting trolled again by a German company it knows all too well: IPCom, which sued Nokia from 2008 until Nokia's sale of its ruined handset division to Microsoft. At the height of the IPCom v. Nokia dispute, the latter took far more reasonable positions on the FRAND defense to SEP assertions than nowadays.

IPCom signed its presumably most lucrative license deal with Deutsche Telekom because its outgoing CEO faced a risk of personal liability.

Today, IPCom brought parallel patent infringement complaints in the Eastern District of Texas (Chief Judge Gilstrap's Marshall Division) against U.S. wireless carriers AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon, alleging the infringement of six (AT&T) or five (Sprint, Verizon) former Bosch and Hitachi standard-essential patents (SEPs) by infrastructure products from Nokia, Ericsson, and Mavenir. The former Bosch patents have expired, but IPCom can still seek damages for past infringement.

I've uploaded all three complaints to Scribd (AT&T, Sprint, Verizon). For your convenience, let me show you the AT& complaint right here (this post continues below the document):

20-10-01 IPCom v. AT&T ... by Florian Mueller

These are the patents-in-suit:

  • Former Bosch patents:

    • U.S. Patent No. 7,333,822 on a "method for transmitting messages in a telecommunication network" (SMS/MMS)

    • U.S. Patent No. 10,382,909 on a "method for transmitting messages in a telecommunication network" (MMS messages using WAP Push messages)

    • U.S. Patent No. 6,983,147 on a "method of transmitting signaling information, a master station, a mobile station and message elements" (LTE)

  • Former Hitachi patents:

Nokia, Ericsson, and Mavenir will presumably intervene on defendants' behalf, as they face indemnifcation claims by the carriers (at least that's the way it usually works).

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Monday, April 6, 2020

Munich I Regional Court postpones Nokia v. Daimler patent ruling from April 9 to May 20, 2020

BREAKING NEWS

In light of the coronavirus crisis, I double-checked with the Munich I Regional Court's (Landgericht München I) press office and found out that the Nokia v. Daimler standard-essential patent ruling scheduled for this week's Thursday (April 9) has been pushed back to May 20, 2020.

The court did not cite any particular reason for the postponement. A postponement of a ruling date is not unheard of in complex cases, and this is a big one in every respect. It's always better if courts take their time than to rush to judgment.

Without speculating on whether this has anything to do with corona, it's simply a fact that the Free State of Bavaria has not imposed any new restrictions in more than two weeks. The current rules (social distancing, partial lockdown) will be in force until at least April 19, 2020. Presently, courts can hold hearings and trials they deem time-sensitive, and they are free to announce decisions, with the presiding judge of a given panel determining courtroom modalities such as a minimum distance to keep between any two persons.

What's more relevant now than court-internal reasons is the impact on parallel proceedings in other places. This gives the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) more time to decide on whether to launch formal investigations into Nokia's refusal to license automotive suppliers. DG COMP resumed its preliminary investigations last month after a couple of rounds of mediation had failed.

DG COMP won't necessarily be the only competition authority in the world to take a closer look at this in the near term.

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How many times can a patent holder violate EU antitrust law in a single litigation? (Nokia v. Daimler)

Last week the Munich I Regional Court's press office confirmed to me that the Nokia v. Daimler ruling scheduled for this week's Thursday (April 9) had not been postponed. The government of the federal state of Bavaria has not imposed any additional corona-based restrictions since. From what I hear, Presiding Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann is the only member of the court's 7th Civil Chamber to go to the courthouse almost every day, while his side judges are working from home. German courts have sometimes postponed patent rulings on very short notice, but for now the operating assumption is that a decision (which may or may not be a final judgment) will come down on Thursday.

With the automotive industry being hit so hard by the coronavirus crisis, Nokia's pursuit of an injunction--while there are plenty of willing licensees (Daimler and a number of suppliers)--is ethically questionable, though there is a possibility of the injunction not having immediate effect in practical terms. So much for corona and ethics; let's also not talk today about the enormous strength of Daimler's invalidity contention, or about proportionality under Art. 3 IPRED and its political ramifications (a Nokia "win" on Thursday--an injunction against entire cars over one of thousands of tiny features of a single cellular standard--would give the whole German patent reform debate new impetus). Now I'll just focus on the antitrust implications of what might happen.

