Showing posts with label Retrials. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Retrials. Show all posts

Thursday, April 6, 2017

Further briefing on Apple v. Samsung design patent damages, no transfer of Apple v. Qualcomm

Procedural decisions relating to two major Apple cases have come down this week. With respect to design patent damages in Apple v. Samsung, Apple did not get its preferred way forward (affirmance of prior damages verdict and an immediate re-retrial necessitated by the Federal Circuit's dismissal of Apple's trade dress claims), but the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has granted Apple's wish that its contract, patent and antitrust action against Qualcomm be kept separate from a long list of (consumer) antitrust cases related to the FTC's mid-January complaint against Qualcomm.

There isn't much to say right now about the Apple v. Samsung design patents case. In a case management order handed down on Tuesday, Judge Lucy Koh disagreed with Apple's most aggressive suggestions, which would have cut the remand proceedings short (after the Federal Circuit decided that the district court should take a closer look at the record in light of the December Supreme Court ruling). I'm not surprised and I doubt Apple itself was.

The retrial proceedings remain stayed for now, and further briefing has been ordered with respect to Apple's argument that Samsung waived its arguments about what the "article of manufacture" (with respect to which Apple could seek a disgorgement of infringer's profits) should be. Filings are due on April 21 and May 5, and a hearing will be held on June 15. I'll follow the process and comment on the parties' detailed arguments. So far, my impression is that the court could easily decide either way, but what would be in the interest of justice is that Samsung gets the chance to make its "article of manufacture" case before a new jury (a jury would be needed in any event for the re-retrial, so justice would be available at almost no incremental cost here). That said, the waiver argument does present a significant hurdle for Samsung to overcome, so this is now going to be a very important phase for that litigation, which will "celebrate" its sixth anniversary in a few days.

In connection with Qualcomm's alleged FRAND violations and allegedly anticompetitive conduct, both Apple and Samsung are on the receiving end, and it's hard to tell which of the two is suffering to a greater extent. It's totally unknown what royalties Qualcomm has been collecting from Samsung, but there are court filings indicating that the amount in dispute between Apple and Qualcomm must be huge, and it's unlikely Samsung got much sweeter deal terms for its devices. Unlike Apple, Samsung is also in the components business, and it recently became known that Qualcomm allegedly prevented Samsung from selling its Exynos wireless chip--or at least its CDMA-compatible versions--to third parties. It would actually make a lot of sense for Samsung to bring its own case against Qualcomm, but maybe Samsung hopes that the earlier-filed FTC and Apple cases will pave the way in the meantime.

At a minimum, Samsung will presumably have to provide witnesses in one or more Qualcomm cases. The aforementioned multidistrict litigation (MDL) panel decision notes that the Northern District of California "also will be convenient for the third parties and witnesses based in Asia (where a number of foreign government investigations of Qualcomm's licensing practices have been conducted or are underway)."

The MDL panel has concluded that various consumer cases brought against Qualcomm should be consolidated with the FTC action in the Northern District of California because of "share[d] factual questions" and in order to avoid duplicative discovery, inconsistent pretrial rulings, and a waste of resources. The FTC case stays in the Northern District of California. The law governing the MDL panel's work shields antitrust cases brought by the FTC (or the DoJ) from venue transfers, and the FTC didn't want to go down to Southern California.

In the Northern District, Judge Koh is also in charge of FTC v. Qualcomm (and will then be handling all the cases merged into that one). The MDL panel decision notes Judge Koh's "multidistrict litigation experience and the ability to steer this complicated litigation on an efficient and prudent course." By now, Judge Koh has a much higher profile than at the outset of Apple v. Samsung, not only because of that particular case but even more so because then-President Obama nominated her for the Ninth Circuit and Hillary Clinton had her on a shortlist of potential Supreme Court nominees.

The two Samsung cases are far from the only Apple cases Judge Koh has already presided over, but Apple v. Qualcomm won't be among them since the MDL panel left it in Southern California:

"We are persuaded that Apple’s action, listed on Schedule B, should be excluded from this MDL. Although Apple asserts antitrust claims similar to those asserted by plaintiffs in the actions listed on Schedule A, it also asserts unique contract and patent claims against Qualcomm. Apple allegedly entered into a rebate program in order to ameliorate the effects of Qualcomm's anticompetitive conduct. Apple seeks nearly $1 billion in unpaid rebates that were allegedly withheld by Qualcomm in retaliation for Apple's responding to requests for information by certain foreign antitrust regulators. Apple also claims that certain of Qualcomm's patents are either not essential or not licensed on FRAND terms. While Apple will seek to obtain some of the same documentary and testimonial evidence relating to Qualcomm's licensing practices as the class plaintiffs, we are convinced that any common discovery can be coordinated among the parties and the involved courts, whereas inclusion of Apple’s action in the MDL could significantly complicate the proceedings and cause delay or other inefficiencies."

The decision notes that Apple had a preference for keeping those cases separate, while Qualcomm wanted centralization. But as the passage quoted above says (at the end), Qualcomm's preferred course of action would have had the potential to complicate matters and cause delay. Does this mean Qualcomm is stalling?

It's too early to tell. It will take some other procedural move(s) before it becomes clear whether Qualcomm is trying to drag these antitrust cases out. For now it looks to me like Qualcomm's stance on centralization had more to do with how it believes it can maximize its chances of getting away unscathed. The panel decision says that Qualcomm wanted centralization only in the Southern District of California but otherwise asked "that Apple's action be excluded from the MDL." That looks very much like forum shopping and hoping for a home team advantage.

The Motley Fool has a story on this week's motion by Qualcomm to dismiss the FTC case. I agree with Evan Niu that Apple's case is the bigger one and share his assessment that Apple would "aggressively carry on" regardless of a dismissal or withdrawal of the FTC's case. But at least for now I wouldn't view the FTC case as skeptically as Mr. Niu does. It's true that now-Chairwoman Ohlhausen was the dissenter from the FTC's decision--just before President Trump's inauguration--to go after Qualcomm. I've previously seen dissents by Mrs. Ohlhausen in FRAND cases and I was disappointed in each case. I don't think her positions on FRAND are representative of what Republicans (since there will be some more Republican commissioners soon) generally believe should be done to curb abuse of standard-essential patents (SEPs). For example, Senator Mike Lee (R.-Utah) played a very proactive role a few years ago, and he's staunchly conservative. I wish Mrs. Ohlhausen had an exchange of FRAND views with Sen. Lee and other Republican lawmakers who share his views (he got a lot of support). There also isn't any indication on the Internet that combating SEP abuse is a leftist cause or ideological issue. Case in point, I've consistently taken pro-FRAND positions over the last ten years and I'm not aware of any other IP/tech law/antitrust blogger who would have linked to Rush Limbaugh's website several times or would have declared himself as clearly and early in support of then-candidate Donald Trump as I did.

It remains to be seen how vigorously the FTC will pursue the case. Regardless of elections and appointments, it's a fact that competition authorities often content themselves with minor cosmetic remedies. That is also a risk in this case. Qualcomm might make some vague and unhelpful promises to modify its conduct and then get away, but Apple is not going to be interested in anything purely symbolic. If Qualcomm wants to settle with Apple, there will be a substantial cost involved.

