Showing posts with label Interoperability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Interoperability. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 10, 2022

Google's #GetTheMessage campaign about iMessenger compatibility with Android Messenger raises important issue for society, gets Qualcomm's support, but has shortcomings

Google has just ratcheted up its campaign to pressure Apple to support the RCS messaging standard in order to massively improve interoperability between Apple's iMessenger and Google's Android Messenger app. I already commented on the topic in January.

The new #GetTheMessage effort says "[i]t's time for Apple to fix texting." Well, it would also be time for Google to fix a number of things--some of which it has in common with Apple. "Goopple" is the mobile ecosystem duopoly, if not a cartelopoly. Apple is more radical and outspoken about its walled-garden approach, while Google isn't truly open in all respects: sometimes it's fauxpen.

One high-profile supporter whose #GetTheMessage tweet I noticed is Qualcomm CEO Cristiano Amon:

This is just the latest in a series of public statements by Qualcomm executives disagreeing with Apple, which is for now--and possibly for several more years to come if they don't get their own baseband chipset act together--a large Qualcomm customer. Apple and Qualcomm are particularly at loggerheads over standard-essential patent (SEP) royalties. SEP license fees should not be an issue for Apple in the #GetTheMessage context, however: Google proposes using the RCS standard, which is apparently too old to be covered by valid patents.

John Gruber of Daring Fireball, who agrees with Apple most but not 100% of the time, notes that what Google is proposing isn't just the open standard, but also end-to-end encryption, which Google added on top of it. This is an interesting observation, but in the greater scheme of things it's of--at best--tertiary relevance. Google is still right in principle that it's important for society to ensure seamless messaging across major mobile platforms. And I can't believe it's a coincidence that Apple uses an inferior contrast (white on light green vs. white on medium blue) for messages that are not sent by and delivered via iMessage. That is one issue, and there are more important ones.

Should Apple just consider RCS suboptimal (and there may be valid reasons for that), it would obviously be free to propose that Apple and Google form a working group, possibly invite other industry players, and develop a superior alternative. But it's easy to see that RCS would be (a) better than the status quo, which forces low-income family to buy iPhones--instead of cheaper and functionally also very good--Android devices for their kids due to classism, and (b) more than good enough for the start.

It's a U.S.-specific issue because of Apple's market share. The problem may, however, be solved in other jurisdictions (particularly the EU with its Digital Markets Act) before anything happens in the States.

In some communication between the two parts of the Goopple duopoly, someone even suggested that Apple and Google should operate as if they were one company. In some respects they come close to that, but not in all. It's not like Apple's heavy-handedness is great for Google; it's just that Google is trying to mitigate the damage, such as by paying Apple something like $15 billion a year to be the default search engine on iOS. I consider it a positive by-product of Google's #GetTheMessage campaign that their disagreement over messenger interoperability may also lead to greater divergence on app store governance and related topics. That's not because I mean to promote conflict, but because nobody can seriously want an Apple-Google cartel. In these special circumstances, division is a good thing (up to a certain point, and not at the expense of interoperability).

The first question is whether this is going to make a difference. John Gruber says Google is beating the RCS dead horse. Granted, Google's campaign appears desperate. In the end it's about selling Android phones in the U.S. market. Google knows that Android as an operating system, and Android-based devices (such as foldables), often introduce innovative features a while before Apple does, yet Apple keeps growing its U.S. market share. That is a legitimate concern. It indicates a market failure that should be remedied.

But will Apple care about whether the #GetTheMessage hash tag is trending somewhere? The problem is that it will be hard for Google to draw attention to the issue after this news cycle is over. The only thing that would help here is regulatory scrutiny and/or private antitrust litigation (which might have to raise an essential facility question, which would not only be hard to prevail on as the concept hasn't been recognized by the Supreme Court but would also be against Google's own interests in other tech law contexts). While not likely to happen, that course of action would generate news at various procedural junctures and culminate in a trial where the plaintiffs' (whoever they might be) lawyers could grill Apple executives and confront them with issues such as classism.

Apple is already facing a publicity campaign by Meta (Facebook) in the U.S. over app tracking:

It's interesting to see the #1 search engine company and the #1 social network company spending money on such campaigns that deal with some of Apple's practices. But so far there hasn't been enough pressure to force Apple to open up.

Will Apple's shareholders care? It's hard to imagine that the board of directors would order the company's executives to do something about messenger interoperability. If Google's campaign makes an impact, it may, however, make it easier for Tim Cook to get his board to support a decision in favor of enhanced interoperability--but there's no reason to assume right now that he even wants to propose such a move.

One thing that Apple may have to consider with a view to the long haul is that it's becoming more and more controversial--not yet to the extent that it influences purchasing decisions, but at some point that may happen. In a recent post on app store class actions in various jurisdictions I mentioned that it would be like a modern-day pillory for Apple if they had to pay out money to iPhone users as a result of a court of law finding that they illegally overcharged their customers. The combination of losing one or more consumer class action lawsuits, Google's #GetTheMessage campaign, and further (ideally even more aggressive) resistance by Meta and others to Apple's ATT program (see this recent post on macroeconomic effects)--and maybe if Epic Games ultimately turned things around and won its case--could materially affect Apple's reputation even in the eyes of end users.

So, while I'm not fully convinced, I support #GetTheMessage because it's a good thing in principle. Please do so as well.

Thursday, July 14, 2022

Google in competition enforcement cross-hairs: (a) in Italy over obstruction of interoperability; (b) in South Africa over paid search results as well as Google Play Store

While Apple is facing even more antitrust issues (and deservedly so), Google is not a distant second in the discipline of drawing regulatory scrutiny and inspiring legislative action to combat various types of abuse of market power. And these days there's even more going on with a view to Google.

Today, the Italian competition authority--in Italian: Autorità garante della concorrenca e del mercato--announced that it has opened formal investigations of Google allegedly impeding interoperability (sharing individuals' data across platforms), with a particular view to weople, a service operated by Italian company HODA (Holistic data Activation). Weople describes itself as "the app to invest and protect your data," or "the first bank to invest your data and gain value from it, while protecting it and activating your privacy rights."

The European Commission manages an EU Framework Program for Research and Innovation, and its 2014-2020 edition named "Horizon 2020" scored Weople as a "high-quality project proposal in a highly competitive evaluation process." These are Weople's five goals as stated on its website:

  1. Give people an easy tool for them to apply the GDPR [General Data Protection Regulation] and act[ivate] their rights. Give people a tool for having, knowing and controlling their data.

  2. Give people a tool to earn money from their data, to participate in this growing and very important market with consciousness and highly protective privacy systems.

  3. Use data to help people and families to get services that can protect them, bring savings and make them feel better.

  4. Give people a high-level and reliable data storage service, with full data availability.

  5. Apply strong and modern principles of ethics and transparency. Apply an economic approach based on both voluntary margin limitations and sharing economy plus social sustainability principles.

These are laudable goals, and it means a lot that the European Commission considers it an interesting project. But according to the Italian competition authority, Google's conduc could compromise the right to portability of personal data as established Art. 20 GDPR and deprive consumers of certain benefits they could derive from their data. Where competition law comes in is the problem that Google's conduct is suspected of limiting the ability of third parties to develop innovative data-based services.

The Italian competition authority has already conducted a dawn raid of Google's Italian premises together with a special police unit named Guarda di Finanza (GdF).

In late October, this already happened in connection with Google's alleged abuse of a dominant position in the Italian market for display advertising.

