Whose racism are you protesting exactly?

Posted on June 3, 2020 by Eric Verlo

SO “WOKE” America is protesting the racist brutality of capitalism’s hired thugs. What are the cops supposed to stop doing exactly? Are they supposed to let poor blacks breathe? Or stop killing poor blacks in such vivid disproportion? What an aimless message these riots bring! Of course the mainstream media is on board. Their theme is domestic unrest with an eye on regime change. It’s what they incite everywhere else. I’m surprised they haven’t labeled this a “color” revolution –except the color is already chosen and it’s their least favorite.

The only result of the visibility which the Black Lives Matter movement has brought to police lynchings is that now you hear regret that poor white criminals aren’t dished out the beatings reserved for blacks. Do we want more police brutality so long as it is equally distributed? Cops aren’t going to stop beating people. It’s their job. In an unequal, predatory economic system, cruelty is a cop’s function.

I also laugh at the celebrity blow-back at unfortunate white protesters who take up the chant “All Lives Matter” usually in earnest because their marches, reflecting their local populations, are mainly white. Their chants don’t negate “Black Lives Matter,” they broaden it. Face it, the BLM slogan is pedantic. Of course Black Lives Matter. The protesters are not illiterate and neither are the police, the supposed audience.

And BLM is such an inarticulate ask. Try “Drone Victims Matter!” Uh, agreed, but the US drone terror program is not going to stand down.

And “hands up” and “taking a knee” are demonstrations of submission. Ugh.

If the issue is in-the-line-of-duty lynchings, I’m sorry but there are unfortunates a rung below African Americans. Per capita, Native Americans die more often at the hand of law enforcement, and below them, the homeless. Constables have been “rolling” poor bums since antiquity. Vulnerable homeless are killed, white and black, in dark alleys, without witnesses sober enough to record it with charged cell phones and Youtube accounts at home. And without faith leaders to rouse their congregations, or order churchgoers to heel once the fundraising was done.

If the George Floyd protests are made to be about discrimination against African Americans in general, and not Floyd’s tragic death-by-cop, then who is co-opting the message really?

Fortunately these riots will prove a difficult genie to ride. Images of civil discord make Trump look bad, but the more violent they become, the more activated will be the middle Americans who cheer for order to be restored.

That same white middle class wants their landscapers and household help to be hispanic who won’t expect to be treated as equals. Immigrant labor is preferred for the same reason. The upper class don’t have to discriminate by skin color. If you are underclass, YOU Do Not Matter.

Supposedly all of America is expected to suppress its racism. That’ll happen when you cease showing deference to family members over strangers, or when you quit disabusing sports fans for rooting against your home team. Clans, schools, ethnicity, and nationality are natural constructs where people feel communal bonds. They are also the only instinctive means by which people find their strength in numbers. Strange we’re all being told to disavow those instincts.

Meanwhile ethnocentrism relating to religious affiliation, if you’ve got one, is still encouraged. Nationalism, when it comes to kicking other religious ass overseas is still applauded. What of that racism?

When cops start beating bank chairmen, when the international brotherhood of man includes the bosses who deploy the cops and not simply the dupes more easily oppressed with racist state terrorism, then we can consider integrating the role of police into our vision of a desirable community. In other words, it ain’t going to happen. Calls to disband or defund the police are great, but until people wield the political power to do it, the calls will be easily refused.

Focusing on race doesn’t unite people, and it doesn’t only divide black and white, it attempts to efface everyone’s chief means to draw individuals together in united fronts against their common foe. Once we’re all free we can talk about equality.

Now addressing the systemic repression of blacks is another matter. African Americans were not immigrants. They alone came to these shores without the promise of the American dream of making a better life for themselves. REPARATIONS and affirmative action, that’s the only recourse to attempt to redress such inequality of footing.

Join the protests if you want, but know they’re serving only the corporate agenda of international liberalism. If you’re all about that, do your best to pull the demonstrations toward the peaceful, lest our president benefit from the gesture of saving middle America from anarchy. But know that team .gov holds all the cards when it comes to inciting and even instigating the violence. They are both ANTI and FA.

Storm Bastille. Load Guillotine. Done.

Posted on December 3, 2017 by Eric Verlo

Tax cuts for the rich. Higher deficit interest to the bankers. Less healthcare, Social Security and safety net for you. Ceaseless war for corporate imperialists, continued resource extraction for climate depopulation, and more austerity for the middle class. 21st Century oligarchs say: let the poor eat shitcake.

D’YA THINK THE TIME TO ACT IS NOW?! You already went to the polls. You elected a democrat president who served only money lenders and warmongers. You already had a democrat majority in Congress. You already called your representative. You already sent them petitions. No matter the party, rich asshole politicians will pass laws to favor the rich. EAT THE RICH is good for laughs but first you gotta catch them. The French Revolution left us a blueprint that historians have tried to distort and blur ever since. Rise up! Overrun the security citadel. Decapitate the hydra of state. This time, spare not a single Mandarin. Minus greedy sociopaths, the average human nature is good.

Iraq War embed Rob McClure, witness to war crimes he didn’t report, suffers phantom pain in gonads he never had.

Posted on November 28, 2017 by Eric Verlo

DENVER, COLORADO- Today Occupy Denver political prisoner Corey Donahue was given a nine month sentence for a 2011 protest stunt. Judge Nicole Rodarte’s unexpected harsh sentence came after the court read the victim statement of CBS4 cameraman Rob McClure, who said he still feels the trauma of the uninvited “cupping [of his] balls” while he was filming the 2011 protest encampment at the state capitol. Donahue admits that McClure was the target of a “nut-tap”, but insists it was feigned, as occupiers demonstrated their disrespect to the corporate news crews who were intent on demonizing the homeless participants even as Denver riot police charged the park. Though a 2012 jury convicted Donahue of misdemeanor unwanted sexual contact, witnesses maintain there was no physical contact.

Of course simply the implication of contact would have humiliated McClure in front of the battalion of police officers amused by the antic. That’s authentic sexual trauma, just as a high school virgin is violated when a braggart falsely claims to have of engaged them in sexual congress. Donahue was wrong, but how wrong? Can professionals who dish it out claim infirmity when the tables are turned?

Ultimately the joke was on Donahue, because his mark turned out to be far more vulnerable than his dirty job would have suggested. The CBS4 cameraman who Donahue picked on was a louse’s louse.

Off limits?
While some might assert there is no context which would excuse touching a stranger’s genital region, I’m not sure the rule of no hitting below the belt is a civility to which folks facing riot cops are in accord. Protesters can’t shoot cops, they can’t spit at cops, in fact protesters have to pull all their punches. Some would have you believe demonstrators should do no more than put daisies in police gun barrels, all the while speaking calmly with only pleasant things to say.

Let me assure you, simply to defy police orders is already a humiliation for police. What’s some pantomimed disrespect? Humiliating riot cops is the least unarmed demonstrators can do against batons and shields and pepper spray. Should the authorities’ private parts be off limits for a public’s expression of discontent? Jocks wear jock straps precisely because private parts aren’t off sides.

It’s tempting to imagine that all cops are human beings who can be turned from following orders to joining in protestations of injustice and inequity. This is of course nonsense. But it’s even more delusional to think corporate media cameras and reporters will ever take a sympathetic line to the travails of dissidents. Media crews exploit public discontent just as riot cops enjoy the overtime. Media crews gather easy stories of compelling interest from interviewees eager to have their complaints be understood.

Corey Donahue
On October 15, 2011, Rob McClure turned his camera off when the narrative wasn’t fitting the derogatory spin he wanted to put on the homeless feeding team which manned Occupy Denver’s kitchen, dubbed “The Thunderdome.” Donahue observed the cameraman’s deliberate black out of the savory versus the unsavory and reciprocated with the crowd pleasing nut-tap. In the midst of this circus, Colorado State Troopers, METRO SWAT, and city riot police charged the encampment and made two dozen arrests.

It was hours later, perhaps after reviewing police surveillance footage, that McClure conferred with police commanders and agreed to press charges for the nut-tap. Corey Donahue was one of the high visibility leaders of the crowd. He’d been involved in multiple arrests, but this time his bond would be higher and harder to post because instead of the usual anti-protest violations, Donahue would be charged with sex crime.

Ultimately Donahue sought political asylum in South America rather than face having to report for the rest of his life as a sex offender. The offense was only a misdemeanor and his trial was a miscarriage of justice. Attorney friends later convinced Donahue to return to the US because this crime was arguably not sex related and was likely to be overturned on appeal. Likewise, a sentence was unlikely to exceed time served as the “nut-tap” paled in comparison to the police brutality and excessive force which has since ensued. Neither Judge Rodarte or victim Rob McClure got the memo, and it wasn’t the first time McClure failed to frame public outcry in the context of brutal militarized repression.

It turns out McClure’s own self respect was probably way too fragile to have ventured to cast stones at the slovenly homeless occupiers.

Rob McClure
Cameraman Robert McClure had been an embedded reporter in Iraq in 2004. You might expect such a experience to have toughened him up, or expanded his empathy for critics of US authoritarian brutality, but that is to underestimate the culpability of the corporate media war drum beaters.

And McClure’s guilt ran deeper that that. According to his CBS4 bio, McClure was reporting from a major military detention center. It turns out McClure covered Abu Fucking Ghraib. In 2004 McClure’s assignment was to distort what happened there as rogue misconduct. No thanks to fuckers like McClure, the Abu Ghraib techniques were later confirmed to be standard protocol. The US torture and humiliation of prisoners was systemic.

McClure’s coverage for CBS4 specifically glorified Dr. Dave Hnida, otherwise a family physician from Littleton, but in the service of the military as a battlefield surgeon assigned to treat prisoners of war. While it sounds commendatory to attend to the health of our sworn adversaries, in practice that job involves most commonly reviving prisoners being subjected to interrogation. Hnida’s task was to keep subjects conscious for our extended depredations. Medical colleagues call those practitioners “torture docs”. They shouldn’t be celebrated. They should lose their medical licenses.

So that’s the Rob McClure who wrote Judge Rodarte to say that after all these years, having witnessed unthinkable horror and sadistic injustice, while still spinning stories to glorify American soldiers and killer cops and power-tripping jailers, the memory of Corey Donahue’s prank made his balls hurt.

Unexpected hagiography of pedophilic sodomy admitted by catholic priests to being “suggestive” instead of noxious.

Posted on November 22, 2017 by Eric Verlo

The pedophile priest theme has been set in stone. A catholic school in Australia commissioned a statue of St Martin de Porres offering a penis sandwich to a child who stands no taller than most convenient. The child’s hands are cupped as if receiving communion. Is the granite statue historically inaccurate? Probably its likeness is timeless. I’m thinking of the resignation to mechanical carnality and the stone cold gaze. De Porres was a Dominican brother in 16th Century Lima, Peru. No doubt the ritual depicted here reflects “Martin the Compassionate” at his least menacing. When he wasn’t molesting children, De Porres was administrating the enslavement of South America’s indigenous people for Spain’s colonial silver mines.

When repulsed parents lambasted the newly installed statue at the Blackfriars Priory School in Adelaide, the priests agreed to cover it up. They conceded that the placement of the loaf of bread -in hand- was “suggestive” of a less palatable offering. While indeed the pose could be said to suggest misconduct, the adjective was paired with another term which only a pederast would be clueless enough to offer: “riské!” Yes, Father, do cover the statue if you suspect your fellow friars will find the little scene titillating. So that’s the Catholic church on pedophilia: it’s set in stone, and kept under wraps.

Denver magistrate separates mother from breastfeeding infant. Jail refuses pump, as they do common decency.

Posted on September 20, 2017 by Eric Verlo

DENVER, COLORADO- A heartbreaking scene unfolded yesterday when Denver Magistrate Kate Boland decided to impose a $10,000 bond on a domestic violence detainee, against the recommendations of the husband (victim), the public defender, and even the city prosecutor, who all wanted the 35-yr-old mother of five released on personal recognizance. Most critical, no consideration was paid to the family’s month-old infant who is breastfeeding. Neither by Boland, nor the downtown detention center, known for its systemic disrespect for the rights and needs of its inmates.

You might not care how poorly criminals or their children are treated, but the inmates of jails are suspects, not convicts. They are unconvicted detainees held on some officer’s probable cause. They’re suspected of a crime, but have a right to a fair trial (under the 6th Amendment) and a right not to be punished before conviction (under the 14th). Depending on who calls 911, they could be YOU.

For those reasons (and the Golden Rule and the social contract), jails have to show a semblance of concern for the still innocent lives disrupted in their care. Denver’s Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center has a famously outlandish record in that regard. Marvin Booker and Michael Marshall are two well known extremes to which Denver sheriffs deputies have disrespected inmates’ lives. A rare survivor, Jamal Hunter, was awarded $3.25 million for beatings he received there. Unfortunately his settlement was contingent on burying the evidence of broader misconduct, thanks Jamal.

Those cases have generated reviews and reforms, but abuses persist. Isn’t it amazing that after repeated court-ordered overhauls, the public could still be told “the detention cenver has no protocols for breastfeeding mothers.”

Magistrate Boland made no allowance for the accused mother to maintain her feedings. After the morning hearing, friends learned the jail didn’t care to accomodate the mother either. That afternoon Baby Thomas became ill and began vomiting, so the father brought the baby to the visitor’s lobby hoping emergency visits could be arranged. The jail said no, though after some persuading, a sergeant agreed to convey a breastpump to the mother if one was supplied. A device was purchased and submitted, but the jail recinded their offer. This time a charge nurse named “Monica” explained she was under no obligation to comply, that she’d called her boss at Denver General who confirmed it. Without a court order, she said, the jail had no further responsibility.

By now activists with Denver Court Support were agitating online about the plight of Baby Thomas. The jail was innundated with telephone calls. The sheriffs cleared the public lobby, cancelled visitations, and put the facility in lockdown in anticipation of a rally.

Nevermind feeding Baby Thomas, release his mother immediately. Activists had raised the monies needed to hire a bondsman to post the bond. The jail was urged to expedite the mother’s release once bond was posted.

Shouldn’t inmates be release when they’ve paid to have their freedom? This is where the Van Cise-Simonet’s disrespect is arbitrary, punitive, and universal. Time to process inmates, either intake or release, takes forever, or just feels like it. Denver’s Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center likes to take a MINIMUM of 11 HOURS for these proceedures.

The pretext for the first delay is “for fingerprints to clear”. Enough time for INTERPOL in Timbuktu to review your prints and give the all clear, because they can’t be expected to be standing at the fax machine at all hours of the day, the jailers explain.

That step is required before a bond can be posted. Once a bond is paid, an inmate’s release requires a second computer delay. Also commonly at least eleven hours. The jailers attribute that wait to “that’s how long the system takes.”

On occasion we’ve seen public pressure result in a shortening of the release time. The upshot is the the release time appears to be at the jail’s whim. In the case of our breastfeeding mother the jail wouldn’t budge.

Worse for Baby Thomas’ mother, someone new to the bonding desk re-initiated the print clearing process instead of terminating it. She had to wait another interminable cycle.

The mother was taken into custody on Monday, her prints cleared by Tuesday morning. After the hearing in Room 2300, where the $10,000 bond was set, the bondsman tried to pay but learned he had to wait. The aforementioned administrative error meant it wouldn’t be before WEDNESDAY morning when her bond could be posted. Everyone is awaiting her release STILL.

As it stands, the mother is supposed to be fitted with an ankle bracelet by 8pm today. That will make it more than 48 hours that she’ll have been in custody. Mothers under stress withheld from feeding infants can stop lactating in less than that time.

The specifics of this domestic violence case are few. A neighbor called the police because the mother was seen holding a knife. The police chose to charge the mother and take her into custody. Who knows what the whole story is. The Denver Court Support activists didn’t get involved to solve the couple’s problems. Because that’s beside the point.

A child shouldn’t have to be harmed while authorities sort this out. An infant deprived of breastmilk suffers a calculable detriment which this magistrate and this jail could minimize, if they cared.

It’s hard to imagine anyone cares at Van Cise-Simonet. The jail is notorious for inedible food and poor health standards. The 23-hour lockdown is standard in all pods. Right now we hear that inmates are sleeping three to four in a cell which has only bunks for two. The one or two extra sleep on the concrete floor. This of course in addition to the litigated sadism of the Denver jailers.

Last night, outside the door of the jail, the Denver sheriffs deputies eventually re-admitted visitors into the lobby at 8pm, but kept the activists outside. Then deputies lined up and started warning the father’s friends to “calm down”. That warning and the posture of the deputies was recognizable to activists –and to many African Americans– as the precursor to the use of tasers. The only option was to leave.

UPDATE: The mother wasn’t able to rejoin her children until 10PM Wednesday. The baby is okay, although no doubt impacted by the interrupted feedings. At a public meeting the next evening to address law enforcement accountability to the community, activists told officials about what happened. They were told by the Denver Sheriff Patrick Firman that the jail DOES HAVE A POLICY to handle breastfeeding and that he was very sorry his employees didn’t know to tell the complainant.

Of course it was the 7th cavalry at Nogun Ri

Posted on April 27, 2017 by Brother Jonah

Even the rightest wing-est extremist in Texas don’t hold a candle to Some Colorado Wingnuts, the ones who call Natives “prairie niggers” or “wagon burners”, especially when any negative reviews of the Seventh Cavalry massacres. Like Wounded knee, a vengeance quest for Custer and a bunch of his homicidal lunatic troopers got their own asses sent to Hell. And before that, at the Little Ouachita, murdering men, women and children at a mostly Cheyenne winter encampment. Must not criticize heroic asswipes like Custer. Oh, that song they adopted, Garryowen, that’s about a really rowdy custom (performed by the lads of Garryowen, a town in Ireland) of getting drunk and beating up on cops. Anyhoo, I got this from Wiki because it’s easy. Sue me. It’s about another massacre and why the people of Korea aren’t as enthusiastic about the U.S. Big Brother as the South Korean Government. Hint: it’s because the corrupt U.S. Government pays the S. Korean Puppet Government to pretend to like us.

The No Gun Ri massacre (Hangul: ??? ??? ?? ??; Hanja: ?????????; RR: Nogeun-ri minganin haksal sageon) occurred on July 26–29, 1950, early in the Korean War, when an undetermined number of South Korean refugees were killed in a U.S. air attack and by small- and heavy-weapons fire of the 7th U.S. Cavalry at a railroad bridge near the village of Nogeun-ri (Korean: ???), 100 miles (160 km) southeast of Seoul. In 2005, a South Korean government inquest certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded, and added that many other victims’ names were not reported. The South Korean government-funded No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimated in 2011 that 250–300 were killed, mostly women and children.

The incident was little-known outside Korea until publication of an Associated Press (AP) story in 1999 in which 7th Cavalry veterans corroborated survivors’ accounts. The AP also uncovered declassified U.S. Army orders to fire on approaching civilians because of reports of North Korean infiltration of refugee groups. Some details were disputed, but the massacre account was found to be essentially correct. In 2001, the U.S. Army conducted an investigation and, after previously rejecting survivors’ claims, acknowledged the killings, but described the three-day event as “an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not a deliberate killing”. The army rejected survivors’ demands for an apology and compensation. United States President Bill Clinton issued a statement of regret, adding the next day that “things happened which were wrong”.

South Korean investigators disagreed with the U.S. report, saying that they believed that 7th Cavalry troops were ordered to fire on the refugees. The survivors’ group called the U.S. report a “whitewash”. The AP later discovered additional archival documents showing that U.S. commanders ordered troops to “shoot” and “fire on” civilians at the war front during this period; these declassified documents had been found but not disclosed by the Pentagon investigators. American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported that among the undisclosed documents was a letter from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea stating that the U.S. military had adopted a theater-wide policy of firing on approaching refugee groups. Despite demands, the U.S. investigation was not reopened.

Prompted by the exposure of No Gun Ri, survivors of similar alleged incidents from 1950–51 filed reports with the Seoul government. In 2008, an investigative commission said more than 200 cases of alleged large-scale killings by the U.S. military had been registered, mostly air attacks

If you’re a vet from that arena, and was above the rank of captain at the time, I won’t give two thirds of a sex act about your damn feelings.

As homeless defendants face camping charges, Denver courts lie to jurors.

Posted on April 5, 2017 by Eric Verlo

DENVER, COLORADO- Trial began yesterday for three homeless activists charged with violating Denver’s Unauthorized Camping Law. An ordinance enacted in 2012 partly as a coordinated response to Occupy Wall Street encampments across the country, partly to smooth the city’s gentrification plans. Though six years old, the ordinance has escaped judicial scrutiny by DPD’s careful avoidance of citing only homeless victims in no position to fight the charges in court. Deliberate civil disobedience attempts have been thwarted by the city bringing other charges in lieu of the “Urban Camping Ban” for which police threatened arrests. Thus Denver Homeless Out Loud’s coup of at last dragging this sham into the Lindsey Flanigan Courthouse has generated plenty of interest. I counted four print reporters and three municipal court judges in the audience! From a jury pool of forty, city prosecutors were able to reject the many who stated outright they could not condemn the homeless defendants for the mere act of trying to survive. At one point the jury selection process was stymied for an hour trying to fill one remaining alternate seat because each successive candidate would not “check their social values at the door.” One potential juror, a hairdresser, became alarmed that all the sympathetic candidates would be purged and so she refused to say how she felt about the homeless. She was removed and they were. As usual jurors were told it was not their place to decide against enforcing bad law. Only those who agreed were allowed to stay. And of course that’s a lie. The only way bad laws are struck down, besides an act of congress, a please reflect how that near impossibility has spawned its own idiom, is when good jurors search their conscience and stand up for defendants.

For those who might have wanted to get out of jury duty, it was an easy day. Show some humanity, provoke authentic laughter of agreement by declaring “Ain’t no way I’m convicting people for camping.” The jury pool heard that Denver’s definition of camping is “to dwell in place with ANY FORM OF SHELTER” which could be a tent, sleeping bag, blanket, even newspaper.