Here's Qualcomm's motion to dismiss the FTC case (this post continues below the document):

17-04-03 Qualcomm Motion to Dismiss FTC Case by Florian Mueller on Scribd

I doubt that Qualcomm will be able to get rid of the FTC case this way, but what is possible is that the FTC might have to amend its pleadings here and there. I may talk about it in more detail after the FTC has responded. Just a couple of observations for now:

  • Qualcomm argues in its motion that a FRAND violation isn't an antitrust violation until it actually causes exclusion, and then goes on to say the following:

    "Specifically, the Complaint does not allege that Qualcomm has ever sought to interfere with a competitor's business by asserting its standard-essential (or any other) patents against a competitor; that rival chip suppliers are unable to compete without a license from Qualcomm; or that the lack of a license has actually excluded any competitor from making sales in any relevant market. Instead, the Complaint alleges only that a license from Qualcomm would 'provide substantial benefits' to chip makers. But Qualcomm has no duty under the antitrust laws to assist its competitors."

    This here is the opposite of what the Korea Fair Trade Commission appears to have concluded with respect to Samsung's Exynos chips. It furthermore doesn't convince me since a patent holder doesn't have to actually litigate (which Qualcomm does from time to time at any rate) to cause exclusion. And if the FTC's case was centered around some actual litigation, Qualcomm would probably be making a Noerr-Pennington argument (saying that litigation cannot give rise to antitrust claims) as certain SEP abusers have in other cases...

  • Qualcomm appears to be trying to make the question of FRAND rate-setting an inevitable, indispensable aspect of the FTC case. Generally, regulatory agencies really struggle with rate-setting. They much prefer to leave those questions to litigation between companies. I remember from the early stages of my interest in FRAND/SEP issues that the European Commission's attempt toward the end of the last decade to do something about Qualcomm's business model and conduct (at the time, Nokia was the key complainant) got derailed in no small part because the Commission didn't feel it could make a FRAND rate determination.

The next key deadline in the various Qualcomm cases is this Friday: Qualcomm will then respond to Apple's San Diego complaint.

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Thursday, November 5, 2015

Oracle to court: Samsung's offense was also Google's defense in Apple case, expert not neutral anymore

In the Android-Java copyright infringement litigation in the Northern District of California, Oracle filed a reply Wednesday evening in support of its motion to disqualify the court-appointed damages expert Dr. James Kearl. In the meantime I had published and commented on Dr. Kearl's filing, which was a de facto opposition brief. Google formally opposes the motion, but I found nothing of interest in Google's opposition brief other than Google offering the prediction that Oracle's damages claim in next year's retrial would be substantially greater than the billion-dollar claim from 2012.

Here's Oracle's reply brief (this post continues below the document):

15-11-04 Oracle Reply in Support of Disqualification of Court Dr. Kearl by Florian Mueller

In the first section, Oracles notes, as I had after Dr. Kearl's filing, that a number of facts about Dr. Kearl's involvement with Apple v. Samsung on Samsung's and, by extension, Google's behalf are undisputed. One of those facts is that the law firm of Quinn Emanuel represented both Google and Samsung, with Google paying directly for some of QE's work:

"That Quinn Emanuel represented both Google and Samsung shows that the important strategic decisions—like asserting counterclaims—likely served the best interests of both companies. [...] It would have been impossible for Google's attorneys to participate in some parts of the litigation while only Samsung's attorneys handled other parts. Google's attorneys were Samsung's attorneys."

The paragraph quoted above is not wrong, but it is obviously a bit one-sided. First, Google was a beneficiary of the counterclaims Samsung brought (in order to discredit Apple's out-of-this-world damages claims in that case), but I doubt Google was involved in any of the decisions relating to those counterclaims, other than maybe as an informal advisor. Second, QE is a big firm and had (actually, still has) a huge team involved with Apple v. Samsung: not just the size of a soccer team but more attorneys than you see different plays in a World Cup semifinal. Such Texas-size teams are not manageable in any context unless there is some division of labor, and I guess different lawyers will have worked on the details of the various patents-in-suit.

That said, I do believe the fact that Dr. Kearl worked with QE in Apple v. Samsung, a case in which QE also represented and presumably continues to represent Google, warrants his disqualification, and it's by far not the only and not even the strongest reason.

The next passage is even stronger in my mind:

"Second, Dr. Kearl helped the Samsung/Google team by offering his analysis of Samsung's counterclaims at trial. Google had two ways to lower Apple's damages, and thereby its liability: on defense, by undermining Apple's expert's analysis; and on offense, by convincing the jury that smartphone patents are not worth much. To execute the offensive strategy, Samsung counterclaimed for $6 million to argue that Apple's $2 billion demand was overstated. When Dr. Kearl testified about Samsung's counterclaims, he also helped to defend Google. In other words, Samsung's offense was also Google's defense."

The above is absolutely true. Even though Dr. Kearl denies that he had sandbagged his damages figures, there cannot be the slightest doubt that he knew, before starting his analysis, what his client wanted to achieve. They won't have told him to arrive at a lowball damages figure. They will have said something to that effect in a slightly more subtle way. For example, they might have told him something like "look at Apple's lunacy of a damages claim and just so you know, we don't want to reciprocate that but we want to show the jury what a more reasonable damages claim looks like." He must have known that he was expected to come up with something that would contrast with Apple's approach.

The second, shorter part of Oracle's reply brief explains why there should be no other court-appointed damages expert either. Oracle's argument is convincing to me when looking at it through the lens of U.S. litigation. In other jurisdictions, such as the one in which I live, court experts are the norm. In the U.S., they are meant to be a rare exception, and if there were reasons for a rare exception last time, the threshold will hardly be met now that the case no longer involves any damages theories related to patent claims.

I guess Dr. Kearl will be disqualified later this month. Anything else would be outrageous.

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Thursday, October 29, 2015

Court expert: I don't want to appear partial and oppose Oracle's motion, but I'm doing it anyway

Dr. James Kearl, the court-appointed damages expert in the Oracle v. Google Android-Java copyright infringement case, yesterday responded to Oracle's motion to disqualify him on the grounds that he is no longer impartial due to his work on Samsung's behalf in the Apple v. Samsung cases that went to trial last year.

Here's his filing (this post continues below the document):

15-10-28 Kearl Answer to Oracle Motion to Disqualify by Florian Mueller

I had a #facepalm moment when I read toward the bottom of the first page that he does "not believe it appropriate for [him] to oppose Oracle's motion" because he--untruthfully--says he does "not have an adversarial position vis-a-vis Oracle" and then read on. His filing is not just a declaration that serves to state some facts for the record. It simply is an opposition to Oracle's motion. Nothing more and nothing less. Anything to the contrary should be reserved for April Fools' Day.

Dr. Kearl's filing spans several pages but does not contain anything new, enlightening, surprising, or whatever else might add value to the motion process.

