Showing posts with label Renault. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Renault. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 1, 2022

Longhorn IP suing Fiat Chrysler (Stellantis) and Nissan in Munich over standard-essential patents: Longhorn was one of seven Avanci licensors suing Ford

The ink is barely dry on the license agreement between the Avanci patent pool and Ford Motor Company, and I've just discovered what could be the beginning of two other waves of standard-essential patent (SEP) enforcement against unwilling licensees in the automotive industry:

L2 Mobile Technologies, a Longhorn IP subsidiary that was the first or one of the first two Avanci licensors to assert cellular SEPs against Ford Motor Company, recently announced

When L2 Mobile Technologies took action against Ford, it was the first or one of the first Avanci licensors to do so. But over time it was joined by six others. If Longhorn IP has determined that Stellantis (which owns about a dozen automotive brands) and Nissan are unwilling licensees, chances are that many others of Avanci's 49 licensors have reached the same conclusion, so we may see more enforcement activity against the same automakers.

Longhorn brought its case against Ford in Delaware, and it would have taken almost three years from filing to trial. It's telling that Longhorn, too, is now betting on Munich, the world's undisputed #1 SEP injunction venue. Presiding Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann of the court's Seventh Civil Chamber expects implementers of standards to "promptly" seek a license upon receipt of an infringement notice, and it's doubtful that Nissan and Fiat Chrysler can defend their failure to do so. Nissan's German advertising slogan is "Er kann. Sie kann. Nissan." ("He can. She can. Nissan.") In light of these Munich lawsuits, they might as well update it to "Er kann. Sie kann. Zigann."

Stellantis's most famous brands are Fiat, Chrysler, Peugeot, Citroën, Opel (once a General Motors subsidiary), Alfa Romeo, Maserati, Jeep, RAM, and Vauxhall. All Stellantis brands combined make approximately 6 million cars per year (at a level with GM). The group also operates the Free2move Global Mobility Hub as well as Leasys, which has a car-sharing fleet of 400,000 vehicles and offers "integrated mobility solutions" to corporate and private customers.

Nissan's annual output is approximately 5 million cars, though the entire Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance sells approximately 10 million cars a year.

Just yesterday, IAM's Joff Wild wrote on LinkedIn that car makers can't deny the pivotal role that connectivity plays, just looking at how much the automotive industry emphasizes mobile connectivity services. He has a point. Car makers predict huge levels of future revenues from premium services--and expect further cost savings (such as by making maintenance more efficient).

For Daimler, Tesla, and Ford, it didn't turn out profitable to defend themselves against cellular SEP assertions for an extended period of time. Stellantis and Nissan (or even the entire Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance) may draw their own conclusions from what happened there. They can seek bilateral licenses, or they can take an Avanci pool license (as other major automakers have), but with German patent injunctions on the horizon, continued infringement is not going to be an option, at least not for the long haul.

It's actually surprising that there are still so many cars driving around without a 4G SEP license. Daimler caved to Nokia a year ago. Meanwhile, the industry is already transitioning to 5G. I struggle to understand why Nissan and Stellantis still aren't licensed.

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Thursday, March 18, 2021

The French Connection: Thales is third industrial giant from France to intervene in Nokia v. Daimler standard-essential patent dispute

The Dusseldorf Regional Court's preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice asks the top EU court to opine on certain questions of antitrust law with respect to the availability of standard-essential patent (SEP) licenses to component makers. Daimler argues that Nokia actually owes its suppliers an exhaustive license that would, by extension, cover the Mercedes maker.

In late 2018, Daimler filed with the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) a complaint over Nokia's refusal to license its suppliers. About two years ago, Nokia started a patent infringement litigation campaign against Daimler that has so far failed to give the former handset maker decisive leverage.