Several jury candidates stated they had relatives who were homeless. Another suggested it would be an injustice to press charges such as these.

“So this isn’t a case for you” the city lawyer asked.

“This isn’t a case for anyone” the prospective juror exclaimed, to a wave of enthusiam from the jury pool and audience.

Another prospect said she didn’t think this case should be prosecuted. The city attorney then asked, “so you couldn’t be fair?”

“I am being fair” she answered. All of these juror prospects were eliminated.

What remained of the jury pool were citizens who swear to uphold whatever law, however vile. One juror that remained even said she gives the benefit of the doubt to police officers. Not removed.

But there is hope because they couldn’t remove everyone. Of the six that remain, one juror agreed to follow the law, even if it was a law which he knew was wrong. That juror works in the legal cannabis industry. He admits he breaks federal law every day. That law is worng he says, but if he has to, he’ll abide by this one.

He admitted, “I can find them guilty. But I’ll have to live with that guilt for the rest of my life.” Ha. Technically the city had to live with that answer.

Another juror recognized that this case was about more than the three homeless defendants. “This case affects not just these three, but the countless homeless outside” gesturing to the whole of downtown Denver.

4/5 UPDATE:
In closing arguments the city lawyers reminded the jury that they swore to uphold the law. No they didn’t, but we’ll see what verdict emerges. After only a couple minutes from beginning deliberations, a juror emerged with this question: if the defendants are found guilty, can the juror pay their fine?

EPILOG:
Well the City of Denver breathes a sign of relief tonight. By which I mean, Denver’s injustice system, Denver’s cops, Denver’s gentrifiers and ordinary residents who are uncomfortable with sharing their streets with the city’s homeless. Today’s offenders were CONVICTED of violating the ordinance that criminalizes the poor for merely trying to shelter from the elements. Today the police and prosecutors and judge and jury acted as one to deliver a message to Denver homeless: no matter the hour, no matter how cold, pick up your things and move along.

This time it wasn’t a jury of yuppy realtors and business consultants that wiped their feet on homeless defendants. It was a cross section of a jury pool that yesterday looked promising.

Today when the jury entered with their verdict the courtroom audience was able to see which juror had been appointed the jury foreman. The revelation wasn’t comforting. Though not the typically dominating white male, this foreman was a female Air Force officer who had declared during voir dire that she had no greater loyalty than law and order. As the jury pool overflowed that first day with professions of sympathy for the homeless, it was the Air Force office, Juror Number Two, who grabbed the microphone to assert that rule of law must always prevail.

Yes, in the interest of optimism I had glossed over those lesser interesting juror statements, in hope that they were only playing to what prosecutors wanted to hear. Left on the jury was a domineering older woman who had said she gives police officers the benefit of the doubt.

An older man, an organist, whose father had been the CEO of a major Fortune 500 company, actually thought that homeless people should be arrested.

I’ll admit now that everyone’s hopes had been pinned on the pot guy who swore he’d have to live with his guilt forever. And so now it’s come to pass.

When those very small people of the jury go home tonight, and eventually read what they’ve done, upheld Denver’s odious, UN-condemned anti-homeless law, they’re going to figure out that they were made to administer the system’s final blow. And Denver couldn’t have done it without them.

The prosecutor had told the jury in her closing statement, that despite the tragic circumstances, everyone was doing their job, the police, the city attorneys, and the judge, and now the jury was expected to do its job. Except that was another lie. It wasn’t the jury’s “job”. They didn’t enlist and they weren’t paid to be executors of the city’s inhuman injustice machine. Whether by ignorance, poor education, or the courtroom team’s duplicity, this jury chose to do it.

But the ignorance runs deep. Judge Lombardi, in her closing remarks to the defendants, reiterated that all the elements had been proved and that justice was served. She praised the jury’s verdict and explained that the only way they could have found otherwise was through “jury nullification”. She said those words after the jury had been dismissed, but she said them on the record, two words that lawyers and defendants are forbidden to utter. In full Judge Lombardi added “and juries are not allowed to do jury nullification.” As if we all can be misled by that lie.

Colo. US District Court judge enjoins DIA to limit restriction of free speech (grants our preliminary injunction!)

Posted on February 22, 2017 by Eric Verlo

DENVER, COLORADO- If your civil liberties have ever been violated by a cop, over your objections, only to have the officer say “See you in court”, this victory is for YOU! On January 29 we were threatened with arrest for protesting the “Muslim Ban” at Denver International Airport. We argued that our conduct was protected speech and that they were violating our rights. They dismissed our complaints with, in essense: “That’s for a court to decide.” And today IT HAS! On Feb 15 we summoned the cops to federal court and this morning, Feb 22, US District Court Judge William Martinez granted our preliminary injunction, severely triming DIA’s protest permit process. In a nutshell: no restrictions on signs, size of assemblies or their location within the main terminal (so long as the airport’s function is not impeded). Permits are still required but with 24 hours advance notice, not seven days. Below is Judge Martinez’ 46-page court order in full:

Document 29 Filed 02/22/17 USDC Colorado

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge William J. Martínez

Civil Action No. 17-cv-0332-WJM-MJW

NAZLI MCDONNELL, and
ERIC VERLO,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,?
DENVER POLICE COMMANDER ANTONIO LOPEZ,
in his individual and official capacity, and?
DENVER POLICE SERGEANT VIRGINIA QUIÑONES,
in her individual and official capacity,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN PART
________________________________________________________

Plaintiffs Nazli McDonnell (“McDonnell”) and Eric Verlo (“Verlo”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) sue the City and County of Denver (“Denver”), Denver Police Commander Antonio Lopez (“Lopez”) and Denver Police Sergeant Virginia Quiñones (“Quiñones”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for allegedly violating Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they prevented Plaintiffs from protesting without a permit in the Jeppesen Terminal at Denver International Airport (“Airport” or “Denver Airport”). (ECF No. 1.) Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which seeks to enjoin Denver from enforcing some of its policies regarding demonstrations and protests at the Airport. (ECF No. 2.) This motion has been fully briefed (see ECF Nos. 2, 20, 21, 23) and the Court held an evidentiary hearing on February 15, 2017 (“Preliminary Injunction Hearing”).

For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted to the following limited extent:

• Defendants must issue an expressive activity permit on twenty-four hours’ notice in circumstances where an applicant, in good faith, seeks a permit for the purpose of communicating topical ideas reasonably relevant to the purposes and mission of the Airport, the immediate importance of which could not have been foreseen seven days or more in advance of the commencement of the activity for which the permit is sought, or when circumstances beyond the control of the permit applicant prevented timely filing of the application; ?

• Defendants must make all reasonable efforts to accommodate the applicant’s preferred demonstration location, whether inside or outside of the Jeppesen Terminal, so long as the location is a place where the unticketed public is normally allowed to be; ?

• Defendants may not enforce Denver Airport Regulation 50.09’s prohibition against “picketing” (as that term is defined in Denver Airport Regulation 50.02-8) within the Jeppesen Terminal; and ?

• Defendants may not restrict the size of a permit applicant’s proposed signage beyond that which may be reasonably required to prevent the impeding of the normal flow of travelers and visitors in and out of Jeppesen Terminal; and specifically, Defendants may not enforce Denver Airport Regulation 50.08-12’s requirement that signs or placards be no larger than one foot by one foot. ??

Any relief Plaintiffs seek beyond the foregoing is denied at this phase of the case. In particular, the Court will not require the Airport to accommodate truly spontaneous demonstrations (although the Airport remains free to do so); the Court will not require the Airport to allow demonstrators to unilaterally determine the location within the Jeppesen Terminal that they wish to demonstrate; and the Court will not strike down the Airport’s usual seven-day notice-and-permit requirement as unconstitutional in all circumstances.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the parties’ filings, and on the documentary and testimonial evidence received at the evidentiary hearing, the Court makes the following findings of fact for purposes of resolving Plaintiffs’ Motion.?

A. Regulation 50

Pursuant to Denver Municipal Code § 5-16(a), Denver’s manager of aviation may “adopt rules and regulations for the management, operation and control of [the] Denver Municipal Airport System, and for the use and occupancy, management, control, operation, care, repair and maintenance of all structures and facilities thereon, and all land on which [the] Denver Municipal Airport System is located and operated.” Under that authority, the manager of aviation has adopted “Rules and Regulations for the Management, Operation, Control, and Use of the Denver Municipal Airport System.” See https://www.flydenver.com/about/administration/rules_regulations (last accessed Feb. 16, 2017). Part 50 of those rules and regulations governs picketing, protesting, soliciting, and similar activities at the Airport. See https://www.flydenver.com/sites/default/files/rules/50_leafleting.pdf (last accessed Feb. 16, 2017). The Court will refer to Part 50 collectively as “Regulation 50.”

The following subdivisions of Regulation 50 are relevant to the parties’ current dispute:

• Regulation 50.03: “No person or organization shall leaflet, conduct surveys, display signs, gather signatures, solicit funds, or engage in other speech related activity at Denver International Airport for religious, charitable, or political purposes, or in connection with a labor dispute, except pursuant to, and in compliance with, a permit for such activity issued by the CEO [of the Airport] or his or her designee. . . .” ?

• Regulation 50.04-1: “Any person or organization desiring to leaflet, display signs, gather signatures, solicit funds, or engage in other speech related activity at Denver International Airport for religious, charitable, or political purposes, or in connection with a labor dispute, shall complete a permit application and submit it during regular business hours, at least seven (7) days prior to the commencement of the activity for which the permit is sought and no earlier than thirty (30) days prior to commencement of the activity. The permit application shall be submitted using the form provided by the Airport. The applicant shall provide the name and address of the person in charge of the activity, the names of the persons engaged in the activity, the nature of the activity, each location at which the activity is proposed to be conducted, the purpose of the activity, the hours during which the activity is proposed to be conducted, and the beginning and end dates of such activity. A labor organization shall also identify the employer who is the target of the proposed activity.”

• Regulation 50.04-3: “Upon presentation of a complete permit application ?and all required documentation, the CEO shall issue a permit to the applicant, if there is space available in the Terminal, applying only the limitations and regulations set forth in this Rule and Regulation . . . . Permits shall be issued on a first come-first served basis. No permits shall be issued by the CEO for a period of time in excess of thirty-one (31) days.” ?

• Regulation 50.04-5: “In issuing permits or allocating space, the CEO shall not exercise any discretion or judgment regarding the purpose or content of the proposed activity, except as provided in these Rules and Regulations. The issuance of a permit is a strictly ministerial function and does not constitute an endorsement by the City and County of Denver of any organization, cause, religion, political issue, or other matter.” ?

• Regulation 50.04-6: “The CEO may move expressive activity from one location to another and/or disperse such activity around the airport upon reasonable notice to each affected person when in the judgment of the CEO such action is necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the transportation function of the airport.” ?

• Regulation 50.08-12: “Individuals and organizations engaged in leafleting, solicitation, picketing, or other speech related activity shall not: * * * [w]ear or carry a sign or placard larger than one foot by one foot in size . . . .” (underscoring in original).

• Regulation 50.09: “Picketing not related to a labor dispute is prohibited in ?all interior areas of the Terminal and concourses, in the Restricted Area, and on all vehicular roadways, and shall not be conducted by more than two (2) persons at any one location upon the Airport.” ?

• Regulation 50.02-8: “Picketing shall mean one or more persons marching or stationing themselves in an area in order to communicate their position on a political, charitable, or religious issue, or a labor dispute, by displaying one or more signs, posters or similar devices” (underscoring in original).

The Airport receives about forty-five permit requests a year. No witness at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing (including Airport administrators who directly or indirectly supervise the permit process) could remember an instance in which a permit had been denied.

?Although there is no formal written, prescribed procedure for requesting expedited treatment of permit requests, the Airport not infrequently processes such requests and issues permits in less than seven days. Last November, less than seven days before Election Day, the Airport received a request from “the International Machinists” 1 to stage a demonstration ahead of the election. The Airport was able to process that request in two days and thereby permit the demonstration before Election Day.
?
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1 Presumably, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. ?
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B. The Executive Order

On Friday, January 27, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13769 (“Executive Order”). See 82 Fed. Reg. 8977. The Executive Order, among other things, established a 90-day ban on individuals from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States, a 120-day suspension of all refugee admissions, and an indefinite suspension of refugee admissions from Syria. Id. §§ 3(c), 5(a), 5(c). “The impact of the Executive Order was immediate and widespread. It was reported that thousands of visas were immediately canceled, hundreds of travelers with such visas were prevented from boarding airplanes bound for the United States or denied entry on arrival, and some travelers were detained.” Washington v. Trump, ___ F.3d. ___, ___, 2017 WL 526497, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017). As is well known, demonstrators and attorneys quickly began to assemble at certain American airports, both to protest the Executive Order and potentially to offer assistance to travelers being detained upon arrival.?

C. The January 28 Protest at the Denver Airport

Shortly after 1:00 p.m. on the following day—Saturday, January 28, 2017— Airport public information officer Heath Montgomery e-mailed Defendant Lopez, the police commander responsible for Denver’s police district encompassing the Airport. Lopez was off-duty at the time. Montgomery informed Lopez that he had received media inquiries about a protest being planned for the Airport later that day, and that no Regulation 50 permit had been issued for such a protest.

Not knowing any details about the nature or potential size of the protest, and fearing the possibility of “black bloc” and so-called “anarchist activities,” Lopez coordinated with other Denver Police officials to redeploy Denver Police’s gang unit from their normal assignments to the Airport. Denver Police also took uniformed officers out of each of the various other police districts and redeployed them to the Airport. Lopez called for these reinforcements immediately in light of the Airport’s significant distance from any other police station or normal patrol area. Lopez knew that if an unsafe situation developed, he could not rely on additional officers being able to get to the Airport quickly.

Through his efforts, Lopez was eventually able to assemble a force of about fifty officers over “the footprint of the entire airport,” meaning inclusive of all officers already assigned to the Airport who remained on their normal patrol duties. Lopez himself also came out to the Airport.

In the meantime, Montgomery had somehow learned of an organization known as the Colorado Muslim Connection that was organizing protesters through Facebook. Montgomery reached out to this organization through the Airport’s own Facebook account and informed them of Regulation 50’s permit requirement. (Ex. 32.) One of the Colorado Muslim Connection’s principals, Nadeen Ibrahim, then e-mailed Montgomery “to address the permit.” (Ex. 30.) Ibrahim told Montgomery:

The group of people we have will have a peaceful assembly carrying signs saying welcome here along with a choir and lots of flowers. Our goal is to stand in solidarity with our community members that have been detained at the airports since the signing of the executive order, though they do have active, legal visas/green cards. Additionally, we would like to show our physical welcoming presence for any newly arriving Middle Eastern sisters and brothers with visas. We do not intend to block any access to [the Airport].

(Id.) Montgomery apparently did not construe this e-mail as a permit request, or at least not a properly prepared one, and stated that “Denver Police will not allow a protest at the airport tonight. We are willing to work with you like any other group but there is a formal process for that.” (Id.)

Nonetheless, protesters began to assemble in the late afternoon and early evening in the Airport’s Jeppesen Terminal, specifically in the multi-storied central area known as the “Great Hall.” The Great Hall is a very large, rectangular area that runs north and south. The lower level of the Great Hall (level 5) has an enormous amount of floor space, and is ringed with offices and some retail shops, but the floor space itself is largely taken up by security screening facilities for departing passengers. The only relatively unobstructed area on level 5 is the middle third, which is currently designed primarily as a location for “meeters-and-greeters,” i.e., individuals waiting for passengers arriving from domestic flights who come up from the underground train connecting the Jeppesen Terminal with the various concourses. There is a much smaller meeters-and-greeters waiting area at the north end of level 5, where international arrivals exit from customs screening.

The upper level of the Great Hall (level 6) has much less floor space than level 5 given that it is mostly open to level 5 below. It is ringed with retail shops and restaurants. At its north end is a pedestrian bridge to and from the “A” concourse and its separate security screening area.

Given this design, every arriving and departing passenger at the Airport (i.e., all passengers except those only connecting through Denver), and nearly every other person having business at the airport (including employees, delivery persons, meeters-and-greeters, etc.), must pass through some portion of the Great Hall. In 2016, the Airport served 58.3 million passengers, making it the sixth busiest airport in the United States and the eighteenth busiest in the world. Approximately 36,000 people also work at the airport.

The protesters who arrived on the evening of January 28 largely congregated in the middle third of the Great Hall (the domestic-arrivals meeter-and-greeter area). The protesters engaged in singing, chanting, praying, and holding up signs. At least one of them had a megaphone.

The size of the protest at its height is unclear. The witnesses at the evidentiary hearing gave varying estimates ranging from as low as 150 to as high as 1,000. Most estimates, however, centered in the range of about 200. Lopez, who believed that the protest eventually comprised about 300 individuals, did not believe that his fifty officers throughout the Airport were enough to ensure safety and security for that size of protest, even if he could pull all of his officers away from their normal duties.

Most of the details of the January 28 protest are not relevant for present purposes. Suffice it to say that Lopez eventually approached those who appeared to be the protest organizers and warned them multiple times that they could be arrested if they continued to protest without a permit. Airport administration later agreed to allow the protest to continue on “the plaza,” an area just outside the Jeppesen Terminal to its south, between the Terminal itself and the Westin Hotel. Protesters then moved to that location, and the protest dispersed later in the evening. No one was arrested and no illegal activity stemming from the protest (e.g., property damage) was reported, nor was there any report of disruption to travel operations or any impeding of the normal flow of travelers and visitors in and out of Jeppesen Terminal.

D. The January 29 Protest at the Denver Airport

Plaintiffs disagree strongly with the Executive Order and likewise wished to protest it, but, due to their schedules, were unable to participate in the January 28 protest. They decided instead to go to the Airport on the following day, Sunday, January 29. They came that afternoon and stationed themselves at a physical barrier just outside the international arrival doors at the north end of the Great Hall, level 5. They each held up a sign of roughly poster board size expressing a message of opposition to the Executive Order and solidarity with those affected by it. (See Exs. 2, 4, M.)

Plaintiffs were soon approached by Defendant Quiñones, who warned them that they could be arrested for demonstrating without a permit. Plaintiffs felt threatened, as well as disheartened that they could not freely exercise their First Amendment rights then and there. Plaintiffs felt it was important to be demonstrating both at that particular time, given the broad news coverage of the effects of the Executive Order, and at that particular place (the international arrivals area), given a desire to express solidarity with those arriving directly from international destinations—whom Plaintiffs apparently assumed would be most likely to be affected by the Executive Order in some way.

Plaintiffs left the Airport later that day without being arrested, and without incident. They have never returned to continue their protest, nor have they applied for a permit to do so.

E. Permits Since Issued

The airport has since issued permits to demonstrators opposed to the Executive Order. At least one of these permits includes permission for four people to demonstrate in the international arrivals area, where Plaintiffs demonstrated on January 29.

II. REQUESTED INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs have never proposed specific injunction language. In their Motion, they asked for “an injunction prohibiting their arrest for standing in peaceful protest within Jeppesen Terminal and invalidating Regulation 50 as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (ECF No. 2 at 4.) At the Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked the Court to enjoin Defendants (1) “from arresting people for engaging in behavior that the plaintiffs or people similarly situated were engaging in,” (2) from enforcing Regulation 50.09 (which forbids non- labor demonstrators from holding up signs within the Jeppesen Terminal), and (3) from administering Regulation 50 without an “exigent circumstances exception.” Counsel also argued that requiring a permit application seven days ahead of time is unconstitutionally long in any circumstance, exigent or not.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. The Various Standards

In a sense, there are at least three preliminary injunction standards. The first, typically-quoted standard requires: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a threat of irreparable harm, which (3) outweighs any harm to the non-moving party, and (4) that the injunction would not adversely affect the public interest. See, e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1125 (10th Cir. 2012).

If, however, the injunction will (1) alter the status quo, (2) mandate action by the defendant, or (3) afford the movant all the relief that it could recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits, a second standard comes into play, one in which the movant must meet a heightened burden. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Specifically, the proposed injunction “must be more closely scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in the normal course” and “a party seeking such an injunction must make a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits and with regard to the balance of harms.” Id.

On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit also approves of a

modified . . . preliminary injunction test when the moving party demonstrates that the [irreparable harm], [balance of harms], and [public interest] factors tip strongly in its favor. In such situations, the moving party may meet the requirement for showing [likelihood of] success on the merits by showing that questions going to the merits are so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.

Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1128 n.5 (10th Cir. 2016). This standard, in other words, permits a weaker showing on likelihood of success when the party’s showing on the other factors is strong. It is not clear how this standard would apply if the second standard also applies.

In any event, “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy,” and therefore “the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003).

B. Does Any Modified Standard Apply?

The status quo for preliminary injunction purposes is “the last peaceable uncontested status existing between the parties before the dispute developed.” Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). By asking that portions of Regulation 50 be invalidated, Plaintiffs are seeking to change the status quo. Therefore they must make a stronger-than-usual showing on likelihood of success and the balance of harms.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Irreparable Harm as it Relates to Standing

Under the circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to begin by discussing the irreparable harm element of the preliminary injunction test as it relates Plaintiffs’ standing to seek an injunction.

Testimony at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing revealed that certain groups wishing to protest the Executive Order have since applied for and obtained permits. Thus, Plaintiffs could get a permit to demonstrate at the airport on seven days’ advance notice—although Regulation 50.09 would still prohibit them from demonstrating by wearing or holding up signs. In addition, as discussed in more detail below (Part IV.B.3.c), Plaintiffs could potentially get a permit to hold a protest parade on public streets in the City and County of Denver with as little as 24 hours’ notice. And as far as the Court is aware, the two Plaintiffs may be able to stand on any public street corner and hold up signs without any prior notice or permit requirement. Thus, Plaintiffs’ alleged irreparable harm must be one or both of the following: (1) the prospect of not being able to demonstrate specifically at the airport on less than seven days’ notice, or (2) the inability to picket in opposition to the government action they oppose—that is, the inability to hold up “signs, posters or similar devices” while engaging in expressive activity at the airport. The Court finds that the second of these options is a fairly traditional allegation of First Amendment injury—even if they do apply for and obtain a permit, by the express terms of Regulation 50.09 Plaintiffs will not be allowed to carry or hold up signs, posters, or the like. The first option, however, requires more extensive discussion and analysis.