Oracle's motion makes clear what the concern is: he's closer to one side than to the other. For a judge who had concerns in 2012 about bloggers potentially influencing a court or a jury (if that had happened, he'd have read blogs like Groklaw that got the rules for copyrightability totally wrong), it should be a no-brainer to dismiss a court-appointed expert once there are facts that show more of a proximity to one party than to the other.

Oracle's motion didn't refer to the strawmen Dr. Kearl's filing puts up just to have something to tear down. It's undisputed that he did not provide expert testimony directly on Apple's infringement assertions against Android. He does not deny, however, that Samsung used his testimony to convince the jury (rightfully so) that Apple's damages claims in that case were not just outsized but downright irrational.

He denies that he or his firm received $5 million (Apple's lawyers told the jury that Samsung had spent $5 million on damages counterclaims of §6 million and that this fact showed Samsung's counterclaims were just about devaluing patents), but he does not say what he and his firm received instead. Also, he doesn't explain why Samsung's trial counsel didn't object to the $5 million claim.

He stresses that he "did not meet or speak with any Samsung corporate officer or employee at any time before, during or after the Apple v. Samsung trial, with the single exception that a Samsung in-house attorney was intermittently present during portions of my preparation that occurred over parts of three days leading up to my court testimony that lasted no more than 20 minutes." Samsung is not a party to Oracle v. Google anyway. But what does he say about Google?

"My communication and work was with counsel from the Quinn Emanuel law firm, which was the outside law firm for Samsung. Likewise, whatever the relationship between Google and Samsung, I had no communication before, during or after the trial with any Google corporate officer or employee. Google's role, if any, and its products and services were completely irrelevant to the work that I did. I was not provided with information regarding Google's role in Apple v. Samsung, nor did I inquire about such."

Quinn Emanuel also represented Google in the same case. Oracle's motion stressed the fact. Dr. Kearl doesn't deny it.

I don't know the man, so he may genuinely be, as he writes, "confident that [he] can assist the court as a neutral economic expert in the present action." But the question is not how he feels. The question is whether Oracle can rely on its chance to make its case on a level playing field. With him, Oracle has every reason to be concerned, no matter how honorable he may be as a person. The court should say "thanks, but no thanks" to his offer to remain involved.

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Friday, October 16, 2015

Appeals court deems Google Books 'fair use' but standard helps Oracle in Android-Java case

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has just published its appellate opinion in the Google Books case.

Early last year I wrote that I had initially been rather skeptical of Google's "fair use" argument relating to Google Books, but ultimately I found myself in agreement with Google. Today's appellate opinion says: "This copyright dispute tests the boundaries of fair use." So the appeals court also didn't find this one a clear and simple case. But all things considered it sided with Google.

I use Google Books quite frequently, but for the purpoes of this blog, "fair use" is of particular interest in connection with only one case: Oracle v. Google, the Android-Java copyright infringement case (in which Oracle yesterday brought a motion to disqualify the court-appointed damages expert).

The Second Circuit won't hear an appeal in Oracle v. Google, but this high-profile case might be cited in the further proceedings, and I don't think it helps Google against Oracle in the slightest. Much to the contrary, the standard the Second Circuit outlines is one that Google cannot possibly meet in the Android-Java case. For example, here's a key passage from today's Google Books ruling:

"Google's division of the page into tiny snippets is designed to show the searcher just enough context surrounding the searched term to help her evaluate whether the book falls within the scope of her interest (without revealing so much as to threaten the author's copyright interests). Snippet view thus adds importantly to the highly transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the searcher. With respect to the first factor test, it favors a finding of fair use (unless the value of its transformative purpose is overcome by its providing text in a manner that offers a competing substitute for Plaintiffs' books [...]"

(emphasis added)

In a nutshell, the above passage says:

  • If what Google does basically just has a promotional effect, right holders can't complain that Google helps them make more money.

  • But forget about "fair use" if there is a substitutive (rather than promotional) effect.

If one applies that standard to Oracle v. Google, it means that the "fair use" defense won't even survive the summary judgment stage: neither the device makers who have adopted Android nor the end users who (like me) have bought Android devices have looked at Android and then decided to use mobile Java. Instead, Android has displaced mobile Java all the way, with Java licensees like BlackBerry and Nokia having gone down the tubes while Android attained market dominance.

There are various differences between Google Books and the Android-Java case, and rather than talk about all of them at once, I just wanted to highlight the key difference in terms of commercial impact. But I also find the discusssion of "transformative use" interesting. The Second Circuit explains that the strongest fair use cases involve "copying from an original for the purpose of criticism or commentary on the original or provision of information about it." Android does none of that with respect to Java. Google Books is not about criticism or commentary, but one can search for books that contain certain terms, which is also information about the copied books:

"We have no difficulty concluding that Google's making of a digital copy of Plaintiffs' books for the purpose of enabling a search for identification of books containing a term of interest to the searcher involves a highly transformative purpose, in the sense intended by Campbell."

Android's use of the Java APIs had no transformative effect: Java already was available on mobile devices.

Google Books is not the clear case of fair use (and, as one of the "fair use" factors, transformative use) as, for example, a rap parody of a Roy Orbison song (that's what Campbell was about). But compared to the Android-Java situation, it's a very solid case. And if a fair use case that is far stronger than any "fair use" argument could ever be in Oracle v. Google "tests the boundaries of fair use," then there is no way a reasonable jury could find in Google's favor in the Android-Java case.

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Oracle moves to disqualify damages expert because Apple v. Samsung is practically Apple v. Google

The Oracle v. Google copyright retrial won't take place next May because of a scheduling conflict for Oracle's senior management with a trial against HP, and a new tentative date has not been set yet. But preparations are continuing.

The latest motion was filed by Oracle on Thursday evening California time: a motion to disqualify the court-appointed damages expert, Dr. Kearl. Oracle furthermore argues that no other court-appointed damages expert will be needed, given that the case no longer involves patents.

Here's the motion along with its public exhibits (this post continues below the document):

15-10-15 Oracle Motion to Disqualify Damages Expert by Florian Mueller

I'm familiar with the issues Oracle has raised here because I also followed the Apple v. Samsung trial last year (via the Internet). Oracle argues that the second Apple v. Samsung case in the Northern District of California "was effectively Apple v. Google" (that's also what Samsung's trial counsel told the jury). I looked at the patent infringement allegations in that case, and the case was indeed all about Android--unlike the first Apple v. Samsung case, which was partly about Android but also about designs Google had nothing to do with (if anything, it appears Google had even discouraged Samsung from using those designs).

It became known that Google paid for Samsung's legal fees--in connection with two of the patents-in-suit, to be precise, but still.

Dr. Kearl, the court-appointed expert in Oracle v. Google, was not involved with Apple's patent assertions against Android per se--he did not do a rebuttal of Apple's damages claims against Samsung. Instead, he made Samsung's case for damages against Apple. But Samsung wasn't interested in collecting anything from Apple: instead, it wanted to show to the jury how unreasonable Apple's damages claim of more than two billion dollars over a few narrow software patents was. Oracle points to what Apple told the jury Dr. Kearl's involvement was really about:

"[O]ne of the issues in that case was whether, as Apple argued, Samsung used Dr. Kearl’s analysis to give the jury a low damages number in an attempt to make all patents appear to have little value. Or, as Apple asked the jury, why else would Samsung pay experts $5 million to pursue a $6 million claim if not to try to devalue patents?"