Daimler notified its tier 1 (direct) suppliers of those cases and the possibility of indemnification claims. Certain suppliers such as Peiker, a German subsidiary of a French company named Valeo, intervened (in support of defendant Daimler) early on. Last year it became known that even French automotive company Renault is technically a supplier to Daimler, by virtue of making a car for Daimler under a cooperation agreement. Renault may not have intervened in all Nokia v. Daimler cases, but in at least a couple of Munich lawsuits.

By now, Valeo and Renault are no longer the only two French companies to have skin in the Nokia v. Daimler game: I've recently found out that Thales, a French industrial giant with 80,000 employees, finally elected to intervene in the Dusseldorf case that gave rise to the ECJ referral. Almost two years after the filing of the complaint, Thales apparently didn't want to miss this opportunity to try to influence the proceedings in Europe's highest court.

Thales is not a direct supplier to Daimler, but a tier 2 supplier (one degree removed) through its customer TomTom. Similarly, Huawei is a tier 2 supplier through such telematics control unit (TCU) makers as Continental and Harman (a Samsung subsidiary).

With a belated filing on February 20, 2021, Thales--represented by Simmons & Simmons antitrust attorney Dr. Jens Steger--attempted to persuade the Dusseldorf court to refer a set of alternative or additional questions to Luxembourg. As far as I can see, the Dusseldorf court shows no signs of being inclined to do so. It will stick to its original set of questions.

In addition to unilateral-conduct issues under Art. 102 TFEU, Thales sought to raise a couple of cartel questions (Art. 101 TFEU):

  • In one of its proposed questions, Thales points out that the FRAND licensing pledge companies like Nokia made to ETSI was key to the European Commission's approval of "the ETSI agreements"--and on that basis suggests that Nokia violates Art. 101 by refusing to license component makers.

  • In another question Thales takes aim at an Avanci contract clause according to which that patent pool reimburses its members' SEP enforcement costs. Thales calls into question that a pool covering more than 60% of the patents essential to a given standard. Apart from the fact that this percentage is merely based on Avanci's own estimates (which are inconsistent with various independent studies), collective ownership percentages of SEPs aren't relevant from a competition law point of view as even a single truly essential patent confers market power upon its holder.

While it's important never to forget that what makes SEPs so powerful is horizontal cooperation, which would raise serious cartel issues without a FRAND licensing obligation, I welcome the fact that the focus will remain on unilateral conduct (monopoly abuse) questions. After all, that's what makes this preliminary reference a seamless continuation of Huawei v. ZTE with a special focus on component-level licensing. Thales aspired to make creative contributions to the process, but the new theories it espouses aren't quite so compelling as to warrant a modification of the referral order, much less at this procedural stage.

Where Thales does, however, still have every opportunity to make a positive impact is by lobbying the French government--which will have the opportunity to submit written observations (comparable to an amicus curiae brief, except that the ECJ doesn't allow private non-parties to make submissions). Thales could also lobby the French EU commissioner, Thierry Breton, who has so far been more sympathetic to Nokia and Ericsson's patent monetization interests than the concerns of the automotive and wider IoT industry over SEP abuse. As internal market commissioner, Mr. Breton has responsibility for the European economy at large (and European consumers), but that doesn't mean he has to act forever as if he were Finland's permanent representative (ambassador) to the European Union. Europe has far more to gain from component-level SEP licensing: its strong automotive sector is reason enough all by itself, and its growth potential in IoT makes it an even smarter choice for the future.

Thales declined to sign Nokia's non-disclosure agreement, and I applaud them for that. However, the need to withhold certain confidential business information from them may slow down its lawyers' access to the record. Unfortunately, German litigation procedures are antiquated, so Thales can't just be provided with access to digital documents. Instead, the court has to provide the original paper documents, and the formal referral to the ECJ can take place only after Thales has had its opportunity to make copies or scans.

Subsequently to the formal referral, the CJEU can start the translation process. The deadline for the written observations to be filed by the European Commission and the governments of the EU member states (to the extent they do so) will be a couple months later--in the late summer, presumably.