Yesterday, South Africa's Competition Commission published a provisional report (press release, PDF) outlining various findings and recommendations 14 months into its Online Platforms Market Inquiry. Unlike the Italian investigation I just mentioned, that one isn't only about Google, but Google appears to be the primary target based on the list of "leading platforms" identified by the investigators:

"Apple App Store, Google Play Store, Takealot, Booking.com, Airbnb, Mr Delivery, Uber Eats, Property24, Private Property, AutoTrader, and Cars.co.za along with Google Search (including its specialist search units such as Google Shopping and Google Travel)." (emphases added)

The following paragrah about Google Search is particularly interesting:

"Among other findings, the Inquiry has provisionally found that Google Search plays an important role in directing consumers to the different platforms, and in this way shapes platform competition. The prevalence of paid search at the top of the search results page without adequate identifiers as advertising raises platform customer acquisition costs and favours large, often global, platforms. Preferential placement of their own specialist search units also distorts competition in Google’s favour. The Inquiry provisionally recommends that paid results are prominently labelled as advertising with borders and shading to be clearer to consumers and that the top of the page is reserved for organic, or natural, search results based on relevance only, uninfluenced by payments. The Inquiry also recommends Google allows competitors to compete for prominence in a search by having their own specialist units and with no guaranteed positions for Google specialist units. The Inquiry is also exploring whether the default position of Google Search on mobile devices should end in South Africa."

I agree that paid search results should be marked more clearly, and there is a point in at least limiting the extent to which non-organic search results appear at or near the top of a search results page.

As for app stores (Apple's iOS App Store as well as Google Play for Android apps), the initial recommendation is potentially helpful but in my view fails to address an even bigger problem than the app tax, which is the app review tyranny:

"In software application stores, there is no effective competition for the fees charged to app developers with in-app payments, resulting in high fees and app prices. The Inquiry’s provisional recommendation is that apps should be able to steer consumers to external web-based payment options, or alternatively a maximum cap is placed on application store commission fees."

A cap on app store commissions would be infinitely more helpful than the sham settlement proposed in the Northern Distict of California, where the attorneys-general of 36 U.S. states, Epic Games, and Match Group (to whose complaint Google responded this week) are still pushing for a meaningful result. In South Korea, Google will likely be fined soon over its bad-faith compliance with a statute relating to in-app payments, but if South Korea had simultaneously capped the commission (as is now being contemplated in South Africa), the situation would be clearer.

One of the most interesting antitrust investigations of Google was announced by Germany's Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) last month and relates to the licensing terms for Google Maps.

While it's been quiet lately about the United States et al. v. Google antitrust litigation in the District of Columbia, that case will go to trial next year and has enormous potential. A joint status report by the United States Department of Justice, the 36 state AGs, and Google was filed on Tuesday (PDF). Yesterday the plaintiffs sought an extension of a deadline to respond to an expert report, which--just like the status report--suggests Google is not being as cooperative as the government plaintiffs would have hoped:

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22087266-22-07-13-plaintiffs-memo-iso-eot-resp-to-fox-report

There's a lot going on, and I'm now keeping track of those issues more systematically than in the past.

Tuesday, January 11, 2022

Google's call on Apple to support the RCS messaging standard is consistent with what an EU commissioner already wanted 11 years ago: the EU's unfinished interoperability business

I may not always agree with The Verge on Apple-related issues, but I have no problem acknowledging that they've been right all along to ask Apple when iMessage would finally support the RCS messaging standard in order to achieve interoperability with other messengers. Now that Google's Android chief Hiroshi Lockheimer publicly called on Apple to do so, there is at least some hope for change.

While the iMessage lock-in problem and the social pressures it exerts on low-income families has been discussed on the Internet for some time (see this Septemer 2020 thread on Hacker News, which contains pretty good explanations of how it works), it took a recent Wall Street Journal article to draw the attention of influential people to that problem. It also came up during the Epic Games v. Apple trial, with Apple-internal communications revealing a lock-in strategy.

When I ditched my iPhone last summer, I knew (not least thanks to the public debate surrounding Epic v. Apple) that one can switch off iMessage, which I did about a week before making my Google Pixel my primary phone. It was a non-issue since I primarily use WhatsApp and Signal. Then I'm not a teenager in the United States. The problem is real, and I do feel sorry for low-income families impacted by it. However, let's be clear that Apple's "culpability" in this context is merely a refusal to be interoperable. No one can reasonably expect them to provide an iMessage app on Android, but I agree with Google that supporting RCS would be the morally right thing to do.

It's hard to predict whether naming and shaming will change Apple's mind. It would actually be out of character for Apple to bow to that kind of pressure. The sole exception to date is that Facebook succeeded in getting Apple to support a small business initiative. But there was a lot less money at stake for Apple in that context. It was inexpensive to come across as generous. Not so this time around. The U.S. market may be well beyond a tipping point, and Apple--not because of superior quality (I'm even happier with my Pixel--relatively speaking, a bargain--than I ever was with an iPhone) but the most extreme "walled garden" strategy. Apple can continue to gain U.S. market share at Android's expense, and presumably that's a major part of the reason why Mr. Lockheimer speaks out (though I don't mean to doubt that he--like me--believes low-income families should have more affordable choices).

Assuming that Apple remains adamant about its iMessage lock-in strategy (which works only in the U.S., but that's the key market), what's next?

This debate immediately reminded me of a policy-making initiative by an EU commissioner many people in tech industry circles remember all too well: "Steelie Neelie" Kroes, famous for playing hardball with Microsoft while she was competition commissioner. In 2010, when she was put in charge of the EU's Digital Agenda, Mrs. Kroes rightly considered interoperability a top priority. Here's what she told Euractiv in a June 2010 interview:

In response to a question mentioning the iPhone:

"Today we are facing a shift from the PC era to an era where mobile devices with always-on Internet connectivity are becoming widespread. In this new and innovative market, interoperability is especially important."

In response to a question about interoperability being a Digital Agenda priority:

"This is not just about Microsoft or any big company like Apple, IBM or Intel. The main challenge is that consumers need choice when it comes to software or hardware products. Any kind of IT product should be able to communicate with any type of service in the future.

"Interoperability of equipment used, of services provided and of data exchanged promotes an increase in user confidence, value and choice. It also promotes acceptance, success and take-up of new technologies and thus competition among providers. It empowers the user to make the best choice in terms of value for money and suitability without being locked-in to one specific company or brand.

"Open standards are therefore vital to deploy interoperability between data, devices, services and networks. Internet is the best example of the power of interoperability. Its open architecture has given billions of people around the world access to devices and applications which talk to one another."

(emphases added)

Almost 11 years later, Apple's refusal to interoperate shows that it would have been good to mandate interoperability through legislation. There was no legislative initiative at the time, and the iMessage lock-in is a problem only for U.S.--and not for EU--consumers. Lawmakers on all continents would have valid reasons to take action, in a principled fashion as opposed to singling out a particular company. Neelie Kroes identified the problem (lock-in) and the solution (interoperability) more than a decade ago. The iMessage lock-in is just one of many issues in the tech sector that could be fixed that way.

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Monday, November 9, 2020

Don't blame EU competition chief Margrethe Vestager if SAP customers' antitrust complaints are fundamentally flawed, get copyright law wrong

You'd be hard-pressed to find anyone less SAP-friendly than me, given that I harshly criticized the German enterprise software maker (just the week before last) for botching--together with Google and Daimler--the German patent injunction reform and even called Microsoft, BMW, and Deutsche Telekom "lemmings" for following SAP's lead. The last occasion on which I collaborated with SAP was over a decade ago when we were co-complainants against Oracle's acquisition of Sun Microsystems--and the individuals I worked with at the time have meanwhile retired. Also, SAP is absolutely irrelevant to my business as a game app maker (I finally submitted a beta version to Apple on Thursday for TestFlight approval, and we'll submit our Android version to Google this week).