Back then, Apple accurately portrayed Samsung's litigation strategy. The strategy worked nevertheless: ultimately the jury (although chosen from Apple's backyard) awarded Apple only about 5% of what it had demanded. Apple was so disappointed as to request a retrial (that appeal is still ongoing).

The fact of the matter is still that Dr. Kearl's work in that case was only in formal terms about a Samsung damages claim against Apple. In reality, it was about Apple's claims against Google's mobile operating system.

The strongest point Oracle makes in my opinion is the following reference to Samsung's trial argument:

"Samsung, for its part, told the jury that Apple's 'billion dollar numbers are completely unsupported,' and that it would 'show [the jury] how properly to calculate a royalty,' by demonstrating how 'Dr. Kearl calculated these damages.' [...] In other words, Samsung's lawyers directly offered Dr. Kearl's analysis as a rebuttal approach on the Android claims, not just as an affirmative calculation on Samsung's counterclaims."

So, yes, "Dr. Kearl was on the Android side of Apple v. Samsung."

Oracle's memorandum outlines the difficulties it would face if it had to ask Dr. Kearl questions in front of the jury. For example, by asking him very critical questions, Oracle could give the jury the impression of the court having endorsed Google's position.

I live in a jurisdiction where party experts have rather little weight and courts must appoint experts on technical issues and damages unless the questions only relate to what is common general knowledge. But in the U.S., party experts are the norm and court experts are a very rare exception. I remember that the mere appointment of a court expert in this case became the subject of reports in the specialized legal press, showing just how unusual this was.

In a couple of cases in which I'm a plaintiff, I also moved to disqualify damages experts because they had ties with the other side. In one case, pending before the Munich II Regional Court (case no. 5 OH 4622/14), my motion was granted a few months ago despite the two defendants' persistent efforts to keep the expert involved. In the other (much smaller) case, a judge at the Amtsgericht Fürstenfeldbruck (a local court, which is below a regional court; case no. 7 H 11/15) denied a motion although the expert himself had already asked to be dismissed, and my interlocutory appeal of that decision is now pending, as is my separate challenge for bias (not related to that decision, though outrageous it was) against that local court judge. The reason I mentioned my own issues with non-neutral court experts is because I feel very strongly that court experts must be neutral, and once there is a way that one party to a litigation can influence the court expert, even if only indirectly, a different expert should be appointed (or none, if none is needed, especially in the U.S., where court-appointed experts are few and far between).

As I wrote last month, I would be extremely surprised if a judge who showed concern in 2012 about the court, including appeals courts, being potentially influenced by bloggers now had no problem with a court-appointed expert--who undoubtedly and massively influences the court and the jury--being aligned with one "camp."

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Wednesday, October 7, 2015

May 9, 2016 may (or may not) be the Oracle v. Google Android-Java copyright retrial date

On Tuesday afternoon local time, Judge William H. Alsup of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a third case management order in the remand proceedings of the Oracle v. Google Android-Java copyright litigation. The most important part relates to the retrial date.

The final pretrial conference is firmly set for April 27, 2016. However, for the retrial itself, "[t]here is no date in 2016 that the Court could set for Oracle v. Google as a 'firm' trial date." The retrial "is [merely] tentatively set for May 9, subject to the possibility that two other cases with priority also set on that day will settle or plead out." The order then explains that "the Court tentatively expects to bring the Oracle v. Google case to trial as soon as the trials previously set for May 9 are completed or vacated due to settlements or pleas."

In practical terms, this means:

  • May 9 is the earliest possibility.

  • It will only be May 9 if parties to other cases do things they can't be forced to do (settle, withdraw) or if the other cases are resolved ahead of trial (summary judgment).

  • If the May 9 trials don't take too long, Oracle v. Google may start as soon as those other trials are over.

  • Theoretically, despite the court's "tentative" plans, this could slip into 2017 for no fault of Oracle or Google.

Another potential uncertainty here (not mentioned in the order) is that there could be delays due to issues with expert reports or as a result of interlocutory appeals or mandamus petitions. There were some expert report do-overs in the original proceedings; there was a mandamus petition by Google (which failed, but it took time) regarding one piece of evidence. I do see the potential for some of that on remand as well. I predict a huge fight especially over jury instructions and how to interpret the Federal Circuit's guidance regarding "fair use." I also see the potential for a pretrial involvement of the appeals court in connection with the court-appointed expert (though I still trust that a judge who even express concern in 2012 about the potential influence of bloggers on court decisions sets a rather high standard for court-appointed experts, a standard that Dr. Kearl cannot possibly meet anymore).

All things considered, I'll mark May 9 on my calendar but with lots of question marks (which, come May, may or may not go away).

The only smartphone patent dispute Google still has to worry about is this case, which is, by now, a copyright-only case. Apple's "thermonuclear war" and Microsoft's five-year effort to force Motorola into an Android patent license have ended in second-class settlements (withdrawals without license agreements). The only two resolutions I can imagine for Oracle v. Google are a license-based partnership between the parties or, maybe, a strategic acquisition of Java by Google (I've seen various tweets in recent weeks and months that suggested this, and while Oracle is more of a buyer than seller of companies, Google has almost three times Oracle's market cap).

The fact that a copyright case has eclipsed Google's patent cases is not because copyright is generally stronger than patents. It's because this case here is about literal copying (a conceded fact in this case), not more or less flimsy allegations of copying as in those patent cases.

Finally, a recommendation for those interested in "fair use" cases: an article by IP litigator Mike Keyes on the "Dancing Baby" case and why it has no bearing on Oracle v. Google.

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Friday, September 18, 2015

Judge denies motion to preclude Oracle from arguing Google's Java copyright infringement was willful

Judge William H. Alsup of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California has just denied a Google motion to preclude Oracle from arguing at next year's retrial that the search giant's infringement of Java copyrights (through incorporation of the declarations of 37 Java API packages into Android) was willful. In its opposition to Google's motion, Oracle had pointed to a particularly "expressive" piece of evidence: a Google-internal email according to which one of its key Android developers found Android's original Java libraries "half-ass at best" and identified a need for "another half of an ass."

The federal judge sees two legal reasons for which Google's motion couldn't succeed. Willfulness would have a bearing on the deduction of certain costs from profits that would have to be disgorged. Should Oracle, however, elect to seek statutory damages instead of, for example, a disgorgement of profits, then up to $150,000 per work infringed, as opposed to the standard maximum of $30,000, would be available. No matter how unlikely Google (and presumably many observers) consider a later Oracle choice to seek statutory damages, Judge Alsup interprets the law as preventing his court "from compelling Oracle to elect its measure of damages early on."

But the outcome isn't all bad for Google. The good among the bad from Google's perspective is that Judge Alsup has simultaneously decided that the trial would be bifurcated. The jury would firstly rule on Google's "fair use" defense without being briefed on Oracle's damages theories; then, if Oracle prevails (which I'm sure it will), damages and willfulness evidence will be presented in the second phase of the trial.

