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Predatory Pricing - Are we doing it right?

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Predatory Pricing
Are we doing it right?

Daniel Dale – s2812989

3312AFE
Economic Policy Analysis
Semester 2, 2016
3739 words

Executive Summary
The supermarket industry, like a number of other Australian industries, faces a
common oligopolistic market structure. In the supermarket industry we see a
strong pair of leading firms in Coles and Woolworths controlling approximately
70% of the market share collectively, with ALDI increasingly growing with
12.1%, IGA at 9.7%, and then a number of small local supermarkets making up
the remainder of the market. One of the issues with this market (and similar
markets) is the potential for firms with substantial market share to utilise their
power in the market and strengthen their market share through below-cost
predatory pricing to monopolise the market and then enjoy supernormal profits.

The regulation on predatory pricing was amended in 2007 in an attempt to

better protect smaller businesses from predatory behaviour from bigger firms
trying to restrict competitors or prevent firms from entering the market with
these amendments being interpreted as having strong political motives in the
wake of an election. In the supermarket industry, the market share trends
indicate there was no predatory pricing behaviour originally, and no obvious
reaction to the regulation amendments. This leads to questioning whether or not
the regulation is relevant to the supermarket industry. The controversial
amendment also raises questions about the interpretation of pro-competitive
behaviour between large players being restrictive to other competitors and
potential entrants who do not enjoy the same economies of scale. However the
ongoing growth of ALDI as they emerge as a potential main player proves that
any existing barriers can be overcome.

Questions should also be raised as to whether predatory or anti-competitive

strategies are being used by these companies in areas other than pricing
decisions. Could predatory bidding/buying be evident in the supplier market for
supermarkets? Should regulation put a higher focus on predatory strategies
being used to create a monopsony market? However these questions are not
broached in this paper, they are suggested for further analysis.

2
Contents

1.0 Introduction 2

2.0 Literature Review 3

3.0 Underlying Theories 5

3.1 Perfect Competition 5

3.2 Monopoly Market 6

3.3 Oligopoly Market 8

3.4 Predatory Pricing 9

4.0 Data 10

5.0 Analysis 12

6.0 Discussion of Findings 14

7.0 Conclusion 16

8.0 References 17

3
1.0 Introduction
There is a fine line between pro-competitive behaviour and anti-competitive
behaviour, one that is often blurred by firms and regulators alike. So where
should a business draw the line with price-cutting? Does a business that seeks to
increase their market share and find better economies of scale face incrimination
under predatory pricing legislation? Should an entity be blamed for a
competitor’s inability to maintain a competitive level with them? Do barriers to
entry caused by predatory behaviour that create an effective duopoly or
oligopoly lead to advantageous markets for consumers? These questions are just
a selection of those relevant to the amendments made to competition legislation,
dubbed ‘The Birdsville Amendment’.

This policy paper specifically analyses the supermarket industry to determine

whether the amendments to regulation were effective or even necessary outside
of their use as an incentive to motivate small businesses to support the Liberal-
National coalition in the 2007 election. The supermarket industry is an industry
that is often accused of harbouring firms that act in this predatory way, with the
two big players – Coles and Woolworths - often thought to be purposely
restricting smaller competitors from gaining market share.

The market shares of the supermarket industry will be analysed in order to

determine trends over the years surrounding the amendments made in the
regulation. If predatory pricing does exist in the market, it should be represented
in the trends in the market share. Following this, if the regulatory amendments
were effective, corrective trends should also be witnessed in the market share
data.

In light of recent events in the industry, the questions need to be asked as to

whether or not that Australian regulation is truly effective in preventing
predatory behaviour in pricing strategies in the supermarket industry? Or is it
discouraging competitive behaviour and natural market behaviour between
competing firms?

