Analytic Philosophy

This article sketches some of the main ideas that informed the work of the post-colonial Indian philosopher Margaret Chatterjee (1925-2019). A philosopher of language and religion, her work straddles the "frozen" traditions of the east and the west, and astutely philosophizes about Gandhian thought in the realm of religious alterity and coevality.

Tiger C. Roholt explains why grooves, which are forged in music's rhythmic nuances, remain hidden to some listeners. He argues that grooves are not graspable through the intellect nor through mere listening; rather, grooves are disclosed through our bodily engagement with music. We grasp a groove bodily by moving with music's pulsations. By invoking the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty's notion of "motor intentionality," Roholt shows that the "feel" of a groove, and the understanding of it, are two sides of a coin: to "get" a groove just is to comprehend it bodily and to feel that embodied comprehension.

William Frankena (1966) has suggested a model
for analyzing philosophies of education based on
practical syllogism which goes back to Aristotle
(1925). Even though the deductive method in
philosophy of education was the subject of
attacks, Frankena’s model has been influential
as it has been appealed to in religious education
studies (e.g., Cohen 2010), applied branches of
education (e.g., Martin 2011), as well as philosophical
reflection on education (e.g., Covaleski
2007). Frankena’s model helps students to analyze
philosophies of education and acquire a
proper understanding of values education (Litke
1976), teacher education (Ainsworth and Johnson
2005), and workplace education (Hager 1999).

"KEYWORDS:
Greek philosophy, analytical philosophy, presocratics, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Heraclitus, atomism, interpretative charity, degrees of existence, true contradictions, J. Barnes, M. Schofield, Charles H. Kahn.
RESUMEN:
Los tres libros abordan problemas importantes de la historia de la filosofía griega a través de la filosofía analítica. Los tres tratan de ofrecer interpretaciones de los presocráticos que eviten atribuirles contradicciones; y los tres fracasan en ese intento hermenéutico, aplicando una caridad interpretativa innecesaria. Y es que es racional reconocer grados de existencia y afirmar que hay contradicciones verdaderas."

In the last few decades there has been a lively debate on the problem of the self both in phenomenological and analytical circles. Among authors that endorse an experiential or minimal notion of the self, the main point of contention has been the diachronic identity problem, i.e. the question whether the experiential self retains its identity through time and, if so, to what extent. In this paper I begin with a brief exposition of two prominent notions of the experiential self, those elaborated by Dan Zahavi and Galen Strawson, followed by a comparison of the two authors' views on diachronic identity. After highlighting what I believe to be certain ambiguities and weaknesses in Zahavi's criticism of Strawson, I argue for a clear and explicit distinction between two different notions of identity, namely those of weak and strong diachronic identity. Finally, I question to what extent Zahavi's notion of the minimal self might be helpful in addressing problems of personal identity, arguing that his own proposal-that of combining the minimal self with other, more complex models (such as the narrative self)-is fraught with certain methodological difficulties.

Problem sebstva je bil v zadnjih letih deležen precejšnje pozornosti tako v fenomenoloških kot analitičnih krogih. Med avtorji, ki zagovarjajo izkustveni oz. minimalni pojem sebstva, se je kot temeljna ost spora izkazalo vprašanje diahrone identitete, tj. vprašanje, ali in v kolikšni meri izkustveno sebstvo ohranja svojo identiteto skozi čas. Pričujoči članek najprej na kratko predstavi dve prominentni pojmovanji izkustvenega sebstva, ki ju zagovarjata Dan Zahavi in Galen Strawson, nato pa ponudi primerjavo stališč obeh avtorjev o diahroni identiteti. Po kratkem orisu določenih nejasnosti in pomanjkljivosti v Zahavijevi kritiki Strawsona ponudimo nekaj razlogov za jasno in eksplicitno razlikovanje med dvema različnima vrstama identitete, in sicer med šibko in močno diahrono identiteto. V zadnjem delu članka obravnavamo vprašanje, v kolikšni meri je Zahavijev pojem minimalnega sebstva relevanten za probleme osebne identitete, pri čemer zastopamo stališče, da je njegov lastni predlog-namreč kombiniranje minimalnega sebstva z drugimi, kompleksnejšimi modeli (kot je narativno sebstvo)-metodološko problematičen.

The emergence of Islamic banks and other financial institutions since the 1970s has stimulated a modern literature that has identified itself as addressing “Islamic accounting”. Much of this literature is prescriptive, though studies of actual practice, and of attitudes to proposed alternatives, are beginning to emerge. Historical research into Islamic accounting is still in a process of development, with a range of studies based on both primary archives and manuals of accounting providing growing insight into accounting in state and private contexts in the Middle East. Other parts of the Muslim world are also the focus of historical accounting research. There is still much to discover, however, before historians can determine the influence of Middle Eastern accounting ideas and practices in other parts of the world. Moreover, the term “Islamic accounting” may simply be a convenient label to group together quite disparate accounting practices and ideas across time and space.