After a "fair use" finding, the next factual issue for the jury to decide will be willfulness. Thereafter, depending on the outcome, cetain damages theories may or may not be presented.

This approach means Google avoids its worst-case scenario, which would have been for the jury to hear about evidence such as the second "half of an ass" before making a decision on the "fair use" defense. I don't know how Google and its lawyers feel about this, but I wouldn't be surprised if they were actually rather pleased. They might have known all along that it was (at best) a long shot to try to avoid any willfulness discussion, so this here may be the best outcome they could have realistically expected.

For now, it appears that Google will be able to present some evidence and argument relating to its equitable defenses. Oracle might use some of the evidence that also has a bearing on willfulness to counter Google's claims that it relied on certain public statements by Sun. If not, Oracle would be substantially disadvantaged as a result of Judge Alsup's pretrial decisions.

So I expect to see some fights further in the process over which pieces of evidence that relate to willfulness are admissible as evidence in the first trial phase anyway (because of some other kind of probative value).

It's worth noting that Judge Alsup was much less concerned back in 2012 about a jury hearing more evidence than necessary. At the time he decided to put Google's defenses, especially "fair use," before the jury even though he ultimately held the infringed declaring API code non-copyrightable (which, as everyone knows, the Federal Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court declined to even take a look at). If he had made his finding before the jury trial, and if it had been upheld (in a parallel universe), the first jury would never even have had to think about "fair use." But this remand is different in some respects, including this one.

A key issue to decide will be whether the court-appointed expert from the first trial, Dr. Kearl, can still testify even though he has in the meantime done work for Samsung, a Google Android partner. I would be extremely surprised if a judge who showed concern in 2012 about the court, including appeals courts, being potentially influenced by bloggers now had no problem with a court-appointed expert--who undoubtedly and massively influences the court and the jury--being aligned with one "camp." I can't imagine that we'll see Dr. Kearl appear at next year's trial, but a formal decision has yet to be made.

Here's the order:

15-09-18 Order Denying Google Motion to Preclude by Florian Mueller

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Friday, August 21, 2015

Google found its own Java libraries "half-ass at best", needed "another half of an ass", took Oracle's APIs

This morning I found out I had actually missed the funniest piece of evidence in that whole Oracle v. Google Android-Java copyright infringement case. I've been following the case ever since it started (it had its fifth anniversary last week) but just learned this morning, when reading a new filing by Oracle in the California remand proceedings, that a Google-internal email (by Android developer Chris Desalvo to his boss, Andy Rubin) stated the following (click on the image to enlarge or read the text below the image):

Subject: Java class libraries

With talks with Sun broken off[,] where does that leave us regarding Java class libraries? Ours are half-ass at best. We need another half of an ass.

-chris

Oracle points to this Google-internal memo (which I found on another blog that covered the 2012 trial but was totally biased in Google's favor, hence got the copyrightability part completely wrong and never wanted to draw attention to this rather telling email) as part of its argument that Google's use of the 37 Java APIs at issue in this copyright infringement case was willful and that Oracle should not be precluded (despite a Google motion in that regard) from telling the jury the whole story about Google's fully-intended infringement. This is the introductory section of the filing (the "ass" part comes after the part I quote here):

"Google is a willful infringer. Google copied and distributed without authorization Sun/Oracle's 37 Java API Packages (and RangeCheck and the eight decompiled files, for that matter). Google knew full well that this was copyrighted material, that it needed to take a license, and that its failure to do so subjected it to legal liability. Indeed, Google's employees were instructed to conceal the scope of the infringement for as long as possible as they 'scrubbed the js' from Android. At no point did anyone inside Google ever suggest that its unauthorized copying was 'fair use'--nor does it have an opinion of counsel justifying its actions.

Google simply didn't care that it was willfully infringing Sun's (and later Oracle's) copyrights. Sun was weak and Google needed to get to market with a mobile solution. When Oracle acquired Sun, Google again had the chance to do the right thing—and this time it faced an opponent that was not hemorrhaging revenue and watching its market capitalization drop through the floor. At that point, Google's executives candidly acknowledged that they needed the Java API Packages, because 'the alternatives all suck.' Google believed it would be 'out of business in 10 years' if it did not succeed in mobile. Still, Google did not do the right thing and take a license. Google stands alone among large companies who commercially exploit the Java Platform without complying with the license terms.

Now Google wants to escape any meaningful consequence for its actions. Google argues that the only consequence of a deliberate wrongdoing that earned it many billions of dollars in profit, severely harmed the Java Platform, and allowed Google to maintain a dominant market share in the search engine advertising market, is the difference between $75,000 and $150,000 in statutory damages. Google tries to convince this Court that it simply makes no difference at all that it knowingly and deliberately took the property of another in violation of the law while earning untold billions in the process.

Google is utterly wrong. Willfulness does matter—even when the infringement is on an epic scale. It matters because for hundreds of years, at law and equity, the courts have consistently recognized that conscious wrongdoers must be deprived of any benefit whatsoever from their knowing choice to disobey the law. The trier of fact has always had the discretion, at law and at equity, to take into account conscious wrongdoing when accounting for profits. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that rule in numerous contexts, the rule has been applied for decades in all types of intellectual property cases, and Congress legislated that rule when it explicitly adopted the rationale of one of those Supreme Court copyright cases, Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940), in Section 504(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act. The jury is entitled to consider it here. Accordingly, Oracle proposes herein both a verdict and a jury instruction that properly address this issue."

The section quoted above makes reference to "fair use," the defense because of which the appeals court ordered a remand. This week Steven Huwig, a professional software developer (who among other things wrote software for a large New York bank), said the following about Google's "fair use" defense on Twitter, which suggests (without him using the same terminology) that he still considers the Android class libraries "half-assed":

"Oracle v. Google in a nutshell: Android is like a parody of Oracle JDK, but there's no fair use exception for this kind of parody."

Parodies in general do fall under the "fair use" exception, but not unintended ones.

If you're interested in more detail on Oracle's lawyers' legal argument as to why they should be allowed to present willful-infringement evidence to the retrial jury, here's the filing:

15-08-20 Oracle Opposition to Google Motion to Preclude Willfulness Evidence by Florian Mueller

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Tuesday, September 9, 2014

Judge declines to overrule California jury in Apple's favor or grant retrial in 2nd Samsung case

Apple's patent infringement lawsuits against Android device makers continue to be anything but thermonuclear after a decision that came down late on Monday by local California time. A federal judge in the Northern District of California has just thrown out Apple's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) or a retrial in the second California case between Apple and Samsung, except for a negligible and inconsequential item that Samsung had not even argued at the spring trial and a finding that one day Apple will get supplemental damages for a limited period of time the jury couldn't consider and only concerning a couple of products (but no tripling for willfulness or anything like that). This practically complete denial is not an unexpected outcome given the rather high legal hurdle for JMOL motions, and Apple's top brass is presumably even less interested in this on the eve of the iPhone 6 launch (by the way, that's going to be the first iPhone I buy, not because I expect it to become my primary phone after all these years of using Android, but because I need to look at it as an app developer and appreciate the larger screen).

