Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84857 January 16, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO DELA ROSA Y AVILES, ANTONIO DELA ROSA Y AVILES, and RODOLFO QUIMSON Y NAVA (At
large), accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:

Rodolfo dela Rosa y Aviles appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 38,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, convicting him of illegal possession of firearms and explosives and imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.1

On January 27, 1987, an information for illegal possession of firearms and explosives was filed against RODOLFO
DELA ROSA y AVILES, ANTONIO DELA ROSA y AVILES, CRESENCIO REYES y DELA CRUZ and RODOLFO
QUIMSON y NAVA, to wit:

That on or about the 9th of December 1986, in sitio (sic) Kadampat, Barangay Bolo, municipality
(sic) of Labrador, province (sic) of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and control three (3) homemade gauge 12 shotguns and fourteen (14) pieces
of dynamite explosives, without first securing the necessary permit/license to possess the same.

Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1866. 2

All accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 3, 1987. On March 12, 1987, the four accused withdrew
their plea of not guilty and substituted it with a plea of guilt. After ascertaining that the plea of guilt was not made
improvidently, the lower court imposed upon them the corresponding penalty. However, on March 19, 1987, the
3

four (4) accused filed a motion withdrawing their plea of guilt. The lower court granted the motion in a resolution
4

dated March 25, 1987. Thereafter, trial proceeded. However, accused Cresencio Reyes changed his mind again
5

and pleaded guilty to a lesser offense punishable under the last paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866. The court accepted the plea and sentenced him accordingly. He was utilized as a witness by the prosecution.
The trial proceeded against the three remaining accused.

The prosecution established that in the morning of December 9, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Antonio dela Rosa,
Cresencio Reyes and Rodolfo Quimson, surrendered to Kagawad Valeriano Rigor of Sitio Kadampat, Bolo,
Labrador, Pangasinan claiming they want to lead a new life. They informed him that Benjamin
Nano, alias Kumander Tamang, a member of the New People's Army (NPA), was shot by one of them. The four had
with them a short shotgun (Exhibit A) and a bag containing several sticks of dynamite (Exhibit C to C-7). Kagawad
6

Rigor offered them breakfast and afterwards went to the police station to report the presence of four (4)
surrenderees in his house. At the police station, Patrolman Gasline Fernandez recorded the report in the
police blotter. Cpl. Crispin Cancino, the station commander, brought along several policemen and
proceeded to the house of Kagawad Rigor. When the group arrived, only Kagawad Rigor and Cpl. Cancino
entered the house. The other policemen stayed outside to secure the area. Inside the house, Kagawad Rigor
introduced the surrenderees to Cpl. Cancino and showed him the short shotgun (Exhibit A) and the bag
(Exhibit C to C-7) containing several sticks of dynamite. Then, all accused, except Rodolfo Quimson, who
was left behind to guide the police in recovering the body of Kumander Tamang, were brought to the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) Headquarters in Lingayen . In Lingayen, they proceeded at the municipal
building and called on Mayor Calixto Pancho. The surrenderees had their picture taken with Mayor Pancho
and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police headquarters, where their statements were
taken by Cpl. Arsenio Paragas and Cpl. Cipriano Castillo. Meanwhile, the charred body of Benjamin Nano
7

was recovered by the police in Sitio Tebel Patar. 8

The following day, Cresencio Reyes informed the police that there were firearms left buried in Sitio Tebel
Patar. Reyes pointed to the hiding place which was covered by banana leaves. When the banana leaves
were removed, the police unearthed two (2) long barreled shotguns (Exhibits B and D). 9
On the other hand, the three accused contend they were recruited by Kumander Tamang on different dates.
Accused Rodolfo dela Rosa testified that he first saw Kumander Tamang on October 28, 1986 at a relative's
wake. Kumander Tamang asked him whether he owned a piece of land. He said he did not, for he was only a
sawali maker. Kumander Tamang then convinced him to join the New People's Army (NPA). He told
Kumander Tamang he would think it over. On November 1, 1986, Kumander Tamang went to his house and
reiterated his offer to him. Cresencio Reyes was with Kumander Tamang at that time. Reyes was carrying a
bag (Exhibit C) while Kumander Tamang had a shotgun (Exhibit A). On November 10, 1986, Kumander
Tamang went to his house and succeeded in persuading him to join the NPA. Kumander Tamang brought
him at a hideout in the mountains of Sitio Tebel Patar, Labrador, Pangasinan.