But I am interested in reasonable and balanced competition enforcement. While I

  • dislike the notion of EU Commission vice president Margrethe Vestager being in charge of both the EU's antitrust watchdog and digital industry policy (a result of precisely the kind of backroom horse trading the EU is notorious for),

  • believe some recent EU competition decisions against U.S. respondents lack merit (in one of those cases, the EU General Court recently agreed with me), and

  • have been criticizing the Commission's reluctance to take action against Nokia,

it's overly simplistic and sometimes just propagandistic to cry wolf over protectionism each and every time Mrs. Vestager and the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) investigate a U.S. company or fail to take action against a European industry player. It depends. Sometimes it's actually true, such as in the Nokia case, though the politician to blame for inaction in that context is EU fake news commissioner Thierry Breton. But there are cases in which it's not the real issue, and I see some initial indications of a strong case against the case against my non-friends at SAP.

Politico--to be clear, I'm not attacking that publication--reported on allegations (also found elsewhere) that Mrs. Vestager had a conflict of interest with respect to SAP. This is different from the situation in October 2019, when I actually disagreed with the focus and message of a Politico article on the automotive component-level standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing issues involving Nokia and, by short extension, Ericsson. A few weeks later I met Politico's Thibault Larger in Brussels and we understood each other's positions quite well; I also apologized should my post have appeared to insinuate anything improper or unreasonable on Politico's side.

At the heart of those complaints against SAP--one was lodged with the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) in 2018, and another with DG COMP--is some customers' disagreement with SAP's policy that it charges for how its software is used, which often involves third-party applications. The complainants--a group named VOICE including the likes of Siemens and Volkswagen--argue that the 2009 EU directive on the legal protection of computer programs (summary) protects interoperability to the extent that SAP couldn't do that. With my combined IP and antitrust background, I can't help but find that argument not only spurious but downright nonsensical.

What the directive in question actually refers to is the decompilation (a step that is typically at the beginning of a reverse-engineering effort) of program code. If a certain set of conditions are met, the right holder's ability to enforce copyright may be limited for interoperability's sake.

There's no such theory in Europe as copyright misuse, which is a very American concept. SAP is free to define the terms of its copyright licenses, even if those terms make whatever reference to third-party products--unless there's an antitrust violation, and the aforementioned directive explicitly says that it's not meant to restrict competition enforcement. At the same time, I can't find anything in that directive that would lower the hurdle for establishing an antitrust violation, contrary to what the complainants say.

They acknowledge that there are alternative Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) offerings by world-class vendors such as Microsoft (way bigger than SAP, not in the ERP market, but genrally speaking) and Oracle (whose relational database management system powers most SAP installations). But they argue there's a lock-in (it's too costly to switch), and that the others are just as bad. So what do they want to make? A collective-dominance case? It's not clear from what they say publicly.

About ten years ago, I raised concerns over many customers' lock-in into IBM's mainframe technology. But here, it does appear that there are successful migration case studies. All that the VOICE group alleges is that switching costs are so high "that no [chief information officer] would survive" such a decision. What's different from the IBM mainframe case (in which the EU, by the way, ultimately did nothing) is that SAP isn't really doing anything that would make it harder for Oracle or Microsoft to compete in the ERP market--at least I can't find any such allegations on VOICE's part.

Pollitico quotes anti-SAP blogger Shaun Snapp as saying that the general counsel of a typical SAP customer has "no clue" about the exact meaning of the terms of a software license agreement. I don't think antitrust law is meant to make up for the shortcomings of in-house legal departments.

Another argument from the same source comes down to making the exploitation of a lack of sophistication a violation of competition law: SAP offers combination discounts, and according to Mr. Snapp, the average SAP customer's "procurement team [which chooses the vendor] only cares about getting the price down."

I'd have to find out more about the complaints to be able to comment on market definition and the allegations of abusive conduct in more detail. But what they've made public so far is pathetic.

I do wish to stress that copyright is far narrower in scope than patents, so it's simply not like the way SAP factors the use of third-party products in when determining a license fee could in any way be compared to, say, SEP abuse by Nokia and its partners in crime. What Nokia does has very negative implications for automotive suppliers and their direct and indirect customers all the way down to consumers--and those who will likely suffer the most, though they're far smaller and therefore in a weaker position, are all those Internet of Things startups that face shakedown after shakedown from SEP holders. But that's because patents are broad, and a SEP doesn't even have to be broad: just by virtue of being essential to a standard, it can keep someone out of a market (if an injunction gets enforced).

I'm not saying that no one could ever violate the antitrust laws through copyright assertions, but it's like 1,000 or 10,000 times harder to do on that basis than with patents, especially with standard-essential patents, and the allegations those SAP customers make in public fall far short of persuading me that SAP needs to be investigated by the European Commission or the Federal Cartel Office of Germany. I may comment on this again on some other occasion.

In the automotive SEP licensing context, Mrs. Vestager need not feel any conflict of interests: on the bottom line, the digitization of Europe's economy would benefit from component-level licensing, not only with a view to the automotive sector but also considering IoT, so even if it had to happen over Mr. Breton's objection, the Commission should take action, which is overdue now that the fourth SEP injunction has come down against Daimler since mid-August. In the SAP (by coincidence, a difference of just one letter vs. "SEP") context, it appears to me that there simply may not be a case to begin with. Rejecting those complaints is probably just a reasonable application of competition law, as opposed to an inhibition to go after a "European champion."

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Saturday, May 10, 2014

In Java case, Federal Circuit just declined to hold massive body of creative stuff non-copyrightable

Within the context of the "smartphone IP wars", yesterday's appellate opinion in Oracle v. Google was spectacular. An unprecedented comeback. Oracle now has more legal leverage over Google than anyone else, such as Apple, has ever had, even at this stage, where things may still take a couple of years before an injunction issues (and, of course, there is some uncertainty remaining with "fair use", though the Federal Circuit made certain limits of that defense clear as well).

But "spectacular" doesn't mean "novel". Let's be clear about that. About two years ago I already wrote that "Oracle v. Google can't MAKE APIs copyrightable -- they HAVE BEEN for more than 20 years". In that post I referred to the Johnson Controls case, which the Federal Circuit also referenced several times in its decision.

This morning I read -- cursorily for the most part -- various comments, including reports on the decision by media that are usually nonjudgmental, and I felt that some people were living in a parallel universe. This includes some of the people who unjustly bashed me after the erroneous district court ruling in 2012 because they didn't realize I had been consistent on copyright in the interoperability context for a long time -- going back to 2004, in fact, in connection with Blizzard v. bnetd (a client-server DMCA case).

Now they can't bash me because I was simply right. So whom are they bashing? The Federal Circuit. They still believe Judge Alsup (whom I respect but nevertheless disagreed with on some issues, particularly copyrightability) got it right. There's all this glorification. Yes, based on what I read from him (his filings) and about him, I have no doubts that he's an interesting, in many ways impressive person. But that doesn't make him infallible. His position on copyrightability wasn't even original: he simply adopted everything Google's counsel told him. And now the Federal Circuit has agreed with Oracle on each copyrightability-related point.