If Nokia obtained and enforced that injunction, it would likely set a new record in the number of EU antitrust violations a patent holder can commit in connection with a single patent infringement case...

The Court of Justice of the EU made it clear in Huawei v. ZTE that a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder violates Art. 102 TFEU (the abuse-of-dominant-position paragraph of EU law) by refusing to grant a FRAND license to an implementer. A license is a license, and not a "have made" right or a contractual arrangement under which a component maker merely becomes a payment processor for the car maker.

There's a number of implementers in that Nokia v. Daimler case whom Nokia has refused to license, yet it seeks to shut down products containing their components. At a minimum:

The six companies I just listed are intervenors in the Munich case. There's even a seventh intervenor: Renault, which makes a car for Daimler. Presumably Nokia is not unwilling to license Renault as it makes entire cars (even when wearing the hat of a Daimler supplier), so in order to know whether Nokia violated the antitrust laws with respect to Renault, one would need to know the status of licensing negotiations between those two organizations. It's hard to imagine that Nokia would want a lower per-unit royalty from Renault than from Daimler, so there likely is another violation, albeit one that requires a quantitative analysis.

So there are six or seven antitrust violations in the vertical supply chain. But Nokia also appears to be violating EU antitrust law with respect to Daimler even if one ignores the suppliers for a moment as the CJEU held in Huawei v. ZTE that the only scenario in which a SEP holder steers clear of an abuse of a dominant position under Art. 102 TFEU involves the combination of two factors, neither of which is present in this case (click on the image to enlarge; this post continues below the image):

Nokia wants the Munich court to interpret the above paragraph in an absurd way. The top EU court said that a SEP injunction is warranted only after a SEP holder made a FRAND offer while the implementer failed to make a good-faith counteroffer. (A blatantly non-FRAND counterproposal would not suffice to avert an injunction.)

The CJEU gave implementers two chances to avoid being enjoined: they can show that the SEP holder's offer was not FRAND, or they can make a diigent good-faith counteroffer without delaying tactics. They can also meet both criteria at the same time, but they don't have to.

Countless articles have been authored on Huawei v. ZTE. I'll just give one example written by a major U.S. law firm (Morrison & Foerster):

"Only if the SEP holder has followed those steps and the alleged infringer continues to use the SEPs in question, and fails to make a FRAND counter-offer and provide security, may the SEP holder seek an injunction. Otherwise, doing so may constitute an abuse of the SEP holder’s dominant position [...]"

In the February trial, the court showed an inclination to agree with Nokia because "the SEP holder hasn't committed any wrongdoing if its own offer is FRAND." That's wrong, however. The CJEU ruling means that the SEP holder commits a wrongdoing either by not making a FRAND offer or by failing to continue to negotiate despite a diligent, good-faith, timely response by the implementer. One could also simplify it like this: if the SEP holder's offer is not FRAND, that's a violation, end of story; but even if it is, the SEP holder can still violate EU antitrust law by rejecting a FRAND counteroffer.

Nokia seeks to convert the two hurdles for SEP holders into two opportunities for them. In order to achieve this, they effectively suggest that Europe's highest court is inarticulate: in the world according to Nokia, "and" doesn't mean "and" when "or" suits Nokia's agenda, as if the judges in Luxembourg didn't know what "and" means.

The "and" in question has a blue background in the screenshot further above. Three L's way against Nokia's attempt to turn the CJEU ruling on its head: language, logic, and layout.

"And" means "both of." So much for the language.

"And" is a logical conjunction.

From a linguistic and logical point of view, it's made even clearer by the fact that the second one of the two parts makes reference to the first by saying "that offer" (I put a green rectangle around the relevant occurrence of "that" in the screenshot). "[T]hat offer" is the SEP holder's initial offer, and interpreting the second part as if it (more precisely, the implementer's failure to fulfill its obligations under it) could independently legalize a SEP injunction simply pulls the rug (the precondition of there already being a FRAND offer on the table) from under its feet.