On the evening of November 14, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Kumander Tamang and Cresencio Reyes,
descended the mountains and proceeded to the house of Antonio dela Rosa, who was Rodolfo's cousin. At
that time, Kumander Tamang was carrying a shotgun (Exhibit A) while Reyes was carrying a bag (Exhibit C).
When they arrived at said place, Kumander Tamang and Reyes entered the house and stayed inside for ten
(10) minutes. When the two came out, dela Rosa was with them. All of them headed for the mountains
afterwards. On November 20, 1986, Rodolfo dela Rosa, Kumander Tamang Cresencio Reyes and Antonio
dela Rosa went to the house of Rodolfo Quimson. Again, only Kumander Tamang and Reyes entered
Quimson's house. They stayed inside for 15 minutes. When the two came out, Quimson was with them.
Afterwards, they returned to their hideout in the mountains.10

On December 8, 1986, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Kumander Tamang called them to a meeting.
Kumander Tamang took the bag (Exhibit C) which Reyes always carries and opened it. The bag yielded
several sticks of dynamite. Kumander Tamang told them that at five o'clock in the afternoon they would go
down Sitio Kadampat and assassinate Kagawad Rigor. He then instructed them on how to use the
11

explosives. After the meeting, they returned to their hut and rested. At two o'clock in the afternoon, they
heard a gunshot from the hut of Kumander Tamang. They rushed outside and saw Reyes holding Kumander
Tamang's shotgun. He announced that Kumander Tamang was dead. He told them it would be better to
surrender themselves to the authorities. He ordered them to gather the shotgun and the sticks of dynamite
while he set on fire Kumander Tamang's hut. At five o'clock in the afternoon, they descended the mountains
and headed towards Sitio Kadampat. At 7:00 a.m., the following day, they reached the house of Kagawad
Rigor. They saw the Kagawad sitting by himself on a bench outside his house. Only Reyes approached the
Kagawad, so as not to frighten him. The three others waited by the roadside. After five (5) minutes, Reyes
signalled the three to approach the house. Kagawad Rigor let them inside the house and offered them
breakfast. Reyes placed the shotgun and the bag on top of the dining table. Kagawad Rigor then left the
house and went to the police station. He returned with several policemen. At first, the policemen pointed
12

their guns at the accused but Kagawad Rigor told them there was no need for they were surrendering
themselves to the authorities. Kagawad Rigor then showed the policemen the shotgun and the bag
containing the sticks of dynamite. The policemen took all the surrenderees to the Municipal Hall, except
Rodolfo Quimson, who was left behind, to lead the police to Kumander Tamang' s body. At the Municipal
Hall, Mayor Calixto Pancho greeted and congratulated them for coming back to the fold of law. They had
their picture taken with Mayor Pancho and Kagawad Rigor. Afterwards, they were brought to the police
headquarters. When an investigator started to question them, they asked for a lawyer to assist them but the
investigator said they would not need one for they were surrenderees and would soon be freed. Hence, they
gave their subscribed statements to the police. After their statements were taken, the police took them back
to the police station in Labrador, where they were detained. On January 5, 1987, they were transferred to the
provincial jail in Lingayen. They denied ever seeing the two (2) long firearms (Exhibits C and D) which were
recovered in Sitio Tebel Patar. They saw said firearms for the first time when the prosecution presented
them as exhibits during the trial.
13

When trial concluded, the lower court convicted the three (3) accused. Antonio dela Rosa did not
appeal while Rodolfo Quimson escaped from the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) where he was detained
14 15

after the lower court convicted him. Only Rodolfo dela Rosa appealed contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT RODOLFO DELA ROSA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
EXPLOSIVES, DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866.

We find merit in the appeal.