The rapidly developing situation that prompted Plaintiffs to go to the Airport on January 29 has since somewhat subsided. The Executive Order remains a newsworthy topic, but a nationwide injunction now prevents its enforcement, see Washington, ___ F.3d at ___, 2017 WL 526497, at *9, and—to the Court’s knowledge—none of the most urgent effects that led to airport-based protests, such as individuals being detained upon arrival, have since repeated themselves. Nonetheless, the circumstances that prompted this lawsuit reveal a number of unassailable truths about “freedom of speech . . . [and] the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I.

One indisputable truth is that the location of expressive activity can have singular First Amendment significance, or as the Tenth Circuit has pithily put it: “Location, location, location. It is cherished by property owners and political demonstrators alike.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2013). The ability to convey a message to a particular person is crucial, and that ability often turns entirely on location.

Thus, location has specifically been at issue in a number of First Amendment decisions. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (abortion protesters’ ability to approach abortion clinic patrons within a certain distance); Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1216–17 (protesters’ ability to be in a location where the President could see them as his motorcade drove past); Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2007) (peace activists’ ability to be near a hotel and conference center where a NATO conference was taking place); Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 2005) (labor protesters’ ability to demonstrate outside a car dealership); Friends of Animals, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 833 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207–08 (D. Conn. 2011) (animal rights protesters’ ability to protest near a circus), aff’d sub nom. Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 475 F. App’x 805 (2d Cir. 2012).

Another paramount truth is that the timing of expressive activity can also have irreplaceable First Amendment value and significance: “simple delay may permanently vitiate the expressive content of a demonstration.” NAACP, W. Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984); see also American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Any notice period is a substantial inhibition on speech.”); Church of Am. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334 F.3d 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2003) (“given that . . . political demonstrations are often engendered by topical events, a very long period of advance notice with no exception for spontaneous demonstrations unreasonably limits free speech”); Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1524 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The five-day notice requirement restricts a substantial amount of speech that does not interfere with the city’s asserted goals of protecting pedestrian and vehicle traffic, and minimizing inconvenience to the public.”).

This case provides an excellent example of this phenomena given that —whether intentionally or not— the President’s announcement of his Supreme Court nomination on January 31 (four days after signing the Executive Order) permitted the President to shift the media’s attention to a different topic of national significance. Thus, the inability of demonstrators to legally “strike while the iron’s hot” mattered greatly in this instance. Cf. City of Gary, 334 F.3d at 682 (in the context of a 45-day application period for a parade, noting that “[a] group that had wanted to hold a rally to protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq and had applied for a permit from the City of Gary on the first day of the war would have found that the war had ended before the demonstration was authorized”).

These principles are not absolute, however, nor self-applying. The Court must analyze them in the specific context of the Airport. But for present purposes, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs’ alleged harm of being unable to protest at a specific location on short notice states a cognizable First Amendment claim. In addition, by its very nature, this is the sort of claim that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). Here, “the challenged action”—enforcement of the seven-day permit requirement during an event of rapidly developing significance —“was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). Further, “there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Id. More specifically, the Court credits Plaintiffs’ testimony that they intend to return to the Airport for future protests, and, given continuing comments by the Trump Administration that new immigration and travel- related executive orders are forthcoming, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that it is reasonably likely a similar situation will recur —i.e., government action rapidly creating consequences relevant specifically to the Airport.

Thus, although the prospect of being unable to demonstrate at the Airport on short notice is not, literally speaking, an “irreparable harm” (because the need for such demonstration may never arise again), it is nonetheless a sufficient harm for purposes of standing and seeking a preliminary injunction.

The Court now turns to the heart of this case—whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Following that, the Court will reprise the irreparable harm analysis in the specific context of the likelihood-of-success findings.

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Evaluating likelihood of success requires evaluating the substantive merit of Plaintiffs’ claim that Regulation 50, or any portion of it, violates their First Amendment rights. To answer this question, the Supreme Court prescribes the following analysis:

1. Is the expression at issue protected by the First Amendment? ?

2. If so, is the location at issue a traditional public forum, a designated public ?forum, or a nonpublic forum? ?

3. If the location is a traditional or designated public forum, is the ?government’s speech restriction narrowly tailored to meet a compelling ?state interest? ?

4. If the location is a nonpublic forum, is the government’s speech restriction ? ?reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, and viewpoint neutral?

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797–806 (1985).

The Court will address these inquiries in turn.

1. Does the First Amendment Protect Plaintiffs’ Expressive Conduct?

The Court “must first decide whether [the speech at issue] is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further.” Id. at 797. There appears to be no contest that the sorts of activities Plaintiffs attempted to engage in at the Airport (including holding up signs) are expressive endeavors protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court deems it conceded for preliminary injunction purposes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on this element of the Cornelius analysis.

2. Is the Jeppesen Terminal a Public Forum (Traditional or Designated)?

The Court must next decide whether the Jeppesen Terminal is a public forum:

. . . the extent to which the Government can control access [to government property for expressive purposes] depends on the nature of the relevant forum. Because a principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Similarly, when the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a public forum[,] speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest. Access to a nonpublic forum, however, can be restricted as long as the restrictions are reasonable and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.

Id. at 800 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alterations incorporated).

a. Is the Jeppesen Terminal a Traditional Public Forum??

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Supreme Court has not definitively decided whether airport terminals . . . are public forums.” (ECF No. 2 at 7.) This is either an intentional misstatement or a difficult-to-understand misreading of the most relevant case (which Plaintiffs repeatedly cite), International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (“Lee”).

The plaintiffs in Lee were disseminating religious literature and soliciting funds at the airports controlled by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark). Id. at 674–75. By regulation, however, the Port Authority prohibited “continuous or repetitive” person-to-person solicitation and distribution of literature. Id. at 675–76. The Second Circuit held that the airports were not public fora and that the regulation was reasonable as to solicitation but not as to distribution. Id. at 677. The dispute then went to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari specifically “to resolve whether airport terminals are public fora,” among other questions. Id.

The Court answered the public forum question in the negative. Relying on the historical use of airport terminals generally, the Court found that “the tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for speech activity.” Id. at 680. “Nor can we say,” the Court continued, “that these particular terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally opened by their operators to such activity; the frequent and continuing litigation evidencing the operators’ objections belies any such claim.” Id. at 680–81. Then, invoking the reasonableness test that applies to government regulation of nonpublic fora, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding that the solicitation ban was reasonable. Id. at 683–85.

Five justices (Rehnquist, White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas) joined all of the major rulings regarding the solicitation ban, including the nonpublic forum status of airport terminals and the reasonableness of the ban. The outcome regarding the distribution ban, however, commanded no majority opinion. Justice O’Connor, applying the reasonableness standard for nonpublic fora, agreed with the Second Circuit that the distribution ban was not reasonable. Id. at 690–93 (opn. of O’Connor, J.). Justice Kennedy, joined in relevant part by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, agreed that the Second Circuit’s judgment regarding the distribution ban should be affirmed, but on different grounds, namely, under a strict scrutiny test (because these justices believed that the airport terminals should be deemed a public forum). Id. at 708–10 (opn. of Kennedy, J.). The result was that the Second Circuit’s invalidation of the distribution ban was affirmed without any opinion commanding a majority view.

Regardless of the outcome with respect to the distribution ban, it is beyond debate that five Supreme Court justices in Lee agreed that airport terminals are not public fora. Id. at 680–81. The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged this holding. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 930 (10th Cir. 2015) (“As an initial matter, an airport is a nonpublic forum, where restrictions on expressive activity need only ‘satisfy a requirement of reasonableness.’” (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 683)). Notably, Plaintiffs have cited no case in which any court anywhere has deemed an airport to be a public forum.

b. Is the Jeppesen Terminal a Designated Public Forum??

Even though the Jeppesen Terminal is not a traditional public forum, Denver could still designate it as a public forum if Denver “intentionally [opens the Jeppesen Terminal] for public discourse.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Denver denies that it has done so, and Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary lack merit.

i. Terminal Visitors’ Incidental Expressive Activities

Plaintiffs argue that visitors to the Jeppesen Terminal “engage in First Amendment activity; they wear buttons, shirts, and hats that convey distinct messages to other visitors. They engage in one-on-one conversations.” (ECF No. 21 at 3.) Thus, Plaintiffs say, Denver has designated a public forum within the Jeppesen Terminal.

The Tenth Circuit has already foreclosed this argument. Addressing the public forum status of the Denver Performing Arts Complex, the Court stated the following: “Even if Denver allowed patrons to wear political buttons or shirts with slogans, this would not be sufficient to establish a designated public forum. The First Amendment does not require the government to impose a ‘zone of silence’ on its property to maintain its character as a nonpublic forum.” Hawkins v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1288 (10th Cir. 1999).

Indeed, even if it wanted to, Denver almost certainly could not impose such a “zone of silence,” as illustrated by Board of Airport Commissioners of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987). There, the Los Angeles airport authority adopted a resolution announcing that “the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport [LAX] is not open for First Amendment activities.” Id. at 570–71 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court found that this provision did not “merely reach the activity of [the religious proselytizers who challenged it],” but also prohibited

even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing. Under such a sweeping ban, virtually every individual who enters LAX may be found to violate the resolution by engaging in some “First Amendment activit[y].” We think it obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if LAX were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech.

Id. at 574–75. Thus, the evidence at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing established beyond any possible dispute that Denver has shown no intent to designate the Airport as a public forum by allowing speech at that location which it may not disallow in the first instance.

ii. The Effect of Regulation 50 Itself?

Plaintiffs further argue, “Regulation 50 states that free speech activity is proper in the Jeppesen Terminal (pursuant to a restriction). Denver has [thus] designated the Jeppesen Terminal a public forum for leafleting, conducting surveys, displaying signs, gathering signatures, soliciting funds, and other speech related activity for religious, charitable, or political purposes.” (ECF No. 21 at 3–4.) Although clever, this argument cannot be correct. 2

First, the Airport knows from the Supreme Court’s Jews for Jesus decision, just discussed, that it cannot prohibit all behavior that can be characterized as First Amendment-protected expressive activity.

Second, the Airport also knows from the Lee decision that it likely cannot completely ban some forms of intentional First Amendment communication (such as leafleting) given that the Jeppesen T erminal, like the Port Authority terminals at issue in Lee, is a large multipurpose facility that can reasonably accommodate some amount of intentional First Amendment activity. So, again, the Airport’s choice to regulate what it could not prohibit in the first place is not evidence of intent to designate a public forum. See Stanton v. Fort Wayne-Allen Cnty. Airport Auth., 834 F. Supp. 2d 865, 872 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (“[t]he designation of certain free speech zones, along with the permit requirement and limitation of expression to certain times, manners, and places as set forth in the permit, are marks of the Airport Authority’s attempt to restrict public discourse, and are inconsistent with an intent to designate a public forum” (emphasis in original)).

Third, Plaintiffs’ position, if accepted, would likely turn out to chill expressive speech in the long run. If a government will be deemed to have designated a public forum every time it accommodates citizens’ natural desire to engage in expressive activity in a nonpublic forum, governments will likely cut back on such accommodations as far as they are constitutionally allowed. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (government may un-designate a designated public forum).

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2 Plaintiffs have unsurprisingly cited no decision from any court adopting their reasoning.
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iii. “Welcome Home” Messages?

Plaintiffs finally argue that “[s]ome individuals (who, importantly, are not airlines passengers) hold signs welcoming home loved ones or those returning from overseas deployment.” (ECF No. 21 at 3.) The Court will address signs welcoming home veterans and active-duty military members in Part IV.B.3.f, below, and for the reasons stated there finds that this practice, to the extent it exists, does not show intent to designate a public forum. As for welcoming home loved ones, the Court sees no greater religious, charitable, political, or labor-related significance in a typical welcome home sign than standing in the meeter-and-greeter area with a pleasant smile.

In any event, to the extent a welcome home sign has greater significance, “[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Thus, simple failure to enforce Regulation 50 against such signholders is not itself sufficient to infer that the Airport intended to designate a public forum. And finally, even if the Court were to find such an intent, the Court would still be required to consider whether the Airport only intended to designate a public forum specifically for, e.g., those wishing to convey welcome home messages: “A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7 (1983) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have nowhere addressed this.

For all these reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Jeppesen Terminal is a designated public forum. 3

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3 Plaintiffs also attack Regulation 50 as a “prior restraint.” (ECF No. 2 at 6–7.) “The term prior restraint is used ‘to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.’” Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.03, p. 4-14 (1984)) (emphasis in original). Whether or not that definition could fit Regulation 50, it adds nothing to this case because the Supreme Court’s forum analysis provides the governing principles.
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3. Given that the Jeppesen Terminal Is Not a Public Forum, Is Regulation 50 Reasonable in Light of the Purposes Served by the Airport, and Is It Viewpoint-Neutral?

a. Reasonableness of the Need for a Permit Submitted in Advance, Generally

Reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry into the “particular nature of the public expression” at issue and “the extent to which it interferes with the designated purposes” of the nonpublic forum. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1290. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lee is significant here, both because of its reasoning and because it has reached the somewhat paradoxical status of a “controlling concurrence.” See id. at 1289 (“In actuality, [Justice O’Connor’s reasonableness analysis in Lee] constitutes only Justice O’Connor’s view, who provided the swing vote in the highly-fractured Lee decision, but as the narrowest majority holding, we are bound by it.”).

In Lee, Justice O’Connor noted the Port Authority’s airports were not single-purpose facilities (unlike many other locations where the Supreme Court had previously examined speech restrictions). 505 U.S. at 688. Rather, the airports were “huge complex[es] open to travelers and nontravelers alike,” id. at 688, and had essentially become “shopping mall[s] as well as . . . airport[s],” id. at 689. The question, then, was whether Port Authority’s restrictions were “reasonably related to maintaining the multipurpose environment that the Port Authority has deliberately created.” Id.

Justice O’Connor’s description of the Port Authority Airports aptly describes the Jeppesen Terminal, to an extent. The Great Hall is lined with restaurants and retail establishments, and in that sense is reminiscent of a shopping mall. On the other hand, most of the floor space on level 6 is simply the floor space needed to get from location to location (the equivalent of wide hallways), and most of the floor space on level 5 is dedicated to security screening. The only large area that is usually free of significant obstructions is the central meeter-and-greeter area—and even that area has at times been taken up by art installations or other features. 4

Moreover, despite certain characteristics of the Airport that may resemble a shopping mall, the Airport’s undisputed primary purpose is to facilitate safe and efficient air travel. The need for safety hopefully needs no discussion —for decades, airports and airplanes have been the specific target of terrorists. As for efficiency, the significance of the Great Hall within the Jeppesen Terminal is particularly evident given that it is the node through which every arriving and departing passenger must pass. As noted, the Airport served 58.3 million passengers last year. Even assuming that just 20 million (about a third) were arrivals and departures (the remainder being those who connect through without reaching the Jeppesen Terminal), this still comes to more than 55,000 passengers moving through the Great Hall per day, or about 2,300 per hour. If the Airport could somehow maintain precisely that average over all days and hours of its operation —which of course never happens— it would still be the equivalent of perpetually filling and emptying a large concert hall every hour.

In this light, the Airport’s general purposes for requiring demonstrators to apply for a permit in advance are difficult to question. As stated by the various Airport administrators who testified at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing (Ken Greene, chief operations officer; Patrick Heck, chief commercial officer; and Dave Dalton, assistant director for terminal operations), it is important for the Airport to have advance notice regarding the presence of individuals coming for reasons other than normal airport- related activities, and particularly those who come to the airport intending to attract the attention of passengers and others. The Airport needs an opportunity to determine the appropriate location for a group of the requested size in light of the day(s) and time(s) requested. The permitting requirement also gives the Airport the opportunity to point out Regulation 50’s code of conduct (Regulation 50.08), so that demonstrators know what activities are and are not permissible.

In addition, the Airport fairly desires an opportunity to understand the nature of the expressive activity, which can inform whether additional security is needed. As Lopez’s testimony illustrates, it is not a simple matter to bring additional police officers to the Airport on a moment’s notice. Lopez further pointed out the advantage of understanding the subject matter of the dispute so that he can anticipate whether counter-protesters might arrive and potentially create at least a difficult, if not dangerous, situation.

Importantly, Denver does not need to prove that any particular past event has raised serious congestion or safety concerns: “Although Denver admits that plaintiffs did not cause any congestion problems or major disruption on the particular occasion that they demonstrated . . . , that is not dispositive. ‘[T]he Government need not wait until havoc is wreaked to restrict access to a nonpublic forum.’” Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 810). Thus, the Airport may reasonably require a permit applied for in advance. The Court does not understand Plaintiffs to be arguing to the contrary, i.e., that the Airport is never justified in requiring an advance permit under any circumstances.

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4 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 15, for example, is a photograph of the meeter-and-greeter area in 2008, and shows that a fountain occupied a significant portion of floor space at the time.
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?b. Reasonableness of the Seven-Day Requirement, Specifically

Plaintiffs do attack Regulation 50.03’s requirement that permit applications be submitted seven days in advance of the desired activity, apparently arguing that this is unconstitutionally unreasonable in all circumstances. Given both Plaintiffs’ testimony at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing, it is not clear that they would be satisfied by a shorter advance-notice period, nor that it would redress their claimed injury —the inability to protest essentially at a moment’s notice on a topical event. But, to the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the seven-day requirement through the overbreadth doctrine (see Part IV.B.4, below), the Court finds that they have not met their higher burden (or even the normal preliminary injunction burden) to show that they are likely to succeed on proving the seven-day requirement unreasonable in all circumstances.

The Airport’s witnesses were not aware of any other airport with a seven-day requirement. The Indiana airport at issue in the Stanton case —which Defendants have relied upon heavily— had a two-day notice requirement, and also a provision by which the airport could accept an application on even shorter notice. 834 F. Supp. 2d at 870. On the other hand, that Airport handled about 40,000 departing and arriving passengers per month, id. at 868, whereas the Denver Airport handles far more than that per day.

The Court’s own research has revealed that airports ahead of the Denver Airport in 2016 passenger statistics have varied requirements:

• O’Hare International Airport (Chicago) — six business days, see Chicago Department of Aviation Amended Rules and Regulations Governing First Amendment Activities at the City of Chicago Airports § 3(A) (Sept. 18, 2015), available at http://www.flychicago.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/ OHare/AboutUs/cdaamendedRulesandRegs.pdf (last accessed Feb. 16, 2017);

• Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport — three business days, see Code of Rules and Regulations of the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Board, ch. 3, § 4, art. VI(A) (2006), available at https://www.dfwairport.com/cs/groups/public/documents/webasset/p1_008800.pdf (last accessed Feb. 16, 2017); ?

• John F. Kennedy International Airport (New York City) — twenty-four hours, see Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Airport Rules and Regulations § XV(B)(2)(a) (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.panynj.gov/airports/pdf/Rules_Regs_Revision_8_04_09.pdf (last accessed Feb. 16, 2017). ??

Obviously there is no clear trend. Depending on how these airports define “business day,” some of these time periods may actually be longer than the Denver Airport’s seven-day requirement. ?

In any event, Plaintiffs have never explained how the Airport, in its particular circumstances, cannot reasonably request seven days’ advance notice as a general rule. Indeed, Plaintiffs could not cite to this Court any case holding that any advance notice requirement applicable to a nonpublic forum was unconstitutional in all circumstances. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on this particular theory of relief.

c. Reasonableness of the Regulation 50.03’s Lack of a Formal Process for Handling Permit Application More Quickly in Exigent Circumstances

Plaintiffs would prefer that they be allowed to demonstrate at the Airport without any advance notice in “exigent circumstances.” Given the serious and substantial purposes served by an advance notice requirement, the Court cannot say that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on this score. Plaintiffs have given the Court no reason to hold that the Airport has a constitutional duty, even in exigent circumstances, to accommodate demonstrators as they show up, without any advance warning whatsoever.

Nonetheless, the Airport’s complete lack of any formal mechanism for at least expediting the permit application process in unusual circumstances raises a substantial and serious question for this Court. As noted in Part IV.A, above, timing and location are cardinal First Amendment considerations, and a number of cases regarding public fora (streets and parks) have held or strongly suggested that an advance notice requirement is unconstitutional if it does not account for the possibility of spontaneous or short-notice demonstrations regarding suddenly relevant issues.

Indeed, as the undersigned pointed out to Defendants’ counsel at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Denver itself is willing to accept an application for a street parade on twenty-four hours’ notice (as opposed to its standard requirement of thirty days) “if the proposed parade is for the purpose of spontaneous communication of topical ideas that could not have been foreseen in advance of [the] required application period or when circumstances beyond the control of the applicant prevented timely filing of the application.” Denver Mun. Code § 54-361(d). But again, this governs a public forum (city streets), where time, place, and manner restrictions such as this must satisfy a narrow tailoring analysis and leave open ample alternative channels for communication. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. As the above discussion makes clear, under controlling authority the Airport need not satisfy the same legal standards.

The parties have not cited, nor has the Court located, any case specifically discussing the need for a nonpublic forum to accommodate short-notice demonstrations. But the Court likewise has not found any case expressly precluding that consideration when evaluating reasonableness in the context of a nonpublic forum. It is perhaps unsurprising that the specific question has never come up in a nonpublic forum until now. The Court believes it to be an accurate observation that this country has never before experienced a situation in which (a) the motivation to protest developed so rapidly and (b) the most obviously relevant protest locations was a place the Supreme Court had already declared to be a nonpublic forum—the airport terminal.