Apple's JMOL/retrial motion was an unmistakable sign of disappointment over the early-May jury verdict that resulted in only about 5% of the damages award Apple was seeking (the key indicator of disappointment is not the JMOL part per se, but the request for a retrial) and, at this point, its last chance for short-term leverage over Samsung after last month's withdrawal of all ex-U.S. lawsuits pending between the two and denial of a sales ban.

This is the public redacted version of the ruling (this post will continue below the document with further commentary as well as a report on the latest filing in Samsung's appeal of the final ruling in the first California Apple v. Samsung case):

14-09-08 Order on Apple's JMOL Motion in 2nd Samsung Case by Florian Mueller

Now that it's clear Apple won't get any improvement from the district court (it will obviously keep trying this at the Federal Circuit), the next milestone will be Judge Lucy Koh's ruling on Samsung's JMOL motion. Samsung faces the same high hurdle but is still more likely to achieve some sort of improvement than Apple was. For example, one of Apple's patent claims-in-suit has meanwhile been rejected by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and another patent-in-suit is from the same patent family whose European member has unanimously been deemed invalid by ten judges. I believe there's a 60%-70% probability that at least one of Apple's liability wins (all three of which are questionable for different reasons) will be overruled by Judge Koh, and a 30%-40% chance of the verdict being upheld. The recent denial of Samsung's "Alice motion" was just a sideshow. The most important issues remain to be resolved.

After deciding on Samsung's JMOL motion, which could happen any day now, we'll see a cross-appeal to the Federal Circuit. Apple was in such a hurry that it immediately appealed the denial of a sales ban, but as I wrote on Thursday (when I reported on Apple's motion for postjudgment royalties of $6.46 per device that infringes the three patents underlying the liability findings), all the appeals relating to the second California Apple v. Samsung case are going to be consolidated. I have no more doubt about that given that the JMOL ruling on Apple's motion has already come down and that the ruling on Samsung's motion won't take very long. In the coming months, Judge Koh will have to rule on the aforementioned motion for monetary compensation as a substitute for an injunction. Apple's desire for this kind of remedy is understandable, but Judge Koh explained in her JMOL decision that she likes to resolve those kinds of issues after the appeal for reasons of judicial economy:

"Because the parties have indicated that an appeal is anticipated, proceeding without the Federal Circuit's guidance may cause unnecessary expenditures of time and resources should the Circuit reverse any part of the jury's verdict on liability. The Court thus finds it appropriate to delay the consideration of evidence of actual postverdict sales and calculation of supplemental damages until after the completion of the appeal in this case. The Court made this same determination in the first case."

Apple will presumably argue that it absolutely urgently needs an award of postjudgment royalties, but I doubt that Judge Koh will find this a good use of her time.

There is one part of Judge Koh's reasoning that reflects far more negatively on Apple's "thermonuclear war" against alleged "copycats" than the outcome of the JMOL process itself. What almost adds insult to injury is that Judge Koh exposes Apple's copycat claims by saying that "Apple's evidence was weak at best" with respect to its (past) practice of the asserted claims. After opening argument at the spring trial Judge Koh already denied an Apple motion for curative instructions relating to (among other things) its practice of the asserted claims (Apple wasn't allowed to present argument at the trial with respect to non-asserted claims of the same patents, which I thought was very strict). Then Apple wanted to place the emphasis on its alleged past practice of certain claims. Even for what Judge Koh describes as "three unasserted extra claims," the order says "Apple's claim is unavailing because this Court gave Apple the choice not once, but twice, to rebut by presenting evidence at trial that Apple practices the extra claims, but Apple declined the Court’s offer both times." And the order notes that "Apple's choice to assert the asserted claims as opposed to the unasserted claims was a strategic decision beneficial to Apple," for example, because there were pretty strong invalidity arguments against the unasserted claims.

Not only Samsung but also Google, whose software was at the heart of Apple's infringement contentions and "copycat" smear campaign, will be pleased with the JMOL order.

Samsung filed reply brief in support of its appeal of the final judgment in the first California Apple v. Samsung case -- hearing likely to take place in the fourth quarter

Since Apple's patents-in-suit have not proven strong enough to yield serious strategic leverage, all that's left to be sorted out between Apple and Samsung is a payment for past infringement. Apple withdrew its cross-appeal, so the only party still fighting for an improvement is Samsung. And Samsung's number one priority is to get the $929 million verdict in the first case (that's the number after a portion of the original verdict was replaced with a new amount by means of a retrial) reduced. That damages award was mostly about design patents and trade dress, not about technical patents. Samsung has support from 27 law professors and a tech industry group. Apple is defending that jury verdict all the way and has support from 54 design professionals and a group of mostly no-tech and low-tech companies, a fact that in and of itself buttresses Samsung's (and Samsung's supporters') argument that a disgorgement of unapportioned infringer's profits over a design patent is not appropriate for today's multifunctional high-tech products such as smartphones.

On Friday, Samsung filed its reply brief, then corrected it, and the final redacted version became available yesterday. There's nothing new in it. The next interesting step is going to be the appellate hearing, though I think there's a reasonable chance of a complete settlement in the meantime. While it's not new per se, I wanted to draw attention to something that Samsung's reply brief highlighted again. Samsung actually had evidence in the first California case (but was not allowed to present it to the jury, which is part of the reason why Samsung wants the ruling in the first case overturned) that it had designs with rounded corners and other iPhone-like elements in the works back in 2006, before the original iPhone was shown:

I acknowledge that I underestimated the significance of this evidence in 2012. In retrospect I think it was unfair that Apple had the right to smear Samsung, in court and in the media, for shameless copying when the truth is that Samsung had come up with such designs totally independently. When the Federal Circuit judges see this, they may feel that a new trial in the first case is warranted, or at least it may show to them that the ruling in the first case way overcompensates Apple for its design "innovations."

Finally, here's the full text of the public version of Samsung's reply brief:

14-09-05 Samsung Reply Brief in Appeal of Ruling in First Apple Case by Florian Mueller

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Saturday, May 24, 2014

Apple requests retrial of Samsung patent case, demonstrates dissatisfaction with jury verdict

After the original version of the Apple v. Samsung II jury verdict that came down on May 2 (and had to be amended on May 5), Apple's PR department had issued a premature statement that basically described the verdict as a win for Apple, though the result was a rather mixed one. Litigants can engage in spin-doctoring all the want, but what's usually more telling is what procedural steps they take after a decision. Do they want to leave a decision intact, or do they seek to have it overturned at all costs?

After the 2012 trial in the first Apple v. Samsung case, Apple was seeking some gradual improvements but more than anything else sought to defend the verdict, while Samsung wanted the jury to be overruled or, in the alternative, a retrial. A limited damages retrial resulted from Samsung's post-trial motions, but the parameters weren't really favorable to Samsung, so the retrial didn't change nearly as much as Samsung had hoped.