Finally, the text layout would make the logical conjunction clear in its own right. In the screenshot, I applied an orange background color to the words "as long as," and a blue one to "where" a few lines below. Nokia's suggestion that the SEP holder could meet either the first or the second criterion is also nonsensical because "as long as" is before a colon followed by two bullet points, while "where" comes after the second of the two bullet points. If the two bullet points were alternative requirements for Nokia to satisfy (as they aren't anyway, for the reasons explained before), "as long as" would have to come after the first bullet point (just to the left of "prior to bringing that action"). But in the CJEU's ruling, "as long as" simply ranks higher than "where," so the two just can't be considered interchangeable.

Seeking an injunction against a willing SEP licensee constitutes only one antitrust violation vis-à-vis a given party. But here, Nokia is practically doing so against seven or eight parties. And against one of them--Daimler--Nokia is apparently violating Huawei v. ZTE even twice as it (i) seeks an injunction despite Daimler having given a diligent, good-faith, and timely response, while (ii) Nokia is demanding a fairly high multiple of the per-unit royalty from Daimler that it gets from major smartphone makers. That higher per-unit fee is even more discriminatory when considering that people use smartphone connections for far more hours per day than their cars are online (while one must not actively use a smartphone while driving, virtually no one turns it off either, so the period during which a smartphone has a cellular connection is pretty much a true superset of the hours when the car is connected).

Anything could happen on Thursday. In some other courts I'd offer a 90% prediction that the case would be stayed over serious doubts concerning the validity of the patent-in-suit. In that regard, Munich is "special" because the court rarely stays cases. But Munich, too, is part of the EU.

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Sunday, January 12, 2020

BREAKING NEWS: Nokia makes antitrust mediation with Daimler and automotive suppliers over standard-essential patent licensing fail

[HAPPY NEW YEAR -- AND BREAKING NEWS]

Nokia wanted to keep its EU antitrust mediation with Daimler and various automotive suppliers strictly confidential. Nice try, but I've been able to obtain reliable and mutually-corroborating information from more than one source. (I obviously protect my sources.)

On Friday (January 10) and Saturday (January 11), Nokia--represented by Bird & Bird's Richard Vary (formerly head of litigation at Nokia) and Roschier's Niklas Östman--met with Daimler and various suppliers (Bosch, BURY Technologies, Continental, Harman, Peiker, and TomTom) at a recently-opened Munich hotel. But nothing came out of a whole series of meetings moderated by a British mediator and two British lawyers appointed by the International Chamber of Commerce. The mediator will communicate with the parties by telephone in the days ahead and make a procedural decision. Theoretically, there could be another series of meetings on the 22nd and the 23rd. However, based on how these past two days went, it would be a total waste of time to reconvene.

In practical terms, it's already clear that mediation is pointless for two reasons that made the Munich meetings fail, neither of which comes as a surprise:

  • Mediation would only have made sense if Nokia had departed from its dogged refusal to extend a true and exhaustive standard-essential patent (SEP) license to Daimler's tier 1 (= direct) suppliers. Continental had made Nokia a binding offer to take such a license before mediation began, but Nokia remains unwilling to grant any such thing as a true license to component makers. It proposes a "have made" right, which is just an extended-workbench type of arrangement as opposed to a component-level license.

  • Furthermore, the meetings inevitably proved unproductive because Nokia refused to make it existing cellular SEP licensing agreements (such as the one with Huawei) available to the other parties. Nokia's excuse was that those agreements allegedly weren't relevant (not only U.S. courts but even some--if not all--German courts would disagree). Therefore, Nokia's counterparts would have had to negotiate without having the slightest idea of what Nokia's existing licensees actually pay for those SEPs.

    At best, Nokia is willing to disclose an obscure and highly atypical license agreement with a car maker who apparently accepted--but only for a transitional period and with the right to terminate as per the end of 2019--a "have made" right. That same car maker is likely to sign an Avanci pool license in the near term based on what I heard.