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Thursday, October 15, 2020

Nokia's latest standard-essential patent licensing offer to automotive suppliers is too little, too late to obviate referral of key questions to CJEU

Earlier this year, Nokia made mediation talks with Daimler and various of its suppliers of telecommunications components fail by refusing to grant exhaustive component-level standard-essential patent (SEP) licenses that would have provided suppliers with the operational freedom they need in order to go about their business. This was not only a disappointment but also a major embarrassment for the European Commission, which continues to be driven by regional protectionism rather than consistent enforcement of competition law and had urged the parties to negotiate even though it was a total waste of time, as anyone knowledgeable about the issues would have predicted.

Roughly eight months later, I have to grant Nokia and its attorneys that they have made some limited adjustments to their position, and that fact appears attributable to last month's Dusseldorf trial more so than to anything the EU Commission has done. Some key players in Brussels are beholden to Nokia, even to the extent that postfactual commissioner Thierry Breton parrots some outdated Nokia-funded propaganda by making an incorrect claim (of Europe being the #1 continent in 5G SEP ownership) from which Nokia's lawyers had already distanced themselves by way of an updated study.

The Dusseldorf Regional Court's strong inclination to refer certain component-level licensing questions to the top EU court--Daimler's lead counsel in the Nokia infringement cases, Quinn Emanuel's Dr. Marcus Grosch, told the Munich I Regional Court last month that he'd be very surprised if it didn't happen--appears to be scaring the living daylights out of Nokia. The decision is scheduled to come down on November 12, and at least the German appeals courts--the lower courts in Mannheim and Munich are too obsessed with forum-selling to do the right thing--will then likely be hesitant to enjoin end-product makers if their suppliers were denied SEP licenses on FRAND terms.

In an apparent effort to dissuade the Dusseldorf court from that CJEU referral, the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court (which hears all appeals of Mannheim judgments) from staying the enforcement of ill-gotten injunctions against Daimler, and to further encourage the Munich I Regional Court to grant Nokia an injunction against Daimler, Nokia sent new licensing offers to several Daimler suppliers (including BURY Technologies, Continental, Valeo/Peiker, Huawei, Harman, and Renault, which builds an entire vehicle for Daimler) about two weeks ago. At the time Nokia also intended to make such an offer to Bosch, but was waiting for a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) to be concluded.

NDAs didn't prevent all sorts of information to leak from the failed mediation process, and I've been able to find out more about its current maneuvering than Nokia would have liked me to.

The structure of Nokia's latest offers still comes with significant field-of-use restrictions that cannot be reconciled with the principle of the free movement of goods in the EU's Single Market and the fact that under the CJEU's Huawei v. ZTE case law, Nokia owes implementers a license on FRAND terms.

Furthermore, Nokia wants to charge royalties based on the value of the end product--a car--as opposed to a reasonable royalty rate. As a result, component makers simply couldn't afford such a license.

But even if one elected to ignore those major issues, Nokia still refuses to extend licenses to certain levels of the supply chain. Its current offers are limited to telematics control units (TCUs) and don't cover network access devices (NAD, often also referred to as connectivity modules) and baseband chips. By contrast, Sharp granted Huawei a license covering all three tiers (tier 1: TCUs; tier 2: NADs; tier 3: baseband chips.

Huawei is a tier 2 supplier to Daimler and suing Nokia in order to secure an exhaustive component-level SEP license on FRAND terms. That case is also pending before the Dusseldorf Regional Court. I don't think Nokia's latest round of offers would obviate a referral of component-level licensing questions to the Court of Justice of the EU with respect to Nokia v. Daimler, but a tier 1 license would certainly not moot the legal issues in Huawei v. Nokia.

