[B! dns] cu39ã®ãƒ–ãƒƒã‚¯ãƒžãƒ¼ã‚¯

cu39 id:cu39

dnsã«é–¢ã™ã‚‹cu39ã®ãƒ–ãƒƒã‚¯ãƒžãƒ¼ã‚¯ (47)

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DNSã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ æ§‹ç¯‰ å…¥é–€ç·¨ - RAKUS Developers Blog | ãƒ©ã‚¯ã‚¹ ã‚¨ãƒ³ã‚¸ãƒ‹ã‚¢ãƒ–ãƒã‚°
ã¯ã˜ã‚ã« åˆã‚ã¾ã—ã¦ã“ã‚“ã«ã¡ã¯ï¼matsutairaã§ã™ï¼ ä»Šå›žã¯ã€æ™®æ®µä½•æ°—ãªãåˆ©ç”¨ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹DNSã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ã¨ã„ã†ã‚‚ã®ã«ãƒ•ã‚©ãƒ¼ã‚«ã‚¹ã—ã€å®Ÿéš›ã«Webã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ãƒ»DNSã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ã®æ§‹ç¯‰ã‚’é€šã—ã¦DNSã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ã¨ã¯ä½•ãªã®ã‹ã‚’ã–ã£ãã‚Šå¦ã¹ã‚‹å†…å®¹ã¨ãªã£ã¦ãŠã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚ã€ŒDNSã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ã£ã¦ã©ã‚“ãªã‚‚ã®ï¼Ÿã€ã€Œè‡ªåˆ†ã§DNSã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ã‚’æ§‹ç¯‰ã—ã¦ã¿ãŸã„ï¼ã€ã¨ã„ã†æ–¹ã€…ã®åŠ›ã«ãªã‚Œã‚Œã°ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ ä»Šå›žã¯åˆã‚ã¦è§¦ã‚‹æ–¹å‘ã‘ã®å†…å®¹ã«ãªã£ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã®ã§ã€ã€ŒDNSã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ã®æ§‹ç¯‰æ–¹æ³•ã ã‘çŸ¥ã‚ŠãŸã„ï¼ã€ã¨ã„ã†æ–¹ã¯ç›®æ¬¡ã‹ã‚‰ã‚¸ãƒ£ãƒ³ãƒ—ã—ã¦ã„ãŸã ã‘ã‚Œã°ã¨æ€ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ æ‰‹é †ã®å¤§ã¾ã‹ãªæµã‚Œã¨ã—ã¦ã¯ã€ã€Œãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³å–å¾—ã€ â†’ ã€Œå„ç¨®ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼æ§‹ç¯‰ã€ â†’ ã€Œå‹•ä½œç¢ºèªã€ã§ã™ã€‚ ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³ã®å–å¾—ã¯é€šå¸¸ãã‚Œãªã‚Šã®ã‚³ã‚¹ãƒˆãŒã‹ã‹ã‚Šã¾ã™ãŒã€ãŠåå‰ãƒ‰ãƒƒãƒˆã‚³ãƒ ã§ã‚ã‚Œã°åˆå›ž1å¹´é–“ã¯1å††ã§åˆ©ç”¨ã™ã‚‹ã“ã¨ãŒã§ãã‚‹ã€Œ.workã€ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³ãŒã‚ã‚‹ãŸã‚ã€æœ€å°é™ã®ã‚³ã‚¹ãƒˆã«æŠ‘ãˆã‚‹ã“ã¨ãŒã§ãã¾ã™ã€‚ã¾ãŸã€ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤
cu39 2020/12/25
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admin

dns

learn
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Introducing 1.1.1.1 for Families
This post is also available in ç®€ä½“ä¸æ–‡, æ—¥æœ¬èªž, Deutsch and FranÃ§ais. Two years ago today we announced 1.1.1.1, a secure, fast, privacy-first DNS resolver free for anyone to use. In those two years, 1.1.1.1 has grown beyond our wildest imagination. Today, we process more than 200 billion DNS requests per day making us the second largest public DNS resolver in the world behind only Google. Yesterday, we
cu39 2020/04/02
"Two Flavors: 1.1.1.2 (No Malware) & 1.1.1.3 (No Malware or Adult Content)"

admin

dns
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
Stop using ridiculously low DNS TTLs | Frank DENIS random thoughts.
DNS latency is a key component to having a good online experience. And in order to minimize DNS latency, carefully picking DNS servers and anonymization relays play an important role. But the best way to minimize latency is to avoid sending useless queries to start with. Which is why DNS was designed since day one to be a heavily cacheable protocol. Individual records have a time-to-live, original
cu39 2019/11/04
admin