One may dislike the fact that the Federal Circuit generally supports intellectual property protection, and maybe does to a greater extent than some other courts. That's OK. What's not OK is to vilify and disrespect that extremely competent court. The circuit judges deal with technical issues every day because their court hears all U.S. patent appeals from district court rulings. Day in and day out they rule on claim construction (interpreting patents), infringement and non-infringement theories, invalidity contentions (comparing patents to prior art). And the decision was reached unanimously by a panel of three judges -- not just one, such as in the district court. I wouldn't even want to claim that these judges are better than Judge Alsup because they serve on a higher court -- if Judge Alsup had been appointed to the Federal Circuit (which depends on many things besides someone's capabilities) and had served on it for a number of years, I have no doubt at all that he'd be a well-respected circuit judge by now. But it would be ridiculous to assume that circuit judges are inherently less smart than district judges.

Judge Alsup became extremely popular in tech media (as a side effect, most likely unintended) and activist circles by saying that he learned to program Java because of this case. I'm also a programmer (by the way, the U.S. patent application I filed this week includes roughly 100 pages, much more than the average patent application, of sample code I wrote in C#, which is very much like Java), so I, too, liked to hear that. But then he issued that erroneous non-copyrightability ruling, and when I read it, I must say with the greatest respect that it did not look to me like something written by a programmer (I'm not saying he didn't learn Java, just that the ruling didn't reflect the related knowledge). One key issue with it was that he conflated the freely-available Java programming language (commands/keywords) with the APIs. By contrast, the Federal Circuit showed how to get that part right. The circuit judges made a clear distinction in yesterday's decision between APIs that may arguably be needed to even implement the free programming language per se (maybe three of them, maybe a little more) and those that are not tantamount to programming language keywords. That is the degree of analytical precision and accuracy that I missed in the district court decision, and I found it in the Federal Circuit opinion. I, as a long-time programmer who wrote ten computer books while in high school, found nothing whatsoever in the Federal Circuit opinion that suggested a lack of understanding of software technologies. But all sorts of people out there now blame the Federal Circuit for not having understood the technical part. That is outrageous.

Let's now get to the real issue, which is the substance of the decision(s) at issue and not the competence of the decision-makers (which others chose to make a big issue in the public debate, without any factual support).

The next major fallacy on the part of those who criticize the appellate opinion is that they substitute their policy views for where the law (statutory law and applicable case law) stands. That's common. Software patent-eligibility is a context in which it's particularly extreme. Anybody with a modicum of knowledge and the ability to shut out ideology can see that U.S. statutory law on patent-eligibility is expansive and inclusive, so the only way to create restrictions is through new legislation. Nevertheless, one effort after the other (recently, CLS Bank) is made to persuade judges to legislate from the bench. And when judges provide minor clarifications that move the goal posts by a quarter of an inch, some people claim that they've been moved by a mile.

The Federal Circuit would have had to legislate from the bench to an extreme extent in order to concur with Google and its supporters. It declined to do what it's simply not supposed to do. It focused on its job, which is to interpret and apply the law as it stands. Isn't it absurd that people who have an important job to do and decide to do that job -- but refuse to do a job no one elected or appointed them for -- then get bashed? Maybe all three circuit judges should have said at the hearing that they learned Java for this case. No one could have proved the opposite, and some people might not criticize the circuit judges now. But they focus on their job. Not on PR stunts. Not on currying favor with activists. They deserve praise, not insults, for their focus on the real thing.

If the Federal Cicuit had affirmed the district court's non-copyrightability ruling in this case, it would have become the first appeals court in the U.S to hold a massive body of (highly) creative, original material not to be protected by copyright.

The people who say that this ruling makes new law are unable -- they don't even try -- to point to appellate decisions in the U.S. that held anything comparable to Java in both creativity and magnitude to be devoid of copyright protection.

Even before API copyrightability became an issue in Oracle v. Google (in the early stages of the dispute it was just known to the general public that the case involved a copyright infringement claim, but not what it related to other than one sample file Oracle provided relatively early on), I talked about it on this blog (in connection with Linux and other copyleft software, in early 2011), and I looked at a number of cases that are now mentioned in the Federal Circuit opinion and some additional ones that were addressed in various briefs and in the district court proceedings. There's no shortage of U.S. appellate case law that held some stuff non-copyrightable because obviously there were always some people who tried to expand the scope of copyrightability in unreasonable ways. But every single one of those non-copyrightability holdings by appellate courts relates to fact patterns that are easily distinguishable from the 7,000 lines of Java API declaring code that Google conceded was highly creative and that it also conceded it had literally copied. Yes, this is a real case of copying, unlike Apple v. Samsung II, where copying was just a red herring that Apple used, with very limited success in the end.

7,000 lines of concededly highly-creative material -- this involves a combination of a quantitative criterion and a qualitative one. You won't find that combination in any of those other cases except when -- and this is just about fair use, not copyrightability -- all that was allowed was intermediate copying (making a few copies for internal development purposes, such as reverse engineering).

There was Lotus v. Borland, about a spreadsheet menu structure that Google's counsel admitted (at the appellate hearing) was not comparable to the Java material because it was so much smaller and simpler. At any rate, the Supreme Court was divided over that one.

A long, long time ago there was Baker v. Selden, where someone wanted a book on an accounting method to result in a monopoly over that method. But owning copyright in a text is different from owning every application of what the text teaches.

In Feist v. Rural, it was made clear that "sweat of the brow" is not a criterion for copyrightability. A phone directory may take a lot of work to put together, but ultimately it's just real-world data -- not original stuff of the kind that Sun Microsystems' engineers created when they wrote those APIs.

In Sega v. Accolade, all that was allowed was a combination of intermediate copying for development purposes (unlike taking stuff and building it into a new product that is distributed, which is what Google did when it hijacked Java for Android) and the copying of 20-25 bytes of code that only served as an identification (like an internal password) that was necessary to make games run on a console. 20-25 bytes. Not 7,000 lines.

So you can find non-copyrightability holdings by U.S. appeals courts for

  • vast quantities of non-original stuff (telephone directories etc.),

  • tiny quantities of original stuff (20-25 bytes, for example), and

  • small quantities of low-creativity stuff (spreadsheet menu structure, and even that one was affirmed only by a divided Supreme Court).

Nothing like the Java APIs.

Both Sega and the subsequent Sony v. Connectix case -- fair use and not copyrightability cases -- did not establish an interoperability exception to copyrightablity, as the Federal Circuit clarified but Google's supporters still don't want to recognize. I already addressed that one two years ago. The problem with reading Sega (which Sony is based on) as holding anything related to compatibility to be non-copyrightable is that this is not even an obiter dictum. It's simply not stated at all unless one takes a few words out of context.

Unless we all want total chaos, there must be a reasonable standard for what is res judicata, an issue that a court actually decided. The standard for what is an obiter dictum (something mentioned beyond the actual decision but expressing an opinion) is lower, but the "interoperability exception" thing does not even meet a reasonable dictum standard if you and I agree that even something that someone claims was said incidentally in a decision must at least be said with a minimum degree of clarity and specificity.

In Sega, interoperability was considered a laudable goal. Yes, it is. That fact weighs in favor of fair use. In that case, it did. Rightly so. So if you only do a few intermediate copies for yourself and you copy 20-25 bytes (a mere identifier), and that's what it takes to bring more games to consumers for a platform they've purchased, that may be fine. In that case, it was. Rightly so. But the Ninth Circuit (the West Coast circuit) didn't say that anything relating to compatibility -- which would require some very complex line-drawing if it was the law (which it is not) -- is by definition non-copyrightable. Every piece of software (including Java, as Oracle never disputed) involves ideas and functionality of the non-copyrightable (perhaps patentable, but not copyrightable) kind. §102(b) of U.S. copyright law ensures that copyright protection does not extend to those ideas and functions, but the expression is protected. So the Ninth Circuit said that Sega's software involved such higher-level ideas and functions, it can't protect those with copyright, and it's fair use to make a few internal copies to research that non-copyrighted functionality, and the justification for research is (in this particular case) that interoperability is a laudable goal. It didn't refer to what kind of code it is: object code, source code; instructions or declarations; textual or binary. Undoubtedly, Sega's software, like anyone else's software including Oracle's software, embodies concepts that fall under §102(b). But it's not even a dictum, much less res judicata, without a minimum of specificity. If one doesn't specify what §102(b) relates to, then the broadest interpretation would simply deprive all software of copyright protection, which without a doubt none of the Ninth Circuit judges intended.