When evaluating the reasonableness of a First Amendment restriction in a nonpublic forum, the Court concludes that it may appropriately consider the ability to shorten an advance notice requirement in a place like the Airport, given how unique airports are within the category of nonpublic fora. As Justice O’Connor noted in Lee, most of the Supreme Court’s major nonpublic forum cases aside from airport cases have involved

discrete, single-purpose facilities. See, e.g., [United States v.] Kokinda, [497 U.S. 720 (1990)] (dedicated sidewalk between parking lot and post office); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (literature for charity drive); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (utility poles); Perry, supra (interschool mail system); Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., [453 U.S. 114 (1981)] (household mail boxes); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (curtilage of jailhouse).

505 U.S. at 688 (parallel citations omitted). As Justice O’Connor observed, however, many airports have become large, multipurpose facilities, see id. at 688–89, and that describes the Denver Airport well. To be sure, the reason for expanding beyond the bare minimum of infrastructure needed to handle travelers and airplanes is to promote air travel—to make the airport a more convenient and welcoming location specifically (although not exclusively) for travelers—but the reasonableness of First Amendment restrictions must nonetheless be judged according to the “multipurpose environment that [airport authorities] ha[ve] deliberately created.” Id. at 689.

Moreover, modern airports are almost always owned and operated by a political body, as well as secured by government employees. Thus, short-notice demonstrations reasonably relevant to an airport are also reasonably likely to be demonstrations about political or otherwise governmental topics, “an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Given all this, and in light of the First Amendment interests in location and timing that this very case has made salient, the Court finds it unreasonable for the Airport to have no formal process by which demonstrators can obtain an expedited permit when -to borrow from the Denver parade ordinance— they seek to communicate topical ideas reasonably relevant to the Airport, the immediate importance of which could not have been foreseen in advance of the usual seven-day period, or when circumstances beyond the control of the applicant prevented timely filing of the application. The Court further finds in the particular circumstances of the Airport that reasonableness requires a process by which an applicant who faces such circumstances can request a permit on twenty-four hours’ notice. If this is all the notice Denver needs to prepare for a street parade, the Court can see no reason why more notice is needed (in exigent circumstances) for a substantially more confined environment like the Airport. 5

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are strongly likely to succeed in their challenge to Regulation 50.03 to this limited extent.

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5 At the Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Defendants’ counsel argued that preparing for a street parade is actually easier than preparing for demonstrations at the airport. The Court cannot fathom how this could possibly be the case, at least when comparing a typical street parade request to the typical Airport demonstration request. Indeed, the normal street parade request window is thirty days, suggesting just the opposite. Denver Mun. Code § 54-361(d). The challenges may be different, but the Court cannot accept—on this record, at least—that Airport demonstrations on average require more preparation time than do public parades or marches.
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d. Reasonableness of the Airport’s Power to Control the Location of Permitted Expressive Activity

At the Preliminary Injunction Hearing, it became clear that Plaintiffs not only wish for a more expansive right to protest in the Jeppesen T erminal, but they also argue for the right to select precisely where in the Terminal they should be allowed to stand. The Court recognizes that, from Plaintiffs’ perspective, their message is diluted if they cannot demonstrate in the international arrivals area, and this is a legitimate concern for all the reasons discussed previously about the power of location when conveying a message. The Court must also account, however, for Airport administrators’ superior knowledge about airport operations, foot traffic patterns, concerns particular to the specific day of the protest, and so forth.

?Regulation 50.04-1 requires permit applicants to specify “each location at which the [expressive] activity is proposed to be conducted,” but nowhere in Regulation 50 is there any limitation on the Airport’s discretion whether to approve the location request. Rather, the only provision addressing this topic is Regulation 50.04-6, which applies to a demonstration already underway: “The CEO may move expressive activity from one location to another and/or disperse such activity around the airport upon reasonable notice to each affected person when in the judgment of the CEO such action is necessary for the efficient and effective operation of the transportation function of the airport.”

There is no evidence that Airport administrators are using their discretion when approving a demonstration’s location to suppress or dilute a particular message, but there is also no logical reason to leave Airport administrators’ discretion essentially unfettered at the permitting stage while restricting it once the demonstration is underway. The Court finds Plaintiffs are likely to succeed at least in proving that Regulation 50.04-1 is unreasonable to the extent the Airport’s discretion is not restrained to the same degree as in Regulation 50.04-6. Defendants will therefore be enjoined to follow the same restraints in both settings.

e. Reasonableness of Regulation 50.09’s Prohibition of Signage Within the Jeppesen Terminal, and Regulation 50.08-12’s Limitation of All Signs to One Square Foot

Regulation 50.09 establishes that “picketing” (defined to include “displaying one or more signs, posters or similar devices,” Regulation 50.02-8) is totally prohibited in the Jeppesen Terminal unless as part of a labor protest. And, under Regulation 50.08-12, any permissible sign may be no larger than “one foot by one foot in size.”

?Any argument that the picketing ban is reasonable in the context of the Airport is foreclosed by Justice O’Connor’s analysis of the leafleting band at issue in Lee. See 505 U.S. at 690–93. Leafleting usually involves an individual moving around, at least within a small area, and actively offering literature to passersby. Signholding is usually less obtrusive, given that the signholder often stays within an even smaller area and conveys his or her message passively to those who walk by and notice the sign. The Court simply cannot discern what legitimate or reasonable Airport purpose is served by a complete ban on “picketing” or signholding among permitted demonstrators in the Jeppesen Terminal.

The Court also finds the one-foot-by-one-foot signage restriction unreasonable. The Airport has a legitimate interest in regulating the size of signs, as well as other aspects of their display (such as whether they will be held in the air, as in traditional picketing), but a one-foot-by-one-foot restriction is barely distinguishable, both legally and as a factual matter, from a complete ban. The point of a sign is to make a message readable from a distance. Few messages of substance are readable from any kind of distance if they must be condensed into one foot square. Reasonableness instead requires the Airport to consider the size of the signs that a permit applicant wishes to display as compared to the needs and limitations of the location where the applicant will demonstrate. Any restriction by the Airport which limits the size of a permit applicant’s signage beyond that which may be reasonably required to prevent the restriction or impeding of the normal flow of travelers and visitors in and out of Jeppesen Terminal will be preliminarily enjoined.

f. Viewpoint Neutrality

?A nonpublic forum is not required to be content-neutral, but it is required to be viewpoint-neutral with respect to the First Amendment activity it permits. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1288. Regulation 50, on its face, is viewpoint neutral, and Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Rather, they say that “Regulation 50 is being enforced as a clearly view-point-based restriction.” (ECF No. 2 at 14 (emphasis added).) This appears to be an as-applied challenge:

Individuals walk through Denver International Airport with political messages and slogans on their shirts and luggage and discuss politics on a daily basis. Counsel for Plaintiffs has worn political shirts while traveling through Denver International Airport and discussed modern politics with fellow passengers on many occasions. However, no other individual, to Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ counsel’s knowledge, has been threatened with arrest for engaging in this political speech. Nor has any individual been arrested for displaying pro-President Trump messages, for example a red hat that reads “Make America Great Again.” Only Plaintiffs’ expressive activity against the President’s Executive Order, and others advocating similarly, has been threatened with arrest.

(Id.) Denver responds:

The permit requirement furthers the nonpublic forum purpose by mitigating disruption at the airport by individuals who choose to be at the airport for non-travel related activities. In Stanton, the [Northern District of Indiana] rejected this exact argument challenging a nearly identical permitting rule of the Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport on an as applied basis by distinguishing between incidental expressive activities by members of the traveling public versus those arriving at the airport solely for purposes of engaging in expressive speech. Any messages a traveler or individual picking up a family member conveys by wearing T-shirts or hats are “incidental to the use of the Airport’s facilities” by persons whose “primary purpose for being present at the Airport is a purpose other than expressing free speech rights,” which is different in kind than individuals arriving at an airport whose primary purpose is expressive speech. Id. at 880–882.

(ECF No. 20 at 11 (emphasis added).)?

This argument obviously relies on a particular interpretation of Regulation 50 (given that the Regulation itself makes no explicit distinction between those who arrive at the airport for travel-related purposes and those who do not). Nonetheless, this is how Airport administrators interpret Regulation 50, as they made clear at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing. They also made clear that they have never sought to enforce Regulation 50 against someone wearing a political shirt, for example, while on airport-related business. Plaintiffs’ own arguments support the sincerity of the Airport administrators’ testimony. By Plaintiffs’ own admission, they are unaware of anyone going about his or her typical airport-related business who has been arrested or even threatened with arrest for wearing a political shirt, discussing politics, etc.

At the Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Plaintiffs attempted to present an as- applied viewpoint discrimination case by showing that the Airport regularly allows individuals to hold rallies, display signs, and so forth, for returning servicemembers and veterans, yet without requiring those individuals to obtain a permit under Regulation 50. The Court agrees that pro-military and pro-veteran messages are political statements, at least to the extent being conveyed by someone not at the Airport to welcome home a relative or loved one (and perhaps even by those persons as well). Thus, it would seem that pro-military messages would fall under Regulation 50. However, Plaintiffs have failed at this stage to show that the Airport’s alleged treatment of pro-military and pro-veteran messages amounts to viewpoint discrimination.

At the outset, Plaintiffs fail to note the subjective element of their claim: “viewpoint discrimination in contravention of the First Amendment requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose.” Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1230. In that light, it is tenuous to suggest that allowing (allegedly) unpermitted pro-military or pro-veteran expression at various times in the past but not allowing these recent unpermitted protests against the Executive Order is evidence of viewpoint discrimination. The question of whether our nation should honor servicemembers and the question of how our nation should treat foreign nationals affected by the Executive Order are not really in the same universe of discourse. To bridge the gap, it takes a number of assumptions about where pro-military attitudes tend to fall in the American political spectrum, and what people with those attitudes might also think about the Executive Order. This would be a fairly tall order of proof even outside the preliminary injunction context.

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ evidence of unpermitted pro-military expression is fairly weak. Plaintiffs’ main example is the activities of the Rocky Mountain Honor Flight, an organization that assists World War II veterans to travel to Washington, D.C., and visit the World War II Memorial, and then welcomes them home with a large and boisterous rally held in the meeter-and-greeter portion of the Great Hall. A former servicemember who helped to organize one of these rallies testified that she inquired of a more-senior organizer whether the Airport required any special procedures, and the answer she received was “no.” However, Airport administrators presented unrebutted testimony that Rocky Mountain Honor Flight rallies are planned far in advance and sponsored by the Airport itself, in connection with TSA and certain airlines. The Airport does not need a Regulation 50 permit for its own expressive activities, and a government entity’s expression about a topic is not a matter of First Amendment concern. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”).

Apart from the Rocky Mountain Honor Flight, Plaintiffs’ evidence comprises photos they gleaned from a Getty Images database showing individuals over the last decade or so being greeted at the Airport by persons holding signs. Some of these signs appear to be simple “welcome home” signs directed at specific returning family members. In the obviously servicemember-related photos, American flags are common. The Court finds that these photos, presented out of context, are not sufficient evidence to make a strong showing of likelihood of success regarding viewpoint discrimination, particularly the subjective intent requirement. Thus, the Court finds no reason for an injunction based on alleged viewpoint-discriminatory conduct. 6

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6 Even if Plaintiffs’ evidence were enough, the Court would find at this stage of this litigation that the only injunctive relief appropriate in light of the balance-of-harms and public interest considerations, below, would be an injunction to enforce Regulation 50 evenhandedly. Such an outcome would not advance Plaintiffs’ interests here.
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4. Is Regulation 50 Overbroad or Vague?

Plaintiffs bring both overbreadth and vagueness challenges to Regulation 50, which, in this case, are really two sides of the same coin. If a speech regulation’s sweep is unclear and may potentially apply to protected conduct, a court may invalidate the regulation as vague; whereas if the regulation actually applies to unprotected as well as protected speech, an individual who violates the regulation through unprotected speech may nonetheless challenge the entire statute as overbroad. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09, 114–15 (1972); 1 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech ch. 6 (Oct. 2016 update). Here, Plaintiffs argue either that Regulation 50 is overbroad because it forbids (without a permit) protected conduct such as wearing a political hat while walking to one’s flight (ECF No. 2 at 16–18); or it is vague because it is unclear to what it applies precisely, given that Plaintiffs have seen Regulation 50 enforced against themselves but not against those who wear political hats or buttons, who are welcoming home military veterans, etc., all of whom are “seemingly in violation” of the Regulation (id. at 18–20).

The first task, then, is to determine what Regulation 50 actually encompasses. Again, the Regulation states that “no person or organization shall leaflet, conduct surveys, display signs, gather signatures, solicit funds, or engage in other speech related activity at Denver International Airport for religious, charitable, or political purposes, or in connection with a labor dispute, except pursuant to, and in compliance with, a permit for such activity issued by the CEO or his or her designee.”

The portion about leafleting, conducting surveys, displaying signs, gathering signatures, or soliciting funds is not vague. It does not fail to “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. Nor is it overbroad given that it is not a complete prohibition of leafleting (as in Lee), but simply a prohibition without a permit.

The arguably difficult portion of Regulation 50 is the “or engage in other speech related activity at Denver International Airport for religious, charitable, or political purposes” clause. It is grammatically possible to interpret this passage as extending to any religious, charitable, or political “speech related activity” by anyone at the Airport, including travelers wearing political buttons or sharing their religious beliefs with others.

Denver argues that no person of ordinary intelligence would have such a worry: “a person of ordinary intelligence cannot reasonably claim that they are unable to discern the difference between a traveler walking through the airport with a ‘make America great again’ baseball cap or travelers discussing politics as they walk to their intended destination and a gathering of people who have no purpose for being at the airport other than to march or station themselves in order to communicate their position on a political issue.” (ECF No. 20 at 14.) This argument is slightly inapposite. The question is not whether someone can distinguish between a passenger’s pro-Trump hat and a gathering of anti-Trump protesters. The question is whether Regulation 50 contains such a distinction, and particularly a distinction between the incidental activities of those who come to the airport for airport-related purposes and the intentional activities of those who come to the airport to demonstrate.

However, to the extent Denver means to say that Regulation 50 would not be interpreted by a person of ordinary intelligence to encompass, e.g., a traveler choosing to wear a “Make America Great Again” hat, the Court agrees. Regulation 50 is not, as Plaintiffs suggest, just one paragraph from Regulation 50.03. Regulation 50 comprises sixteen major subdivisions, many of which are themselves subdivided. A person of ordinary intelligence who reads Regulation 50 —all of it— cannot avoid the overwhelming impression that its purpose is to regulate the expressive conduct of those who come to the Airport specifically to engage in expressive conduct. Thus, Regulation 50 is not vague.

As for overbreadth, “[t]he first step in [the] analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). For the reasons already stated, the Court finds that the only reasonable construction is one that does not extend to an airline passenger wearing a political T-shirt, or anything of that character. Cf. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 575. This is, moreover, the Airport’s own interpretation, the sincerity of which is borne out by Plaintiffs’ own experience. Thus, Regulation 50 is not overbroad. 7

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7 Even if Regulation 50 were vague or overbroad, the Court would nonetheless find that an injunction against enforcing Regulation 50 as a whole would be against the public interest. The more appropriate remedy would be an injunction to follow precisely the interpretation that the Airport currently follows, but that would be of no benefit to Plaintiffs.
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?C. Irreparable Harm

Having found that Plaintiffs are strongly likely to succeed in invalidating a narrow subset of Regulation 50, the Court returns to irreparable harm. Given that Plaintiffs First Amendment rights are at stake in those portions of Regulation 50 that the Court finds to be unreasonable, irreparable harm almost inevitably follows: “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

?D. Balance of Harms

The injury to a plaintiff deprived of his or her legitimate First Amendment rights almost always outweighs potential harm to the government if the injunction is granted. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999). Thus, the Court finds that the harm to Plaintiffs from the Airport’s continued enforcement of the unreasonable portions of Regulation 50 would be greater than the harm to the Airport in refraining from such enforcement, particularly given that the unreasonable portions are quite limited and most of Regulation 50 will remain unchanged.

?E. Public Interest

Finally, as with irreparable injury and balancing of interests, it is almost always in the public interest to prevent a First Amendment violation. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132; Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1163. Moreover, the Court is not striking down Regulation 50 or even altering it in any significant respect. Thus, the public’s interest in safe and efficient Airport operations remains unaffected.?

F. Bond

A party awarded a preliminary injunction normally must “give[] security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The Tenth Circuit has held, however, that “a trial court may, in the exercise of discretion, determine a bond is unnecessary to secure a preliminary injunction if there is an absence of proof showing a likelihood of harm.” Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestern Pipeline Co., 825 F.2d 1461, 1462 (10th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2954 n.29 (3d ed., Apr. 2016 update) (citing public rights cases where the bond was excused or significantly reduced). Denver has not argued that Plaintiffs should be required to post a bond, and the Court finds that waiver of the bond is appropriate in any event.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED to the ?limited extent stated in this order and otherwise DENIED; ?

2. The City and County of Denver (including its respective officers, agents, ?servants, employees, attorneys, and other persons who are in active concert or participation with any of them, and further including without limitation Defendants Lopez and Quiñones) (collectively, “Defendants”) are PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED as follows:

a. Defendants must timely process a permit application under Denver Airport Regulation 50.04-1 that is received less than 7 days but at least 24 hours prior to the commencement of the activity for which the permit is sought, provided that the applicant, in good faith, seeks a permit for the purpose of communicating topical ideas reasonably relevant to the purposes and mission of the Airport, the immediate importance of which could not have been foreseen 7 days or more in advance of the commencement of the activity for which the permit is sought, or when circumstances beyond the control of the applicant prevented timely filing of the application; however, circumstances beyond Defendants’ control may excuse strict compliance with this requirement to the extent those circumstances demonstrably interfere with the expedited permitting process; ?

b. So long as a permit applicant seeks to demonstrate in a location where the unticketed public is normally allowed to be, Defendants must make all reasonable efforts to accommodate the applicant’s preferred location, whether inside or outside of the Jeppesen Terminal;

c. Defendants may not enforce Denver Airport Regulation 50.09’s prohibition against “picketing” (as that term is defined in Regulation 50.02-8) within the Jeppesen Terminal; and

d. Defendants may not restrict the size of a permit applicant’s proposed signage beyond that which may be reasonably required to prevent the impeding of the normal flow of travelers and visitors in and out of Jeppesen Terminal; and specifically, Defendants may not enforce Denver Airport Regulation 50.08-12’s requirement that signs or placards be no larger than one foot by one foot.

3. This Preliminary Injunction is effective immediately upon issuance of this Order, and will remain in force for the duration of this action unless otherwise modified by Order of this Court.

Dated this 22nd day of February, 2017, at 8:05 a.m. Mountain Standard Time. BY THE COURT:

__________________________
William J. Martínez?
United States District Judge

Two arrested at Colorado Springs bank, asking Wells Fargo to divest from DAPL

Posted on February 11, 2017 by Eric Verlo

COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO- Water Protectors Jerima King (on left) and Karyna Lemus were arrested inside a downtown bank on Friday while trying to convey a message to Wells Fargo Bank to divest its interest in Energy Transfer’s controversial Dakota Access Pipeline. Protesters were denied entry into the Wells Fargo main location but marched to a nearby branch and entered its lobby before police were called. Several dozen Springs activists participated in coordination with protests at Wells Fargo banks across the country.

The bank doors were locked against the Water Protectors, who’d been asked to act in support of the Standing Rock encampment which is actively trying to block the construction.

CSPD officers emerge to warn protesters that those who remain seated will be arrested. Before the protest had even begun, a CSPD paddy wagon was parked on the sidewalk next to the bank, to intimidate the activists. Earlier police officers circulated to tell everyone that they’d be allowed to enter, and be arrested if they wish. The police said they’d seen Facebook references to the desire to be arrested. They wanted to know specifics of what to expect to ensure that no one would have to be hurt getting arrested.

When the group tried to enter, the same officers blocked our way. They said “you can’t come in.” When I disagreed and pushed past them, they physically ejected me out the door. Then commanded me to rebove my foot from holding the door ajar.

So much for the pre-arrangements touted by those protesters who’d taken their council. Since there was no gameplan to discuss, meaning there was no way to tell the police what to expect, the police were effectively disseminating the warning that being arrested unpredictably would mean getting hurt. And there was never an intention to allow the demonstrators to enter the bank atrium, no matter how peaceful.

The new CSPD warning was conveyed to Karyna and Jerima. But everyone remained, whether seated or standing.

After a brief rally at the front door. The water protectors discussed visiting a Wells Fargo branch four blocks to the south. Over the bullhorn we feigned disbanding, thanking everyone for joining in, then going to our cars. Except we appeared to have left our cars, all of them, in the same direction. CSPD did not take note and we were able to reach the branch location and enter its lobby.

There was not room enough for everyone in the tiny lobby. Note the bullhorn.

Officers arrest the two water protectors who stayed behind after the bank employees locked the doors.

Water Protector Jerima King is led out in handcuffs.

El Paso County Green Party upstart Karyna Lemus is taken in handcuffs.

Arrestees were taken to CSPD HQ in a police van.

Occupy v. Martinez (Plaza Protest Ban) 2015 Order Granting Prelim Injunction

Posted on February 8, 2017 by Eric Verlo

While we await a judge’s response to the complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction against DIA’s free speech permit, I was drawn to reminisce about an earlier federal injunction GRANTED against Denver’s 2nd Judicial District. It was/is (!) also a preliminary injunction curbing police intimidation. This one prevents arrests of Jury Nullification pamphleteers at the Lindsey Flanigan Courthouse in Denver. More broadly, it halts the enforcement of the despotic “Chief Justice Order 1” which attempted to curb free speech in Tully Plaza, between the courthouse and the jail, site of innumerable protest rallies since the facility was erected in 2010. After a protracted legal battle, the case will finally come to trial in April 2017. This case also started with police overreach, then a complaint, a motion, and a hearing. In August 2015, US District Judge William Martinez issued the below court order granting the preliminary injunction.

Document 28 Filed 08/25/15 USDC Colorado

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez

Civil Action No. 15-cv-1775-WJM-MJW

ERIC VERLO,?
JANET MATZEN, and?
FULLY INFORMED JURY ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs, v.

THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO, a municipality,?ROBERT C. WHITE, in his official capacity as chief of police for Denver, and CHIEF JUDGE MICHAEL MARTINEZ, in his official capacity as chief judge of the Second Judicial District,

Defendants.

______________________________

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
______________________________

Plaintiffs Eric Verlo, Janet Matzen, and the Fully Informed Jury Association (“FIJA”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this lawsuit to establish that they have a First Amendment right to distribute and discuss literature regarding jury nullification in the plaza outside of Denver’s Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse (“Courthouse Plaza” or “Plaza”). (ECF Nos. 1, 13-1.) The Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse is where most criminal proceedings take place for Colorado’s Second Judicial District (which is coterminous with the City and County of Denver).

Plaintiffs have sued the City and County of Denver itself and its police chief, Robert C. White, in his official capacity (jointly, “Denver”). Plaintiffs have also sued the Hon. Michael A. Martinez 1 in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District. Out of recognition that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit does not target Chief Judge Martinez himself but rather a policy promulgated by the Second Judicial District through Chief Judge Martinez, the Court will refer below to Chief Judge Martinez as “the Second Judicial District.”

On the same day Plaintiffs filed their complaint, they also moved for a preliminary injunction to restrain Defendants from taking any action to stop them from distributing certain literature regarding, or advocating for, jury nullification on the Courthouse Plaza (“Motion”). (ECF No. 2.) The Second Judicial District, represented by the Colorado Attorney General’s office, filed a response defending its current policy of limiting expressive activities to certain areas away from the main walkways leading to the Courthouse doors. (ECF No. 24.) Denver, represented by the Denver City Attorney’s office, did not file a response, but instead filed a joint stipulation with Plaintiffs regarding the status of the Plaza. (ECF No. 23.) As discussed further below, Denver (a) has no intent to enforce the Second Judicial District’s policy that would otherwise restrict Plaintiffs’ activities, and (b) agrees with Plaintiffs that they have a First Amendment right to distribute and discuss their literature essentially anywhere on the Courthouse Plaza, including in the areas designated as restricted by the Second Judicial District.

This Court held an evidentiary hearing and heard oral argument on August 21, 2015. Having considered all of the filings, evidence, and arguments submitted to date, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for the reasons explained below.

—————
1 No relation to the undersigned.?
————

I. LEGAL STANDARD

To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing that four equitable factors weigh in their favor: (1) they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) their threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. See Westar Energy, Inc. v. Lake, 552 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2009); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007). “[B]ecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts Alleged in the Original Complaint

Plaintiffs’ original complaint recounts the story of two non-parties, Mark Iannicelli and Eric Brandt, who were passing out pamphlets on the Courthouse Plaza on July 27, 2015. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 14.) The pamphlets were titled “Fresh Air for Justice” and “Your Jury Rights: True or False?” (Id. ¶ 15; ECF No. 1-3; ECF No. 1-4.) Both pamphlets contain some history of jury nullification and various general statements about the jury’s role as envisioned by the Framers. (See generally ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-4.) But the pamphlets also contain certain calls to action which could raise concern. “Fresh Air for Justice,” for example, contains the following:

• “Judges say the law is for them to decide. That’s not true. When you are a juror, you have the right to decide both law and fact.” (ECF No. 1-3?at 3.) ?

• “If the law violates any human rights, you must vote no against that law by voting ‘not guilty.’” (Id. (emphasis in original).) ?

“Fresh Air for Justice” also contains the following, which could be interpreted as encouraging prospective jurors to lie during voir dire:

When you are called for jury duty, you will be one of the few people in the courtroom who wants justice rather than to win or to score career points. For you to defend against corrupt politicians and their corrupt laws, you must get on the jury. During the jury selection, prosecutors and judges often work together to remove honest, thinking people from juries. ?

When you’re questioned during jury selection, just say you don’t keep track of political issues. Show an impartial attitude. Don’t let the judge and prosecutor stack the jury by removing all the thinking, honest people!

Instructions and oaths are designed to bully jurors and protect political power. Although it all sounds very official, instructions and oaths are not legally binding, or there would be no need for independent thinking jurors like you.?

?(Id. at 4.)

The other pamphlet, “Your Jury Rights: True or False?”, does not contain language quite as direct as the foregoing, but it does declare, “You cannot be forced to obey a ‘juror’s oath.’” (ECF No. 1-4 at 3.) ?

Iannicelli was arrested on the Plaza that day, and Brandt was arrested on a warrant a few days later. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 18.) Both were charged with jury tampering: “A person commits jury-tampering if, with intent to influence a juror’s vote, opinion, decision, or other action in a case, he attempts directly or indirectly to communicate with a juror other than as a part of the proceedings in the trial of the case.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-609(1). The affidavit supporting Brandt’s arrest mentions that he and Iannicelli had been on the Courthouse Plaza at a time that jurors “would be expected to be arriving” for the ongoing death penalty prosecution of Dexter Lewis. (ECF No. 1-2 at 4.) 2

Plaintiff Eric Verlo “wishes to pass out the same literature on the Lindsey-Flannigan [sic; ‘Flanigan’] plaza as Eric Brandt and Mark Iannicelli were passing out which caused them to be arrested.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Janet Matzen wishes to do the same. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff FIJA is

an association, based in Montana, who’s [sic] members passionately believe in the concept of jury nullification. FIJA intends to hold an educational campaign in Denver on September 5, 2015 where its members wish to pass out the same brochures on the Lindsey-Flannigan [sic] plaza as Eric Brandt and Mark Iannicelli . . . .

(Id. ¶ 11.) 3 Plaintiffs say that the arrests of Brandt and Iannicelli have caused them to to fear that they too might be arrested and prosecuted. (Id. ¶ 22.)

——————
2 Lewis was charged with murdering five individuals at a Denver bar in 2012. See, e.g., Jordan Steffen & Matthew Nussbaum, “Denver jury hears opening arguments in five Fero’s bar killings,” Denver Post (July 20, 2015), at http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28513519/denver-jury-hears-opening-arguments-five-feros-bar (last accessed Aug. 24, 2015).

3 September 5, 2015, is a Saturday —an unlikely day for a jury nullification advocate to reach his or her target audience at a courthouse. When this was pointed out at the preliminary injunction hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs qualified the date with an “on or about.”
——————

?B. Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint & Supplemental Filings

Two days after filing suit, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to insert allegations regarding a Second Judicial District administrative order recently posted on the Courthouse doors. (ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 2.) The order, designated “CJO 15-1” and dated August 14, 2015, was titled “Chief Judge Order Regarding Expressive Activities at the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse.” (ECF No. 24-1.) This order was actually amended on August 21, 2015, hours before the preliminary injunction hearing in this Court, and admitted as Exhibit 1 in that hearing. (See ECF No. 25-1.) The Court will refer to the amended order as the “Plaza Order.” In relevant part, it reads as follows:

The Court has the responsibility and authority to ensure the safe and orderly use of the facilities of the Second Judicial District; to minimize activities which unreasonably disrupt, interrupt, or interfere with the orderly and peaceful conduct of court business in a neutral forum free of actual or perceived partiality, bias, prejudice, or favoritism; to provide for the fair and orderly conduct of hearings and trials; to promote the free flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on sidewalks and streets; and to maintain proper judicial decorum. Those having business with the courts must be able to enter and exit the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse freely, in a safe and orderly fashion and unhindered by threats, confrontation, interference, or harassment. Accordingly, the Court hereby prohibits certain expressive activities on the grounds of the Courthouse, as depicted in the highlighted areas of the attached map [reproduced below], without regard to the content of any particular message, idea, or form of speech.

Prohibited Activities: The activities listed below shall be prohibited in the following areas: anywhere inside the Lindsey-Flanigan Courthouse, including courtrooms, corridors, hallways, and lobbies; the areas, lawns, walkways, or roadways between the Courthouse and public sidewalks and roads; and any areas, walkways, or roadways that connect public sidewalks and roads to Courthouse entrances or exits. This includes the Courthouse entrance plaza areas on the east and west sides of the Courthouse as depicted in the highlighted areas of the attached map.

1. Demonstrating; picketing; protesting; marching; parading; holding vigils or religious services; proselytizing or preaching; distributing literature or other materials, or engaging in similar conduct that involves the communication or expression of views or grievances; soliciting sales or donations; or engaging in any commercial activity; unless specifically authorized in writing by administration;

2. Obstructing the clear passage, entry, or exit of law enforcement and emergency vehicles and personnel, Courthouse personnel, and other persons having business with the courts through Courthouse parking areas, entrances, and roadways to and from Courthouse and Courthouse grounds; ?

3. Erecting structures or other facilities, whether for a single proceeding or intended to remain in place until the conclusion of a matter; or placing tents, chairs, tables, or similar items on Courthouse grounds; except as specifically authorized in writing by administration; and ?

4. Using sound amplification equipment in a manner that harasses or interferes with persons entering or leaving Courthouse grounds or persons waiting in line to enter the Courthouse. ?

(Id. at 1–2 (formatting in original).) The Court will refer to the Plaza Order’s numbered paragraphs by their number, e.g., “Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order” (referring to the forms of prohibited expressive activity). In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Plaza Order was “apparently” entered in response to Brandt’s and Iannicelli’s actions. (ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 2.)

The “attached map” referenced in the Plaza Order is reproduced on the following page:

(Id. at 3.) This map shows an aerial view of the Courthouse. The top of the map is north. The Courthouse itself is the irregularly shaped, white-roofed building occupying the left half of the map. Immediately to the left (west) of the Courthouse is Fox Street. Immediately to the north is Colfax Avenue. Immediately to the right (east) of the Courthouse grounds is Elati Street, which is closed to traffic other than police vehicles as it runs past the Courthouse. Elati bisects a circular area paved in a tan color. Just to the right (east) of Elati, and not depicted in the map, is Denver’s Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center (“Detention Center”), which houses pretrial detainees. Thus, the area between the Courthouse and Detention Center is a fairly spacious place suitable for public gatherings.

Immediately to the east and west of the Courthouse are areas that the Second Judicial District highlighted in yellow to indicate where expressive activity is restricted (“Restricted Area”). This matter principally concerns the arc-shaped portion of the Restricted Area to the east of the Courthouse (“East Restricted Area”). The East Restricted Area comprises the following:

• planter boxes and public art (collectively, “Landscaping”); ?

• sidewalks, including a narrow sidewalk beginning at the north of the map ?(just below the blue bus stop icon) and following the arc of the planter boxes until it reaches a much wider sidewalk that completes the arc, which itself connects with the awning-covered steps leading to the Courthouse front doors depicted in approximately the center of the map (collectively, “Sidewalks”); and ?

• a gravel passive security feature between the narrow sidewalk and the Courthouse itself (“Gravel Area”). ?

C. Evidence Received at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing

1. Commander Lopez

?Plaintiffs called as a witness Commander Antonio Lopez of the Denver Police Department. Lopez oversees the Denver Police district that encompasses the Courthouse and the Detention Center. Lopez testified that the Courthouse opened in 2010 or 2011. During that time, he has seen “more protests [in the area between the Courthouse and the Detention Center] than [he can] recall. At one point w e were averaging about two or three a week, in that area.” On cross-examination, Lopez clarified that most of those protests were nearer to the Detention Center than the Courthouse. Nonetheless, to Lopez’s knowledge, the Denver Police Department has never restricted or interfered with any peaceful First Amendment activity taking place between the Courthouse and the Detention Center.

2. Mr. Steadman

The Second Judicial District called Steven Steadman, who is the Colorado judicial branch’s security administrator. Steadman was closely involved in the discussions leading up to the Plaza Order. Steadman testified that, during those discussions, he was unaware of Brandt and Iannicelli or the distribution of jury nullification literature, and that the Plaza Order actually arose from very different concerns.

According to Steadman, discussions began with Chief Judge Martinez in early July 2015 because the Dexter Lewis trial was scheduled to overlap with another death penalty trial in Arapahoe County, i.e., the trial of Aurora theater shooter James Holmes. Steadman and Chief Judge Martinez specifically worried about potentially violent protests that might break out if Lewis (who is black) eventually received the death penalty but Holmes (who is white) did not. Proactively seeking to avoid such a problem, Steadman gave Chief Judge Martinez a copy of an order entered by the Hon. Carlos A. Samour, Jr., who presided over the Holmes trial in Arapahoe County. Judge Samour’s order apparently was a model for what the Second Judicial District eventually issued as the Plaza Order.

On cross-examination, Steadman confirmed that the Plaza Order was intended specifically to address the protests that might erupt if Holmes and Lewis were treated differently with respect to the death penalty. Steadman admitted, however, that his office could require several hours’ notice between the announcement that the jury had reached a verdict and the actual reading of the verdict, which would permit a police presence to assemble in anticipation of protests. Steadman also admitted that nothing like the Plaza Order had been in place or enforced prior to August 14, 2015, and that passing out jury nullification literature did not present any security risk beyond what the Second Judicial District has tolerated, without incident, since the Courthouse opened.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Article III Standing

As mentioned previously, Denver has stipulated with Plaintiffs that it will not enforce any prohibition on distributing jury nullification literature on the Courthouse Plaza. Specifically, Denver has stipulated that

Plaintiffs who wish to engage in peacefully passing out jury nullification literature to passersby on the Plaza are entitled to do so and that Denver, through its police or sheriff department, will not arrest or otherwise charge Plaintiffs for handing out literature regarding jury nullification so long as Plaintiffs do not violate Colorado law or Denver’s Revised Municipal Code when they are handing out their literature. The parties stipulate that Plaintiffs’ proposed intent of peacefully handing out jury nullification literature to or discussing jury nullification with passersby at the Plaza, without more, does not violate Colorado law. . .

***

. . . Denver stipulates that it does not intend to enforce the [Plaza] Order as written and will only impose content and viewpoint neutral reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the use of the Plaza, and/or other exterior areas surrounding the Plaza if Denver determines that a compelling need exists to do so.

(ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 2, 4.)

?Given this stipulation, the Second Judicial District argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring this lawsuit because no threat of enforcement is imminent. (ECF No. 24 at 6–8.) See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” includes, among other things, an “actual or imminent” “invasion of a legally protected interest”); Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2009) (to obtain prospective relief, a plaintiff must show a “credible threat of future prosecution”). As stated at the preliminary injunction hearing, however, the Court rejects this contention.

The Second Judicial District’s standing argument assumes that the only way an individual could run afoul of the Plaza Order is through Denver’s independent enforcement efforts. But Chief Judge Martinez, and perhaps any other judge in the Second Judicial District, could issue a contempt citation for violating the Plaza Order. Cf. Schmidter v. State, 103 So. 3d 263, 265–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (distributor of FIJA literature convicted of contempt for violating an administrative order similar to the Plaza Order). The violator would then be required to appear before the issuing judge, and if he or she fails to appear, an arrest warrant can issue. See Colo. R. Civ. P. 107(c). Denver may then be obligated to arrest the violator —not on the authority of the Plaza Order, but on the authority of the judge’s contempt citation. See id. (requiring the sheriff to carry out the arrest). The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Colorado state law enforcement officers, not subject to Denver’s stipulation, could also effect the arrest of such a hypothetical violator.

Thus, the Court finds that Article III standing still exists, and the Court will move on to the elements Plaintiffs must establish to secure a preliminary injunction. To repeat, those elements are: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Westar Energy, 552 F.3d at 1224.

?B. Likelihood of Success

Evaluating the likelihood of success requires evaluating the substantive merit of Plaintiffs’ claim that the First Amendment grants them a right to discuss and distribute pamphlets about jury nullification with individuals entering and leaving the Courthouse. To answer this question, the Supreme Court prescribes the following analysis:

1. Is the expression at issue protected by the First Amendment? ?

2. If so, is the location at issue a traditional public forum, a designated public ?forum, or a nonpublic forum? ?

3. If the location is a traditional or designated public forum, is the ?government’s speech restriction narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest? ?

?4. If the location is a nonpublic forum, is the government’s speech restriction reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, and viewpoint neutral?

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797–806 (1985). The Court will address these inquiries in turn.

1. Does the First Amendment Protect Plaintiffs’ Pamphlets and Oral Advocacy of the Message Contained in the Pamphlets?

The Court “must first decide whether [the speech at issue] is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further.” Id. at 797. There appears to be no contest on this point. The Second Judicial District has raised no argument that any part of the message conveyed by the pamphlets is unprotected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court deems it conceded for preliminary injunction purposes that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the question of whether the First Amendment protects their message.

2. Is the Courthouse Plaza a Public Forum?

The Court must next decide whether the Courthouse Plaza—and the Restricted Area specifically—is a public or nonpublic forum:

. . . the extent to which the Government can control access [to government property for expressive purposes] depends on the nature of the relevant forum. Because a principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Similarly, when the Government has intentionally designated a place or means of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental interest. Access to a nonpublic forum, however, can be restricted as long as the restrictions are reasonable and are not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.

Id. at 800 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alterations incorporated).

?The public/nonpublic inquiry presents a unique dilemma in this case. On the one hand, Denver’s stipulation with Plaintiffs includes the following: “The Lindsey-Flanigan plaza . . . which is located between the Van Cise-Simonet Detention Center and the Lindsey-Flanigan courthouse is a public forum and any content-based regulations must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest . . . .” (ECF No. 23 ¶ 1 (emphasis added).) On the other hand, the Second Judicial District strong ly disagrees:

. . . Plaintiffs assert that the courthouse plaza is a traditional public forum, and therefore maintain that Chief Judge Martinez’s administrative order must be strictly scrutinized. As a matter of state law, however, Chief Judge Martinez— and not Denver—is responsible for the oversight of the courthouse and the adjoining grounds. Thus, any concession on this point by Denver binds neither the parties nor this Court.

(ECF No. 24 at 8.) Apparently a minor turf war has erupted between Denver and the Second Judicial District over control of the Courthouse grounds.

When asked at the preliminary injunction hearing regarding the “state law” that gives Chief Judge Martinez “responsib[ility] for the oversight of the courthouse and the adjoining grounds,” counsel for the Second Judicial District directed the Court to Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-3-108(1). That subsection reads: “The board of county commissioners in each county shall continue to have the responsibility of providing and maintaining adequate courtrooms and other court facilities including janitorial service, except as otherwise provided in this section.” Neither this language, nor anything else in § 13-3-108, appears to relate to a chief judge’s authority over courthouse policies or courthouse grounds.

?Counsel for the Second Judicial District also pointed this Court to State ex rel. Norton v. Board of County Commissioners of Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995) (“Mesa County”). In Mesa County, the county commissioners defied an order from the Twenty-First Judicial District’s chief judge requiring additional security measures at the county courthouse. See Mesa County, 897 P.2d at 789. The county commissioners further announced their intent to stop providing support of any kind to the Twenty-First Judicial District, arguably in violation of § 13-3-108(1) (quoted above), Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-1-114(2) (requiring county sheriffs to assist the judiciary when the judiciary perceives a “risk of violence in the court”), and Colorado Revised Statutes § 30-11-104(1) (requiring each county to “provide a suitable courthouse”). See id. The county commissioners believed that Colorado’s constitutional Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights allowed the county to disregard the foregoing statutes because they created an impermissible “subsidy” to the court system. Id. at 789–90. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the county commissioners’ position and held that counties’ statutory duties toward the court system are not “subsidies” under the Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights. Id. at 791.

The Mesa County decision highlights the relationship between counties and the state courts that sit within them. It emphasizes county sheriffs’ duties to assist judges in preventing “violence in the court.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-114(2). It does not support the Second Judicial District’s notion that it controls and can speak for the status of the Courthouse grounds.

Finally, counsel for the Second Judicial District cited this Court to In re Court Facilities for Routt County, 107 P.3d 981 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Routt County”). Routt County held that, under certain circumstances, a state judicial district’s chief judge has inherent authority to order the board of county commissioners to design and pay for a new courthouse. Id. at 984. Quoting Peña v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo. 1984), Routt County relied on the notion that “courts necessarily possess certain inherent powers, which . . . consist of ‘all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective.’” Routt County, 107 P.3d at 984.

Both Routt County and Peña specifically address the Colorado judiciary’s inherent authority to order another state or municipal entity to spend money on the judiciary’s behalf. That power is not at issue here. Nonetheless, the inherent authority described in Routt County and Peña could conceivably also extend to entering orders such as the Plaza Order. The ultimate question, however, is whether Denver or the Second Judicial District speaks for the First Amendment status of the Courthouse Plaza. For at least three reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail against the Second Judicial District on that question.

First, counsel for the Second Judicial District agrees that Denver owns the Courthouse itself and all of its grounds.

Second, counsel for the Second Judicial District further stated that there was no lease agreement of which he was aware between Denver and the Second Judicial District. Rather, the Second Judicial District occupies the Courthouse “as provided by law.”

?Third, it is undisputed that the Second Judicial District is not the Courthouse’s sole occupant. Denver County Court also sits in the Courthouse. Denver County Court is unique among county courts in Colorado because the Colorado Constitution grants Denver the authority to set the “number, manner of selection, qualifications, term of office, tenure, and removal of [its] judges.” Colo. Const. art. VI, § 26. Moreover, a Chief Justice Directive from the chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court states that “[t]he chief judge of the Second Judicial District shall not have administrative authority over the Denver County Court.” CJD 95-01, Preamble (amended Aug. 17, 2012), available at https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Directives/95-01amended8-17-12.pdf. Thus, there are two distinct judicial bodies operating in the Courthouse, and the Second Judicial District apparently cannot speak for both.