dns
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
3.0.0.0/8ãŒAmazonã«:Geekãªãºãƒ¼ã˜
3.0.0.0/8ãŒAmazonã«å‰²ã‚Šå½“ã¦ã•ã‚ŒãŸIPv4ã‚¢ãƒ‰ãƒ¬ã‚¹ã«å¤‰ã‚ã£ã¦ã„ã¾ã™(via Hacker News)ã€‚ è¡¨é¢çš„ã«è¦‹ãˆã¦ã„ã‚‹ã®ã¯ã€IPv4ã‚¢ãƒ‰ãƒ¬ã‚¹ã®ç§»è»¢ã§ã™ãŒã€æã‚‰ãã€IPv4ã‚¢ãƒ‰ãƒ¬ã‚¹å£²è²·ã«ã‚ˆã£ã¦Amazonã¸ã¨ç™»éŒ²ãŒç§»è»¢ã•ã‚ŒãŸã‚‚ã®ã ã¨æ€ã‚ã‚Œã¾ã™ã€‚ ã“ã®IPv4ã‚¢ãƒ‰ãƒ¬ã‚¹ç§»è»¢ã«ã‚ˆã‚Šã€Amazonã¯IPv4ã‚¢ãƒ‰ãƒ¬ã‚¹ç©ºé–“å…¨ä½“ã®1/256ã‚’æ–°ãŸã«ä½¿ãˆã‚‹ã‚ˆã†ã«ãªã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚ 3.0.0.0/8ã¯ã€ä»¥å‰ã¯ã€GE(General Electric Company)ã«å‰²ã‚Šå½“ã¦ã‚‰ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ ã—ã‹ã—ã€æœ€è¿‘1å¹´ã»ã©ã§4å›žã«åˆ†ã‘ã¦Amazonã¸ã¨3.0.0.0/8ãŒç§»è»¢ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ ARINã®whoisã‚’è¦‹ã‚‹ã¨ã€3.0.0.0/8ã¯ã€3.0.0.0/9ã¨3.128.0.0/9ã«åˆ†ã‘ã‚Œã¦ç™»éŒ²ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ ä¸¡æ–¹ã¨ã‚‚ã€çµ„ç¹”ã¯ã€ŒAmazon Techno logies Inc. (AT-88-Z) ã€ã¨ã‚ã‚Š
cu39 2018/11/17
admin

network

dns
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GitHub - oscar-stack/vagrant-hosts: Manage static DNS on vagrant guests
These settings are on a per provisioner basis. They configure the individual behaviors of each provisioner instance. hosts Description: An array of tuples containing: An IP address A list of hostnames match with that address. These entries may use special keys as described in the next section. Default: [] exports Description: A hash containing named lists of [address, [aliases]] entries that are e
cu39 2017/05/15
coding

admin

vagrant

dns
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
GitHub - BerlinVagrant/vagrant-dns: A plugin to manage DNS records for vagrant environments
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cu39 2017/05/15
coding

admin

vagrant

dns
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
Godaddyã®SSLè¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã«ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³èªè¨¼ã®è„†å¼±æ€§ãŒã‚ã‚Š8850ä»¶ã®è¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ãŒå¤±åŠ¹ã•ã‚ŒãŸ
ã‚¨ã‚°ã‚¼ã‚¯ãƒ†ã‚£ãƒ–ã‚µãƒžãƒª GoDaddyç¤¾ã®ç™ºè¡Œã™ã‚‹ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³èªè¨¼SSLè¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã«èªè¨¼ä¸å‚™ã®è„†å¼±æ€§ãŒã‚ã‚Šã€äºˆé˜²çš„ãªå‡¦ç½®ã¨ã—ã¦8850ä»¶ã®ç™ºè¡Œæ¸ˆè¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ãŒå¤±åŠ¹ã•ã‚ŒãŸã€‚ã“ã‚Œã¯åŒæœŸé–“ã«ç™ºè¡Œã•ã‚ŒãŸè¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã®2%æœªæº€ã§ã‚ã‚‹ã€‚ç¾åœ¨ã¯è„†å¼±æ€§ã¯è§£æ¶ˆã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã‚‹ã€‚ æ¦‚è¦ GoDaddyç¤¾ã¯ç±³å›½ã®ãƒ›ã‚¹ãƒ†ã‚£ãƒ³ã‚°ï¼ˆãƒ¬ãƒ³ã‚¿ãƒ«ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ï¼‰ã‚„ãƒ¬ã‚¸ã‚¹ãƒˆãƒ©ã®å¤§æ‰‹ã§ã€èªè¨¼å±€ï¼ˆCAï¼‰ã®äº‹æ¥ã‚‚æ‰‹ãŒã‘ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ GoDaddyãŒç™ºè¡Œã™ã‚‹ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³èªè¨¼è¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã®èªè¨¼æ‰‹ç¶šãã«ä¸å‚™ãŒã‚ã£ãŸã¨ã—ã¦å ±å‘Šã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ In a typical process, when a certificate authority, like GoDaddy, validates a domain name for an SSL certificate, they provide a random code to the customer and ask them to p
cu39 2017/01/12
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dns