So there is neither any applicable case law in the U.S. that holds a Java API-like combination of quantity and quality (originality/creativity) of material non-copyrightable nor is there an interoperability exception to copyrightability in the Ninth Circuit.

The full Federal Circuit (a petition for an en banc review is a given) or the Supreme Court couldn't and wouldn't create such an exception either. Google and others who want this have to talk to Congress. They don't even seem to try this, presumably because they know it won't happen since the software industry is overwhelmingly on Oracle's side.

Then don't blame the Federal Circuit for doing its job. The Federal Circuit opinion is extremely well-reasoned and, as I said, reflects an accurate understanding of how programming languages and APIs work. Unfortunately, many of those who have commented on it and will comment on it going forward may not even have read it in the first place. They just don't like the result.

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Tuesday, June 4, 2013

Google lobbying front grossly overstates economic weight behind brief in Oracle Android/Java case

I've now located the fifth and last amicus curiae brief supporting Google against Oracle's Android/Java copyright appeal. The Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA) has published its submission to the Federal Circuit on the organization's website.

Last week I already said this about the CCIA's allegiance to Google:

Google is a driving force behind the CCIA. It has various other members, but there is no other member that the CCIA would have supported as consistently and aggressively in a variety of IP contexts in recent years as Google.

The CCIA's brief mentions refers to its decades of allegedly promoting interoperability. It is true that, like the EFF, it has done some pro-interoperability work. But just like Google and the equally Google-funded EFF, the CCIA also fails the litmus test for genuine and consistent advocates of interoperability: it doesn't fight against FRAND abuse. In a submission to the FTC, the CCIA warns that enforcement of FRAND licensing pledges could "diminish incentives to standard setting". Interestingly, the notion that affirmance of District Judge Alsup's denial of copyrightability to 7,000+ lines of declaring Java API code could "diminish incentives" to create and promote such platforms does not cross the CCIA's mind. In its FRAND-related submissions (also including one to the FTC and the DoJ) it conflates standard-essential patent (SEP) with non-SEP issues, which is a key part of Google's strategy that has failed all the way so far. True promoters of interoperability would never deny that SEPs raise issues that non-SEPs don't (even though some issues are relevant to all patents), and wouldn't discourage antitrust enforcement in this context and oppose implementer-friendly FRAND interpretations -- and, in particular, wouldn't suggest that it's fine to let SEP users renege on FRAND licensing pledges in order to give them leverage so they'll get away with infringement of non-SEPs. Simply put, the CCIA is all for IP when it's Google's IP, and all for infringement when Google infringes.

The first sentence describes the CCIA, but misleadingly blows out of proportion the economic weight behind its brief:

"The Computer & Communications Industry Association ('CCIA') represents over twenty companies of all sizes providing high technology products and services, including computer hardware and software, electronic commerce, telecommunications, and Internet products and services -- companies that collectively generate more than $250 billion in annual revenues."

It mentions Oracle and Sun's former membership (2011) and links to its list of members. Once you look that one up and think things through, the CCIA is suddenly only half as big as it claims. This is an amicus curiae brief -- Google as a party doesn't count. At the current run rate, Google's annual revenues are $56 billion. Microsoft is also a member of BSA | The Software Alliance and filed a pro-Oracle brief in its own name. Microsoft (annual revenues of $80 billion at current run rate) therefore has to be subtracted from the CCIA's list of members as far as this brief is concerned. Once you exclude Microsoft and Google, the potential amici represented by CCIA are smaller in revenues than Apple alone, which through BSA supports Oracle.

Oracle has clearly received far more powerful and meaningful support from amici than Google. Greater economic weight. Greater diversity. Greater independence (Oracle's amici include some of its competitors, such as IBM and Microsoft). At least four of the five, if not all five, pro-Google amicus briefs involve organizations and individuals paid by Google. While Oracle is supported even by archrivals, Google largely relies on its funded friends and their mobilization efforts.

I'm also underwhelmed by the content of the pro-Google briefs. They're all (which doesn't surprise in light of obvious orchestration) consistent in their interoperability-centric anti-copyrightability stance. Only the Application Developers Alliance at least raises an argument against resolving interoperability through "fair use" (though that argument comes down to fear of frivolous litigation, and the Alliance doesn't properly consider antitrust). I'm not saying that it's 100% certain the Federal Circuit will reject this theory of an interoperability-copyrightability dichotomy -- of course we all have to see what comes out of this. But if the circuit judges ask at the appellate hearing, whenever it will be held, whether interoperability can't also be ensured through fair use and, if all else fails, antitrust law, then Google and most of its amici will have to make an argument at the hearing that they didn't raise in their briefs -- and if the Federal Circuit deems "fair use" and FRAND the more appropriate and flexible tools for ensuring interoperability, then Oracle will be in great shape.

The CCIA's brief focuses on the international landscape, such as a ruling by the Court of Justice of the EU and various free trade agreements. I couldn't find any example in there of a problem that U.S. copyright law, with its robust "fair use" exception, can't solve unless copyrightablity is denied even to expressive and original creations. In fact, the CCIA's brief mentions the possibility of a fair-use-based solution all the time. Here are a couple of examples:

"Since this Court's 1992 decision in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), however, no less than five U.S. courts have permitted reproduction during the course of software reverse engineering under the fair use doctrine."

"The Legislative Council decided to broaden Hong Kong's fair dealing provision to more closely resemble the fair use provision of the U.S. Copyright Act."

Has the CCIA given up on non-copyrightability and is trying to at least support Google on the "fair use" side as a fallback position? Or does it want both non-copyrightability and the "fair use" exception to safeguard interoperability, though one such tool would be enough? Maybe this will become clearer at the appellate hearing.

But before we get there, Oracle will file a reply brief to Google's opening brief and the amicus curiae briefs, and since this is a cross-appeal, Google will also get to file a final reply on some minor issues.

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Monday, June 3, 2013

Google-supporting IP professors feel Oracle interprets the scope of copyrightability too broadly

For an appeal that Linus Torvalds thought was a waste of money by Oracle, the Android-Java copyright case has actually drawn a whole lot of interest, and the effort that Google, its funded friends and its few other supporters put into this shows that the outcome is far from the foregone conclusion that some people suggested a year ago.

There's another amicus curiae brief that I didn't list in my Friday post on the filings made last Thursday. It was filed by a group of intellectual property professors and uploaded to SSRN by Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) Vice Chairwoman Professor Pamela Samuelson. This suggests that she leads this group, so this may be the third (!) amicus curiae brief to have been orchestrated by the Google-funded and Google-loyal EFF. But I recognize that not all of the signatories are EFF activists or as Google aligned as, for example, Professor Mark Lemley, who supports Google's baseball extortion proposal to resolve FRAND disputes. In particular, I noted that New York University Professor Katherine Strandburg, who does support Judge Posner's FRAND ruling, is among the amici. That's a good sign, really.

