OSV - Open Source Vulnerabilities
AlmaLinux 4300 View AlmaLinux vulnerabilities Alpaquita 8039 View Alpaquita vulnerabilities Alpine 3939 View Alpine vulnerabilities Android 3139 View Android vulnerabilities BellSoft Hardened Containers 304 View BellSoft Hardened Containers vulnerabilities Bitnami 6336 View Bitnami vulnerabilities Chainguard 33596 View Chainguard vulnerabilities crates.io 1932 View crates.io vulnerabilities Debian
The SYZBOT CTF
目次 第ï¼ç« ã€€æ¦‚è¦ 0.1 syzbot ã¨ã¯ï¼Ÿ 0.2 主ãªç™»å ´äººç‰©ç´¹ä»‹ï¼Ÿ 0.3 自己紹介：熊猫㮠Linux ã¨ã®é–¢ã‚ã‚Šã«ã¤ã„㦠0.4 今日ã®ãŠè©±ã€Œãƒã‚°ãƒãƒ³ãƒ†ã‚£ãƒ³ã‚°ã€ ç¬¬ï¼‘ç« ã€€Linux カーãƒãƒ«ã«ã¤ã„㦠1.1　Linux カーãƒãƒ«ã®è¦æ¨¡ã«ã¤ã„㦠1.2　Linux カーãƒãƒ«ã®åˆ¶ç´„äº‹é …ã«ã¤ã„㦠1.3　Linux カーãƒãƒ«ã®ãƒ‡ãƒãƒƒã‚°æ”¯æ´æ©Ÿèƒ½ã«ã¤ã„ã¦ ç¬¬ï¼’ç« ã€€ã‚«ãƒ¼ãƒãƒ«ãƒ¡ãƒƒã‚»ãƒ¼ã‚¸ã‚’èªã‚るよã†ã«ã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã®è©¦è¡ŒéŒ¯èª¤ã«ã¤ã„㦠2.1 printk() ã«æ±‚ã‚られã¦ã„ã‚‹ã‚‚ã®ã¨ã¯ï¼Ÿ 2.2 複数行分ã®ãƒ¡ãƒƒã‚»ãƒ¼ã‚¸ã‚’ãƒãƒƒãƒ•ã‚¡ãƒªãƒ³ã‚°ã™ã‚‹è©¦ã¿ï¼ˆï¼’ï¼ï¼‘７年４月～） 2.3 メッセージ本文ä¸ã«ã‚³ãƒ³ãƒ†ã‚ã‚¹ãƒˆæƒ…å ±ã‚’åŸ‹ã‚込む試ã¿ï¼ˆï¼’ï¼ï¼‘８年４月～） 2.4 １行分ã®ãƒ¡ãƒƒã‚»ãƒ¼ã‚¸ã‚’ãƒãƒƒãƒ•ã‚¡ãƒªãƒ³ã‚°ã™ã‚‹è©¦ã¿ï¼ˆï¼’ï¼ï¼‘８年６月～） 2.5 å†ã³ï¼‘行分ã®ãƒ¡ãƒƒã‚»ãƒ¼ã‚¸ã‚’ãƒãƒƒãƒ•ã‚¡ãƒªãƒ³ã‚°ã™ã‚‹è©¦ã¿ï¼ˆï¼’ï¼ï¼‘８年９月～） 2.6 å†æŒ‘戦（
NetBSD Blog
This report was written by Maciej Grochowski as a part of developing the AFL+KCOV project. How Fuzzing works? The dummy Fuzzer. The easy way to describe fuzzing is to compare it to the process of unit testing a program, but with different input. This input can be random, or it can be generated in some way that makes it unexpected form standard execution perspective. The simplest 'fuzzer' can be wr
ファジングã¨çµ±è¨ˆå¦ - Qiita
Whitebox Fuzzingã¯ã‚る入力ã«å¯¾ã—ã¦ãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ を実行ã—ãŸéš›ã€å®Ÿè¡Œã•ã‚ŒãŸã‚³ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ãƒ•ãƒãƒ¼ä¸Šã®å…¨ã¦ã®ãƒã‚¸ãƒƒã‚¯ã‚’記録ã—ã€ä»–ã®æ–°ãŸãªãƒ•ãƒãƒ¼ã‚’生æˆã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã®æ¡ä»¶ã‚’SMTソルãƒã§å°Žã事ã§æ¬¡ã®å…¥åŠ›ã‚’生æˆã™ã‚‹ã€‚ã„ã‚ゆるSymbolic ExecutionãŒã“ã‚Œã«åˆ†é¡žã•ã‚Œã‚‹ã€‚ Greybox Fuzzingã®éƒ¨åˆ†çš„ãªæƒ…å ±ã¨ã„ã†ã®ã¯ã‹ãªã‚Šæ›–昧ãªå®šç¾©ã ãŒã€å¤šãã¯ãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ を実行ã—ãŸéš›ã®ã‚«ãƒãƒ¬ãƒƒã‚¸æƒ…å ±ãŒä½¿ç”¨ã•ã‚Œã‚‹ã€‚ã“れを特ã«Coverage based (Greybox) Fuzzingã¨å‘¼ã¶ã€‚ 例ãˆã°AFLã¯ã‚る入力を実行ã—ãŸéš›ã«é€šã£ãŸã‚¨ãƒƒã‚¸ã‚«ãƒãƒ¬ãƒƒã‚¸ã‚’観測ã—ã€ä»Šã¾ã§è¦‹ãŸã“ã¨ã®ç„¡ã„エッジを通るã¨ãã®å…¥åŠ›ã‚’優先的ã«ä¿æŒã™ã‚‹ã‚ˆã†ã«ãªã£ã¦ã„る。 FCS(Fuzzing Configuration Schedule) ã•ã¦ã§ã¯æœ¬é¡Œã®ã‚·ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã‚¹ã‚±ã‚¸ãƒ¥ãƒ¼ãƒªãƒ³ã‚°å•é¡Œã«ã¤ã„ã¦èª¬æ˜Žã™ã‚‹ã€‚ VALENTIN J.M1ã«ã‚ˆã‚Œ