Monografia  si  kladie  za  cieľ  kriticky  zmapovať chápanie pojmu možných svetov. V historicky ladenej prvej kapitole opisuje formovanie sémantiky možných svetov, spolu s naznačením niektorých problémov, ktoré so sebou prináša, a ktoré prenikavým spôsobom odhaľoval predovšetkým W. V. O. Quine.
V ďalších dvoch kapitolách sa zameriava na modernejšie názory na povahu možných svetov, pričom hlavná pozornosť je venovaná dichotómii medzi posibilistickým a aktualistickým prístupom k otázke modalít, popri ktorom je nevyhnutné posúdiť aj iné rozlíšenia (esencializmus - antiesencializmus, realizmus - redukcionizmus, príp. erzacizmus či fikcionalizmus, naturalizmus - nenaturalizmus a pod.). Zvýšená pozornosť je venovaná koncepciám D. Lewisa, S. Kripkeho, A. Plantingu, R. M. Adamsa, N. Reschera a D. Armstronga.
Neštandardný prístup k problematike možných svetov je zachytený vo štvrtej kapitole. Táto kapitola je predovšetkým venovaná významnej koncepcii J. Hintikku, ktorá pracuje s pojmom epistemických možných svetov a dokumentuje  príklon  k modifikácii  a  relativizácii  modálneho diskurzu.
V monografii sú objasnené niektoré reprezentatívne koncepcie možných svetov, resp. možných indivíduí a je v nej naznačený celkový postup od posudzovania možných svetov ako ideálnych logických konštruktov, cez ich relativizáciu prostredníctvom oddelených oblastí indivíduí pre jednotlivé svety a ďalej prostredníctvom vzťahu dosiahnuteľnosti až k fikčným, nemožným a neštandardným možným svetom.

Die Texte, die in diesem Band versammelt sind, gehen hervor aus den Vorträgen, die im Rahmen des Philosophischen Kolloquiums am Institut für Philosophie der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg gehalten wurden. Hier stellen externe und interne Professor*innen und Nachwuchswissenschaftler*innen ihre Forschung vor, Absolvent*innen des Instituts finden hier Gelegenheit, ihre Thesen zu präsentieren und zur Diskussion zu stellen. Die hier versammelten Texte sollen einen Einblick geben in das Leben am Institut und in die vielfältigen Diskussionen, die hier geführt werden. Das Philosophische Kolloquium soll Studierenden, Lehrenden und Interessierten von außerhalb ein Forum bieten, sich über aktuelle Entwicklungen und Fragestellungen der Philosophie und anderer, naher Disziplinen zu informieren und diese zu diskutieren. Darum versammelt das Oldenburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie 2017/2018 nicht nur Beiträge aus dem Philosophischen Kolloquium, sondern auch Beiträge, die das Institutsleben widerspiegeln. Dementsprechend streifen die einzelnen Kapitel vielfältige Themen der gegenwärtigen Philosophie: Fragen aus der Geschichte der Philosophie, Fragen nach dem Status des Subjekts, der Würde des Menschen, der Politischen Philosophie, der Ästhetik, der Didaktik, der gegenwärtigen Situation der Universität und der analytischen Erkenntnistheorie. Trotz aller thematischer Differenzen fühlen sich die Beiträge dem gemeinsamen philosophischen Gespräch verpflichtet, das dieses Jahrbuch hoffentlich weiter befördern wird.

To ask the question, “Does evidence law matter?,” is often to assume that some sets or groups of people believe it is important while others are challenging that view.  However, another assumption regarding the nature of this question is possible—that the question is asked because legal academics believe that evidence law both does and does not matter, and that those academics also believe that these are irreconcilable beliefs.  What is of particular interest is how legal academics reached this point and why they believe that evidence law both does and does not matter. 

Consideration of these aspects of evidence law scholarship and study reveals that evidence law can be understood as something both rational, irrational, and non-rational.  It can be perceived as permitting practitioners and scholars to both accommodate paradox and accept the conflict of an abstract rule of law imposed by “concrete” persons.  This stands at odds with progressive reform efforts which attempt to define, codify, and ultimately reconcile the inherently dichotomous nature of evidence law.  In order to achieve real progress in the area of evidentiary reform, the idea of progress will have to be abandoned.

This article explores theoretical alternatives to contemporary western hegemonic feminist discourses, advancing methodologies that mark an epistemological break with western feminist scholarship; namely Orientalist criticism, third world (black) feminism, and Islamic feminism with all the innovative methodologies and insights they offer into studying and understanding the condition and reception of women in the material and immaterial culture of the Arab/ Islamic experience.