The professors' brief has three sections. The first two sections seek to argue that the scope of copyrightable program code is allegedly narrower than Oracle claims. The third one talks about constraints on the design choices of subsequent programmers. I've compared the content of this brief to the three potential attack vectors against Google's position that I identified last week. My first concern was that interoperability is more of a "fair use" than copyrightability argument. I've since credited the Application Developers Alliance for at least trying to explain why "fair use" would not be the appropriate tool. In this regard, the brief of the App Dev Alliance also has a unique advantage over the one submitted by these professors, who only mention "fair use" in contexts in which they cite cases that support interoperability through fair use (which relates to, and supports, the third point I had made about Google's argument). The extent to which the professors, like Google and its other amici, try to conflate copyrightability and "fair use" considerations is best demonstrated by the following two consecutive sentences:

"[T]he interface procedures were unprotected aspects of the Sega program under § 102(b). [...] Nor did it undercut Accolade's defense that Sega had a licensing program for Genesis-compatible videogames in which Accolade declined to participate."

No one would ever argue that the existence of a licensing program is relevant to copyrightability. (You can only license what's copyrighted, but by offering a license you don't satisfy copyrightability criteria.) It's a "fair use" argument. But the professors say this right after citing to copyrightability law.

The unique part of the professors' brief, however, is its third section, which relates to my second point: large parts of Google's argument become irrelevant if the question of what constrained Google's design choices (after it made the fundamental decision to arbitrarily co-opt parts of the Java APIs, but anyway) is separated from what constrained the choices of Sun's programmers who created Java, and if the latter determines copyrightability, while the former may have a bearing on "fair use" (or FRAND, if antitrust were an issue, which it isn't because FRAND as well as GPL-based licenses are available and Google declined both). I will, therefore, focus in this post on the unique focus of the professors' brief, but before this I'll say only a few things about the narrow-scope argument.

Allegedly narrow scope of copyrightable program code

If Oracle were asserting against Google its copyrights in a book on object-oriented programming and claimed infringement by using and/or teaching OOP techniques described in that book, then Baker v. Selden would already have given the answer in the 19th century, and that answer would indeed favor Google. But the use of 7,000+ lines of declaring code from the asserted Java APIs is, in my opinion, far more on the "expression" than "idea" side of things.

I, too, would have a problem with the scope of software copyright if it became so broad that developers might infringe it inadvertently, or that they couldn't work around what it protects. I'm not afraid that I'd inadvertently write 7,000 lines of declaring code the same way someone else did, and/or to independently come up (or to be forced to come up) with the structure, sequence and organization of such a body of work.

Every software copyrightability case is about where to draw the line between function and expression. But no one can deny that the purpose of copyright is to protect originality, and if the structure, sequence and organization of 7,000+ lines of highly creative declaring code ended up being unprotectable, I believe copyright would fail to serve its stated purpose.

With all the legal argument about what different statutes and decisions say, the professors don't give even one example of a case in which a similarly complex body of original, highly creative code was denied copyrightability. There are "fair use" cases in which you could either copy small amounts of code or just make copies for your own development/testing purposes; there are cases in which non-original, preexisting data like the content of telephone directories was denied copyrightability despite being huge ("sweat of the brow" is not a substitute for creativity); but no U.S. court, before Judge Alsup's decision in question, found something like those 37 Java APIs uncopyrightable. If this ruling is affirmed, it's a game changer; but if it's reversed, then it just means that a new level of non-copyrightability is not reached.

The professors' brief does not address the second one of the two "axioms" Oracle's opening brief stated:

The Copyright Act's threshold for copyright protection is very low. Any "creative spark" counts, "no matter how crude [or] humble." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This is a Supreme Court decision that is central to Oracle's argument, and the professors' brief doesn't mention it even once -- maybe because it's inconvenient.

Constraints on design choices of subsequent programmers

The headline of the third section sums up this claim:

When a Computer Program Interface Constrains the Design Choices of Subsequent Programmers, the Merger Doctrine Precludes Copyright Protection for that Interface Design.

What's key here is the word "subsequent". Java's programmers were subsequent to other programmers, and Android's programmers were subsequent to Java's. What's not in dispute is that Oracle can't claim copyright in what was dictated at the time Java was created; what it disputes is that constraints on Android's developers, after they chose to copy some Java APIs, determine copyrightability.

The professors' related argument is built on top of Computer Associates v. Altai:

Altai established, and other courts later followed, the rule that external factors such as the 'compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is designed to operate' limit the scope of copyright in programs because these factors constrain the freedom of design choices of subsequent programmers. Altai, 982 F.2d at 709-10.

Again, there's the word "subsequent". But that word does not appear in Altai anywhere near the concept of "freedom of choice" (only in completely different contexts). Let's look at the freedom-of-choice sentence in Altai (and the previous sentence):

"Professor Nimmer points out that 'in many instances it is virtually impossible to write a program to perform particular functions in a specific computing environment without employing standard techniques.' [...] This is a result of the fact that a programmer's freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is designated to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers' design standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry."

I honestly can't interpret that part as implying the word "subsequent" in the way in which Google's amici interpret it. All five items listed in that sentence undoubtedly make sense for constraints that affected both parties, CA and Altai.

Where Altai filters out elements dictated by external factors, it says this:

"The district court also found that the overlap exhibited between the list of services required for both ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5 was 'determinated by the demands of the operating system and of the applications program to which it [was] to be linked through ADAPTER or OSCAR.' Id. In other words, this aspect of the program's structure was dictated by the nature of other programs with which it was designed to interact and, thus, is not protected by copyright."

So there was a third program here -- the operating system -- and dictated elements that both programs, the allegedly-infringing and the allegedly-infringed one, needed. It doesn't say that the asserted works dictated anything to the alleged infringers.

I know this isn't legal authority, but interestingly, the Wikipedia article on this ruling understands it this way, too:

"The court found that the similarity in services required by the operating system was due to the nature of the operating system, thus it was not protected by copyright."

Copyright, by definition, protects an original creator against subsequent copying. It doesn't help you against your predecessors. It wouldn't make sense to me if a copyist could get too much mileage out of the mere fact of being subsequent. And I don't think that that's what Altai meant.

There are IP professors supporting both parties' positions. Software companies and creatives are overwhelmingly in favor of Oracle's position. The Federal Circuit will think about what's the best policy to balance innovation and competition, and it will interpret such cases as Altai, so further down the road we'll know which professors are right in the Federal Circuit's opinion.

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Saturday, June 1, 2013

EFF's amicus briefs in Oracle v. Google suggest non-copyrightability is only path to interoperability

Many roads lead to Rome, but if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. I'm sure you've heard these two proverbs before, but the authors and signatories of two EFF-orchestrated amicus curiae briefs supporting Google against Oracle's Android-Java copyright appeal did not bear them in mind when making their submissions to the Federal Circuit, proposing to throw out the baby with the bath water by denying copyrightability to some of the most creative and expressive elements of computer programs for the sake of (whatever they mean by) interoperability.

In my previous post I explained that Google and the EFF's advocacy of "interoperability" is anything but principled, and that Android is not interoperable with Java by any stretch of the imagination. But for the purposes of this present post I'm going to forget about Android's incompatibility with Java and focus on the question of how to ensure true interoperability while affording software creations a reasonable degree of intellectual property protection.

In most cases software copyright isn't an obstacle to interoperability because the creators of application programming interfaces (APIs) frequently have an interest in the adoption of their creations. Self-regulation works, and it actually is possible to do clean-room implementations of the Java APIs, subject to reasonable terms and conditions that Google didn't want to accept. But every now and then there could be a problem with a right holder wielding copyright in an effort to prevent interoperability, just like there are standard-essential patent (SEP) owners, like Google, who pursue injunctions. What do we do then?