The information I've obtained suggests that Nokia has not been constructive, neither structurally (exhaustive license vs. "have made" right) nor procedurally (disclosure of existing SEP license agreements). If Nokia had agreed to grant component-level licenses (real licenses, not "have made" rights), and if it had then presented its existing SEP licensing agreements, mediation could have worked in theory. But no one could seriously have expected it to happen, which is why I predicted the failure of this mediation effort before. By now it's failed for all practical purposes, whether or not the mediator will order another series of meetings later this month.

EU competition chief Margrethe Vestager said last month that she expected an update on mediation by mid-February. She's not going to get any good news out of mediation, that's for sure.

What I've found out about the way the talks were structured is that the first day consisted of bilateral talks between Nokia and each of Daimler's suppliers. The suppliers invited to mediation included the ones intervening in the German infringement cases, plus Samsung subsidiary Harman, but not Huawei, which wanted to join but Nokia wasn't willing.

On the second day, Nokia might have hoped to drive a wedge between Daimler and its suppliers. Daimler met separately with each supplier (for antitrust reasons, they couldn't just all sit at the same table and discuss numbers), but neither Daimler nor the suppliers were prepared to agree with Nokia that the problem could simply be solved by Daimler reaching an agreement with each supplier on how to split the outrageous, supra-FRAND royalties Nokia demands.

The European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) will have to make a decision. They hoped to avoid it, but it was clear that there's a binary, structural question at issue. Either the suppliers get a license and can make components they are free to sell not only to Daimler but also to others (in case they end up sitting on some excess quantities, for instance), or it's not a license.

The next Nokia v. Daimler SEP infringement trial is scheduled for January 21 and will take place in Mannheim unless the court decides to push the trial date back. Another Mannheim trial, originally scheduled for December, was postponed on short notice, but I heard from more than one source that the patent-in-suit in that one was so ridiculously weak that the court likely wouldn't have reached the FRAND defense anyway...

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Wednesday, October 30, 2019

Game changer in automotive patent wars? Huawei brought antitrust complaint against Nokia in German court to get exhaustive module-level SEP license

The Munich I Regional Court scheduled a Nokia v. Daimler "double-header" for today: first hearings (several months after which there will be trials followed by decisions) in two of the Finnish company's ten patent infringement cases pending against the German car maker.

The wireless standard-essential patents-in-suit are EP1388234 and the related German patent DE60240446C5 on a "hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) scheme with in-sequence deliver of packets" as well as EP2797239 on "a method and a telecommunication device for selecting a number of code channels and an associated spreading factor for a CDMA transmission." On June 5, the same court held a hearing on Nokia's infringement action against Daimler over EP1671505 on a "redundancy strategy selection scheme," and indicated a strong inclination to rule in Nokia's favor, unless things change when the actual trial takes place on February 6, 2020.

A number of suppliers of telematics control units (TCUs) to Daimler are intervening in the infringement case on the automotive company's behalf: Continental (which tried twice, but unsuccessfully so far, to shield Daimler from Nokia's lawsuits by means of a U.S. antisuit injunction), BURY, Bosch, TomTom (world-famous for its navigation systems), and Valeo subsidiary Peiker. Another intervenor, Huawei, makes cellular communications modules that are at the heart of many TCUs made by others; Huawei is also known to offer TCUs, but its counsel mentioned only its connectivity modules today.

Another factor that sets the Chinese mobile technology company apart from the other intervenors is that Huawei is presently obtaining several times more SEPs--and has a far higher share of existing 4G patents--than Nokia. By contrast, the TCU makers intervening in this case largely don't own cellular SEPs. What lends this particular importance is that it shows it's about product-focused innovators (car makers, TCU makers, and the likes of Huawei, Samsung, and LG) versus companies like Nokia and Ericsson, whose current product business is a shadow of its former self, so they increasingly focus on patent monetization.

Something I had heard through the grapevine was finally confirmed today:

Huawei has recently filed an antitrust complaint against Nokia with the Dusseldorf Regional Court, asking the court to order Nokia to make a FRAND licensing offer to Huawei--which (as was also mentioned today) already has a license agreement in place with Nokia for its end products (phones, tablets etc.)--that would result in an exhaustive SEP license covering Huawei's cellular connectivity modules.