Da sich in den letzten Jahren das Paradigma einer von der analytischen
Philosophie inspirierten analytischen Theologie zu einem
leistungsfähigen theoretischen Ansatz zur Diskussion religionsphilosophischer
und theologischer Fragestellungen entwickelt hat,
wird im Folgenden zunächst der Versuch unternommen, die Struktur
einer analytischen Theologie der Geschichte zu erarbeiten.
Dazu wird der Begriff der analytischen Theologie skizziert, um darauf
basierend zu argumentieren, dass eine analytische Theologie
der Geschichte unter Zuhilfenahme offenbarungstheologischer,
naturwissenschaftlicher und philosophischer Erkenntnisse Theorien
über das Ganze der Geschichte der Welt als Geschichte der
Welt sub specie deitatis entwickelt und sich dabei wesentlich auf
die anhand möglicher Welten definierten Begriffe temporaler Möglichkeit
und Notwendigkeit stützt. Im Anschluss daran werden
zentrale Grundpfeiler einer analytischen Geschichtstheologie gerechtfertigt
bevor in einem letzten Schritt argumentiert wird, dass
die zentrale Herausforderung einer metaphysisch allumfassenden
Geschichtstheologie neben der Rechtfertigung der Möglichkeit des
Bösen in der Geschichte der Welt darin besteht, ontologischen Zufall
und menschliche Freiheit mit göttlicher Allwissenheit und Vorsehung
zu vermitteln.

CITE AS: Corcoran, John. 1999.  “Laws of thought”.  Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.  R. Audi, Ed.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP. p. 489.

Laws of thought are laws by which or in accordance with which valid thought proceeds, or that justify valid inference, or to which all valid deduction is reducible. Laws of thought are rules that apply without exception to any subject matter of thought, etc.; sometimes they are said to be the object of logic. The expression, rarely used in exactly the same sense by different authors, has long been associated with three equally ambiguous expressions: the law of identity (ID), the law of contradiction (or non-contradiction; NC), and the law of excluded middle (EM).
The so-called “logical truths” of standard first-order logic as discussed in mainstream logic works such as Corcoran-Masoud 2014 and 2015 are uninterpreted sentences and thus not even true.
Nevertheless, they too have been called laws of thought even though they are not laws in any normal sense. Other people unacquainted with traditional usage are inclined to think that a law of thought is a law that might be arrived at by thought, which could make ‘law of thought’ coextensive with ‘law’.
Sometimes, these three expressions—ID, NC, and EM— are taken as propositions of formal ontology having the widest possible subject matter, propositions that apply to entities per se: (ID), every thing is (i.e., is identical to) itself; (NC) no thing having a given quality also has the negative of that quality (e.g., no even number is non-even); (EM) every thing either has a given quality or has the negative of that quality (e.g., every number is either even or non-even).

This paper first discusses how Russell and Hochberg have addressed some phenomena of relatedness, notably relational order, in a similarly “positionalist” way, but by appealing to different sorts of formal relations: “positions” in Russell’s case and “ordering relations” in Hochberg’s. After pointing out some shortcomings of both approaches, the paper then proposes an alternative view based on “o-roles,” which are, roughly speaking, ontological counterparts of the thematic roles postulated in linguistics. It is argued that o-roles are sort of middle-of-the-road entities in the sense that they have the  virtues of positions and those of ordering relations, without having their respective vices. Some tentative ideas on which o-roles should be acknowledged are also put forward.

In an environment characterized by the emergence of new and diverse (and often opposed) philosophical efforts, there is a need for a conception of philosophy that will promote the exchange and critical consideration of divergent insights. Depending upon the operative conception, philosophical efforts can be viewed as significant, insightful and instructive, or unimportant, misguided and not “real” philosophy. This paper develops John Dewey's conception of philosophy as a mode of inquiry in contrast with Bertrand Russell's conception of philosophy as a mode of analysis. I argue that while Russell's analytic conception of philosophy justifies the dismissal of non-analytic philosophies, Dewey's conception of philosophy provides a theoretical framework for the comparison, evaluation and interaction of alternatives.

When we engage in communication, the success of our communicative acts depends on whether we understand each other. This intersubjective understanding depends on both, that the words we use have a meaning and that we know what our words mean. The question which then arises is, what does constitutes the meaning of our words? With regard to this question Wittgenstein claimed that what constitutes the meaning of our words is their rule-guided use in the language. Hence, knowing the meaning of a word means knowing how to use it, in accordance with rules. Grice has criticized this Wittgensteinian view, arguing that meaning and use shall not be confused and that meaning can be analyzed in terms of speakers' intentions. This will enable us to account for cases in which utterances are produced in the absence of rules. What I aim at is to compare these two views in order to shed light on the phenomenon of unconventional language use. To give a philosophical account of the unconventional use of language can help us to grasp not only how intersubjective understanding works, but also why it matters to understand the other.