ClusterFuzz
ClusterFuzz ClusterFuzz is a scalable fuzzing infrastructure that finds security and stability issues in software. Google uses ClusterFuzz to fuzz all Google products and as the fuzzing backend for OSS-Fuzz. ClusterFuzz provides many features to seamlessly integrate fuzzing into a software project’s development process: Highly scalable. Can run on any size cluster (e.g. Google’s instance runs on 3
GitHub - xoreaxeaxeax/sandsifter: The x86 processor fuzzer
The sandsifter audits x86 processors for hidden instructions and hardware bugs, by systematically generating machine code to search through a processor's instruction set, and monitoring execution for anomalies. Sandsifter has uncovered secret processor instructions from every major vendor; ubiquitous software bugs in disassemblers, assemblers, and emulators; flaws in enterprise hypervisors; and bo
マイクãƒã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆã€AIã§ã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢ã®ãƒã‚°ã‚„脆弱性を探る「Microsoft Security Risk Detectionã€ã‚’発表
マイクãƒã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆã€AIã§ã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢ã®ãƒã‚°ã‚„脆弱性を探る「Microsoft Security Risk Detectionã€ã‚’発表 ãƒã‚°ã‚„脆弱性を発見ã™ã‚‹æœ‰åãªæ‰‹æ³•ã®ã²ã¨ã¤ã«ã€ŒFuzzing Testã€ãŒã‚ã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚Fuzzing Testã¨ã¯ã€æ¤œæŸ»å¯¾è±¡ã®ã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆã‚¦ã‚§ã‚¢ã«å•é¡Œã‚’引ãèµ·ã“ã—ãã†ãªãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ï¼ˆã“ã‚ŒãŒã€ŒFuzzã€ã¨å‘¼ã°ã‚Œã‚‹ï¼‰ã‚’大é‡ã«é€ã‚Šè¾¼ã¿ã€ãã®å¿œç”や挙動を監視ã™ã‚‹ã€ã¨ã„ã†ã‚‚ã®ã§ã™ã€‚ ã“ã‚Œã¾ã§Fuzzing Testã¯ä¸€èˆ¬ã«ã‚»ã‚ュリティテストã®å°‚門家ãªã©ãŒãƒ†ã‚¹ãƒˆãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚’作æˆã—ã€å®Ÿè¡Œã—ã€ãã®æŒ™å‹•ã‚’監視ã™ã‚‹ä½œæ¥ã‚’è¡Œã£ã¦ãã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ã¾ãŸã€ã™ã§ã«ä¸€éƒ¨ã®ãƒªã‚¹ã‚¯æ¤œå‡ºã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スã§ã¯ã“ã†ã—ãŸä½œæ¥ã«AIã®åˆ©ç”¨ã‚‚始ã¾ã£ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã¨ã®ã“ã¨ã€‚ Microsoft Security Risk Detectionã¯ã€AIを使ã£ã¦ã“ã†ã—ãŸä½œæ¥ã‚’自動化ã—ã€ã‚¯ãƒ©ã‚¦ãƒ‰ã«ã‚ˆã£ã¦å¤§é‡ã«å®Ÿè¡Œã™ã‚‹ã¨ã€ãƒžã‚¤ã‚¯ãƒã‚½ãƒ•ãƒˆãƒªã‚µãƒ¼ãƒã®David M