If true interoperability is at stake, the "fair use" exception might work. The EFF's "Start-ups" brief mentions "fair use" only twice, in the same paragraph, in an effort to portray "fair use" cases (Sony, Sega) as non-copyrightability decisions. Its "Scientists" brief doesn't mention it even once.

Even if "fair use" failed in a particular case to ensure interoperability (for example, it's specific to copyright and doesn't apply to patents), there would always be antitrust law as a last resort in order to obtain a compulsory license on FRAND terms. The EFF's "Start-ups" brief doesn't mention "antitrust" or "competition law" at all. Its "Scientists" brief refers to it only once, in connection with UNIX, but fails to address it otherwise, even in connection with IBM's conduct in the mainframe business and the effect it had on its PC-related strategies.

Both briefs presuppose that there is only one tool: copyrightability. But besides the non-copyrightability hammer, there are those other tools I just discussed. All it takes the appeals court to disagree with Google's lawyers' and amigos' anti-copyrightability argument is to agree with Google's in-house copyright counsel William Paltry, who advocated that the "appropriate balance" can best be struck with the help of "fair use" and other tools. The whole notion of an interoperability-copyrightability conflict goes away once there is a determination that interoperability is irrelevant to copyrightability and better resolved with the help of more flexible and use-specific tools. Copyrightability should be consistent from the moment of creation, just like patent offices don't reject applications that could result in standard-essential patents because of their subject matter (and patent law doesn't even have the "fair use" tool). Addressing protection first, access later means that creators don't become the victims of their own creations' success, while still being able to take market power and "expectations" into consideration, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, when someone wants to use someone else's creation. But some people want the Federal Circuit to destroy intellectual property with a hammer only to deprive itself and all other courts in the United States of the opportunity to decide on interoperability based on what happens to an API after its creation and on what a defendant wants to do with it and to it.

The EFF's submissions are, of course, consistent with Google's appellate brief, which even argued that intellectual property protection can be lost over time, mentioning Aspirin as one example. Not only are trademarks, contrary to copyright, a totally use-dependent intellectual property right but Google's lawyers omit a historic fact. A couple of readers contacted me on Twitter shortly after the post I just linked to and noted that Bayer lost trademark protection for Aspirin because it had to give up certain rights under the Treaty of Versailles (after World War I). The most diplomatic term for this is expropriation.

I'm now going to explain why there are (at least) two EFF amicus briefs, not just one, and then I'll quote some passages from those briefs and comment on them.

Two EFF amicus curiae briefs: one submitted in the name of "Computer Scientists", the other in the name of "Innovators, Start-ups, and Investors"

On Thursday the EFF issued a press release on the first of its amicus briefs in this case, which the EFF submitted as counsel to a group named "Computer Scientists". The EFF also published this brief. I have the greatest respect for these amici, which the EFF listed on its website with short bios, and for the EFF attorneys representing them. But for the reasons I explained in a previous post, all those Google-supporting amici (the ones on that list and all others) fail to counterbalance the economic weight of those supporting Oracle, and the EFF used FUD to mobilize people and companies for its cause. It says something that most amici only signed up as private persons because they couldn't get their current or former employers to support Google on this one.

The second EFF-orchestrated brief, published near-simultaneously on academic document site SSRN, is positioned as a submission by "Software Innovators, Start-ups, and Investors" and was filed by the Law, Technology, and Public Policy Clinic of the EFF's Vice Chairwoman of the Board, Professor Pamela Samuelson. On its website the Samuelson Clinic lists the EFF as its first client. One of the Computer Scientists' counsel is Professor Jason Schultz, who coauthored the Defensive Patent License with his colleague, Assistant Professor Jennifer Urban. Professor Schultz also was an Assistant Professor at the Samuelson Clinic while the DPL was originally conceived. The "Software Innovators, Start-ups, and Investors" include two former EFF leaders -- co-founder Mitch Kapor and former Chairwoman of the Board (1991-1998; the EFF was founded in 1990) Esther Dyson -- and Esther Dyson's EDventure Holdings. (The "Computer Scientists" also include several EFF board members: John Perry Barlow, Brian Behlendorf, David Farber).

Far be it from me to be disrespectful of Professor Samuelson and her staff. And I'm not accusing the EFF of circumventing any filing limitations or of finding ways to get more speaking time at the appellate hearing. I just want to shed light on the fact that support for Google is not nearly as broadbased as the EFF would have us believe. This effort is orchestrated, not organic.

Oracle's amici represent, among other things, a substantial percentage of software R&D, and include some of Oracle's fiercest competitors, while Google has not gathered support from any of its rivals.

The signatories of the EFF's briefs don't have a comparably high share among computer scientists, software innovators, start-ups, and investors as Oracle's corporate amici have in the overall software market. For example, there are only two venture funds among the investors the EFF mobilized: Foundry Group and Union Square Ventures. Those aren't California-based, which is where most of the venture capital action in the U.S. is (Sand Hill Road). They're also great, but only two, and about 90% of the anti-software-patent commentary that you'll find in the media (including social media) from venture investors comes from partners of these funds (Brad Feld and Fred Wilson), who are apparently more anti-IP than I thought (and than they probably are, but it appears to be easy to mobilize them for this kind of agenda).

The two EFF briefs are the only ones to have been published so far.

Commentary on select passages from the EFF briefs

The EFF's "Computer Scientists" brief talks a lot about the IBM PC and its BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) as an example of an open API and speculates that "IBM enforced copyright on the BIOS source code and would certainly have used copyright to control reimplementations of the BIOS API if the law allowed". But there's a much better explanation for IBM's decision. From the 1950s on (and even at the beginning of this decade) IBM had antitrust problems with its mainframe monopoly. While mainframes are mentioned in that same brief as one of various industries allegedly made innovative and competitive by "[t]he freedom to reimplement and extend existing APIs", and an AT&T consent decree is mentioned in connection with UNIX, the 1956 IBM Consent Decree is omitted. It's no less famous than the AT&T one, but less supportive of the EFF's argument. It shows that interoperability can be achieved by antitrust means. And when IBM created the PC, it had learned its lesson well and tried to steer clear of running into the same problems again in the next computing market. So it allowed the creation of IBM PC compatibles -- basically, in order to obviate the need for another consent decree.

One of the "Computer Scientists" is Andrew Tridgell, who created Samba, which the brief also discusses. Again, the antitrust approach worked, and Microsoft was required by the European Commission to offer a FRAND license to all relevant intellectual property (patents, copyright, whatever). The EFF already made a Samba-based anti-copyrightability argument last year, but it fails to explain why non-copyrightability is the answer (and "fair use" and FRAND are not).

Some of the EFF's examples are protocols that are far simpler than the Java APIs in question. For example, HTTP or the menu structure at issue in the Lotus case. I'm not saying that there's no copyright in simpler things than the Java APIs, but there's definitely a stronger case for non-copyrightability in cases like HTTP or a spreadsheet menu than in the Java case.

The EFF's briefs also suggest that software is cheaper if APIs aren't copyrightable. For example, the EFF gives an example of how NASA allegedly saved money because it was able to continue to use some old manufacturing robots even though the relevant APIs were "orphan works" ("The freedom to reimplement APIs also helps rescue 'orphan' software or data—systems whose creators have either gone out of business or abandoned their product in the marketplace."). The EFF then links this to budget cuts and the latest sequester. This "logic" runs counter to the positions taken very recently by the Federal Circuit's Chief Judge Rader in a snowplow patent case: "While the general public certainly enjoys lower prices, cheap copies of patented inventions have the effect of inhibiting innovation and incentive. This detrimental effect, coupled with the public’s general interest in the judicial protection of property rights in inventive technology, outweighs any interest the public has in purchasing cheaper infringing products. In sum, the public has a greater interest in acquiring new technology through the protections provided by the Patent Act than it has in buying 'cheaper knock-offs.'"