This book explores the complex domain of social reality, asking what this reality is, how it is composed and what its dynamics are in both theoretical and practical terms. Through the examination of some of the most important contemporary theories of social ontology, the book discusses the fundamentals of the discipline and lays the foundations for its development in the political sphere. By analyzing the notion of State and the redesign of ontology, the author argues in favor of a realist conception of the State and shows the reasons why this promotes a better understanding of the dynamics of power and the actualization of a greater justice between generations. This book captures the relationship between different generations within the same political context, and presents it as a necessary condition for the re-definition of the concepts of State and meta-State.

David Lewis’s theory of possible worlds is considered as unable to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. This book discusses some ways how this can be done. Chapter I outlines the Lewisian well-defined conception of analysis and motivates the discourse about impossibles. In Chapter II, I present a particular impossibility generated by genuine MR and several options available to Lewis in order to account for it. Chapter III discusses a specific epistemological worry regarding MR and shows that the worry is unjustified. Chapter IV outlines two theories of impossible worlds deemed as ersatz impossibilia. I stress their advantages as well as their limitations. Finally, Chapter V explores several strategies how to avoid unwanted consequences, given that we accept full- blooded impossibilia within our ontology.

Modern secular-thought has detached modern religion from both human intellect and nature.  Secular evolution, they tell us, has transcended religion in a world driven by blind fate in which we are the derivative of animals.  The religion of the divine prophets (as explained by Maimonides) held that man (ie. Human) is distinct from animals by his intellect, which is inextricably linked to divine Providence.  In this chapter he discusses five theories on Providence.

He concludes by saying; “the theory that Divine Providence does not extend to man [with] no difference between man and other animals, implies very bad notions about God ; it disturbs all social order, removes and destroys all the moral and intellectual virtues of man.”

In his classic 1955 paper " Evil and Omnipotence, " Mackie maintains that since the problem of evil is a necessary result of the incompatibility of the belief in the existence of a wholly good and powerful God with the belief in the reality of evil, the only adequate solution to the problem of evil is to deny either one of these two beliefs. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve the problem of evil, as formulated by Mackie, by explaining away the alleged incompatibility between the two beliefs. I advance two arguments against Mackie's formulation: its failure to consider that God, being a perfect being, has other divine attributes (in addition to being wholly good and powerful) which come into play in the manner by which He exercises His omnipotence; and its confusion of God's decision to exercise His omnipotence in certain ways with the limits of His power (or, in particular, its confusion of what God decides not to do with what He cannot do).

I ask questions about the intersubjectivities associated with the discipline, its pre-suppositions, institutionalized problems, aims, objectives, purposes, domains, terms,  etc.

I commence with the existence of individuals of the human species, the manner in which they are aware of, relate to,perceive, think and think about the universe they find themselves in.

I mention the domains employed by philosophy to explore, talk about and explain human beings in the universe, I intend to explore a number of aspccts of the discourse of philosophy and the doing of philosophizing.
namely metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, religion, the arts and the tools being employed for the doing of philosophy.

I question institutionalized problems, the professionalization and institutionalization of philosophy and I ask if its problems are meaningful and the ways in which it deals with them are the most appropriate

These are some of the limits of philosophy identified. It cannot meaningfully do the work of the sciences. It can be an area of study, research, teaching and learning like the Classics. Or, it can be done as reasoned reflection on any subject, issues, topics, phenomena by words, or performance and XPHI philosophy activities or expressions.  There  are three ways available to the doing of philosophy or about philosophy.
1.1
The institutionalized academic thinking and writing about it, and the study and teaching of it. This concerns already existing ideas from the past and the work of others from the present.
1.2
As actions or activities such as in performance and experimental philosophy.
1.3
Then there is the opposite pole to 1.1  dealing with the work of others, on the continuum of philosophically related activies, namely original, creative thinking.
This consists of reasoned and argued reflection by means of concepts on any ideas, phenomena, topics, issues, anything and everything.

Enactivism is a major research programme in the philosophy of perception. Yet its metaphysical status is unclear, since it is claimed to avoid both idealism and realism yet still has aspects of both within it. One attempt to solve this conundrum is based on the fusion of enactivism with phenomenology and the mathematical concept of symmetry breaking (Moss Brender, 2013). I suggest this is not entirely successful and propose it needs the addition of a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics (for example, Informational Structural Realism). The processes we commonly call 'perception' are causal transfers of information at certain levels in the hierarchy of meaningful structures that comprise physical reality. Phenomenologists could use the word 'perception' metaphorically across all levels, although realists need not do so.