It is undisputed that accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa and his companions were the ones who
surrendered the subject firearm (Exhibit A) and explosives (Exhibit C to C-7) to Kagawad Rigor. However,
Rodolfo dela Rosa denies that he was in possession of said ammunitions in the manner punishable by law.
According to him, his real intention was merely to turn over the ammunitions, which were owned by
Kumander Tamang, to the authorities. The trial court perceived otherwise. It declared that since Rodolfo
dela Rosa joined the New People's Army (NPA), there is reason to conclude that he provided himself with
arms such as Exhibits A, B, C to C-7 and D. And since mere possession is sufficient to convict a person
16

for crimes which are malum prohibitum like illegal possession of firearms, appellant dela Rosa must be
convicted. It is of no moment that he surrendered the ammunitions to the authorities.
We fail to see how appellant dela Rosa could be convicted of illegal possession of firearms based on the
above reasoning. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 punishes any person who shall ". . . unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition."
(emphasis supplied) 17

Broken down into its salient elements, illegal possession of firearms is committed when the holder thereof:

(i) possesses a firearm; and

(ii) lacks the authority or license to possess it. 18

In People v. de Gracia , we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person
19

under PD 1866, thus:

But, is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for
unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a
violation of the law? This query assumes significance for illegal possession of firearms is a
malum prohibitum, punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of
criminal intent are not valid defenses.

When a crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary, it is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by
the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime but he
intended to commit an act, and that act is by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the
first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for
illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an
intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without
regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in
possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit
an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person
under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess
a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in
good faith and without criminal intent.

In the early case of People v. Estoista , we held that a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless
20

possession of firearms is not punishable. We stated therein that:

The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact
definition, and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to
constitute a violation vary. The rule laid down in the United States courts — rule which we
here adopt — is that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a
firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of
weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or
hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment."

Also, in People v. Remereta , where the question posed was whether an accused who stole a firearm could
21

simultaneously be prosecuted for theft and illegal possession of firearms, we held that transient
possession is not sufficient to convict one under the latter crime, thus:

While in stealing a firearm the accused must necessarily come into possession thereof, the
crime of illegal possession of firearms is not committed by mere transient possession of the
weapon. . . . Thus, stealing a firearm with intent not to use but to render the owner
defenseless, may suffice for purposes of establishing a case of theft, but would not justify a
charge for illegal possession of firearm, since intent to hold and eventually use the weapon
would be lacking.

Hence, the kind of possession punishable under PD No. 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm
either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. It is not
22

enough that the firearm was found in the person of the accused who held the same temporarily and
casually or for the purpose of surrendering the same. Admittedly, animus possidendi is a state of mind. As
such, what goes on into the mind of an accused, as his real intent, could be determined solely based on his
prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to
his possession. 23

Thus, in People v. Leo Lian , we rejected the argument of the accused that the charge against him should
24

be dismissed because there was no animus possidendi on his part. In said case, the accused contended
that he was on his way to the municipal hall to surrender the firearm when he met some of his friends. He
then forgot about the firearm, until the police officer unceremoniously seized the same from him, affording
him no chance to surrender it himself.

In rejecting accused-appellant's claim, Justice Regalado wrote that:

. . . , the Court finds it hard to believe that appellant still had to hide the firearm in his waist
before setting out to surrender it to the authorities when he could have taken the gun to the
town hall in the same bag in which he found it, in which case it would have been safer and
would have avoided detection. In fine, the indispensable elements of possession without the
necessary authority or license and the corresponding attendance of animus possidendi have
both been convincingly established by the prosecution to warrant appellant's conviction . . . .

That animus possidendi is determinable from the prior and simultaneous acts of the accused is further
exemplified while accused by People v. Lubo. In this case, while accused-appellant pleaded lack
25

of animus possidendi, his conduct belied the same. Accused-appellant Lubo was found to have secured a
"temporary license" for the subject firearm. Under such circumstance, we held that accused-appellant
intended to possess the subject firearm beyond reasonable doubt.

Coming now to the case before us it is undisputed that the police officers never really arrested Rodolfo dela
Rosa, for the truth of the matter was that there was no need for such arrest. Dela Rosa and his companions
had surrendered the ammunitions to Kagawad Rigor even before the police arrived. In fact, the police
learned of the surrender because Kagawad Rigor reported it to the police station in Labrador. This is in
contrast to People v. Leo Lian, where appellant Lian merely feigned intention to surrender the firearm which
the police found in his possession . In the case at bar, appellant dela Rosa's intention to surrender the
ammunitions was very clear from the beginning and he was able to execute the same.

