TLS Certificate Optimization: The Technical Details behind "No Browser Left Behind"
TLS Certificate Optimization: The Technical Details behind "No Browser Left Behind"2016-03-23 Back in early December we announced our "no browser left behind" initiative to the world. Since then, we have served well over 500 billion SHA-1 certificates to visitors that otherwise would not have been able to communicate securely with our customers’ sites using HTTPS. All the while, we’ve continued to
TLS overhead - netsekure rng
Every so often I get the question – “What is the overhead incurred by using TLS?â€. Strangely enough, I couldn’t find a straight answer by doing some searching on the web, so let’s explore the answer. The TLS handshake has multiple variations, but let’s pick the most common one – anonymous client and authenticated server (the connections browsers use most of the time). As per the TLS standard the h
TLSæš—å·è¨å®šã‚¬ã‚¤ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ 安全ãªã‚¦ã‚§ãƒ–サイトã®ãŸã‚ã«ï¼ˆæš—å·è¨å®šå¯¾ç–編） | æƒ…å ±ã‚»ã‚ュリティ | IPA 独立行政法人 æƒ…å ±å‡¦ç†æŽ¨é€²æ©Ÿæ§‹
「TLSæš—å·è¨å®šã‚¬ã‚¤ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ã€ã¯ã€TLSサーãƒã®æ§‹ç¯‰è€…ã‚„é‹å–¶è€…ãŒé©åˆ‡ãªã‚»ã‚ュリティを考慮ã—ãŸæš—å·è¨å®šãŒã§ãるよã†ã«ã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã®ã‚¬ã‚¤ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ã§ã™ã€‚「様々ãªåˆ©ç”¨ä¸Šã®åˆ¤æ–ææ–™ã‚‚åŠ å‘³ã—ãŸåˆç†çš„ãªæ ¹æ‹ ã€ã‚’é‡è¦–ã—ã¦ã€TLS通信ã§ã®å®Ÿç¾ã™ã¹ã安全性ã¨å¿…è¦ã¨ãªã‚‹ç›¸äº’接続性ã¨ã®ãƒˆãƒ¬ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã‚ªãƒ•ã‚’考慮ã—ãŸ3ã¤ã®è¨å®šåŸºæº–（「高セã‚ュリティ型ã€ã€ŒæŽ¨å¥¨ã‚»ã‚ュリティ型ã€ã€Œã‚»ã‚ュリティ例外型ã€ï¼‰ã‚’è¨ã‘ã¦ãŠã‚Šã€å„々ã®è¨å®šåŸºæº–ã«å¯¾å¿œã—ã¦ã€TLSサーãƒã§è¨å®šã™ã¹ã具体的ãªè¦æ±‚è¨å®šï¼ˆã€Œéµå®ˆé …ç›®ã€ã¨ã€ŒæŽ¨å¥¨é …ç›®ã€ï¼‰ã‚’決ã‚ã¦ãŠã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚ 本ガイドラインã¯å®‰å…¨ãªã‚¦ã‚§ãƒ–サイトã®ä½œã‚Šæ–¹ã¨ã¨ã‚‚ã«é©åˆ‡ãªæš—å·è¨å®šã‚’ã™ã‚‹è³‡æ–™ã®ä¸€ã¤ã¨ã—ã¦ãŠä½¿ã„ã„ãŸã ã‘ã¾ã™ã€‚ ãªãŠã€æœ¬ã‚¬ã‚¤ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ã¯ã€æš—å·æŠ€è¡“評価プãƒã‚¸ã‚§ã‚¯ãƒˆCRYPTRECã§ä½œæˆã•ã‚Œã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ 「TLSæš—å·è¨å®šã‚¬ã‚¤ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ã€ã®å†…容 1ç« ã¨2ç« ã¯ã€æœ¬ã‚¬ã‚¤ãƒ‰ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒ³ã®ç›®çš„ã‚„SSL/TLSã«ã¤ã„ã¦ã®æŠ€è¡“çš„ãªåŸºç¤ŽçŸ¥è˜ã‚’