security
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ã€Œå›½ç¨Žã‚¯ãƒ¬ã‚¸ãƒƒãƒˆã‚«ãƒ¼ãƒ‰ãŠæ”¯æ‰•ã‚µã‚¤ãƒˆã€ã¯èª°ãŒé‹å–¶ã™ã‚‹ã‚µã‚¤ãƒˆãªã®ã‹
ã€Œåˆ©ç”¨è€…ã¯ã€è‡ªåˆ†ï¼ˆç´ç¨Žè€…ï¼‰ãŒãƒˆãƒ¨ã‚¿ãƒ•ã‚¡ã‚¤ãƒŠãƒ³ã‚¹ã«ç´ä»˜ã‚’å§”è¨—ã™ã‚‹ã®ã ã¨ã„ã†ã“ã¨ã‚’ã¡ã‚ƒã‚“ã¨ç†è§£ã—ãŸæ–¹ãŒã‚ˆã„ã€ã¨ã„ã†ãŠè©±ã€‚
cu39 2017/01/05
dns

web

security

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ä¸å›½æœ€å¤§ç´šã®èªè¨¼å±€ã€ŒWoSignã€ãŒãƒ‹ã‚»ã®è¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã‚’ç™ºè¡Œã—ã¦ã„ãŸã“ã¨ãŒåˆ¤æ˜Ž
by Barney Moss ç„¡æ–™ã§SSLè¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã‚’ç™ºè¡Œã—ã¦ãã‚Œã‚‹ã“ã¨ã§ã€å¤šãã®è‡ªå®…ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒãƒ¼ãƒ¦ãƒ¼ã‚¶ãƒ¼ã«é‡å®ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã‚‹ä¸å›½æœ€å¤§ç´šã®èªè¨¼å±€ã€Œæ²ƒé€š(WoSign)ã€ãŒã€ã€Œå½ç‰©ã®è¨¼æ˜Žæ›¸ã€ã‚’å¤§é‡ã«ç™ºè¡Œã—ã¦ã„ãŸã“ã¨ãŒæ˜Žã‚‰ã‹ã«ãªã‚Šã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ The story of how WoSign gave me an SSL certificate for GitHub.com | Schrauger.com https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an-ssl-certificate-for-github-com Thoughts and Observations: Chinese CA WoSign faces revocation after possibly issuing fake certificates of Github,
cu39 2016/09/01
dns

security
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
CVE-2015-7547: glibc getaddrinfo stack-based buffer overflow
The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet
cu39 2016/02/17
admin

security

dns
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
Route leak
The Tier 1 transit provider of the ISP leaking routes appears to have stopped accepting these announcements, some routing changes may still be re-occurring, traffic should be back to normal.
cu39 2015/06/13
admin