2
2.0 Literature Review

Predatory pricing is oft defined as the practice by a firm of temporarily charging

prices at a level below that of their costs in an act to eliminate or restrict
competition, with the plan to subsequently raise prices to supra-competitive
levels and recoup their losses, as well as increase profitability (Clarke, 2008;
International Competition Network, 2008). While the low prices that predatory
pricing brings about benefits consumers, these below-cost prices often push
smaller competitors out of the market, giving the dominant firm monopoly
power over the market, and then subsequently being able to raise their prices to
above-market levels to gain substantial profits (Federal Trade Commission; The
unkindest cuts, 2011). In Australia, the Trade Practices Act provides regulations
prohibiting predatory pricing under the umbrella of misuse of market power in
s.46(1), and also more specifically through recently added direct provisions in
s.46(1AA) (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission).

The predatory pricing legislation in the Trade Practices Act has seen some recent
controversial developments. Prior to recent amendments, the legislation
prohibited firms holding a significant level of market power from abusing this
power with the intent of eliminating/restricting an actual/potential competitor,
creating a preventative barrier to entry, or deterring the engagement of
competitive behavior in their industry (Ritter, 2005). An amendment was
brought about in 2007 in order to clarify certain parts of the legislation to aid the
Court’s interpretations in regards to the control the firm has over the market, the
consideration of sustained low cost pricing, as well as the necessity for the
market power to exist in the market in question (Trade Practices Legislation
Amendment (No 1) Act 2007).

In light of the looming 2007 federal election, Senator Barnaby Joyce led changes
to the amendment at the last minute in an attempt to appease small businesses
and ensure the LNPs reelection to Government (Terceiro, 2008). What has been
dubbed as ‘The Birdsville Amendment’, came about in response to these small
businesses concern that the current legislation was not effective, particularly
following the Boral Besser Masonry v ACCC case in which Boral was found to be
using predatory pricing, but not classed as having market power, and therefore
not abusing such power, and therefore not breaching the existing legislation
(Rigby, n.d.). This rushed adjustment to the aforementioned proposed
amendment saw the addition of s.46(1AA), which sees firms in breach of the
legislation when the following criteria are met:

• The firm has a substantial share of the market,

3
• They supply, or offer to supply, goods and services for a sustained period
for lower than the relevant cost
• They do this with the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a
competitor, preventing entry to the market, or deterring/preventing
competitive behaviour (Clarke, 2008).

These legislative amendments were interpreted differently by businesses of

varying sizes. While small businesses welcomed these changes and saw them as
security for them within their industries against predative behaviour from the
big players, those bigger firms which do have market power (such as Coles and
Woolworths in the supermarket industry) now see a threat to their actions that
may have otherwise been considered as competitive behaviour (Bradley and
Bath, 2013; Predatory pricing laws shock big operators, 2007). The main
controversial changes that were brought about were the removal of the
requirement of substantial market power and the taking advantage of such
power, the vagueness of the relevant cost used, and the purpose criteria
conflicting with general competitive behaviour and import competition (Clarke,
2008).

One of the biggest industries that this regulation aims to curb is that of the
supermarket industry, where two big firms, Coles and Woolworths, control
nearly 75% of the market (Bariacto and Di Nunzio, 2014). While Coles and
Woolworths participate in pro-competitive behaviour between each other, this
behaviour may result in causing detriment to other smaller competitors, and
preventing entry to the market, as can be seen in other industries in Australia
involving duopolies and oligopolies (Beaton-Wells, 2015). The question follows
then as to what should differentiate predatory pricing and pro-competitive
behaviour? And is it efficient to allow the existence of a duopoly such as that in
the supermarket industry?

4
3.0 Underlying Theories
3.1 Perfect Competition
The general theories behind market behaviours assume that markets are
efficient and perfect competition exists. The key factors that define the perfectly
competitive market are:

• The industry makes the price, and the firm takes the price
• There are no barriers to entry and therefore many firms
• Information is publicly available
• All inputs and outputs are homogenous across firms.

When operating in a perfectly competitive market, Pareto equilibrium is

witnessed in the supply and demand market and price is set by this equilibrium
in the market. In the short run, this price may occur at a point higher than firm’s
average total costs, resulting in profits higher than normal as shown in Figure
3.1.1.

Figure 3.1.1. Perfect competition in the short run. Reprinted from Perfect
Competition, Retrieved from
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Perfect_competition.html.