This time around, it's the opposite. Just like Apple in the first case, Samsung is still trying to obtain some improvements (due to sealing it's unclear what exactly it has requested), while Apple can't hide its dissatisfaction with this month's verdict: in addition to seeking additional liability findings in its favor from Judge Koh, a tripling of the largest part of the damages award, and a permanent injunction (in the previous post I just discussed that initiative), Apple has also moved, late on Friday by local time, for a complete damages retrial (this post continues below the document):

14-05-23 Apple Motion for JMOL and Retrial by Florian Mueller

In connection with Apple's pursuit of a higher damages figure, be it by tripling and/or a retrial, it's worth noting that Apple's damages claim relating to the '647 "quick links" patent was more than 20 times what Apple itself demanded from Motorola Mobility in a parallel case for the same patent, on a per-device basis. For reasons I explained in my previous post, the '647 claim construction from the "Posner case" was accepted by Apple last week when it brought a motion for a remand of a reexamination procedure jointly with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Under that claim construction, the patent isn't nearly as valuable as Apple is claiming in the California Samsung case.

The part that proves Apple's disappointment with the outcome of the recent trial is where it argues that "Samsung's improper and prejudicial statements to the jury warrant a new trial on infringement for the '414 and '959 patents (in the event that the Court does not grant JMOL of infringement), a new trial on willfulness for all patents other than the '721 patent (and also other than the '647 patent if the Court grants JMOL of willfulness for that patent), and a new trial on damages for all five of Apple's asserted patents" (emphasis added).

Samsung could also make an argument that it was prejudiced. There was a controversial propaganda video that Judge Koh showed to the jury, though there would been a non-prejudicial alternative. The $2.2 billion damages claim was absolutely ridiculous, yet Judge Koh allowed Apple to present it to the jury, while not permitting Samsung to discuss with the jury the real-world evidence that the terms of Apple's license agreements with companies like HTC and Nokia (or Apple's 60-cents-per-unit damages claim from Motorola over the '647 patent) are. The jury basically had to arrive at its damages figure in a parallel universe in which everything was painted in a light way too favorable for Apple, not in the harsh light of reality, in which Apple's patents are far less valuable than the company claims. The jury wasn't told about the status of the reexamination of the '172 autocomplete patent and was generally misled about (in)validity issues.

But Apple thinks it could get a better damages award next time, and is pushing hard for a new trial.

As for Apple's argument that it was prejudiced, the points Apple makes aren't all wrong. It's just that they aren't extremely strong (while the hurdle for a new trial is reasonably high) and, on balance, if anyone was prejudiced, it was Samsung, not Apple, for the reasons I outlined before.

  • During the trial I already agreed with Apple that Judge Koh should have allowed it to make certain arguments with respect to its alleged non-practice of the patents-in-suit. However, to some extent this is a problem of "you make your bed and you lie in it": Apple made some procedural concessions relating to case narrowing only to go to trial as quickly as possible. This had a limiting effect: Apple then couldn't point to other claims from the asserted patents than the five claims-in-suit.

  • Apple argues that Samsung's "references to the possibility of a permanent injunction" were prejudicial because "the jury could have decided to reduce the damages it awarded to Apple or, even worse, the jury could have found no liability on certain patents as a way to reduce the impact of any injunction". I thought it was reasonable for Apple to request a curative instruction from the court, and the judge was very strict by not granting one. However, it's not likely that the jury's damages award was influenced by this in any way.

  • Apple furthermore believes Samsung should not have been allowed to tell the jury about the fact that the Federal Circuit had reversed a preliminary injunction over the Galaxy Nexus because this "unfairly suggested to the jury that an appeals court sided with Samsung and against Apple on an issue that was relevant in the current trial, when in fact the Federal Circuit's decision had no relevance to the issues that were before the jury". However, it was part of Apple's trial strategy to argue that Samsung had removed the universal search feature and then put it back because of customers complaining. The parties also had an argument over related user comments on a website. It is, however, an obviously important fact that Samsung put the feature back because the preliminary injunction was lifted.

Judge Koh is hardly going to order a new trial for those reasons. She may make some minor adjustments to the verdict, and then she'll let the parties appeal the unfavorable parts of the ruling to the Federal Circuit. Thereafter, there may be a retrial -- but in the meantime the parties will probably settle because this litigation has become a waste of resources.

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Friday, March 7, 2014

That was quick: Samsung appeals final judgment in first Apple v. Samsung patent case

On Thursday evening local California time, Samsung filed a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit of the final judgment that had been handed down less than 20 hours before. By proceeding so quickly, Samsung demonstrates a strong belief that something is fundamentally wrong with the outcome of that California case. And presumably it won't take long before Apple will also appeal the unfavorable parts of that ruling, possibly including Thursday's denial of its renewed motion for a permanent injunction (in that post I also mentioned that Judge Koh certified the ruling).

The August 2012 billion-dollar jury verdict can be appealed only now because a limited damages retrial (concerning 13 of the 28 accused devices) had to be held last November (resulting in a final total damages figure of $929 million), and after a partly (but, as we know now, not sufficiently) successful appeal by Apple of the December 2012 denial of an injunction, Judge Lucy Koh had to take another look at this equitable remedy.

Samsung was unhappy about the verdict for several reasons. None of its offensive counterclaims against Apple succeeded, while Apple prevailed on almost all liability issues. And the jury, as one or more of its members later told the press, didn't really care to evaluate Samsung's invalidity contentions -- after the first few prior art references it got tired of the process and decided to simply rule in Apple's favor.

A few days after the verdict I identified the fact that not a single patent-in-suit was found invalid as the biggest issue with the verdict. While Apple's rubber-banding patent survived (most of its claims didn't, but the claim asserted in this case was affirmed in June 2013), the Central Reexamination Division of the United States Patent and Trademark Office rejected all claims of the '915 pinch-to-zoom API patent, Apple's most valuable multi-touch software patent in this case, last year and Apple had to file an appeal to the USPTO's Patent Trial and Appeals Board (a fact I discussed in this late-December post on Apple's renewed motion for a permanent injunction).

It's a safe guess that the validity of the '915 patent will be a key issue on appeal. Should the Federal Circuit share the USPTO's current perspective that the patent should never have been granted in the first place, then there will have to be another retrial.

Yes. Another retrial. It would be the third trial in this case. And it would involve more than 20 products. That's because the court had adopted Apple's proposal to keep the verdict form simple (over Samsung's objections) and have the jury determined damages only on a per-product basis, but not in the form of a product/patent matrix. As a result, it's now impossible to tell precisely what portion of the damages award (but certainly not an insignificant one) the jury awarded for infringement of the '915 patent. If the patent is found invalid (which is now reasonably likely to happen), the jury verdict is worthless with respect to more than 20 products. And the only way to set a new damages figure would be another jury trial. That's the way it works.

For the rubber-banding patent, invalidation is unlikely, but Samsung claims that Apple narrowed its scope through representations it made in reexamination (something Samsung also says about the '915 patent, but if that one was invalidated, any narrowing statements wouldn't matter anyway). So the infringement of that one could also be a key issue on appeal.