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in their contention that Denver controls and speaks for the Courthouse Plaza. 4 Because Denver has stipulated that the Courthouse Plaza is a public forum, Plaintiffs are likewise likely to prevail in their claim that the Courthouse Plaza is at least a designated public forum, if not a traditional public forum. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 5

Moreover, the Court notes that the Second Judicial District has not specif ically argued for a finding that the Courthouse Plaza is a nonpublic forum. Rather, it says that “resolving [the type of forum at issue] is not necessary for the purposes of this proceeding because [the Plaza Order] would satisfy even the strictest test.” (ECF No. 24 at 9.) Thus, the Court turns to the question of whether the Plaza Order can survive a strict scrutiny analysis. 6

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4 Ultimately, a Colorado state court may need to resolve this question. See, e.g., CJD 95-01 ¶ 15 (“Any disputes arising from the exercise of the authority described in this directive shall be resolved by the Chief Justice.”). In this posture, however, the Court need only conclude that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed.

5 If the Courthouse Plaza is indeed a public forum, it would be unique in that respect. The parties have not cited, nor could the Court find, a single case in which courthouse grounds were deemed a public forum. Cf. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2005) (courthouse grounds not a public forum); Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Comfort v. MacLaughlin, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (same); Schmidter, 103 So. 3d at 270 (same).

6 The ensuing analysis assumes, of course, that the Second Judicial District may attempt to enforce the Plaza Order through its own contempt power. If such power did not exist, there would likely be no reason to scrutinize the Plaza Order under any constitutional standard given Denver’s control over the Plaza and its stipulation not to interfere with Plaintiffs’ intended activities. (See Part III.A, supra.)
—————

3. Is the Plaza Order Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest, and Does it Leave Open Ample Alternative Means of Communication?

“In [a] quintessential public forum[], the government may not prohibit all communicative activity.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also id. at 46 (holding that the government may un-designate a designated public forum, but until it does so, “it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum”). The state may, however, “enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which [1] are content-neutral, [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and [3] leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id. The Court will address each element in turn as it applies to the Plaza Order.

a. “Content-Neutral”?

The Plaza Order applies “without regard to the content of any particular message, idea, or form of speech.” (ECF No. 25-1 at 1.) On its face, then, it appears content-neutral. Plaintiffs have not argued otherwise.

b. “Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest”

The Plaza Order itself asserts several interests:

. . . to minimize activities which unreasonably disrupt, interrupt, or interfere with the orderly and peaceful conduct of court business in a neutral forum free of actual or perceived partiality, bias, prejudice, or favoritism; to provide for the fair and orderly conduct of hearings and trials; to promote the free flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on sidewalks and streets; and to maintain proper judicial decorum . . . .

(Id.) However, in response to Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Second Judicial District has only defended the Plaza Order on the bases of preserving “the efficient functioning of the court” (e.g., unhindered ingress and egress to the Courthouse) and “maintain[ing] public safety.” (ECF No. 24 at 12.)

These are potentially “significant” government interests. Legitimate time-place- manner restrictions in a public forum can be motivated by “objectives [such as] public safety, accommodating competing uses of the easement, controlling the level and times of noise, and similar interests.” First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002). But the Court finds on this record that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in proving that the Plaza Order is not narrowly tailored to these stated objectives. Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order bans essentially all expressive activity regardless of whether it would affect “the efficient functioning of the court” or threaten “public safety.” Courts look dimly on such “First Amendment Free Zones.” See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987); First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1132.

Moreover, in the Second Judicial District’s briefing (see ECF No. 24 at 12) and at the preliminary injunction hearing, it became clear that the sole motivating concern behind the Plaza Order was potentially violent protests that could follow if Dexter Lewis receives the death penalty. Steadman, the Second Judicial District’s witness, agreed that other measures could address that concern, e.g., he could arrange for additional security well in advance of any verdict announcement. He also agreed that Plaintiffs’ activities posed no greater threat to the Courthouse than it has faced in the last five years, when expressive activities have been unrestricted. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs will likely demonstrate that at least Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order is not narrowly tailored to serve the interests of maintaining public safety and the efficient functioning of the court.

c. “Leave Open Ample Alternative Channels of Communication”

Given the foregoing finding, inquiry into the alternative channels of communication is unnecessary. 7 The Court accordingly holds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in defeating at least Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order under the strict scrutiny test applied to public forums.

————
7 The Court nonetheless notes Plaintiffs’ argument at the preliminary injunction hearing that their advocacy requires person-to-person contact because the concept of jury nullification is obscure and does not lend itself well to pithy slogans that can easily be chanted or placed on a placard (and therefore understood from a distance). Plaintiffs’ counsel could not cite this Court to any authority holding that those wishing to advocate complicated or lesser understood concepts receive more solicitude than others when it comes to available channels of communication. To the contrary, the case law suggests that the government can more easily restrict person-to-person interaction because of its potential for harassment. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773–74 (1994). The Court need not resolve the issue at this time, but only raises it as a matter of potential concern as this case progresses.
————

?C. Irreparable Injury

“[T]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Second Judicial District offers no response to Plaintiffs’ irreparable injury argument. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured absent a preliminary injunction.
?
D. Balancing of Interests

The injury to a plaintiff deprived of his or her First Amendment rights almost always outweighs potential harm to the government if the injunction is granted. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999). And again, the Second Judicial District offers no response to Plaintiffs’ argument that the balance of interests tips in their favor. Accordingly, the Court finds that the balance indeed tips in Plaintiffs’ favor, although the Court will issue the narrowest injunction possible so that the Second Judicial District is not unduly restrained in its ability to maintain safety and proper judicial functioning. (See Part III.F, infra.)?

E. Public Interest

Finally, as with irreparable injury and balancing of interests, it is almost always in the public interest to prevent a First Amendment violation. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132; Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1163. The Second Judicial District does not argue otherwise. The Court therefore finds that a narrowly drawn injunction would be in the public interest.

?F. Scope of Injunctive Relief

The Court will enter a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiffs. However, the Court will not grant an injunction as broad as Plaintiffs’ counsel requested at the preliminary injunction hearing. Plaintiffs’ counsel requested an injunction stating that their message and form of advocacy is protected speech, supposedly to protect against any other government agency that might try to silence them. But the Court cannot say (on this record at least) that Plaintiffs’ message and form of advocacy is always protected speech under all circumstances. In addition, an injunction must run against a party—this Court cannot enter an injunction against the world at large. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (describing persons bound by an injunction). If Plaintiffs believe that a particular government agency is likely to attempt to silence them, they need to join that agency as a party and satisfy the preliminary injunction as against that agency. 8

Further, although Plaintiffs apparently seek to strike down the entire Plaza Order as unconstitutional, the Court will limit its injunction only to certain portions of the Plaza Order. As counsel for the Second Judicial District pointed out at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Plaza Order applies both inside and outside the Courthouse, but Plaintiffs have only challenged its restrictions outside the Courthouse. Accordingly, the Court will not disturb the Plaza Order as it operates inside the Courthouse.

In addition, the Court notes the Landscaping and Gravel Area in the East Restricted Area. Although no party discussed the scope of a potential injunction in these specific areas, the Court assumes for present purposes that Denver did not intend its public forum stipulation to authorize Plaintiffs to tramp through the Landscaping or the Gravel Area, both of which are ultimately designed for the Courthouse’s security. The Court therefore will not enjoin the operation of the Plaza Order as it applies to the Landscaping and Gravel Area.

The Court also notes that Plaintiffs have specifically alleged their intent to distribute and discuss the two pamphlets attached to their original complaint, “Fresh Air for Justice” (ECF No. 1-3) and “Your Jury Rights: True or False?” (ECF No. 1-4). At the preliminary injunction hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs reemphasized that these two pamphlets form the basis of what they wish to discuss. The Court will therefore limit its injunction to distribution of those specific pamphlets and oral advocacy of the message contained in those pamphlets.

Finally, only Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order is truly at issue here. Plaintiffs have not challenged the Second Judicial District’s authority to prevent obstruction of the entryways (Paragraph 2), to prohibit the erection of structures (Paragraph 3), or to restrict sound amplification equipment (Paragraph 4). Thus, the Court will limit the injunction to Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order. 9

————
8 Plaintiffs’ counsel expressed some concern that the Denver District Attorney’s office had been involved in the arrest of Brandt and Iannicelli and that the DA’s office might continue to pursue similar prosecutions. But Plaintiffs have not joined the DA’s office as a party, and in any event, in light of Denver’s stipulation with Plaintiffs, it is questionable whether the Denver Police Department would execute any arrest warrant based on Plaintiffs’ activities.

9 A party awarded a preliminary injunction normally must “give[] security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The Tenth Circuit has held that “a trial court may, in the exercise of discretion, determine a bond is unnecessary to secure a preliminary injunction if there is an absence of proof showing a likelihood of harm.” Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestern Pipeline Co., 825 F.2d 1461, 1462 (10th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Judicial District has not put forth any evidence of a likelihood of harm, nor has it argued that Plaintiffs should be required to post a bond. Having considered the issue sua sponte, the Court determines that a bond is unnecessary in light of the lack of likely harm to the Second Judicial District, and in light of the nature of the case. Cf. 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2954 n.29 (3d ed., Apr. 2015 update) (citing public rights cases where the bond was excused or significantly reduced).
————

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ and Denver’s Stipulation (ECF No. 23) is ACCEPTED and shall be treated as if an order from this Court; ?

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; and ?

3. The City and County of Denver, its police chief, Robert C. White, in his official capacity, and the Second Judicial District (including their respective officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and other persons who are in active concert or participation with any of them) (collectively, “Defendants”) are PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED as follows (all capitalized terms bear the respective meanings assigned above): ?

a. Save for any Plaintiff physically located on the Landscaping or Gravel Area, Defendants shall not enforce Paragraph 1 of the Plaza Order against any Plaintiff (including any FIJA member) physically located in the Restricted Area to the extent he or she is otherwise lawfully seeking to distribute and/or orally advocate the message contained in the pamphlets titled “Fresh Air for Justice” and/or “Your Jury Rights: True or False?”

b. To the extent consistent with the foregoing prohibition, Defendants remain free to enforce Paragraphs 2–4 of the Plaza Order.

Dated this 25th day of August, 2015.

BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez?
United States District Judge

How I nearly got arrested for holding a sign at Denver International Airport

Posted on February 3, 2017 by Eric Verlo

DIA, COLORADO- Last weekend I joined thousands across the country protesting Trump’s executive order restricting entry visas from seven predominantly Muslim countries. Spontaneous demonstrations had erupted at international airports nationwide on Saturday January 27. Denver’s airport was no exception but the lively gathering of sign holders was ultimately persuaded by police to leave the premises. Supposedly a permit was required to hold signs. Demonstrators the next day were quickly ushered outside, to rally instead between the terminal and adjacent lightrail station, where only a tiny fraction of travelers would see them. This much we knew as we monitored events online while we reconnoitered DIA from the short-term parking garage. We made our way swiftly to the International Arrivals doors at the north end of the main terminal WITH OUR SIGNS.

International Arrivals
The point was to reach immigrants, right? We walked to our intended protest spot unhindered and inconspicuous, because of course signs are not an unusual sight at an airport. Travelers who’ve been a long time away, in particular soldiers returning from deployment, are frequently greeted by family members holding signs. Often limo drivers have to page their corporate clients. We carried our placards with their message facing inward hoping they’d be mistaken for everyday signs. When we raised them above our heads we attracted immediate attention. They read “#NO MUSLIM BAN #NO REGISTRY, END WHITE PATRIARCHY” and “FIRST THEY CAME FOR THE MUSLIMS AND WE SAID: NOT TODAY MOTHERFUCKER.” Immediately a man with a “DIA Operations” cap informed us that we weren’t allowed to hold signs. We assured him the opposite was true. He called for backup.

We weren’t alone in front of International Arrivals. In addition to the families awaiting loved ones, there were a couple dozen law firm employees holding signs which read “Pro Bono Immigration Legal Services”. We surmised that their presence might have already been negotiated with DIA. Soon a couple of those lawyers approached us to announce loudly that the public protest was outside the building and that we could continue there unmolested. We thanked them for their assistance but urged that they also clarify publicly that we were within our rights to stay inside as well. I was upset that their gravitas, as lawyers, was seen as supportive of the authorities telling us to stop.

Police officers arrived in short order, a first one filming us with a digital point-and-shoot, then a second filming with a cell phone, both surely streaming to a command center. After six officers assembled, a sergeant approached us flanked by two DIA employees. She gave us our formal warnings. We were given instructions to “cease and desist” while we countered that we knew our rights. After a second warning we were assured that a third would mean our immediate arrest. We held our signs higher, all the while asserting their order was unlawful. The immigration lawyers huddled as far away from us as they could. Sgt. Virginia Quinones then got on her phone to consult somebody.

I recount this scene like it was a nail-biter, but of course we’ve held this standoff many, many times before. For activists with Occupy Denver, it’s become the routine. I was wearing an OD hoodie on this visit to DIA and I suspected whoever was on the line with Sgt Quinones had likely dealt with OD before. To be honest, this standoff too often does lead to arrest, so we were not proceeding without trepidation. Denver jail is an excreble experience. But it’s an unlawful arrest and that’s where we have to push back. As the sergeant kept talking, she and her entourage retreated. We stood our ground smiling and winked to each other. For onlookers however, the tension lingered. Several lawyers approached us to offer their cards, in case of arrest.

Intimidation
Though we were confident about asserting our rights, the six officers standing at the ready made it near impossible to entice other sign holders to join us. Our encourgements would be followed by the DIA operatives offering their advice to the newcomers. Nearly every newcomer opted to go outside. Only after hours of detente, with officers projecting a more relaxed inattentiveness, did we succeed in building a consensus of demonstrators.

In the meantime DIA operatives installed queue barriers to keep us from intermingling with the lawyers and family members waiting for international travelers. This strategy might also have meant to force us into the flow of passengers entering the nearby security check. We stood clear and even as our numbers grew, no obstruction occured.

One interesting fellow, a Mr. Gene Wells, wore a jacket with a message taped on its back. It read:

“D. TRUMP
IS A SMALL MAN
WHO CONTINUES
TO SHRINK
AS A PERSON”

with the letters diminishing in size every line. He was warned by DIA personnel that he could only wear his jacket outside. DIA operatives wouldn’t leave his side as he walked through the terminal, but abandoned their effort to intimidate him as he rejoined us at the arrivals door.

A couple of travelers joined in before they had to catch a flight, they held signs they’d printed that morning at their AirBnB. We were joined by Quakers and even a former Denver Occupier. At most we numbered eight, compared to the hundred outside.

The protest outside
The protest outside was seen only by those travelers arriving or leaving by light-rail. And potentially by only half of those departing DIA through the B and C terminals, whose security check queue necessitated passing the windows facing the south. Perhaps. Most travelers approaching security aren’t lingering to take in the sights. The other half of passengers departing DIA go through the north security check, or over the walkway to Terminal A.

All arriving passengers, on the other hand, enter the main terminal from the north or using the underground train. They pass through the center of the main terminal before exiting at the baggage claims to the east and west. International arrivals enter the terminal from the north and proceed directly to parking or ground transport. If they are met by family they are very UNlikely to be riding the light-rail to downtown Denver.

While the protest outside did garner local television coverage, it was prevented from reaching immigrants or those awaiting arrivals, to convey the solidarity which those who opposed the Muslim Ban wished to express.

Inside our signs prompted a constant stream of public support. Passing travelers gave us thumbs up, high fives and thank yous. Muslims shook our hands and offered their heartfelt thanks. A couple gentlemen made speeches expressing their pubic appreciation of what we and the lawyers were doing.

Permits
The DIA operatives kept explaining that protesters need only apply for permits. The catch was that they required seven days advance notice. And of course activist do not expect permits to be granted.

One of the Quakers who joined us expressed confidence that her group would be granted a permit to protest at DIA. She explained to me that she was personal friends with the new Denver DA.

I told her applying for permits set a bad precedent. Asking for permission implies those rights are not already protected by the First Amendment. Permits also restrict others to the code of conduct agreed by those who signed permit agreements. Often permits are used to exclude public participation on public grounds temporarily reserved for the use of the permit holder.

Worse, the police can intervene when “others” aren’t abiding by the permit agreement, when they aren’t complying with police intrusion, or aren’t acquiescing to the authority of the permit holder.

Never the less, this Quaker wanted to inform me that as the anticipated holder of the permit at DIA, she wished to invite me to participate with her group. However, she anticipated that her church colleagues would be made most uncomfortable by my sign (which ended with the word “motherfucker”). So if I did choose to join, she was expressing her preference that I not bring my sign.

Mistakenly released DPD After Action Report reveals 27 officers on “shadow operations” at Denver 100 Mask March

Posted on June 28, 2016 by Eric Verlo

DENVER, COLORADO- Hidden deep in the evidence against one of nine protesters arrested at last year’s Guy Fawkes’ Day march in Denver, was an “AFTER ACTION REPORT” never encountered before in discovery evidence available to previous Denver activism defendants. This report has provided the first public mention of “Shadow Teams” deployed on “Shadow Operations” against peaceful demonstrators. Most remarkable was that 27 officers were mobilized for shadow operations, among a total of 169, clocking a total of 1379 man hours, against a rally and march that numbered “around 100” at its peak, to quote the report.

The report was presented to Denver municipal judge Beth Faragher on Monday before the trial of one of the Anonymous arrestees. The judge was asked why discovery evidence didn’t include reports from the “Shadow Teams” detailing, for example, what their shadow operations were. Judge Faragher agreed to continue the trial until September to allow city attorneys to come up with some answers.

One defendant’s lawyer was also provided the Denver Police Department’s Crowd Management Manual, an earlier edition of which was leaked last year by Denver’s Unicorn Riot. The current manual does not differ on this subject and defines Shadow Team as: “A team of officers assigned to identify Persons of Interest as being involved in possible criminal activity based on Reasonable Suspicion.”

There is no disagreement that shadow operations involve undercover officers following targeted activists. The question is what were they doing to maintain their cover? You can’t surveil moving marches from under storefront awnings or hotel windows. To mingle with protesters who have to march with them. To ingratiate yourself with hosts you have to participate. To impress leaders you have to delegate. So what actions were the shadow offices mimicking?

The title “Million Mask March” means to aggregate all the actions across the world demonstrating on Guy Fawkes’ Day, every 5th of November. Individual marches are ridiculed for being mere fractions of a million, in Denver for example, marshalling only a hundred or so. Now, even more humiliating for Denver may be the revelation that up to a quarter of the marchers were undercover cops.

Denver activists are accustomed to infiltrators, such have been photographed and outed regularly, but 27 officers operating in “shadow teams” is news. It may rewrite the last several years of arrest incidents. Arrests of Denver protesters have appeared sporatic and haphazard. Now it seems the targeting may have been restricted to actual protesters, because their shadow companions were not arrestible, by virtue of being cops.

Although Shadow Teams are mentioned in the DPD manual, this After Action Report is the first to itemize their deployment.

Here’s the command structure which list the names of three officers whom lawyers may be able to depose: a Commander Fountain, Lieutenant Mitchell, and Lieutenant Jimenez. Defense lawyers are now considering deposing these officers to learn more about what their operations entail.

Unfortunately the narrative provided in the 4-page after action report does not detail the “shadow” activity. It does however mention the number of anonymous activists which Denver was mobilizing against. From 20 building up to 100 tops. Here’s the full narrative:

Denver Police Department AFTER ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE OF INCIDENT (Chronological log, if applicable, to be attached)

On 11-05-2015 members of the Denver Police Department were assigned to various locations throughout downtown Denver to monitor the Million Mask March. Response personnel consisted primarily of District SCAT teams, DMU, Metro/Swat and Gang Bureau officers. The MAP Team was staged at 14th and Delaware to facilitate arrest processing. On-duty traffic resources and DPD special units assisted as well. District Six Commander Tony Lopez acted as the Operations Chief and managed activity in the field. The Command Post was maintained at the Denver Crime Lab with representatives from RTD, DSD, DFD, CSP and DHPD.

By 1130 hours about 10 protestors gathered in the 1400 block of Lincoln on the west side of the Capitol. The participants were primarily dressed in black clothing and many were wearing masks. By 1245 hours the crowd grew to over 40 people. They demonstrated peacefully by holding signs and banners. On November 4th the protest group announced a planned march between the hours of 4 – 5 pm. The morning crowds and noon marches that took place in 2013 and 2014 did not occur this year.

Afternoon March

At 1420 hours some group members were observed making signs with spray paint. By 1545 the crowd grew to around 60. At 1640 hours Sergeant Cervera 680 contacted security at the World Trade Center (1625-1675 Broadway) in anticipation of protest activity there (Ben Buthe 720-499-2292 or CP 303-595-7049). DPD was advised that the WTC Plaza closes at 1800 hours.

At approximately 1650 hours officers contacted occupants of a suspicious dark truck NY GMY4295 parked on the elevated lot just east of DPD HQ (1400 blk of Cherokee). The incident checked clear.

At 1700 hours, two individuals wearing Guy Fawkes masks were observed walking southbound in the 1300 block of Delaware and then eastbound on W. 13th Avenue past the south side of DPD HQ.

At 1704 hours the group left northbound on Lincoln from the Capitol. They turned left on the 16th Street Mall but appeared to stay on the east sidewalk. The group turned south on Court Place but quickly crossed the street and walked back toward the Mall. At 1714 hours, some members walked in the street upon being encouraged by an individual with a bullhorn. This action interrupted the RTD Shuttle Service. The entire group then continued their march by walking down the center of the Mall. The Federal Reserve Security office was notified.

At 1725 hours the group rallied a short time at Stout Street and then turned around to march back toward Broadway. They turned west on California and walked toward 15th Street, where they remained on the sidewalk. The group turned right on 15th Street and started an unpermitted march in the street shortly thereafter. DMU officers responded to encourage the protestors back on the sidewalk. Verbal orders were given as well.

The group turned east on Stout and then north on the 16th Street Mall. They rallied for a short time at the Federal Reserve Building at 16th and Arapahoe and then continued northbound on the Mall. The group appeared to number around 100 at this time.