Huawei is more likely than not to succeed with its Dusseldorf antitrust action. Presiding Judge Dr. Thomas Kuehnen ("Kühnen" in German), who chairs one of the two patent-specialized "senates" (divisions) of the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court and is the principal author of the leading German reference work on patent infringement proceedings, published an article this year in the periodical of the German Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (GRUR). In that article, Judge Dr. Kuehnen explained why implementers at all levels of the supply chain are entitled to an exhaustive FRAND license--and after analyzing various procedural avenues, he concluded that the most practical approach is for the implementer to ask a court--as Huawei is doing now--to obligate the SEP holder to make a FRAND offer. That appears more reasonable than a prayer for relief over a specific set of terms, given that a SEP owner has more information available to make a FRAND offer that complies with the criteria laid out by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Huawei v. ZTE.

Huawei's counsel in the Dusseldorf antitrust action--and representing Huawei to the extent it is an intervenor in Nokia's patent infringement actions--is Preu Bohlig's Professor Christian Donle. Preu Bohlig is one of Germany's oldest IP law boutiques. In the smartphone patent wars that firm successfully defended HTC against a couple of Apple patents. When I heard of Professor Donle's component licensing antitrust action, I invited him to speak at my Brussels conference on November 12 (that's already the week after next), and he thankfully accepted, so he will share a panel with Bristows' Pat Treacy, BakerBotts' Paul Lugard, and Orrick's Jay Jurata. But back to the German cases:

If at the end of Huawei's antitrust action Nokia is required to grant an exhaustive module-level SEP license on FRAND terms (and a real license as opposed to an "extended workbench" type of deal under which the de facto licensee would still be the car maker, with the component supplier merely acting as a licensing agent on the OEM's behalf), Nokia's patent infringement actions against Daimler will, to the extent they involve Daimler cars that come with a then-licensed Huawei component, be not only meritless, but even downright unlawful.

For that reason, Huawei has intervened in the German Nokia v. Daimler cases, requesting that--to the extent Huawei is affected--the cases be severed and stayed. I don't know what percentage of Daimler cars come with a cellular communications module from Huawei--all that has been mentioned so far is that Continental is one of Huawei's various customers among TCU makers, so the percentage could be extremely high.

In today's first hearing, the Munich court (I'll comment separately on their attitude toward antitrust defenses to patent infringement cases) basically said that since Nokia has chosen to sue Daimler, they are for now inclined to be ignorant of the issues raised by Huawei--though we're simply talking about the very (il)legality of what Nokia is doing by refusing to license Huawei while suing its (indirect) customer, Daimler. But it was just a first hearing, so there still is a chance for Huawei to obtain a stay even from the Munich court (which is an outlier court even within Germany in this specific context), or maybe it won't even be necessary in case Nokia fails to prevail on infringement and/or cases get stayed over validity concerns.

I've quickly drawn up a few diagrams to explain the relationship between the different parties and cases. First, here's a hypothetical scenario in which Nokia would--which it probably won't unless forced to--finally honor its FRAND pledge and extend an exhaustive SEP license to Huawei, which would in turn supply TCUs (which it may or may not do, but definitely could do anytime) to Daimler (click on the image to enlarge):

Patent exhaustion works downstream, so the net effect is that Daimler, as the end-product maker, would find itself fully licensed. While an argument was made today about exhaustion under German law requiring that the first licensed sale already involves a product practicing all claim limitations, Nokia did not--as I'm convinced it could not--make an argument that its SEPs claim cars, and Huawei's connectivity modules are full-featured communications devices that--to put it in a slightly oversimplified way--contain all the hardware you find in a phone apart from a screen.