Corollarily, the Office of the Solicitor General's contention that dela Rosa was in constructive possession of
the ammunitions is irrelevant for possession — whether physical or constructive — without animus
possidendi is not punishable. Dela Rosa's possession was harmless, temporary and only incidental for the
purpose of surrendering the ammunitions to the authorities. Consequently, the prosecution failed to
establish the first element of animus possidendi.

Similarly, the records are bereft of sufficient proof that Rodolfo dela Rosa possessed the ammunitions
without authority to do so. Except for the preliminary examination of Pfc. Cipriano P. Castillo conducted by
Municipal Circuit Trial Judge Benjamin N. Abella, the prosecution offered no other evidence during the
26

trial which showed lack of license. In the preliminary examination, the only relevant question asked by the
judge was:

JUDGE ABELLA.

Q: Did you or the Stn. Commander ask or verify whether any or all of the
above-named suspects have any license to possess the above-mentioned
firearms and explosives?

A: Yes, sir. But they stated that they have no license to possess any of the
firearms and explosives which were recovered from their possession, control
and custody.

The Office of the Solicitor General offers the extrajudicial statement of accused Rodolfo dela Rosa that 27

Kumander Tamang supplied him with explosives and dynamite in furtherance of subversive
activities. According to the Solicitors, the extrajudicial statement is sufficient to prove that the firearms
28

were illegally possessed. The presumption is erroneous. Aside from the fact that dela Rosa repudiated the
extrajudicial statement because it was uncounselled , the same did not contain any admission that he had
29

no license to possess the firearm. And, even if it had contained an admission that he had no license, it still
would not have sufficed.

In People v. Solayao , the prosecution relied only on the testimonial evidence that accused-appellant
30

admitted before the police officer who accosted him that he did not have any authority or license to carry
the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one. In acquitting the accused-appellant, we stressed that
the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the lack of license which is a negative
averment. The burden is in consonance with the evidentiary rule that "when a negative is averred in a
31

pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the
fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the
negative." More importantly, the burden placed on the shoulders of the prosecution to prove beyond
32

reasonable doubt the lack of license is premised on the constitutional presumption of innocence of the
accused. Thus, in People v. Solayao, this Court suggested that the prosecution could have, at the very
33

least, presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused did not have the
license to the gun. But, an extrajudicial admission of the accused, solely, will not suffice.

The Office of the Solicitor General contends that for accused-appellant to join the New People's Army and
stay in the mountains without arming themselves is highly improbable. Thus, there is reason to believe that
they illegally possessed the ammunitions to further their subversive activities even prior to surrendering
them to the authorities. We reiterate that mere suspicion will not prove the prosecution's case in court. In a
prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866, it is incumbent on the Government to prove both elements
of the crime: (1) that the accused possessed the firearm and (2) that he had not first obtained a license or
permit from the appropriate authorities. 34

As always, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of
an accused beyond reasonable doubt . The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the
Revised Penal Code which are mala in se or in crimes which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special
law. We find that such quantum of proof was not adequately presented in this case.
35

IN VIEW WHEREOF, accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Rosa is acquitted in Criminal Case No. L-3616. His
immediate release from the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) is ordered, except if charged and detained for
other offenses.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 193.

2 Original Record, p. 30.

3 Original Record, p. 42; Rollo, p. 138.

4 The four (4) accused pleaded guilty under the impression that they will be eligible for
Amnesty under Executive Order No. 107. Thus, they withdrew their plea when informed that
they were not qualified for said Amnesty. Original Record, p. 48.

5 Original Record, pp. 54-55.

6 The trial court noted that the bag presented in court contained five (5) live dynamite
wrapped with black electrical tape, three (3) brown wrapping paper and one (1) empty shell of
a shotgun. TSN, July 7, 1987, p. 7.

7 Exhibit "F", "G", "H", "I", Original Record, pp. 5-12.

8 TSN, Cpl. Crispin Cancino, July 7, 1987, p. 15.

9 TSN, Valeriano Rigor, September 9, 1987, pp. 6-9.

10 TSN, Antonio dela Rosa, October 26, 1987, pp. 4-5.

11 TSN, Rodolfo dela Rosa, October 8, 1987, pp. 3-14.

12 Ibid, p. 8.

13 TSN, Rodolfo Quimson, October 9, 1987, pp. 2-12.

14 Rollo, pp. 137, 140, 145.

15 Rollo, p. 145.

16 Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 192.