The EFF's "Innovators, Start-ups, and Investors" brief says a lot of things about the value of interoperability that I wholeheartedly agree with, beginning with the first paragraph:

"Interoperability between programs and systems is key to software innovation. It allows systems to connect and individuals to apply knowledge and skills from one environment to another. By easing the way for software developers to build upon existing platforms, interoperability allows efficient software ecosystems to grow, fueling the development of innovative new products and services and increasing competition to the benefit of consumers."

It's also true that "[c]loud services rely heavily on interoperability--and specifically on APIs--to work". But neither EFF brief explains why the denial of copyrightability is the only way to ensure interoperability. There's some talk about legal certainty, but if "fair use" was too uncertain to be useful, it wouldn't be as important as it is. FRAND is also given more and more meaning by courts (despite Google's efforts to derail or delay some of the related processes).

What I strongly dislike about the "Innovators, Start-ups, and Investors" brief are various references to the "use" of APIs. That's not at issue in this case. Oracle is happy to let anyone "use" the Java APIs to write Java apps.

The other key point I want to criticize about it is the lack of balance when it comes to the interests of start-ups in connection with intellectual property protection. Professor Samuelson herself has conducted studies such as the Berkeley Patent Survey that show, for example, that start-ups with patents are more likely to be funded by venture capitalists. It's simply wrong -- and inconsistent with the Samuelson Clinic's findings in other contexts -- to suggest that weaker IP, merely by lowering entrance barriers in some areas, is the perfect environment for startups to flourish. If every incumbent could force a startup out of the market by disallowing any use of APIs, there would be a problem, but that's not what would result from a reversal of the district court's non-copyrightability decision. There's another way to look at it: if even Oracle couldn't prevent Google from hijacking Java, what would a startup do if Google decided to supplant its products or services? IP is quite often needed to give startups leverage against incumbents.

The right balance must be struck, and in my opinion Google and the EFF's positions are too far on the anti-IP side. That's why I can't support them, though I support the cause of interoperability (more consistently than they do).

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Google and EFF have credibility deficit in 'interoperability' context, try to redefine the term

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important role in democracy. While corporations have interests, activists are loyal to a cause regardless of whom it benefits. Even if I disagree with an NGO's positions and objectives (for example, because it demands too much of a good thing), I can still respect or even admire the idealism with which activists pursue a given cause, if they are indeed loyal to it. But I have no respect for those who under the guise of grassroots activism advance, instead of a noble cause, corporate interests, regardless of whether they do so for financial gain or due to ideological bias (or both). When this happens, they become dishonest and use double standards. And when I say "they", this rarely includes well-meaning members and external supporters but is usually limited to the leadership of such organizations.

There's a certain, transparent pattern. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) intermittently criticizes Google in contexts in which it's only about "end users v. Google" (1, 2), but never takes action against Google when it's about "Google v. other corporations", with other companies than Google promoting the interests of end users. Google knows that the EFF will give inconsequential lip service to its defense of digital liberties in fields in which Google doesn't face more resistence than a few screaming activists who can't force it to change any of its practices, but wherever Google has conflicts with its peers and could actually be forced by regulators or courts to do the right things, it knows that it can count on the EFF's support or, at a minimum, its deafening silence. Always.

I attribute this pattern of non-principled behavior to the combination of two factors. On the one hand, both organizations are anti-IP. On the other hand, Google has generously rewarded the EFF for its loyalty on the important issues.

Google and the EFF's claim to defend "interoperability" in connection with the Android/Java copyright case is the height of hypocrisy. First, Android isn't interoperable with Java, as Android co-founder Rich Miner admitted (click on the image to enlarge or read the text below the image):

"Q48. Does Android support existing Java apps?

A. No.

Q49. Is Android Java compatible?

A. No."

Nuff said.

Second, antitrust regulators and courts have had (and still have) to intervene against Google's (Motorola's) assault on interoperability by reneging on FRAND licensing (and even on reciprocal-licensing) commitments relating to patents declared essential to telecommunications and video standard, attempting to hold end users hostage by threatening to disconnect many millions of users from cellular networks and to prevent them from watching video material they or their friends had purchased or recorded. In the U.S., the FTC found Google's (Motorola's) conduct anticompetitive and stressed that this hurts consumers, and the European Commission recently issued a Statement of Objections (SO), a preliminary antitrust ruling, for the same reasons. Policy makers (Senators, Congressmen) and industry associations including an organization of retailers (who sell everybody's products) expressed profound concern over this outrageous conduct on multiple occasions -- but the EFF did not submit a single amicus curiae brief or position paper to contribute to the pressure others put on Google.

Just like Google has reneged on FRAND licensing and grant-back commitments, the EFF has reneged in this highly important context on its mission of "defending your rights in the digital world". I regret that I have to say so, but someone has to call them out for it.

I've run Google searches on the EFF's website with terms like "FRAND", "RAND", and "standard-essential patents". I found only one statement that the EFF itself made (as opposed to court filings or other official documents it nonjudgmentally republished). About a year ago, the EFF argued that Judge Posner's two-way Apple v. Motorola ruling was evidence of a broken patent system and said about Judge Posner's denial of injunctive relief over FRAND-pledged SEPs that it's "glad to see Judge Posner reaffirm this important principle" (that injunctions aren't granted over such patents). That's all there is. (They also used a regulatory statement on FRAND as an argument in a non-FRAND case, but that's just opportunistic behavior and doesn't promote FRAND.)

But where is the EFF now that the FRAND part of Judge Posner's ruling is being appealed by Google? The Posner appeal has prompted a similar number of amicus curiae briefs as Oracle v. Google. The EFF is silent. It will speak out against Google where it doesn't matter, but where Google has a dispute with Apple and a similar one with Microsoft, the EFF doesn't care about "your rights in the digital world".

If you look for true defenders and promoters of interoperability, you can't count on the EFF. You have to look elsewhere. Your rights in the digital world are actually being defended vigorously by Oracle's lead counsel in the Google copyright appeal, Orrick's Joshua Rosenkranz, who is also fighting -- against Google -- for affirmance of Judge Posner's FRAND ruling. Oracle, as a member of BSA | The Software Alliance, also supports this noble cause. Microsoft's landmark FRAND case against Google's Motorola in the Western District of Washington has helped shape the law in consumer-friendly ways. But the EFF won't support any other company against Google, no matter how noble and important the cause is. That's where it draws the line -- and that is not a principled stance on interoperability.

The EFF has orchestrated at least two of the four amicus curiae briefs that were submitted on Thursday in support of Google against Oracle's copyright appeal. These are also the only two pro-Google amicus briefs to have been published so far, and I will discuss their content (and the substance in them that I was hard-pressed to find) in a subsequent post. Before doing so, I wanted to draw more attention to Google and the EFF's insurmountable credibility problem in connection with interoperability. If Java apps don't run on Android, they have the chutzpah to call this state of affairs "interoperability". But if Google seeks sales and import bans over H.264, the format in which most of the world's digital video material is stored, or cellular standards like GPRS and 3G (UMTS), or WiFi (WLAN), everything's fine. I mean: fine with them. Not with me.

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