Besides infringement and validity issues and possibly (though not necessarily) some damages-related argument, we may also see some argument over jury instructions. The jury instructions were a very contentious issue in this case. Parties always disagree on them to some extent, but in this case there were some very fundamental issues. Modification of the jury instructions would also require a large-scale retrial...

Almost three years after Apple filed this first California lawsuit, the fact of the matter is that it does not have any remedies in its hands. Neither has Samsung paid even a cent of the damages award (since it isn't truly final, and quite frankly, it's unlikely that the final outcome will be identical to the current $929 million figure) nor is an injunction in force, after two failed attempts to obtain one. This appeal is going to be adjudicated sometime next year; then there may very well be another trial (I think this is fairly likely to happen); and then there could even be another appeal. That's the reality of patent litigation.

The fact that Apple still cannot enforce any remedy of any kind against Samsung in the United States -- again, after almost three years of litigation -- is a huge success for the law firm of Quinn Emanuel, which has so far delivered precisely what benefits its client the most: QE has shielded Samsung from any actual business impact of this first California lawsuit. Meanwhile, Samsung's market share has grown, and it's now the global market leader. The fact that QE persuaded Judge Koh to once again deny a permanent injunction, even though the partly-successful appeal made it a rather likely outcome, can hardly be overestimated.

But this is just one of numerous Apple-Samsung lawsuits pending worldwide, and not even the only one in the Northern District of California. The next Apple v. Samsung trial, over different patents and mostly different products, will start on the 31st. When Apple prepared its remedies-related evidence in that case, it didn't have the benefit of certain guidance from the Federal Circuit and from Judge Koh regarding the "causal nexus" requirement for injunctive relief. This is speculative, but it could be that the evidence in that second California litigation is not strong enough to prove a causal nexus between any infringements the jury may identify and the alleged irreparable harm. The requirements are exacting. There's no such thing anymore as a presumption that a patentee is entitled to an injunction (despite the fact that intellectual property was envisioned by the Founding Fathers to be an exclusionary right). Not even in a case in which the number one and the number two in the market are suing each other.

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Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Samsung wants a retrial of the November retrial in its first U.S. patent litigation with Apple

Last month a federal jury in the Northern District of California awarded Apple $290 million in damages for Samsung's infringement of 13 of the 28 products accused in this first litigation between these parties, replacing a vacated $410 million portion of the August 2012 §1.05 billion verdict. When Samsung asked for a retrial, it obviously hoped to get more out of it than roughly a 10% discount, but the total of the affirmed damages from the first trial and the retrial award is still almost $930 million.

The retrial was a necessity for formal reasons after the court disagreed with the notice dates Apple presented to the 2012 jury. In my detailed Q&A, published a few days before the retrial commenced, I said that neither of the parties nor the court really wanted a retrial under these circumstances. And at the time I already discussed the theoretical possibility of one or more further retrials. As expected, Samsung is still unhappy and formally requests either a judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) in its favor or a new trial or a massive adjustment of the damages award (this post continues below the document):

13-12-14 Samsung's Corrected Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law by Florian Mueller

Asking for an adjustment on a JMOL basis is common practice. Apple is doing the same in its motion (asking the court to hold that Apple's $379 million retrial damages claim was the only result a jury could have reasonably arrived at), but it's not asking for yet another trial (this post continues below the document):

13-12-13 Apple's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law by Florian Mueller

Apple's motion is considerably shorter than Samsung's not only because Apple focuses on JMOL but also because Apple conservatively applies the page limit for post-trial briefs to the total of this JMOL motion and the renewed motion for a permanent injunction that it will bring once the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remands the injunction question to Judge Lucy Koh's court in California. Last month Apple prevailed with respect to its software patents-in-suit, but the Federal Circuit has not yet issued its mandate. Apple says this could happen as early as December 26, but I think it will take a couple more months due to an expected Samsung petition for a rehearing and it's not unimaginable that Samsung might even try to appeal this issue to the Supreme Court.

Samsung is extremely unlikely to persuade Judge Koh to order a retrial of the retrial and presumably brought this motion only to preserve its record for the appeal. Judge Koh really wants to reach the point of a final judgment so as to enable the parties to appeal the unfavorable parts (obviously, Samsung has more of a need to appeal than Apple, but Apple also can seek some improvements) to the Federal Circuit. If the Federal Circuit finds any jury instruction prejudicial or reverses any underlying liability finding, or disagrees with other relevant parts of the district court judgment, then there will be a third trial in this case (absent a settlement). Given that there are so many legal questions in this case and a multiplicity of issues either party can raise on appeal, a third trial is not entirely unrealistic. But for practical reasons it doesn't make sense to delay the inevitable cross-appeal, given that even a retrial at this stage would still involve the risk of a need for a retrial on remand.

Samsung's arguments for a retrial of the retrial have two truly interesting aspects and one that is idiotic. The stupid point Samsung makes can be addressed quickly. It claims, as it did at trial, that Apple's lead counsel, Morrison & Foerster's Harold McElhinny, appealed to "racial bias" against Asians. But he didn't use any pejorative terms of the kind you can hear at the beginning of Full Metal Jacket or say anything other that really has to do with race. At most one can say that he appealed to patriotism, but even that would be at least an exaggeration given that he just explained how domestic companies go out of business if they can't defend their intellectual property against foreign copyists. I just don't understand why Samsung made the decision to press this non-point instead of focusing on its more reasonable arguments.

Samsung's lawyers did it again and figured out how the jury arrived at its numbers. Last year they reverse-engineered almost the entire original jury verdict. This time around they can explain the jury's methodology for each of the products at issue in the retrial:

  • Six devices were found to infringe only software (not design) patents. On those, the jury awarded precisely what Apple claimed in lost profits and reasonable royalties (this was obviously easy to figure).

  • The other serven devices were found to infringe both software and design patents. On those, the jury awarded the same 100% of Apple's claimed lost profits and reasonably royalties plus the exact average of the parties' calculations of total infringer's profits (61.4% of Apple's expert's number because even Samsung didn't argue that there were no profits).

Samsung argues that the jury failed to do its job of actually deducting costs from the claimed profits and that such "compromise" verdicts are contrary to law (provided that the jury's methodology can be reverse-engineered). If there's any way Judge Koh can uphold the jury award nevertheless, I guess she will, just to make sure that the case gets appealed now rather than later.

The other interesting argument for a retrial of the retrial is Samsung's allegation that Apple violated the Entire Market Value Rule and generally misled the jury by comparing its damages claim (as well as the minuscule amount Samsung conceded it owed Apple) to Samsung's total revenues generated with the accused products in the U.S. during the relevant period of time ($3.5 billion) as well as the total number of accused devices sold (10.8 million units) despite the fact that, for example, not all of those products infringe design patents (which entitle a patentee to a disgorgement of infringer's profits). Samsung points to the January 2011 Federal Circuit decision in Uniloc v. Microsoft, which involved the grant of a new trial because of the patentee's use of an inadequate damages theory. I guess what Apple did in the Samsung retrial was not tantamount to using an inadequate theory (given that the numbers presented by its experts were based on court-approved theories), but this kind of argument yet makes more sense than the racial bias story.

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