security

dns
ãƒªãƒ³ã‚¯
MACHIDA.KANAGAWA.JPã¯ãªãœã€Œã¾ãŽã‚‰ã‚ã—ã„ã€ã®ã‹
ç§ã¯æ¤œè¨¼ç”¨ã«ã„ãã¤ã‹ã®ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã‚’ç™»éŒ²ã—ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ãŒã€ãã®ã†ã¡ã®ä¸€ã¤ãŒã€Œç™ºæŽ˜ã€ã•ã‚Œã€ä¸–é–“ã‚’ãŠé¨’ãŒã›ã™ã‚‹ã“ã¨ã«ãªã£ã¦ã—ã¾ã„ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ ã“ã®ãƒšãƒ¼ã‚¸ã®ãƒšãƒ¼ã‚¸ãƒ“ãƒ¥ãƒ¼ã¯ã€8æœˆ16æ—¥(é‡‘) 9:00ç¾åœ¨ã§ã€31438ã¨ãªã£ã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ãšã„ã¶ã‚“ã‚ˆãå‚ç…§ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ã¡ãªã¿ã«ã€ã€Œæœ¬ç‰©ã®ã€ç”ºç”°å¸‚ã®ãƒ›ãƒ¼ãƒ ãƒšãƒ¼ã‚¸ã¯ä¸‹è¨˜ã®é€šã‚Šã§ã™ã€‚ ã—ã‹ã—ã€ä¸Šè¨˜ã®ã‚ˆã†ãªä¸»å¼µã¯ã„ã¾ã¾ã§ã«ã‚‚ã‚ã£ãŸã—ã€ä»Šæ›´äºŒç•ªç…Žã˜ã®ã“ã®ãƒã‚¿ãŒã€ä¸Šè¨˜ã®ã‚ˆã†ãªç°¡ç´ ãªå†…å®¹ã§è©±é¡Œã«ãªã‚‹ç†ç”±ã¨ã—ã¦ã¯ã€ã‚„ã¯ã‚Š MACHIDA.KANAGAWA.JPã¨ã„ã†ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã«ã‚ã‚‹ã®ã§ã—ã‚‡ã†ã€‚ã“ã‚Œã¯ã€Œéƒ½é“åºœçœŒåž‹JPãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã€ã¨ã„ã†ã‚‚ã®ã§ã€ã€Œæ—¥æœ¬å›½å†…ã«ä½æ‰€ã‚’æŒã¤å€‹äººãƒ»çµ„ç¹”ã§ã‚ã‚Œã°ã€ã„ãã¤ã§ã‚‚ç™»éŒ²ãŒã§ãã¾ã™ã€ï¼ˆã“ã¡ã‚‰ã‚ˆã‚Šå¼•ç”¨ï¼‰ã€‚ ã§ã¯ã€ã©ã†ã—ã¦ç´›ã‚‰ã‚ã—ã„ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åãŒç™»éŒ²ã§ãã‚‹ã‹ã¨ã„ã†ç†ç”±ã‚’èª¬æ˜Žã—ã¾ã™ã€‚ éƒ½é“åºœçœŒåž‹JPãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åãŒã§ãã‚‹å‰ã«åœ°åŸŸåž‹JPãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã¨ã„ã†ã‚‚ã®ãŒã‚ã‚Šã€å¤šãã®
cu39 2013/08/16
dns

local

spec
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ãã®ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã€ä½¿ã„çµ‚ã‚ã£ãŸå¾Œã‚‚é¢å€’ã‚’è¦‹ç¶šã‘ã‚‹è¦šæ‚ŸãŒã‚ã‚Šã¾ã™ã‹ï¼Ÿ:Geekãªãºãƒ¼ã˜
2013å¹´å‚è°é™¢è°å“¡é€šå¸¸é¸æŒ™ã®åºƒå ±æ´»å‹•ã‚’ç›®çš„ã¨ã—ã¦ã€2013senkyo.jpã¨ã„ã†ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åãŒç™»éŒ²(ãŠã‚ˆã³åˆ©ç”¨)ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ ã“ã‚Œã«é™ã‚‰ãšã€ã“ã®ã‚ˆã†ãªå½¢ã§å„æ¡ˆä»¶ã”ã¨ã«å°‚ç”¨ã®ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã‚’åˆ©ç”¨ã—ãŸPRæ´»å‹•ãŒã€ä¸–ç•Œä¸ã§é »ç¹ã«è¡Œã‚ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ å…¬é–‹äºˆå®šã®æ˜ ç”»ã®ã‚¿ã‚¤ãƒˆãƒ«ã‚„æœŸé–“é™å®šã§ç™ºå£²ã•ã‚Œã‚‹å•†å“åã‚’ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã«ä½¿ã£ãŸãƒ—ãƒãƒ¢ãƒ¼ã‚·ãƒ§ãƒ³ãªã©ãŒã€ãã®å…¸åž‹çš„ãªã‚‚ã®ã§ã‚ã‚‹ã¨ã„ãˆã‚‹ã§ã—ã‚‡ã†ã€‚ ã—ã‹ã—ã€ãã®ã‚ˆã†ãªå½¢æ…‹ã§ç™»éŒ²ãƒ»åˆ©ç”¨ã•ã‚Œã¦ã„ã‚‹ã„ã‚ã°ã€ŒæœŸé–“é™å®šã®ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã€ã§ã¯ã€ã€Œä½¿ã„çµ‚ã‚ã£ãŸå¾Œã®ã“ã¨ã€ãŒã€ã—ã°ã—ã°å¿˜ã‚ŒåŽ»ã‚‰ã‚Œã¦ã—ã¾ã†ã“ã¨ãŒã‚ã‚Šã¾ã™ã€‚ ãŸã¨ãˆã°ã€ä»Šå›žå–ã‚Šä¸Šã’ãŸ2013senkyo.jpã¯æ±Žç”¨JPãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã§ã™ã€‚ æ±Žç”¨JPãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã¯æ—¥æœ¬å›½å†…ã«ä½æ‰€ãŒã‚ã‚Œã°èª°ã§ã‚‚ç™»éŒ²ã§ãã¾ã™ã€‚ ãã®ãŸã‚ã€ä»®ã«ä»Šå›žã®é¸æŒ™çµ‚äº†å¾Œã«ã“ã®ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã®ä½¿ç”¨ã‚’çµ‚äº†ã—ãŸå ´åˆã€ç™»éŒ²æ–™ã•ãˆæ‰•ãˆã°åŸºæœ¬çš„ã«èª°ã§ã‚‚ã“ã®ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã‚’å†ç™»éŒ²ã—ã€æ¬¡ã®ç™»
cu39 2013/07/09
dns