However in the long run, other firms will enter the market to take advantage of
these additional profits being made, and will then increase the supply of the
product. This increased supply will drive the equilibrium price down to the point
where the marginal cost of the firm is equal to their average total cost, at which
only normal profits are made, and there is no extra incentive to operate within
the market, as seen in Figure 3.1.2.

5
Figure 3.1.2. Perfect competition in the long run. Reprinted from Perfect
Competition, Retrieved from
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Perfect_competition.html.

3.2 Monopoly Market

The theory behind predatory pricing is that firms operate with anti-competitive
strategies in order to monopolise the market and create barriers to entry. By
using below-cost pricing at which others cannot compete, a firm may intend to
attract more consumers, increasing their market share and driving other firms
out of the market until they are the major or only firm in the market. When the
firm has been successful at obtaining monopoly power, where an artificial
barrier to entry is created due to this pricing strategy, other firms will not enter
the market as they cannot compete with the prices, especially considering
startup costs involved. Now that the monopoly firm has captured the market
share, it will also be enjoying substantial economies of scale due to higher
production. The firm can therefore raise their prices to achieve high super-
normal profits to subsidise their losses from their below-cost pricing strategy, as
well as continue to earn high profits. The firm will be able to achieve these
profits without challenge, as any firm that would want to enter the market would
face low economies of scale and would not be able to run profitably. In Figure
3.2.1 we see that a monopoly market still produces at a profit-maximising point
where MR=MC, but the relevant price level is higher than the average total cost,
creating super-normal profits in the shaded area.

6

Figure 3.2.1. Monopoly market. Reprinted from Monopolistic Competition, Retrieved
from http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Monopoly.html.

While monopolies bring about economies of scale and potential comparative

advantage for the country, the consumer is disadvantaged through restricted
choices, lower supply as controlled by the firm, higher prices than would exist in
a competitive market, and reduced consumer surplus. This reduced consumer
surplus is mostly gained by the monopoly firm, with the remainder being
attributed to deadweight loss. This lost surplus, as well as reduced producer
surplus can be seen in Figure 3.2.2 in the deadweight loss that exists in the
shaded area.

Figure 3.2.2. Deadweight loss in monopoly market. Reprinted from Monopolistic
Competition, Retrieved from
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Monopoly.html.

7
3.3 Oligopoly Market
Where there are a few strong firms in the market which each obtain a large
portion of the market share, and combined control the majority of the market, an
oligopoly or duopoly (two main firms) is present. In an oligopoly market, these
main firms can enjoy similar economies of scale as what is experienced in the
monopoly market, while still having competitive behaviour between these main
firms.

Figure 3.3.1. Kinked demand curve in oligopoly market. Reprinted from Oligopoly,
Retrieved from http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Oligopoly.html.

In an oligopoly, firms experience a kinked demand, as shown in Figure 3.3.1. This

kink will occur at the initial price in the market and represents the difficulty in
firms adopting independent pricing strategies. Where one firm chooses to raise
its price, demand is relatively elastic, that is other firms will not follow and the
firm will lose revenue. Where a firm decides to lower its price, other firms will
follow as demand is relatively inelastic, and all firms will lose revenue at the
lower price. The market will see the equilibrium price and quantity remain
stable despite small changes in the marginal cost as firms are unwilling to change
their price dues to these losses in revenue. The oligopoly market can be said to
be a cross between perfect competition, where firms are price-takers, while also
enjoying monopolistic benefits such as economies of scale and some barriers to
entry, as well as those larger firms experiencing some super-normal profits in
most situations.