Not only is it urgent to refer the question of component-level licensing to the top EU court but there are some worrying developments in SEP case law in Germany that actually require the referral of further questions to the CJEU. One of the two patent infringement panels of the Mannheim Regional Court has recently decided to gut Huawei v. ZTE by focusing on the implementer's counteroffer; the Federal Court of Justice of Germany held in Sisvel v. Haier that SEP holders no longer need to present claim charts to implementers (which particularly disadvantages small companies, but the last thing a dogmatic judge in Germany would care about is the economy); and the Munich I Regional Court applies the Sisvel v. Haier guidance in such extreme ways that it's hard to see how any implementer could actually defend itself there short of simply capitulating and taking a license on the terms dictated by the SEP holder. Most recently, the Munich I Regional Court has practically waived the requirement to provide collateral (bond or deposit) if an injunction is enforced during the appellate proceedings. They still determine an amount that needs to be posted, but it's typically negligible. I'll talk about that some more on another occasion. For now I merely wanted to underscore the necessity to get certain German courts overruled by the CJEU before more damage is done to innovation and competition.

If Nokia keeps improving its offers at the snail's pace we've seen from the failed handset maker in recent years, the CJEU will likely provide further clarification before Nokia ever makes a truly fair and reasonable licensing offer to automotive suppliers.

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Monday, April 6, 2020

How many times can a patent holder violate EU antitrust law in a single litigation? (Nokia v. Daimler)

Last week the Munich I Regional Court's press office confirmed to me that the Nokia v. Daimler ruling scheduled for this week's Thursday (April 9) had not been postponed. The government of the federal state of Bavaria has not imposed any additional corona-based restrictions since. From what I hear, Presiding Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann is the only member of the court's 7th Civil Chamber to go to the courthouse almost every day, while his side judges are working from home. German courts have sometimes postponed patent rulings on very short notice, but for now the operating assumption is that a decision (which may or may not be a final judgment) will come down on Thursday.

With the automotive industry being hit so hard by the coronavirus crisis, Nokia's pursuit of an injunction--while there are plenty of willing licensees (Daimler and a number of suppliers)--is ethically questionable, though there is a possibility of the injunction not having immediate effect in practical terms. So much for corona and ethics; let's also not talk today about the enormous strength of Daimler's invalidity contention, or about proportionality under Art. 3 IPRED and its political ramifications (a Nokia "win" on Thursday--an injunction against entire cars over one of thousands of tiny features of a single cellular standard--would give the whole German patent reform debate new impetus). Now I'll just focus on the antitrust implications of what might happen.

If Nokia obtained and enforced that injunction, it would likely set a new record in the number of EU antitrust violations a patent holder can commit in connection with a single patent infringement case...

The Court of Justice of the EU made it clear in Huawei v. ZTE that a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder violates Art. 102 TFEU (the abuse-of-dominant-position paragraph of EU law) by refusing to grant a FRAND license to an implementer. A license is a license, and not a "have made" right or a contractual arrangement under which a component maker merely becomes a payment processor for the car maker.

There's a number of implementers in that Nokia v. Daimler case whom Nokia has refused to license, yet it seeks to shut down products containing their components. At a minimum:

The six companies I just listed are intervenors in the Munich case. There's even a seventh intervenor: Renault, which makes a car for Daimler. Presumably Nokia is not unwilling to license Renault as it makes entire cars (even when wearing the hat of a Daimler supplier), so in order to know whether Nokia violated the antitrust laws with respect to Renault, one would need to know the status of licensing negotiations between those two organizations. It's hard to imagine that Nokia would want a lower per-unit royalty from Renault than from Daimler, so there likely is another violation, albeit one that requires a quantitative analysis.

So there are six or seven antitrust violations in the vertical supply chain. But Nokia also appears to be violating EU antitrust law with respect to Daimler even if one ignores the suppliers for a moment as the CJEU held in Huawei v. ZTE that the only scenario in which a SEP holder steers clear of an abuse of a dominant position under Art. 102 TFEU involves the combination of two factors, neither of which is present in this case (click on the image to enlarge; this post continues below the image):

Nokia wants the Munich court to interpret the above paragraph in an absurd way. The top EU court said that a SEP injunction is warranted only after a SEP holder made a FRAND offer while the implementer failed to make a good-faith counteroffer. (A blatantly non-FRAND counterproposal would not suffice to avert an injunction.)