#mailerstudy 02 メールã¨æš—å· - SSL/TLS -
2. 2 ç§ã¯èª° • æ°å: æ»æ¾¤ éš†å² @ttkzw • 所属: æ ªå¼ä¼šç¤¾ãƒãƒ¼ãƒˆãƒ“ーツ • 何やã£ã¦ã„る人 â–« メーラMuttã®å›½éš›åŒ–や日本語対応パッãƒä½œè€… â–« SpamAssassinã®æ—¥æœ¬èªžå¯¾å¿œãƒ‘ッãƒä½œè€… • メールシステムã¨ã®é–¢ã‚ã‚Š â–« システム管ç†è€…ã¨ã—ã¦1997å¹´ã‹ã‚‰2006å¹´ã¾ã§ãƒ¡ãƒ¼ãƒ«ã‚µãƒ¼ ãƒã®ç®¡ç† â–« 昔ã€qmail関連ã§è‰²ã€…ã‚„ã£ã¦ã„ãŸã€‚2006å¹´ã«qmailæ¨ã¦æ¨ ã¦ã€‚Postfix/Dovecoté£ã„ã«ã‚¯ãƒ©ã‚¹ãƒã‚§ãƒ³ã‚¸ â–« ç¾åœ¨ã¯å€‹äººã‚µãƒ¼ãƒã§ãƒ¡ãƒ¼ãƒ«ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒã‚’é‹ç”¨ ï‚– Postfix + Dovecot + Sieve(dovecot-pigeonhole) + ClamAV + SpamAssassin + spamass-milter + Roundcube
ç§ãŒæ„›ã—㟠openssl (SSL/TLS ç·¨) - ã—ã¦ã¿ã‚“ã¨ã¦
id:blooper:20120907 ã®ç¶šãã§ã™ãŒã€çš†æ§˜ã«ãŠã‹ã‚Œã¾ã—ã¦ã¯æ—¢ã«è¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ãŒå¥½ãã§å¥½ãã§ãŸã¾ã‚‰ãªããªã£ã¦ã€HTTPS を利用ã—ãŸã‚µã‚¤ãƒˆã«è¡Œãã¨è¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã®æ‹¡å¼µã¾ã§èªã‚“ã 後ã§ãªãã¦ã¯è¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã®å†…容ãŒæ°—ã«ãªã£ã¦ã‚µã‚¤ãƒˆã®æœ¬æ–‡ãŒèªã‚ãªããªã£ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã‹ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ãŒå¦‚何ãŠéŽã”ã—ã§ã—ょã†ã‹ã€‚ SSL 㯠Secure Sockets Layer ã®é æ–‡å—㧠Netscape Communications ㌠1995 å¹´ã«ã€ã£ã¦ã®ã¯ wikipedia:Secure_Sockets_Layer ã§ã‚‚見れã°è¼‰ã£ã¦ã‚‹ã®ã§è¦‹ã¦ã。ã§ã€RFC ã«ã—よã†ã£ã¦ã“ã¨ã§ SSL 㯠Netscape ã®ã§ã—ょ? ã£ã¦ã“ã¨ã§ TLS (Transport Layer Security) ã«æ”¹åã—ãŸã€ã¨è¨˜æ†¶ã—ã¦ã‚‹ã‚“ã ã‘ã©æœ¬å½“ã ã£ã‘ãªã€‚ãƒãƒ³ãƒ‰ã‚·ã‚§ã‚¤ã‚¯æ™‚ã®ãƒ¬ã‚³ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã®ãƒãƒ¼ã‚¸ãƒ§ãƒ³è¦‹ã‚‹ã¨ SSLv3.0 㯠3.0 TLSv1.0
RFC 2818: HTTP Over TLS
Network Working Group E. Rescorla Request for Comments: 2818 RTFM, Inc. Category: Informational May 2000 HTTP Over TLS Status of this Memo This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This memo describe
1
リリースã€éšœå®³æƒ…å ±ãªã©ã®ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“スã®ãŠçŸ¥ã‚‰ã›
最新ã®äººæ°—エントリーã®é…ä¿¡
j次ã®ãƒ–ックマーク
kå‰ã®ãƒ–ックマーク
lã‚ã¨ã§èªã‚€
eコメント一覧を開ã
oページを開ã
GitHub - aws/s2n-tls: An implementation of the TLS/SSL protocols
{{#tags}}- {{label}}
{{/tags}}