17 Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,

Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or
Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing
Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations thereof, and for Relevant Purposes) as amended by
Republic Act No. 8294 on June 6, 1997 providing for a scheme of penalties, depending on the
classification of the firearm illegally possessed.

18 People v. Caling, 208 SCRA 827 (1992).

19 233 SCRA 716, 725, 727 (1994).

20 93 Phil. 647 (1953).

21 98 Phil. 413 (1956).

22 See also People v. Soyang, L-13983, December 31, 1960.

23 Supra note 19, at 727.

24 People v. Leo Lian, G. R. No. 115988, March 29, 1996.

25 People v. Lubo, et al. 101 Phil. 180, 183 (1957).

26 Original Record, pp. 17-18.

27 Exhibit "H", Rollo, pp. 23-24.

28 Appellee's Brief, p. 10; Rollo, p. 215.

29 Accused-appellant contends that they asked for the assistance of counsel when the police
started to question him. However, Cpl. Cancino stated he does not need a lawyer for he was a
surrenderee and will soon be freed. Appellant's Brief, p. 11; Rollo, p. 170.

30 262 SCRA 256 (1996).

31 See also People v. Evangelista, 256 SCRA 624 (1996); People v. Ramos 222 SCRA 557
(1993); People v. Fajardo 17 SCRA 494 (1966).

32 Supra note 30 at 265, citing V. Francisco, Evidence 13, 1973 ed.

33 See also People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 420 (1993).

34 People v. Caling, 208 SCRA 827 (1992).

35 People v. Argawanon, 231 SCRA 614 (1994); People v. Quijada, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July
24, 1996.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 234196, November 21, 2018 ]
JONATHAN MENDOZA Y ESGUERRA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
A. REYES, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision[2] dated June 21, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38156 and
its Resolution[3] dated August 24, 2017, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed
decision affirmed albeit with modification as to penalty the Decision [4] dated August 26, 2015 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6, finding Jonathan Mendoza y Esguerra (petitioner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions as defined and
penalized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294.
An Information was filed before the RTC of Tanauan City, Batangas, Branch 6, charging the petitioner for
violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, to wit:

That on or about the 31st day of August 2006, at about 11:45 o'clock in the evening at Barangay 5, Poblacion,
City of Tanauan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously has in his possession,
custody and control one (1) Ranger caliber 45 pistol (Imperial Defense Service) with Serial No. C02009, two
(2) magazines with nine (9) pieces of live ammunitions and three (3) pieces of empty shells of the same
caliber without having secured the necessary license and/or permit from the proper authorities to possess
the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
On December 13, 2006, assisted by the counsel, the petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.[6] Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The evidence for the prosecution tend to establish that on August 31, 2006, at about 11:45 p.m., during a
checkpoint, Police Officer 1 Ryan Pagcaliwagan (PO1 Pagcaliwagan), PO1 Celso Torres, and PO1 Fheljun
Calalo flagged down a motorcycle as it had no license plate and its three occupants were not wearing a
helmet. The occupants were later identified as Julius Opeña (Opeña), the owner of the motorcycle, Jeffrey
Coral (Coral), and herein petitioner who was then driving the motorcycle. [7]
As they were approaching the motorcycle, PO1 Pagcaliwagan saw the petitioner take a firearm and cover it
with a bag. The former then alerted his co-police officers, took the firearm and arrested the petitioner who
denied ownership of the gun, but at the same time claimed the same was licensed. [8]
Confiscated from the petitioner were one (1) gray Ranger caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. CO2009, one (1)
stainless magazine with four (4) pieces of live ammunition, one (1) black magazine, five (5) live ammunition,
and three (3) pieces of empty shells for caliber .45. The items were brought to the police station and turned
over to PO1 Charlie Bermejo and marked by PO1 Pagcaliwagan.[9]
For their part, the defense presented as witnesses the petitioner, Opena, and Anthony Carpio (Carpio). [10]
The petitioner denied any criminal liability and by way of defense claimed that the firearm, magazines, and
live ammunition were the product of an illegal search and thus were illegally obtained in his possession. [11]
The petitioner testified that on the alleged date of the incident, he went to a drinking spree with his friends
at Barangay Santol. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted that he went to buy more beer with his friends
Opeña and Coral. While on their way and as they were passing Bank of the Philippine Islands, they were
stopped by police officers. As ordered, they stopped and alighted from the motorcycle. They were frisked and
the motorcycle was searched. As a result of which, the firearm, magazines, and ammunitions were recovered
under the seat of the motorcycle.[12]
Opeña and Carpio corroborated the petitioner's testimony. Carpio, in his testimony, likewise admitted that
the firearm and ammunition are registered under his name, and that he placed the same under the seat of the
motorcycle without the knowledge of the petitioner. Carpio submitted that he brought the said firearm as he
intends to sell the same to a friend but later forgot to retrieve the same from the motorcycle. Carpio averred
that the day after, after having learned of the petitioner's arrest, he immediately went to the police station
and presented his license to the chief of police his license to possess the said firearm. [13]
On August 26, 2015, the lower court rendered its Decision,[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding [petitioner] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, the court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1)
day to eight (8) years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php 30,000.00).
Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[15]
In so ruling, the RTC held that the prosecution established the elements of the crime charged. In so doing,
the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of PO1 Pagcaliwagan that the subject firearms and ammunitions
were retrieved from the petitioner. Further, and similarly relying on the testimony of PO1 Pagcaliwagan, the
RTC found untenable the petitioner's defense of illegal search and seizure as well as lack of knowledge as to
his possession of the seized items, concluding the search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The RTC held
that PO1 Pagcaliwagan was correct in flagging down, arresting, searching, and seizing the subject items
from the petitioner after seeing the latter withdrew a gun and hid it under his bag.

Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the CA. On June 21, 2017, the CA rendered its Decision [16] affirming the
lower court's decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we AFFIRMED with Modification the Decision of the [RTC] dated
August 26, 2015 in Criminal Case No. 06-09-3144. As modified, [the petitioner] is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional in its
maximum period, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS and ONE DAY of prision mayor minimum in
its medium period, as maximum and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was a valid search and seizure of the subject item, which is
done pursuant to a lawful arrest. Contrary however to the RTC's determination, the CA held that it was the
initial violation for the absence of license plate and helmet that justified the search and seizure in this case.
Anent the penalty, the CA modified the imposition by the RTC which it found to be contrary to the
indeterminate sentence law.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution [18] dated August 24,
2017.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari whereby the petitioner submits the following issues for the
Court's resolution, viz.:
1.) Whether or not police officers have the legal authority to search the body of the driver and/or his
motorcycle because he violated traffic rules and regulations?

2.) Whether or not the police officers in this case had validly conducted a search incident to a lawful arrest
as governed by Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In its Comment, the respondent argues that PO1 Pagcaliwagan and his fellow police officers "had a valid and
legal reason to seize the firearm from the petitioner, who, in their presence, tried to hide said firearm, a clear
indication that at that time, he had committed or was committing an offense." [19] Further, the respondent
justifies the act of the police officer in flagging down the motorcycle driven by the petitioner by the fact that
it appears to have no plate number.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the instant case, the Court finds that the rise or fall of the instant
petition depends upon the appreciation of the testimony of the parties. Particularly, whether the testimony of
PO1 Pagcaliwagan is sufficient to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling of the Court

The Court rules in the negative.
The issue of credibility is a factual issue that is generally beyond the province of a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with the principle that the Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, as a rule, the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally left to be determined by the trial court which had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility through their demeanor on the stand.
Likewise, the factual findings by the trial court when affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect by the Court
and not disturbed on appeal. However, jurisprudence provided exceptions to the said rule. Thus, the Court
may pass upon questions of fact: where there is an "ostensible incongruence" in the findings of the said
courts,[20] or in criminal cases where the testimony upon which the conviction is based is "riddled with
patent inconsistencies and improbabilities on material points."[21] The Court, in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.,
[22]
summarized the recognized exceptions to the rule, thus under the following instances, the Court, acting
on a petition for review for certiorari may rule upon factual questions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
[23]
(Citations omitted)
In this controversy, a review of the records reveals that there are improbabilities in the testimony of PO1
Pagcaliwagan, upon which the conviction is based, thus warranting that the Court re-examine the relevant
facts and circumstances. Primarily, while the same relies heavily on the credibility of the testimony of PO1
Pagcaliwagan, a matter that is generally left for the trial court to determine, finding that the appreciation of
the same is erroneous, the Court decides to make its own evaluation of the evidence on record. In this light,
the Court concludes that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner is invalid, which thus renders the search
conducted thereafter illegal.
The prosecution and the defense vary as to their narration of what happened on the day the alleged crime
was committed.