The CJEU gave implementers two chances to avoid being enjoined: they can show that the SEP holder's offer was not FRAND, or they can make a diigent good-faith counteroffer without delaying tactics. They can also meet both criteria at the same time, but they don't have to.

Countless articles have been authored on Huawei v. ZTE. I'll just give one example written by a major U.S. law firm (Morrison & Foerster):

"Only if the SEP holder has followed those steps and the alleged infringer continues to use the SEPs in question, and fails to make a FRAND counter-offer and provide security, may the SEP holder seek an injunction. Otherwise, doing so may constitute an abuse of the SEP holder’s dominant position [...]"

In the February trial, the court showed an inclination to agree with Nokia because "the SEP holder hasn't committed any wrongdoing if its own offer is FRAND." That's wrong, however. The CJEU ruling means that the SEP holder commits a wrongdoing either by not making a FRAND offer or by failing to continue to negotiate despite a diligent, good-faith, timely response by the implementer. One could also simplify it like this: if the SEP holder's offer is not FRAND, that's a violation, end of story; but even if it is, the SEP holder can still violate EU antitrust law by rejecting a FRAND counteroffer.

Nokia seeks to convert the two hurdles for SEP holders into two opportunities for them. In order to achieve this, they effectively suggest that Europe's highest court is inarticulate: in the world according to Nokia, "and" doesn't mean "and" when "or" suits Nokia's agenda, as if the judges in Luxembourg didn't know what "and" means.

The "and" in question has a blue background in the screenshot further above. Three L's way against Nokia's attempt to turn the CJEU ruling on its head: language, logic, and layout.

"And" means "both of." So much for the language.

"And" is a logical conjunction.

From a linguistic and logical point of view, it's made even clearer by the fact that the second one of the two parts makes reference to the first by saying "that offer" (I put a green rectangle around the relevant occurrence of "that" in the screenshot). "[T]hat offer" is the SEP holder's initial offer, and interpreting the second part as if it (more precisely, the implementer's failure to fulfill its obligations under it) could independently legalize a SEP injunction simply pulls the rug (the precondition of there already being a FRAND offer on the table) from under its feet.

Finally, the text layout would make the logical conjunction clear in its own right. In the screenshot, I applied an orange background color to the words "as long as," and a blue one to "where" a few lines below. Nokia's suggestion that the SEP holder could meet either the first or the second criterion is also nonsensical because "as long as" is before a colon followed by two bullet points, while "where" comes after the second of the two bullet points. If the two bullet points were alternative requirements for Nokia to satisfy (as they aren't anyway, for the reasons explained before), "as long as" would have to come after the first bullet point (just to the left of "prior to bringing that action"). But in the CJEU's ruling, "as long as" simply ranks higher than "where," so the two just can't be considered interchangeable.

Seeking an injunction against a willing SEP licensee constitutes only one antitrust violation vis-à-vis a given party. But here, Nokia is practically doing so against seven or eight parties. And against one of them--Daimler--Nokia is apparently violating Huawei v. ZTE even twice as it (i) seeks an injunction despite Daimler having given a diligent, good-faith, and timely response, while (ii) Nokia is demanding a fairly high multiple of the per-unit royalty from Daimler that it gets from major smartphone makers. That higher per-unit fee is even more discriminatory when considering that people use smartphone connections for far more hours per day than their cars are online (while one must not actively use a smartphone while driving, virtually no one turns it off either, so the period during which a smartphone has a cellular connection is pretty much a true superset of the hours when the car is connected).

Anything could happen on Thursday. In some other courts I'd offer a 90% prediction that the case would be stayed over serious doubts concerning the validity of the patent-in-suit. In that regard, Munich is "special" because the court rarely stays cases. But Munich, too, is part of the EU.

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