history

commerce

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.inãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³ååœæ¢ã¨whoiså…¬é–‹ä»£è¡Œ:Geekãªãºãƒ¼ã˜
ä»Šæ—¥(4æœˆ30æ—¥é ƒ)ã€ä¸€éƒ¨ã®äººã€…ã®é–“ã§ã€Œã†ã¡ã®Webã‚µã‚¤ãƒˆã§ä½¿ã£ã¦ã‚‹.inã®åå‰è§£æ±ºãŒå‡ºæ¥ãªããªã£ãŸï¼ã€ã¨ã„ã†æ‚²é³´ãŒèžã“ãˆã¦ã„ã¾ã™ã€‚ æ•°å¹´å‰ã€ã‚¤ãƒ³ãƒ‰ã®ccTLD(country code Top Level Domain)ã§ã‚ã‚‹ã€Œ.inã€ã‚’æ—¥æœ¬å›½å†…ã®Webã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“ã‚¹ã§ä½¿ã†ã®ãŒæµè¡Œã—ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ ã€Œ.inã€ã¯ã€Œã‚¤ãƒ³ã€ã¨èªã‚ã‚‹ãŸã‚èªžå‘‚ãŒè‰¯ãã€å€‹äººãŒæ°—è»½ã«Webã‚µã‚¤ãƒˆã‚’ä½œã£ãŸã¨ãã«ã€ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã‚‚åŒæ™‚ã«ç™»éŒ²ã™ã‚‹ã¨ã„ã†ã®ãŒæµè¡Œã£ãŸã‚ã‘ã§ã™ãŒã€ãã®ã¨ãã«whoisã§ä¸–ç•Œã«å‘ã‘ã¦é€£çµ¡å…ˆ(å€‹äººã§ã‚ã‚Œã°æ°åä½æ‰€é›»è©±ç•ªå·ã®å ´åˆã‚‚ã‚ã‚Š)ã‚’å…¬é–‹ã•ã‚Œã‚‹ã®ã¯å«Œã ã¨ã„ã†ã“ã¨ã§ã€whoisæƒ…å ±å…¬é–‹ä»£è¡Œã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“ã‚¹(ã‚‚ã—ãã¯ãƒ—ãƒ©ã‚¤ãƒã‚·ãƒ¼ä¿è·ã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“ã‚¹)ã‚’ä½¿ã†ã¨ã„ã†ã®ãŒå‰²ã¨ä¸€èˆ¬çš„ã«è¡Œã‚ã‚Œã¦ã„ã¾ã—ãŸã€‚ ã—ã‹ã—ã€ãã®.inã®ãƒ¬ã‚¸ã‚¹ãƒˆãƒªã§ã‚ã‚‹INRegistryãŒã€whoisæƒ…å ±å…¬é–‹ä»£è¡Œã‚µãƒ¼ãƒ“ã‚¹ã‚’åˆ©ç”¨ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹ãƒ‰ãƒ¡ã‚¤ãƒ³åã‚’æ¬¡ã€…ã¨åœæ¢ã—ã¦ã„ã‚‹ã‚ˆã†
cu39 2013/04/30
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cu39 2013/03/27
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cu39 2012/02/22
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cu39 2012/01/09
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cu39 2012/01/09
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cu39 2011/09/30
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cu39 2011/09/08
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