Patent exhaustion works across any number of levels of a supply chain. Here's the second of my three charts--the present commercial reality of Huawei supplying its modules to Continental, which in turn sells a TCU to Daimler, but with the assumption of Nokia finally (which is not the case yet) granting a component-level license to Huawei (click on the image to enlarge):

The third and final chart combines the two previously-shown paths down the supply chain with Nokia's ongoing (allegedly unlawful) patent litigation campaign against Daimler and Huawei's Dusseldorf antitrust action against Nokia (click on the image to enlarge; this post continues below the diagram):

The chart mentions the basis for the Huawei v. Nokia antitrust case: Art. 102 TFEU, the unilateral-conduct (abuse of dominant position) paragraph of EU law.

Daimler and four other suppliers (Continental, Valeo, BURY, and Gemalto) filed EU antitrust complaints against Nokia earlier this year. Huawei would be in its right to do so, but no such filing is known. What is known by now is the Dusseldorf antitrust case, and just like Huawei v. ZTE started in that same town, where I attended the January 2013 trial that resulted in the referral of various SEP injunction-related questions to the CJEU, Huawei v. Nokia, too, has the potential to make EU antitrust history.

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Thursday, September 21, 2017

Meet the patent trolls of the 2030s: Bosch, Volkswagen, Daimler, BMW

Four days before the 67th International Motor Show (IAA) in Frankfurt will end, I'd like to offer a bold prediction: unless a miracle of the kind I can't imagine happens, Germany's automotive industry (car manufacturers as well as suppliers) will suffer a fate similar to that of the smartphone divisions of the likes of Nokia and Ericsson, ultimately resulting in "trollification" by the 2030s.

As Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted last month, 52% of all patent filings related to self-driving cars belong to German companies, with Bosch alone (which is number one and followed by Audi and Continental)holding three times as many patents in that field as Google and Apple or Tesla not having any significant patent holdings in that field yet. Besides Bosch, Audi, and Continental, three other German companies are among the top 10 patent holders in this field: BMW, Volkswagen, and Daimler.

Patent filings related to self-driving cars are picking up speed, so the landscape will almost certainly change in some ways in the coming years, but not entirely.

So far, major automotive companies have not used patents aggressively. Much to the contrary, they often find themselves on the receiving end of patent troll lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas and elsewhere, and they tend to support reasonable royalties (such as through the Fair Standards Alliance) and defensive initiatives (including a fake one--"fake" because it's merely about making a statement and doesn't solve a single patent-related problem ever--called Open Invention Network). I'm not aware of any major dispute between two large car makers. Apparently they work out cross-licensing deals quietly and amicably.

But that's because right now those companies are in the business of selling vehicles (and related services), not in the patent assertion business. While it may seem daring to talk in 2017 about what's going to happen in the 2030s (if not before), I am fairly convinced (not 100%, but way above 50%) that we're less than two decades away from the point at which Germany's automotive industry is going to enforce patents aggressively and try to shake down the future winners in the marketplace.

I believe Germany's leading car makers--and some of their key suppliers--are going to be in only a slightly better position than the smartphone divisions of companies like Nokia and Ericsson were when Apple and the Android ecosystem revolutionized the concept of a mobile communications device. I said "slightly better" because brands like BMW and Mercedes have been very strong for several times longer than Nokia's brand at the time of the iOS/Android revolution. Those brands are associated with certain strengths, some of which will remain important even in the self-driving electric future. But apart from that factor, those companies are practically doomed and will have to resort to patent licensing in less than 20 years' time. They won't disappear into oblivion too quickly, but over time they will, and there will be a long period during which they will still be around and you'll still see Mercedes stars on the roads, but where most of the revenue opportunity will belong to leading U.S. technology companies.

One challenge that those German automotive companies may somehow manage to overcome--though they haven't so far--is the one of creating good user interfaces. I've had an S-Class for a few years and the UI is just simply not well-thought-out. One example is the big button that also serves as a wheel. When using voice control to dial a number from my history of calls, that button means "Yes, this number" in one situation and "No, abort the operation" less than a second later--something that would be completely unthinkable at a company like Apple or Google. Another example is that they waste space on the screen by showing the city of a destination before the street name (which then often doesn't fit on the screen at all, or must be abbreviated beyond recognition). Those are simple things, and while it's astounding that Mercedes would ever have come up with a stupidly-designed user interface in the first place, they--and their competitors--may figure this part out over time.