At 1750 hours the demonstrators turned right on Lawrence and marched primarily on the sidewalk toward 17th Street. They stopped momentarily midblock in front of the Westin Hotel then continued outbound on Lawrence. The group turned south on 18th Street where some of the members walked in the street. At 1757 hours, most of the crowd began an unpermitted march in the street 1700 block of Arapahoe. Demonstrators were advised to get out of the street and back on the sidewalk. After refusals to comply, four parties were arrested for the continued violations. Traffic officers diverted vehicular traffic at 18th Street for safety and opened the street at 1805 hours. At 1803 hours a female victim contacted 724A Officer Gates and stated she was assaulted by one of the protestors. District 6 officers were dispatched for the report and an ambulance was called.

The demonstrators continued their march on the sidewalk on Arapahoe toward 16th Street, then turned left on the Mall. They turned west on Curtis and marched across 15th to 14th Street. At 1817 hours an individual wearing a grey backpack with a metal baton attached to the back appeared to be trying to incite a disturbance. The group turned south on 14th and walked toward Champa where they stopped and blocked traffic. At 1820 hours a white male wearing all black with a military-type vest and carrying a backpack with white lettering was advised by police to get out of the street at 14th and Champa.

At 1825 hours the group continued to march south on 14th Street. They crossed California, Welton and Glenarm and then turned east on Tremont. At 1835 hours some members attempted to march in the streets again at 15th and Tremont. DMU officers once again responded to order and marshal the violators back on the sidewalk. The group continued south on 15th Street toward Colfax Avenue. The group marched unpermitted in the streets again on Colfax Avenue eastbound toward Broadway.

At 1844 hours a protestor pushed over DPD Lieutenant Mike Wyatt and bicycle officer Tab Davis at Colfax and Broadway. The suspect was arrested shortly thereafter. A second arrest was made after an individual attempted to “unarrest” the first suspect. At 1858 hours Sergeant Horton reported a felony drug arrest. Once again, traffic and DMU personnel assisted with traffic control in order to maintain a safe environment. Two additional protestors were arrested for disobedience. The protestors ultimately gathered back at the State Capitol and dissipated by around 1930 hours.

Throughout the afternoon and evening, multiple announcements were made by police for the demonstrators to get out of the street. Three Use of Force reports were completed in association with the arrests and three officers suffered injuries. One of the three officers (Cash) was transported to DHMC with a knee injury related to an arrest. Except for those officers involved in an arrest, all units were released by 2000 hours.

Hastert being a pedophile is not the story! Where did a former wrestling coach get millions to bribe his victims?!

Posted on April 27, 2016 by Eric Verlo

If Dennis Hastert was being treated like a convicted serial pedophile, he’d never see the light of day, you’d think. Instead the judge was asked to take into account his years of public service. Which is almost not missing the point of the whole scandal. Dennis Hastert being a pedophile pales next to the number of victims of his white collar crime. Paying hush money to the former victims of his predatory sexual abuse was the petty crime for which he was sentenced to 15-months in prison. Hastert’s biggest crime was his corruption as the longest serving Speaker Of The House. Dennis Hastert was a high school wrestling coach before running for office and becoming a multimillionare land speculator. Could Hastert’s record stint in Congress mean he didn’t break records for stealing from his constituents and their interests? It’s obvious where Hastert got the millions in cash with which to pay off his many underage victims. THAT’S the crime for which Dennis Hastert isn’t serving enough time. BY ALL MEANS, DO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HIS PUBLIC SERVICE. Award his millions to his abused victims, put Dennis Hastert in jail forever, then, for betraying the public trust, hang him.

I have to ask: if Dennis Hastert was a perv as a wrestling coach, what predilections do you suppose he indulged as America’s second most powerful office-holder and corrupt multimillionaire? Are we to imagine Speaker Hastert kicked his pedophilia habit for graft? Those are two distinct abberations. One’s a mental disorder, the other is calculated greed.

At today’s sentencing the judge called Dennis Hastert a “serial pedophile” and expressed it was shocking to say serial pedophile and House Speaker in the same sentence. I doubt that. Mostly because we only learn these things after the fact. I think it would be more accurate in the future to wonder which if any of our speakers are not pedophiles.

If fellow congressmen and staffers knew anything of Hastert activities –and how couldn’t they not?– they should face prosecution as well.

Hillary, Trump Hold Historical Meeting

Posted on April 27, 2016 by David Lee Anderson

DLA News Service, Denver, Colorado

Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, along with Bill and Melania have met privately to discuss the fall election. The meeting was conducted at a closed door meeting on Wall Street late Tuesday evening after sweeping wins by both candidates in Super Tuesday primaries. The candidates have made a tentative agreement, that after their nominations in their respective party conventions, they will suspend this fall’s Presidential election.

They have agreed that this is an effort to get their money out of politics, whereas they agree on so many of the political and social issues, they will each serve a two year term as President and vice President as soon as the Negros are evicted from the Whitehouse.

Due to the limited number of bedrooms in the Whitehouse, it was decided that Bill and Melania would share a bedroom while Hillary and Donald shared the Presidential Suite.

The one undecided issue is, who will get the first two year term.

There was also some discussion on merging the Democratic and Republican parties to simplify the Presidential elections, with a ban on all other political parties as a cost cutting maneuver.

The selection of all Senate and Congressional seats would then fall to the Vice Presidents office with no need of costly future elections.

April 15: NYC took a bridge, Chicago & Seattle took the streets, Portland took Town Hall, and Denver took the cake

Posted on April 16, 2015 by Eric Verlo

DENVER, COLORADO- Yes, Denver’s FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN march kept to the sidewalks. When ISO members (organizing the local “15 NOW” group) pushed the boundaries, SEIU marshals criticized them not just for agitating, but for pushing their socialist agenda. Occupy Denver activists held a prominent banner which referenced reigning minimum wage champion Socialist Alternative. Most of the attendees were union members whose representatives have obviously failed to credit the SA party or Seattle Councilwoman Kshama Sawant for the nation’s first $15 minimum wage victory. We fielded questions all evening from marchers eager to know if an SA chapter was brewing in Colorado.

TO BE FAIR, Denver’s march did take an adventurous turn, by Denver standards, but the rally began as might be expected from an event dominated by the SEIU and other corporate unions and their immobile nonprofit cohorts. Denver’s 4-15 rally started in the middle of CU-Denver’s Auraria campus, invisible from any street and unseeable to even partipants arriving, until they turned the corner to find it, behind the Tivoli Center.

Then organizers had a lineup of speakers which stretched well past expectations, trimming the crowd by over a third as supporters opted to slip away due to the unexpected cold front. Next participants were admonished to stick to the sidewalk, even on campus grounds, and applaud the police who’d agreed to permit the march. We were heading to a neighboring McDonalds, at least we were taking the scenic route.

Throughout the rally and march, a brass band played, and members of the local band Flobots led chants and songs. This lent a fun energy but it did preclude ordinary marchers speaking out or centering the vocal messaging on anything more than the generic themes of financial discontent. Even as crowds lingered in front of McDonalds, the band played on, when poignant denunciations might have provided a suitable climax.

Fortunately, a “Silver Brigade” had been deployed to patronize the fast food monster beforehand, to prevent managers from being able to lock the doors when the marchers arrived. McDs managers did lock the doors and they discussed a number of interesting defensive tactics under the noses of our operatives, but the managers were ultimately unable to refuse senior citizens demanding they be allowed to exit. This exit was timed to allow the Fight-for-Fifteen procession to march straight up to the counter, demanding a living wage, etc. Their objections heard, the marchers left and eventually crossed the street and dissolved into shortcuts through the Auraria campus.

(Note: My account of our inside job may appear indiscrete, but I include it purposefully. One, because even with advance knowledge it’s a difficult tactic to prevent, and two, because organizers of successive protests of establishments such as McDs need to include this tactic if they don’t want to remain locked out.)

The highlight for me was infusing the event theme with the S-word. Desperate as they were today to fight for a living wage, vowing “we’ll be back” or else to “shut it down”, these union adherants will shortly become the usual Democrats, waving the Hillary banners, as if there was no alternative.

Whose fault is it that America’s minimum wage has been allowed to lapse below the poverty level? Is the responsibility not in part that of the unions’? The SEIU is driving the official “Fight for Fifteen” campaign, but only after socialists have led the way, as they did whenever the labor movement made its gains.

NE Patriots are serial cheaters, so are their namesakes. The unfair advantage is an essential of Capitalism.

Posted on January 22, 2015 by Eric Verlo

First the New England Patriots got caught spying on their adversaries, now they’ve been tweaking the air-pressure of their game balls to sneak a ballistic handling advantage. Rules be damned, Patriot quarterback Tom Brady prefers his ordnance two pounds psi shy, hollow-points –if you will– which are also against regulation. For how long have the Patriots been manipulating advantages? And how else? They weren’t satisfied with the home field advantage on Sunday. Maybe officials should bring protractors to investigate the Boston gridiron. A level playing field doesn’t likely suit the Patriots either.

OF COURSE it doesn’t. Who expects sportsmanship from “patriots?!” Patriotism is the antisocial insistance on your own cultural superiority. American exceptionalism is an endorsement of tactical superiority, covert war, disproportionate force, drones, extrajudicial assassination, death squads, snipers, collateral damage, and torture. Formal US policy is to FLAUNT international law. American materialism profits from insider trading, extortion, usury, and corporate hegemony uber alles! Why would our surrogate Sunday warriors pretend there is honor among thieves?

Of course America underinflates footballs to best our opponents. We also diligently deploy inspectors to ensure our intended defeatees can’t recallibrate theirs. Meanwhile our leaders dissemble when plausible deniability stretches thin.

Of course NFL officials are not discussing a Super Bowl disqualification for the recidivist Patriots. Instead they’re weighing minor penalties, no doubt manageable, if not tax deductible. If America’s best cheaters don’t advance to the Super Bowl, the outcome would be hypocritical. Go Team! America Fuck Yeah!

I’m kidding of course. Sack the quarterback, disqualify the Patriots, send whoever else to the Super Bowl, then march the entire US defense and offense departments to the Hague.

UPDATE 1/23:
While fans and media try to belittle the scandal (ie. “Deflate-gate” and “Ballghazi”), statisticians have noted a damning anomaly relating to the advantage gained from underinflated footballs. After the rules were changed to allow offensive teams to use their own footballs –Brady was among the quarterbacks lobbying for the change– New England’s ball handling superiority grew beyond the realm of probability.

Probably all teams know that well-inflated footballs fly further but underinflated balls are easier to grab. Maybe the purpose of making a personalized array of game balls available is so offensive teams can exploit alternate characteristics as needed. Maybe the NFL understood this when they granted the rule change. Maybe the Patriots just couldn’t pass up every opportunity to cheat, until the statistics made plain their greed. Whether by hubris or head-injury numbskulledness, Tom Brady and his receivers thought they coud break PT Barnum’s rule too.

The American Dream hinges on equality of opportunity and fair play, but of course Capitalism idealizes the unfair advantage.

Btw I abhor the theatre of corporate sports, but when it exposes the reek of America’s national character, I like to make sure to smell it.

Je Suis a Goddamn Neoliberal Meme… Je Suis Charlie, Neda, Kony, Save Dafur

Posted on January 12, 2015 by Eric Verlo

A million people mobilized in Paris, including 40 WORLD LEADERS!? How long have their limousines been queued? I usually brag that our corporate foes can’t manufacture consent in the streets, except when they do.

I AM NEDA, KONY 2012, SAVE DARFUR, now JE SUIS CHARLIE are purely neoliberal consolidations of public support. They’re televised Nurenburg rallies masked as spontaneous demonstrations. Add “I AM ___” to “______ Spring” and colored revolutions as dead giveaways of psy-op inspired counterrevolution.

With NYPD turning their backs on their mayor and Westboro Baptists making the protest of soldiers look unreasonable, the choices are narrowing for activists who want to define their struggle with tactics not splooged upon by the lumpen knee jerk Fascists.

A woman approached me yesterday at an anti police brutality demonstration in solidarity with Ferguson. She agreed with the cause, but wanted to know why we weren’t also speaking out for abused children, for example those thrown off bridges by deranged parents. While child abuse has its systemic causes, the answer highlights what differentiates insurgent demonstrations from the false. People take to the streets to challenge power, not to gang up with power to further its oppressive agendas.

Duh. Except the lure of popular causes seems to be irresistable to social justice types normally starved for public support. I saw the “Save Darfur” project twist and fracture my local peace community. Obama Lincoln 2008 had the same effect, another socially engineered bandwagon.

I’m not galled by the hypocracy of world leaders “marching” in Paris, pretending to stand for press freedoms. I’m upset my the millions of Frenchmen duped into attending their photo-op. Those millions of Frenchmen in the same street should have trampled the World Bank kapos underfoot, instead of pretending the corporate cabal were people too.

(Remember when I AM NEDA protests failed to tie a viral snuff vid to false accusations of election fraud in Iran?)

One less racist misogynist philanderer, but Instagram popularity is off chart

Posted on April 22, 2014 by Eric Verlo

“You can fuck Magic Johnson for all that I care, just don’t put him on Instagram” billionaire Donald Sterling told his mistress in a now infamous recording in which he also explained he didn’t want her bringing black people to his basketball games. The NBA responded by stripping the LA Clippers owner of his franchise because they won’t abide blatant racism, as if the NBA performer audience color divide wasn’t overt enough. Who could have envisioned a boyfriend being more jealous of Instagram than actual physical infidelity? KUDOS INSTAGRAM! And three cheers for billionaires so greedy that they can’t abide a sex-worker mistress being compensated with a house and car. Sterling’s wife sued the mistress to recover less than one percent of their tax-evading family trust, in spite of being forwarned that an incriminating tape would be leaked to the press. But I’m really curious about the friends Sterling said were complaining to him about the Instagram pic. Who sees someone posing with Magic Johnson and asks “why is your girlfriend standing next to a BLACK MAN?”

The Putin knock-knock joke is easier to find than his Kremlin speech on Crimea

Posted on March 27, 2014 by NMT

This graphic circulating on the interwebs is a lot easier to find than Vladimir Putin’s March 18 address to the Kremlin about the referendum in Crimea after the Western coup in Ukraine. Bypassing dubious translations excerpted on Capitalist media sites, here is a transcript of his speech direct from the Kremlin. Putin is no hero, but he threatens US-EU banking hegemony, gives asylum to Edward Snowden, and executes zero people with drones.

QUOTING PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA VLADIMIR PUTIN:
Federation Council members, State Duma deputies, good afternoon. Representatives of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are here among us, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol!

Dear friends, we have gathered here today in connection with an issue that is of vital, historic significance to all of us. A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms.

More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96 percent of them spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves.

To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other.

Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour.

Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and traditions. This makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost over the centuries. Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other ethnic groups have lived side by side in Crimea, retaining their own identity, traditions, languages and faith.

Incidentally, the total population of the Crimean Peninsula today is 2.2 million people, of whom almost 1.5 million are Russians, 350,000 are Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their native language, and about 290,000-300,000 are Crimean Tatars, who, as the referendum has shown, also lean towards Russia.

True, there was a time when Crimean Tatars were treated unfairly, just as a number of other peoples in the USSR. There is only one thing I can say here: millions of people of various ethnicities suffered during those repressions, and primarily Russians.

Crimean Tatars returned to their homeland. I believe we should make all the necessary political and legislative decisions to finalise the rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars, restore them in their rights and clear their good name.

We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living in Crimea. This is their common home, their motherland, and it would be right – I know the local population supports this – for Crimea to have three equal national languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar.

Colleagues,

In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our country went through during the entire 20th century.

After the revolution, the Bolsheviks, for a number of reasons – may God judge them – added large sections of the historical South of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine. This was done with no consideration for the ethnic make-up of the population, and today these areas form the southeast of Ukraine. Then, in 1954, a decision was made to transfer Crimean Region to Ukraine, along with Sevastopol, despite the fact that it was a federal city. This was the personal initiative of the Communist Party head Nikita Khrushchev. What stood behind this decision of his – a desire to win the support of the Ukrainian political establishment or to atone for the mass repressions of the 1930’s in Ukraine – is for historians to figure out.

What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then. The decision was made behind the scenes. Naturally, in a totalitarian state nobody bothered to ask the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol. They were faced with the fact. People, of course, wondered why all of a sudden Crimea became part of Ukraine. But on the whole – and we must state this clearly, we all know it – this decision was treated as a formality of sorts because the territory was transferred within the boundaries of a single state. Back then, it was impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two separate states. However, this has happened.

Unfortunately, what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart. Things developed so swiftly that few people realised how truly dramatic those events and their consequences would be. Many people both in Russia and in Ukraine, as well as in other republics hoped that the Commonwealth of Independent States that was created at the time would become the new common form of statehood. They were told that there would be a single currency, a single economic space, joint armed forces; however, all this remained empty promises, while the big country was gone. It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realised that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered.

At the same time, we have to admit that by launching the sovereignty parade Russia itself aided in the collapse of the Soviet Union. And as this collapse was legalised, everyone forgot about Crimea and Sevastopol – the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.

Now, many years later, I heard residents of Crimea say that back in 1991 they were handed over like a sack of potatoes. This is hard to disagree with. And what about the Russian state? What about Russia? It humbly accepted the situation. This country was going through such hard times then that realistically it was incapable of protecting its interests. However, the people could not reconcile themselves to this outrageous historical injustice. All these years, citizens and many public figures came back to this issue, saying that Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian city. Yes, we all knew this in our hearts and minds, but we had to proceed from the existing reality and build our good-neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine on a new basis. Meanwhile, our relations with Ukraine, with the fraternal Ukrainian people have always been and will remain of foremost importance for us.

Today we can speak about it openly, and I would like to share with you some details of the negotiations that took place in the early 2000s. The then President of Ukraine Mr Kuchma asked me to expedite the process of delimiting the Russian-Ukrainian border. At that time, the process was practically at a standstill. Russia seemed to have recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine, but there were no negotiations on delimiting the borders. Despite the complexity of the situation, I immediately issued instructions to Russian government agencies to speed up their work to document the borders, so that everyone had a clear understanding that by agreeing to delimit the border we admitted de facto and de jure that Crimea was Ukrainian territory, thereby closing the issue.

We accommodated Ukraine not only regarding Crimea, but also on such a complicated matter as the maritime boundary in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. What we proceeded from back then was that good relations with Ukraine matter most for us and they should not fall hostage to deadlock territorial disputes. However, we expected Ukraine to remain our good neighbour, we hoped that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and civilised state that would protect their rights in line with the norms of international law.

However, this is not how the situation developed. Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced assimilation. Moreover, Russians, just as other citizens of Ukraine are suffering from the constant political and state crisis that has been rocking the country for over 20 years.

I understand why Ukrainian people wanted change. They have had enough of the authorities in power during the years of Ukraine’s independence. Presidents, prime ministers and parliamentarians changed, but their attitude to the country and its people remained the same. They milked the country, fought among themselves for power, assets and cash flows and did not care much about the ordinary people. They did not wonder why it was that millions of Ukrainian citizens saw no prospects at home and went to other countries to work as day labourers. I would like to stress this: it was not some Silicon Valley they fled to, but to become day labourers. Last year alone almost 3 million people found such jobs in Russia. According to some sources, in 2013 their earnings in Russia totalled over $20 billion, which is about 12% of Ukraine’s GDP.

I would like to reiterate that I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people. However, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.

The new so-called authorities began by introducing a draft law to revise the language policy, which was a direct infringement on the rights of ethnic minorities. However, they were immediately ‘disciplined’ by the foreign sponsors of these so-called politicians. One has to admit that the mentors of these current authorities are smart and know well what such attempts to build a purely Ukrainian state may lead to. The draft law was set aside, but clearly reserved for the future. Hardly any mention is made of this attempt now, probably on the presumption that people have a short memory. Nevertheless, we can all clearly see the intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II.

It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have been taken over by the impostors, but they do not have any control in the country, while they themselves – and I would like to stress this – are often controlled by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke – this is reality.

Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.

Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.

First, we had to help create conditions so that the residents of Crimea for the first time in history were able to peacefully express their free will regarding their own future. However, what do we hear from our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are violating norms of international law. Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing as international law – better late than never.

Secondly, and most importantly – what exactly are we violating? True, the President of the Russian Federation received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces in Ukraine. However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet. Russia’s Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with an international agreement. True, we did enhance our forces there; however – this is something I would like everyone to hear and know – we did not exceed the personnel limit of our Armed Forces in Crimea, which is set at 25,000, because there was no need to do so.

Next. As it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme Council of Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to self-determination. Incidentally, I would like to remind you that when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly the same thing, almost word for word. Ukraine used this right, yet the residents of Crimea are denied it. Why is that?

Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central authorities. Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN International Court agreed with this approach and made the following comment in its ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: “No general prohibition may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence,” and “General international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence.” Crystal clear, as they say.

I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it. Here is a quote from another official document: the Written Statement of the United States America of April 17, 2009, submitted to the same UN International Court in connection with the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I quote: “Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of international law.” End of quote. They wrote this, disseminated it all over the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what? The actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions, as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again, one wonders why.

We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal argument? The ruling of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human losses.

I will state clearly – if the Crimean local self-defence units had not taken the situation under control, there could have been casualties as well. Fortunately this did not happen. There was not a single armed confrontation in Crimea and no casualties. Why do you think this was so? The answer is simple: because it is very difficult, practically impossible to fight against the will of the people. Here I would like to thank the Ukrainian military – and this is 22,000 fully armed servicemen. I would like to thank those Ukrainian service members who refrained from bloodshed and did not smear their uniforms in blood.

Other thoughts come to mind in this connection. They keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is strange to hear. I cannot recall a single case in history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and with no human casualties.

Colleagues,

Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been happening in the world over the past several decades. After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are sadly degrading. Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle “If you are not with us, you are against us.” To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall.

This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well. It was hard to believe, even seeing it with my own eyes, that at the end of the 20th century, one of Europe’s capitals, Belgrade, was under missile attack for several weeks, and then came the real intervention. Was there a UN Security Council resolution on this matter, allowing for these actions? Nothing of the sort. And then, they hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too.