Clangã§ãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¸ãƒ³ã‚° (-fsanitize=fuzzer) - Qiita
Clang開発版ã«libFuzzerãŒæ–°ã—ã„サニタイザã¨ã—ã¦å–ã‚Šè¾¼ã¾ã‚ŒãŸã€‚clang -fsanitize=fuzzerã§ä½¿ãˆã‚‹ã€‚ ファジングã¨ã¯ ファジング (fuzzing) ã¯ãƒ†ã‚¹ãƒˆæ‰‹æ³•ã®ã²ã¨ã¤ã€‚ãŠã‹ã—ãªãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚’自動的ã«å¤§é‡ç”Ÿæˆã—ã¦ãƒ—ãƒã‚°ãƒ©ãƒ ã¸å…¥åŠ›ã—ã€ã‚¯ãƒ©ãƒƒã‚·ãƒ¥ã‚’誘発ã™ã‚‹ã“ã¨ã§ãƒã‚°ã‚’ã‚ã¶ã‚Šã ã™ã€‚ libFuzzerã¯ãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¸ãƒ³ã‚°ã‚’ãŠã“ãªã†ãŸã‚ã®ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ–ラリ。 trunk版ã®clangをインストール Clangã®trunk版をインストール: svn co http://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk llvm svn co http://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/cfe/trunk llvm/tools/clang svn co http://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/compiler-rt/tr
GitHub - kernelslacker/trinity: Linux system call fuzzer
Trinity: Linux system call fuzzer. "After the initial euphoria of witnessing the explosion had passed, test director Kenneth Bainbridge commented to Los Alamos director J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Now we are all sons of bitches." Oppenheimer later stated that while watching the test he was reminded of a line from the Hindu scripture the Bhagavad Gita: Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." #
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GitHub - trailofbits/deepstate: A unit test-like interface for fuzzing and symbolic execution
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-song.pdf
GitHub - securesystemslab/agamotto: Agamotto: Accelerating Kernel Driver Fuzzing with Lightweight Virtual Machine Checkpoints
Introduction to Fuzzing
NetBSD Blog
NetBSD Blog
GitHub - google/syzkaller: syzkaller is an unsupervised coverage-guided kernel fuzzer
Testing date parsing by fuzzing
Fuzzing the Linux Kernel: A student in peril.
Application security testing
GitHub - MozillaSecurity/peach: Peach is a fuzzing framework which uses a DSL for building fuzzers and an observer based architecture to execute and monitor them.
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