Maybe someone will explain to their software developers the concept of a race condition because the way the thing intermittently fails to activate functions when starting up--or the way the UI occasionally freezes when dialing--suggests to me they have one or more of those in their code. Maybe they'll even understand that they should keep track of the last cities I navigated to so I don't have to select the same city again and again when entering a destination. And who knows, maybe they'll realize one day that they should provide free firmware updates from time to time to keep customers happy, especially when you have really nasty bugs in your software (as they do). Again, none of that is rocket science.

The bigger issues are of the strategic kind. For decades they have largely relied on a core competence: combustion engines, which involve about 200 times as many parts as electric motors. Daimler once invested in Tesla, then exited. With more foresight, it would have acquired it while it still had the chance. Anyway, those companies will lose their #1 competitive advantage.

Once Silicon Valley companies are the technology leaders (which Tesla in some ways already is) in the automotive industry, Germany's automotive companies will also struggle in the "war for talent." Most of the world's best software developers either already are in the United States or are potentially receptive to offers from such world-class employers as Google, where they can make a lot more money than at BMW, like Daimler or Volkswagen, get perks that are heard of in Germany, and often get to work on more interesting stuff. There will always be some talented developers who will choose to come to or stay in Germany, but a majority of the world's best programmers won't even consider Germany, period. Frankly, the cost-benefit ratio of learning German--a hard language to learn and of very limited use--is inferior, and most programmers already speak a least a little bit of English. In all likelihood, the average Google or Apple programmer will simply be better than his counterparts at German automotive companies, and if Apple or Google wanted to hire a very talented person away from a Volkswagen or BMW, they could in most instances.

Even if those German automotive companies figured out the digital user experience (which is doable) and even if they built better electric cars over time, there is, however, one thing that's simply going to marginalize them. It's that self-driving cars will be mobile communications devices on wheels. Speed and similar success factors of the old times aren't going to matter anymore at all. Instead, it's all going to be about what you can do while the car is doing all the driving.

The most lucrative parts of the car value chain are going to relate to productivity, communications, and entertainment applications. Plus all sorts of e-commerce (including "sharing economy"-style) services.

Those parts of the value chain will, without the slightest doubt, belong to such companies as Apple, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft. Of those companies, Apple is believed to be working on a car of its own and even made a joke about it at a corporate event. The others--especially Google--will be open to partnering (as they're already doing in some areas) with such companies as Daimler. But they're going to have all the leverage because of a force that is far more powerful than the leadership of traditional automotive companies presumably knows: network effects.

Short of developing something that would have to be several times more revolutionary than the iPhone was ten years ago, there's absolutely no way that BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen--even if they agreed to a three-way merger and secured regulatory approval for it--could ever get sufficient traction among app developers so they could compete effectively with Apple and Google. Even Microsoft with Windows Phone and with all of its money couldn't.

My app is in the final testing stage. We'll launch in a first market (probably New Zealand, where other games have also been launched early) in a couple of weeks and will quickly expand from there before finally launching in the United States. I know what drives platform choices. A few years ago I thought I would start on Android, then wanted to serve both major platforms at the same time, and ultimately decided to do iOS first, Android later. Before I would consider any other platform, we'd most likely do Mac and Apple TV versions of our game. Thereafter? Maybe, maybe, maybe even a Windows version at some point. But a Mercedes/BMW/Volkswagen version? I just don't see that happen.

Using Android on open-source terms won't be a viable option (at least nowhere outside China). Android is open-source in some ways but proprietary in others. It's no secret that most Android device makers aren't really profitable. Automotive companies can still make low-margin hardware in the future. But the biggest revenue streams are going to pass them by.

Also, a high percentage of the people buying premium cars are Apple customers, and their loyalty to Apple is simply stronger. Just this week I was thinking about this when I saw a German car with an Apple sticker on it. I was thinking to myself: Would anyone do it the other way round and put a Mercedes or BMW logo on an iPhone or a MacBook? Or a Volkswagen logo on an iPad? Obviously not.

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