There was a whole series of controlled “colour” revolutions. Clearly, the people in those nations, where these events took place, were sick of tyranny and poverty, of their lack of prospects; but these feelings were taken advantage of cynically. Standards were imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, or these peoples’ cultures. As a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals. The Arab Spring turned into the Arab Winter.

A similar situation unfolded in Ukraine. In 2004, to push the necessary candidate through at the presidential elections, they thought up some sort of third round that was not stipulated by the law. It was absurd and a mockery of the constitution. And now, they have thrown in an organised and well-equipped army of militants.

We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open and fair. But we saw no reciprocal steps.

On the contrary, they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern you.” That’s easy to say.

It happened with the deployment of a missile defence system. In spite of all our apprehensions, the project is working and moving forward. It happened with the endless foot-dragging in the talks on visa issues, promises of fair competition and free access to global markets.

Today, we are being threatened with sanctions, but we already experience many limitations, ones that are quite significant for us, our economy and our nation. For example, still during the times of the Cold War, the US and subsequently other nations restricted a large list of technologies and equipment from being sold to the USSR, creating the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls list. Today, they have formally been eliminated, but only formally; and in reality, many limitations are still in effect.

In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today. They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally.

After all, they were fully aware that there are millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea. They must have really lacked political instinct and common sense not to foresee all the consequences of their actions. Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must always remember this.

Today, it is imperative to end this hysteria, to refute the rhetoric of the cold war and to accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.

At the same time, we are grateful to all those who understood our actions in Crimea; we are grateful to the people of China, whose leaders have always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into account the full historical and political context, and greatly appreciate India’s reserve and objectivity.

Today, I would like to address the people of the United States of America, the people who, since the foundation of their nation and adoption of the Declaration of Independence, have been proud to hold freedom above all else. Isn’t the desire of Crimea’s residents to freely choose their fate such a value? Please understand us.

I believe that the Europeans, first and foremost, the Germans, will also understand me. Let me remind you that in the course of political consultations on the unification of East and West Germany, at the expert, though very high level, some nations that were then and are now Germany’s allies did not support the idea of unification. Our nation, however, unequivocally supported the sincere, unstoppable desire of the Germans for national unity. I am confident that you have not forgotten this, and I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support the aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore unity.

I also want to address the people of Ukraine. I sincerely want you to understand us: we do not want to harm you in any way, or to hurt your national feelings. We have always respected the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, incidentally, unlike those who sacrificed Ukraine’s unity for their political ambitions. They flaunt slogans about Ukraine’s greatness, but they are the ones who did everything to divide the nation. Today’s civil standoff is entirely on their conscience. I want you to hear me, my dear friends. Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other regions will follow Crimea. We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that. As for Crimea, it was and remains a Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean-Tatar land.

I repeat, just as it has been for centuries, it will be a home to all the peoples living there. What it will never be and do is follow in Bandera’s footsteps!

Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian. Otherwise, dear friends (I am addressing both Ukraine and Russia), you and we – the Russians and the Ukrainians – could lose Crimea completely, and that could happen in the near historical perspective. Please think about it.

Let me note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia. These are things that could have become reality were it not for the choice the Crimean people made, and I want to say thank you to them for this.

But let me say too that we are not opposed to cooperation with NATO, for this is certainly not the case. For all the internal processes within the organisation, NATO remains a military alliance, and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory. I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors. Of course, most of them are wonderful guys, but it would be better to have them come and visit us, be our guests, rather than the other way round.

Let me say quite frankly that it pains our hearts to see what is happening in Ukraine at the moment, see the people’s suffering and their uncertainty about how to get through today and what awaits them tomorrow. Our concerns are understandable because we are not simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.

Let me say one other thing too. Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure that these people’s rights and interests are fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and territorial integrity.

We want to be friends with Ukraine and we want Ukraine to be a strong, sovereign and self-sufficient country. Ukraine is one of our biggest partners after all. We have many joint projects and I believe in their success no matter what the current difficulties. Most importantly, we want peace and harmony to reign in Ukraine, and we are ready to work together with other countries to do everything possible to facilitate and support this. But as I said, only Ukraine’s own people can put their own house in order.

Residents of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the whole of Russia admired your courage, dignity and bravery. It was you who decided Crimea’s future. We were closer than ever over these days, supporting each other. These were sincere feelings of solidarity. It is at historic turning points such as these that a nation demonstrates its maturity and strength of spirit. The Russian people showed this maturity and strength through their united support for their compatriots.

Russia’s foreign policy position on this matter drew its firmness from the will of millions of our people, our national unity and the support of our country’s main political and public forces. I want to thank everyone for this patriotic spirit, everyone without exception. Now, we need to continue and maintain this kind of consolidation so as to resolve the tasks our country faces on its road ahead.

Obviously, we will encounter external opposition, but this is a decision that we need to make for ourselves. Are we ready to consistently defend our national interests, or will we forever give in, retreat to who knows where? Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would like to know what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this disparate bunch of ‘national traitors’, or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation so as to provoke public discontent? We consider such statements irresponsible and clearly aggressive in tone, and we will respond to them accordingly. At the same time, we will never seek confrontation with our partners, whether in the East or the West, but on the contrary, will do everything we can to build civilised and good-neighbourly relations as one is supposed to in the modern world.

Colleagues,

I understand the people of Crimea, who put the question in the clearest possible terms in the referendum: should Crimea be with Ukraine or with Russia? We can be sure in saying that the authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol, the legislative authorities, when they formulated the question, set aside group and political interests and made the people’s fundamental interests alone the cornerstone of their work. The particular historic, population, political and economic circumstances of Crimea would have made any other proposed option – however tempting it could be at the first glance – only temporary and fragile and would have inevitably led to further worsening of the situation there, which would have had disastrous effects on people’s lives. The people of Crimea thus decided to put the question in firm and uncompromising form, with no grey areas. The referendum was fair and transparent, and the people of Crimea clearly and convincingly expressed their will and stated that they want to be with Russia.

Russia will also have to make a difficult decision now, taking into account the various domestic and external considerations. What do people here in Russia think? Here, like in any democratic country, people have different points of view, but I want to make the point that the absolute majority of our people clearly do support what is happening.

The most recent public opinion surveys conducted here in Russia show that 95 percent of people think that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and members of other ethnic groups living in Crimea – 95 percent of our citizens. More than 83 percent think that Russia should do this even if it will complicate our relations with some other countries. A total of 86 percent of our people see Crimea as still being Russian territory and part of our country’s lands. And one particularly important figure, which corresponds exactly with the result in Crimea’s referendum: almost 92 percent of our people support Crimea’s reunification with Russia.

Thus we see that the overwhelming majority of people in Crimea and the absolute majority of the Russian Federation’s people support the reunification of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol with Russia.

Now this is a matter for Russia’s own political decision, and any decision here can be based only on the people’s will, because the people is the ultimate source of all authority.

Members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol, today, in accordance with the people’s will, I submit to the Federal Assembly a request to consider a Constitutional Law on the creation of two new constituent entities within the Russian Federation: the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and to ratify the treaty on admitting to the Russian Federation Crimea and Sevastopol, which is already ready for signing. I stand assured of your support.

Occupy Denver: not as badass as they pretend to be

Posted on February 22, 2014 by Eric Verlo

DPD interrupt Occupy Denver protest at the Tattered Cover Bookstore
DENVER, COLORADO- Occupy activists were making their usual cacophony on Friday night when Denver police cruisers began converging into a familiar disproportionate show of force. Experienced skirmishers though Occupiers are, we couldn’t help whispering to each other as we watched more DPD officers accumulate on foot from vehicles yet unseen. The unintended effect of course was that our chanting diminished as the tension rose and Denver onlookers were treated to a literal illustration of the chilling effect of police intimidation. To make matters more embarassing, Occupy was shouting that we would not be silenced! By the time police were trooping upon us there was no sound but DPD boot steps and our “cameras on, everybody, cameras on.”

Our Friday night boycott of the Tattered Cover Bookstore is part of an OD operation to pressure downtown businesses to withdraw their support for the city’s urban camping ban, an ordinance which in effect criminalizes the homeless. The Tattered Cover claims to have asserted neutrality on the city’s decision to forbid sleeping and sheltering in public, but OD stands with Howard Zinn when he claimed “you can’t be neutral on a moving train.” Silence is consent. Injustice prevails when good people say nothing, yada yada. So it’s the Tattered Cover’s turn to step up to what is everyone’s responsibility. OD invited the Tattered Cover to sign a letter rescinding their support for the inhumane ordinance, but the Tattered Cover’s owner held to her obstinence. She was confident that her customers would have sympathy for her business’s precarious balancing act with the community’s unchristian conservatives. If the Tattered Cover wants to put business over doing the right thing, OD concluded that a boycott could provide the commensurate incentive.

A boycott strategy has worked twice before on this campaign. Actually, boycotts and pickets seldom fail. The global have-nots owe everything to street protest. Grown prosperous, middle America has been shorn of this wisdom. Most Americans do not know what protest is about, thus Friday nights in downtown Denver are also a teaching moment for Occupy. Pardon the inconvenience people of Denver, you’re welcome.

To be fair, for the uninitiated, protests are a messy, noisy thing.

As this Friday evening progressed, occupiers suspected the police were going to make an issue of the serenading, it was self-evidently less melodious than the previous weeks. Earlier we noticed officers dispatched in pairs into multiple directions seeking interviewees from among our audience. But we did not expect a DPD delegation to descend upon us at troop strengh. We began shouting down the DPD as their commander shouted “Can everybody hear me?” What authority had officers to interrupt our constitutional right to assemble? It is amply documented that when activists attempt to interrupt the meetings of others, with Occupy’s “mic check” for example, we are escorted from the room with rough haste.

In Occupy’s defense Friday night, we didn’t submit ourselves to being lectured about “what you are free to do etc, etc.” We knew our rights. We also suspected a noise complaint before the hour of 10pm was of dubious legitimacy. We did however accept an abridgement of our free speech, for the sake of, let’s call it, detente. Because it was dark and we were outnumbered.

A few Occupiers were not happy about being made to relinquish megaphones and drums on the trumped-up premise of signed noise complaints. The officers had obviously solicited the complaints; they had not been dispatched in response to any. Some Occupy wild cannons threatened to upset our disarmament truce. Our hushed reproaches become the next inadvertent impediment to regaining a chant momentum.

In debriefing it was agreed that the more impertinent among us are precious resources Occupy should not make a habit of quashing. When demonstrator numbers are enough to effect unarrests, we’ll have occasion to reject civil liberty infringing ultimatums and encourage the pushing of limits beyond the habitual collective consensus comfort level. This security culture indiscretion about protest strategy is tendered here as an encoded call to action.

BUT SERIOUSLY, what do you make of the Denver Police Department’s exagerated show of numbers at the Friday night action? It was the usual DPD MO in the heydays of Occupy, and it’s what they are throwing now at the Anonymous “Every 5th” resurgence, but what about OD’s campaign -to repeal the Urban Camping Ban- could have provoked a law enforcement surge aimed at its decisive truncation?

WHO KNEW a picket of such limited scope could draw such ire. We aren’t threatening Capitalism or banks or energy infrastructure, or DPD’s favorite, FTP.

However hypocritical and exceptionalist the Tattered Cover is behaving, I don’t believe they requested DPD’s move. But I don’t doubt the Downtown Business Partnership is fearful that the famed independent bookstore might cave to protester demands at which point the DBP’s mandate will lose its liberal cover. They know the inevitability of boycott victories, they’re business people.

What Does Democracy Look Like? Not likely the Old Testament Thank You

Posted on September 7, 2013 by Eric Verlo

I attended Occupy Denver’s forum “What Does Democracy Look Like?” this weekend to hear activist scholars of considerable repute throw in their two cents. The first day was a splendid gathering, except where a curated discussion of intentional community lapsed into theology. Yes, a distillation of mostly white reform literature (Fanon was dismissed as wayward) yielded three steps for The Way Forward: Egypt, Exodus and the Promised Land. Yep.

By which he meant: 1) Recognize your enslavement, 2) have the courage to leave all for an uncertain fate in the desert, and 3) seek/develop/discover your own promised land.

Even as metaphor it’s embarassing. Enlightened salvation from Old Testament mythology? No thank you, and for that matter, up yours! Unfortunately the language I used was less restrained, but his religious offensiveness had been compounding. He’d begun his presentation admonishing listeners that transformation begins with the self and so he’d already unmasked himself as spiritual. Worse, a monotheist.

Egypt: I’ll come back to “systems of oppression” in a moment.

The Exodus: a myth, it didn’t happen, even Hebrew scholars now agree with the historical and archeological records.

As to the Promised Land: that was a real estate scheme to backdate a deed, offered as divinely conceived proof of landlordship. The same title is being waived around to dispossess Palestinians today.

But really, isn’t the exodus-to-promised-land malarkey at the very foundation of Western Civilization’s expansion problem?! Are we really all entitled to virgin land? As if earth hasn’t been continuously and fully inhabited since before agrarian civilization, before monotheism was conceived to impose inequity, and justify slave-wages, interest and rent. The craddle of exploitation, that was Egypt.

But can we run from Egypt? The remedy staring us in the face, from which common men are deliberatly destracted, conspiring to emancipate Egypt, is to rid ourselves of the oppressor sociopaths. In practical terms understood more clearly by the better educated before us, we must strangle Egypt’s kings with the entrails of its priests.

I don’t care how academic your garb, when you tell your flock to reapply themselves to the sacred, and your “sacred” is biblical, supposing to transcend nature, you’re a priest.

Thank you WDDLL organizers but I do not go to church and I resent when devious means are employed to bring it to me. Actually those priests are the worst, they’re missionaries! If we’ve learned one thing as we discuss mankind’s break from his mille millenia of sustainable existance, resist the colonizer. Conquored peoples ourselves, we can only wish that indigenous peoples could have given Western missionaries the reception they deserved, and it’s no less true today: fire.

Alas as a result I heard a number of attendees today praise their faith. To each his own, but unhelpful. If you have to evangelize you’re a liability because nonsense is infectuous, especially as education levels recede. Can others entrust you with the battleplan while you commune with the adversary?

There’s a wonderful scene in AGUIRRE, THE WRATH OF GOD, Werner Herzog’s dramatic depiction of conquistadors wreaking havoc in the Amazon. Following a coup among the greedy Spaniards, the wife of the abruptly deposed leader appeals to the mission’s priest, as her last resort to restore order. The priest, her ally only moments before, turns on her thus: “Her ladyship must know that the church always stands on the side of the strong.”

My impatience with not so anti frackers

Posted on May 4, 2013 by Eric Verlo

I’d tell you I’ve had it up to here with moderate turncoats, but of late I’ve resolved to keep them well underfoot. Take the local fight against FRACKING.

We’ve built a pretty determined group of fractivists in Colorado Springs, with healthy allies statewide, and in the interest of growth began to make alliances with less hardy participants who have unseemly strong opinions considering their otherwise unproven skills, stamina, and motives. Their most common denominator however is that they do not hold firmly oppositional positions to the oil & gas industry; they consider themselves more diplomatic than radical which by their own assumption will prove more successful. Except, no.

The conviction of moderates is so strong that they compromise not one iota, and isn’t it the same with every political issue? The centrists rule the roost, blind to the fact that their promises deliver absolutely nothing, every time. Yet their goals always look more attainable because they’re “reasonable.” Fuck ’em. Maybe they don’t even know it but they serve to preserve things as they are.

Some of these types appear highly effective in their personal affairs and so reach positions of influence in activist circles, ironically because they have gained a lot of that experience running in place. Some of them are professional, they’re paid whether they get anywhere or not, and it’s not difficult to deduce that their jobs are gone if the mission is accomplished. It’s also not beyond the pale that some are obstructionist, by nature or contract, but to speculate is irrelevant because the solution is much easier and occurs to anyone who’s true to his or her principles: dismiss all the semi-principled outright.

What I do find tiring is having to explain to newcomers, stepping into the conflict between activists and inactivists, that such implacable moderation does not get movements anywhere, it’s a lazy option that detracts from our real efforts, and very likely it wasn’t what drew newcomers to the movement either.

In truth before I joined the fight, there was opposition to fracking, it was faint, it was token, and it was prepared to capitulate. Those voices are around still, at the ready to wave the white flag. Why we welcome them as allies I do not understand, they are worse than worthless. By which I mean they are every bit as harmful as the corrupt administrators, the greedy frackers, or the pro-industry buffoons. And let’s also not dismiss the evidence that industry operatives are manipulating the divisions between community organizers, making the effect of the vacillators worse. Now I’m ready to give you the skinny on our city’s anti and not so anti fracking forces, so you’ll know where to lend your energy when the next assault begins.

Another criminal sociopath evades the hangman. Maggie Thatcher goes to hell

Posted on April 12, 2013 by Eric Verlo

Was Margaret Thatcher religious? We might take solace that her final breaths were complicated by abject horror of the fate she knew awaited her. She might have been iron willed and resolute, are we going to pretend she was clueless? But justice delayed is justice denied. Thatcher’s karma is pie in the sky, while her destructive legacy was concrete as the sarcophagus that will protect her.

Ordinary Britons are jubilant and now officials and talking heads are admonishing celebrants to respect her deadness. — Did we learn nothing from Reagan’s funeral? We eulogized the senile man, and the unintelligencia used our lapse to lionize the cretin! Are we now going show the same clueless deference to Margaret Thatcher and add to the false history supporting her enduring world dynasty of greedy-bastards?! Thatcher was a wicked sociopath and those who praise her expose their ignorance or lack of conscience.

My takeaway from the spontaneous celebrations of Margaret Thatcher’s death is that we’ve got to hold good-riddance parties BEFORE these mofos pass on! On a related note, what pretext does President Obama have for attending the inauguration of George Dubya’s presidential library if he isn’t bringing handcuffs? The World Court should arrest the lot at Thatcher’s funeral.

Zero Dark Thirty has critics protesting that torture shouldn’t be shown to work, instead of torture being wrong

Posted on January 14, 2013 by Eric Verlo

Protest torture, don’t protest Zero Dark Thirty’s depiction of torture as working, even if the public account of the hunt for Osama bin Laden holds that it did not. Who’s your source for that, the CIA? No doubt countless plenty were tortured elsewhere in the actual narrative. How perverse for human rights groups to oppose torture based on it being ineffectual, instead of inhumane. Do you doubt torture works? Look at poor Bradley Manning, already pleading guilty. You’d think galvanizing the public against the horror of torture would be easier than trying to sell them a lie, that torture isn’t fiendishly effective. Remember the inane debate about what constitutes torture? That can be illustrated in less than a second, likewise its effectiveness. What sophistry. This is same patronizing social engineering which moralists envision to contort society to new-age morays expunged of sociopathic ills. Greed, slavery, war, genocide, all work perfectly well. That’s the problem

Letter to Michael Moore, indelible hero, retrograde Occupy Obama supporter

Posted on November 5, 2012 by Eric Verlo

Dear Michael,
I write you as a longtime, enthusiastic fan, and please pardon me if the deference and affection I’d like to convey have been overcome by my shock at your recent emails. My question may sound rhetorical, but I would really like to know: what the hell compels you to shill once again for Barack Obama? Beside the campaign pablum.

When you visited Occupys across the country, including ours in Denver, I defended you to friends who dismissed you as the usual shepherd’s crook for the Democratic Party. No no no I assured them, he gets it. But did you? We weren’t protesting eight years of Bush followed by an ineffectual Obama, we were protesting Obama and the economic system under his watch. We weren’t protesting the Democratic Party being insufficiently adversarial to the Republicans, we were protesting the corporate party system, the Democrat face being the more two-faced.

Most significantly, while our anger was vented at Wall Street, the repression we were dealt, and which dissenters continue to suffer, came directly from the agencies of President Obama.

Yet now you presume to accuse the same audience of cynicism about the election, and urge us to support Democrat Obama, the wolf in sheep’s clothing, out of fear of the Big Bad Wolf, as usual Republican.

Maybe as the election draws to a climax you’ve become privy to an unseen power struggle you need to tell us about. Because it’s at odds with your earlier giddiness with Occupy. Then your enthusiasm was unclouded by your pragmatism today.

Please do tell, because Mitt Romney seems more a sheep in wolf’s clothing to me. He’s a cartoonish straw man villain spouting wedge-issue threats to scare us crows from lighting upon the real corporate agenda. The banking kleptocracy doesn’t care about gay/women’s rights except to restrict all rights, the easier to pursue its grand thefts. If the GOP had wanted to pick a winner, I’m certain the average doctor or teacher you come across everyday would have made a more suited contender.

Could the GOP have chosen a greedier more callous thug, who didn’t pay his taxes, tainted by so much scandal that a new one emerged every day to titillate and offend? Obama had to sluff the first presidential debate because they’d chosen such an unbelievable, lame duck opponent that the ratings threatened to tank.

When the Neocon Washington Post endorsed President Obama, I knew the stooge from the ringer. The empire would be screwed without Obama to placate its victims. As Glen Ford argues, Obama may appear the lesser evil, but he’s the more effective evil. He’ll sell what arrogantly-white Romney never could: more war, austerity, privatization, fossil fuel. Without Obama, the global populace would push back.

I don’t favor a Romney win, but for another reason than you. A Romney presidency would mean another cycle of voter outrage, with MoveOn once again rallying Democrats, as if they were any different, and you probably among them.

But the election is not even going to be close. The six billion spent on this election was six billion earned by the media by pretending the polling was tied, to extort more spending by both sides. Meanwhile horseless statistician Nate Silver is vilified by television pundits because he’s calculated that surprise, Obama has a comfortable lead over his bogeyman idiot challenger.

Yes I know multitudes who support Mitt Romney. Four years ago they got nowhere with John McCain, because the juggernaut of empire was already up to full steam with Obama. I confess I didn’t know it then, and fretted a GOP win like everybody else, but it didn’t keep me from voting for Cynthia McKinney against war and climate change.

You began your letter by saying “I get it” but then assume we non-voters are motivated by apathy or weariness. You’re the one who sounds worn down. Bummer.

Yours,
Eric

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