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ionis 2017/04/18
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SWEET32: 64ãƒ“ãƒƒãƒˆãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯æš—å·ã¸ã®èª•ç”Ÿæ—¥æ”»æ’ƒ
ãƒˆãƒªãƒ—ãƒ«DESã®ã‚ˆã†ãª64ãƒ“ãƒƒãƒˆãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯æš—å·ã«å¯¾ã™ã‚‹èª•ç”Ÿæ—¥æ”»æ’ƒãŒå®Ÿç”¨ã«ãªã‚‹ã“ã¨ãŒåˆ†ã‹ã£ãŸã¨ã®ã“ã¨(SWEET32ã€CVE-2016-2183)ã€‚ TLSã€SSHã€IPsecã€OpenVPNã®ã‚ˆã†ãªæš—å·ãƒ—ãƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ«ã¯ã€ã‚¯ãƒ©ã‚¤ã‚¢ãƒ³ãƒˆã¨ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒé–“ã§ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã‚’æš—å·ã™ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã«ã€ä¸€èˆ¬çš„ã«AESã€ãƒˆãƒªãƒ—ãƒ«DESã€Blowfishã®ã‚ˆã†ãªãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯æš—å·ã‚¢ãƒ«ã‚´ãƒªã‚ºãƒ ã‚’åˆ©ç”¨ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã€‚ãã®ã‚ˆã†ãªã‚¢ãƒ«ã‚´ãƒªã‚ºãƒ ã‚’ä½¿ç”¨ã™ã‚‹ã«ã¯ã€ãƒ‡ãƒ¼ã‚¿ã¯ãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯ã¨å‘¼ã°ã‚Œã‚‹å›ºå®šé•·ã®å¡Šã«åˆ†å‰²ã—ã€å„ãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯ã¯æš—å·åˆ©ç”¨ãƒ¢ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ã«å¾“ã£ã¦åˆ¥ã€…ã«æš—å·åŒ–ã•ã‚Œã‚‹ã€‚ãƒˆãƒªãƒ—ãƒ«DESã‚„Blowfishã®ã‚ˆã†ãªå¤ã„ãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯æš—å·ã¯ã€ãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯ã‚µã‚¤ã‚ºãŒ64ãƒ“ãƒƒãƒˆã§ã‚ã‚‹ã®ã«å¯¾ã—ã€AESã¯128ãƒ“ãƒƒãƒˆã®ãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯ã‚µã‚¤ã‚ºã‚’ä½¿ç”¨ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã€‚ ãŸã¨ãˆãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯æš—å·ã«å¯¾ã™ã‚‹æš—å·æ”»æ’ƒè‡ªèº«ã§ãªãã¨ã‚‚ã€çŸã„ãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯ã‚µã‚¤ã‚ºã¯èª•ç”Ÿæ—¥æ”»æ’ƒã«å¼±ã„ãƒ–ãƒãƒƒã‚¯æš—å·ã«ãªã‚‹ã¨ã„ã†ã“ã¨ãŒæš—å·ã®ä¸–ç•Œã§ã¯ã‚ˆãçŸ¥ã‚‰ã‚Œã¦ã„ã‚‹ã€‚
ionis 2016/08/29
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Sweet32: Birthday attacks on 64-bit block ciphers in TLS and OpenVPN
Sweet32: Birthday attacks on 64-bit block ciphers in TLS and OpenVPN Cryptographic protocols like TLS, SSH, IPsec, and OpenVPN commonly use block cipher algorithms, such as AES, Triple-DES, and Blowfish, to encrypt data between clients and servers. To use such algorithms, the data is broken into fixed-length chunks, called blocks, and each block is encrypted separately according to a mode of opera
ionis 2016/08/29
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HTTPS and OpenVPN face new attack that can decrypt secret cookies
HTTPS and OpenVPN face new attack that can decrypt secret cookies More than 600 sites found to be vulnerable to demanding exploit called Sweet32. From an upcoming paper laying out a new attack against 64-bit block ciphers used by HTTPS and OpenVPN. Credit: Karthikeyan Bhargavan and GaeÌˆtan Leurent From an upcoming paper laying out a new attack against 64-bit block ciphers used by HTTPS and OpenVPN
ionis 2016/08/29
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ionis 2015/08/21
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Mozilla SSL Configuration Generator Redirecting to the updated SSL Configuration Generatorâ€¦
ionis 2015/03/04
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Security/Server Side TLS - MozillaWiki
The ordering of cipher suites in the Old configuration is very important, as it determines the priority with which algorithms are selected. OpenSSL will ignore cipher suites it doesn't understand, so always use the full set of cipher suites below, in their recommended order. The use of the Old configuration with modern versions of OpenSSL may require custom builds with support for deprecated ciphe
ionis 2015/02/26
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