Based on the testimony of PO1 Pagcaliwagan, they flagged down the motorcycle ridden by the petitioner,
and the latter's two (2) male companions after noticing that the vehicle bore no license plate and its
occupants were not wearing a helmet. Thereafter, PO1 Pagcaliwagan allegedly saw the petitioner took out a
gun and hid it under his bag. This is what prompted the officers to arrest the petitioner and conduct a search
as an incident thereto.

The theory of the prosecution, which was found credible by both the RTC and the CA, was that the
warrantless arrest and search was justified under Section 5(a) and (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which
provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it.

xxxx

In order for an arrest to be justified under paragraph (a), the following elements must be present: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, in order for paragraph (b) to operate, at the time of the
arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the appellant had committed it.[24]
Even siding with the version offered by the prosecution, the Court sees no such overt act, much more, an
offense that was committed that would justify the arrest of the petitioner without warrant.

The petitioner and his companions were flagged down during a checkpoint after the police officers noticed
that the motorcycle which they were riding bore no license plate and the riders are not wearing any helmet.
The commission of a traffic violation does not justify the arrest of the petitioner. Under Section 29 [25] of R.A.
No. 4136 or The Land Transportation Code, such violation merely warrant the confiscation of the offender's
driver's license.[26]
Furthermore, the conflicting accounts of how the firearm was retrieved, lend support that the arrest and
eventual search and seizure are invalid.

In this case, while PO1 Pagcaliwagan claims that the firearm was within his plain sight just as the petitioner
attempted to conceal the same while 2 to 3 meters away from the checkpoint, the petitioner claims that the
motorcycle's compartment was opened and from there PO1 Pagcaliwagan saw and recovered the firearm and
ammunitions.

The Court finds the story offered by PO1 Pagcaliwagan as to how the firearm was retrieved, hard to believe.
When confronted by police officers, the ordinary reaction of a person who knows that he has in his
possession a gun for which he has no license is to prevent the same from being discovered. It is
inconceivable why the petitioner would go the lengths of going down the motorcycle, opening the
compartment from under the seat and remove the well-concealed firearm, only to again cover the same with
his bag in front.

The theory is not only contrary to human experience and reaction but as well faced with suspicion in view of
the fact that the placement of the gun when it was taken was outside the view of other police officers in the
checkpoint. Simply, it is only PO1 Pagcaliwagan who affirmed that the firearm was in plain sight. [27]
Also the charge must fail as the prosecution failed to establish the essential elements of, and the facts
constitutive of the offense charged.[28]
The petitioner was indicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms, as defined and penalized by P.D.
No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. The elements for the prosecution of which crime are: (1) the
existence of subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not
have the corresponding license for it. Verily, ownership is not an essential element of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms. What is merely required is either actual or constructive possession coupled
with animus possidendi or intent to possess.[29]
In this controversy, while the existence of the firearm and the absence by the petitioner of the license to
own the same may be conceded, the absence on the part of the petitioner of animus possidendi is sufficient
to cause his acquittal.
In the case of People v. De Gracia,[30] the Court held that while mere possession, without criminal intent, is
sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there
was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Otherwise stated, to be
convicted of illegal possession of firearms it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good
faith and without criminal intent. Thus, the Court continued:
[A] temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a
violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No.
1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is
absent, there is no offense committed.[31]
Animus possidendi is a concept that eludes specific standards to indicate its existence. Being a state of
mind, animus possidendi is determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and
contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. [32] "What exists in the realm of
thought is often disclosed in a range of action."[33]
The petitioner claims that he was not aware that the subject firearm and ammunitions were inside the
motorcycle's compartment. This was corroborated by Carpio, the firearm's owner. Carpio's testimony was
succinctly summarized by the CA, viz.:
Anthony admitted and corroborated the testimony of accused-appellant, among others, that the firearm and
ammunition were owned and licensed in his name, that he placed the bag containing the said firearm and
ammunition in the compartment of the motorcycle without the knowledge of accused-appellant. He further
testified that he happened to bring the firearm as he intended to sell it to his co-worker who failed to arrive
that day in Brgy. Santol. However, he forgot about the firearm in the motorcycle when he left the accused-
appellant at the drinking session. It was only the following day that he learned of the arrest of the accused-
appellant for possessing the firearm. Immediately, he proceeded to the police station. He saw the accused-
appellant in jail and presented to the chief of police his license to possess said firearm. [34] (Citations
omitted.)
The consistency of the story and the manner in which Carpio acted coupled with the fact that the petitioner
was merely charged to be the driver on the night of the incident bolsters the conclusion that the petitioner
was indeed not aware of the presence of the firearm and ammunitions inside the motorcycle compartment.
Not being the owner of the motorcycle, the petitioner cannot even be remotely charged with or presumed to
have knowledge of the subject firearm.

Knowledge is an essential component of intent. Without awareness or knowledge of the existence of the
subject firearm and ammunitions, it cannot be said that the petitioner has the intent to possess.

While absence of knowledge on the part of the petitioner cannot be established with absolute certainty in
this case, possibilities abound that constrain the Court to acquit the accused. It is both well settled and
elementary principle in criminal law that when the facts and evidence are susceptible to two or more
interpretations, one of which consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other with his guilt,
acquittal must ensue.[35] As in that case, the prosecution is regarded to not have hurdled the test of moral
certainty required for conviction.[36]
The overriding consideration in criminal prosecutions is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, in which case the Court is "under a long
standing injunction" to resolve the doubt in favor of the petitioner. [37] Where there is reasonable doubt,
presumption of innocence must be favored and the accused must be exonerated as a matter of right, even
though his innocence may not have been established.[38] This is a guarantee that no less that the
Constitution enshrines.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
June 21, 2017 and Resolution dated August 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38156 are
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jonathan Mendoza y Esguerra is ACQUITTED of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and J. Reyes, Jr.,[*] JJ., concur.

[*]
Designated as Additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 18-32.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Henri
Paul Inting, concurring; id. at 5-12.
[3]
Id. at 13.
[4]
Rendered by Judge Arcadio I. Manigbas; id. at 35-44.
[5]
Id. at 5-6.
[6]
Id. at 6.
[7]
Id. at 6-7.
[8]
Id. at 7.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id. at 7-8.
[13]
Id. at 8.
[14]
Id. at 6.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id. at 5-12.
[17]
Id. at 11-12.
[18]
Id. at 13.
[19]
Rollo, pp.70-71.
[20]
Estate of Margarita D. Cabacungan v. Laigo, et al., 671 Phil. 132, 146 (2011).
[21]
People v. Bansil, 364 Phil. 22, 31-32 (1999).
[22]
269 Phil. 225 (1990).
[23]
Id. at 232.
[24]
People v. Villareal, 706 Phil. 511, 517-518 (2013).
[25]
SEC. 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act,
confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau
therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two
hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be
extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from
the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
[26]
Luz v. People, 683 Phil. 399, 406 (2012).
[27]
TSN, April 30, 2009. p. 8.
[28]
People v. Ganguso, 320 Phil. 324, 335 (1995).
[29]
Jacaban v. People, 756 Phil. 523, 532 (2015); Gonzales v. CA, 343 Phil. 297, 305 (1997).
[30]
304 Phil. 118 (1994).
[31]
Id. at 130.
[32]
Jacaban v. People, supra note 29; People v. De Gracia, id.
[33]
People v. De Gracia, id. at 131-132.
[34]
Rollo, p. 8.
[35]
People v. Salidaga, 542 Phil. 295, 308-309 (2007).
[36]
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (1st Division), 357 Phil. 762, 783 (1998).
[37]
People v. Salidaga, supra note 35.
[38]
People v. Maraorao, 688 Phil. 458, 466-467 (2012).