8
3.4 Predatory Pricing
When operating in an oligopoly market, independent strategies are generally
ineffective. Similarly, in perfectly competitive markets, firms are price-takers and
cannot charge higher than the equilibrium price as consumers will just opt to
purchase the product from competitors at the equilibrium price. In these
markets, firms may seek profits that may exist in a monopoly market, and strive
to achieve this by using predatory pricing strategies. Predatory pricing sees a
firm, generally with an established portion of market share, reducing their prices
to a low level at or below cost price. The idea behind this behaviour is that other
firms will not be willing to suffer a loss in order to compete with these prices in
the market, and the firm will capture the majority of the market and drive
competitors out of the market. This results in a monopoly market where the firm
can then set their own prices, much higher than before, and be able to recoup
their losses and enjoy large profits, while creating barriers to entry through large
economies of scale. Figure 3.4.1 shows the price level that may be adopted in
predatory pricing, where the level is set at a point where the marginal cost is
below the average total cost, and then produced at the amount demanded at that
price level. Where the firm produces at this unprofitable amount, and encounters
a high marginal cost at that quantity, they are able to capture a much larger
share of the market.

Figure 3.4.1. Price level under predatory pricing. Reprinted from Predatory
Pricing and Oil Games, Retrieved from
http://alokeghosh.com/predatory-pricing-and-oil-games/.

9
4.0 Data
A number of observations can be witnessed in the market share data for the
supermarket industry over the eleven year period being analysed. Figures 4.1
and 4.2 show the market share of the industry from December 2005 through to
December 2015, with Figure 4.1 showing December 2005 to December 2013,
and Figure 4.2 showing December 2007 to December 2015. The data shows a fall
in Coles’ market share of approximately 7 percentage points from mid 2006 to
mid 2009, with a regain of part of that market share to 33%, followed by another
small drop and resurgence resulting to an end share of 32.5% in 2015.
Woolworths is shown as maintaining their market share over the same time,
being fairly consistent over the period of 2005 to early 2011, followed by a
steady fall of around 5 percentage points to end at a market share of 37.3% at
the end of 2015. Collectively, these two industry leaders have lost approximately
5 percentage points across this eleven year period, with the majority of that
being where Coles’ loss from 2006 to 2009.

Figure 4.1. Market share supermarket industry 2005 - 2013 Reprinted from
Market share narrows between Coles and Woolworths, while ALDI makes important
gains, Retrieved from
http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/5427-market-share-narrows-between-coles-
woolworths-while-aldi-makes-gains-201402120013/.

Meanwhile, the data shows steady growth for the ‘secondary competitors’ – ALDI
and IGA – with IGA becoming steady just under the 10% mark, and ALDI
continuing to enjoy growth to a share of 12.1%. The data also tells the story of
the remaining supermarkets in the market, which collectively enjoyed a 14.1%
market share at the beginning of the data period, and have become stable around
8% by the end of the data period. These ‘other supermarkets’ do see their decline

10
steadying between mid 2007 and early 2009 and also steadies around 8%
following mid 2011.

Figure 4.2. Market share supermarket industry 2007 - 2015. Reprinted from
Supermarket sweep: ALDI’s share of the Aussie market still rising, Retrieved from
http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6762-supermarket-sweep-aldis-share-of-
aussie-market-still-rising-201604142258/.

The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ data on price levels in the supermarket

industry does not indicate any changes in overall price levels for the
supermarket industry that reflect introduction of amendments to the regulation
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

11
5.0 Analysis
The data presented by Roy Morgan on the make-up of the supermarket industry
suggests a number of things. Firstly, there is no firm that controls a substantial
share of the market, rather there are two key players, Coles and Woolworths,
who together share approximately 70% of the market. These two firms are
joined by two secondary players, IGA and ALDI, who now control over 20% of
the market, as well as a collection of other minor supermarkets controlling the
remaining 10%. The supermarket industry appears to be acting as an oligopoly,
with Coles and Woolworths being two firms that can be considered to control the
market, similar to a duopoly market. As the collection of other supermarkets
reduces and some firms break away from this category, such as IGA and ALDI, to
capture more of the market for themselves, the market starts to reflect more of a
broad oligopoly with these players having more power.

Secondly, it would seem that most of the changes in Coles’ market share is
reflected in changes in Woolworths’ market share, and visa versa. While there is
a 5% overall reduction in their collective market share, most changes create an
opposite change in the other main competitor. This reflects the competitive
market within which Coles and Woolworths operate together. These two strong
forces compete against each other to claim each other’s market share, with the
data showing that consumers will move between the two, seeing each of them as
an easy replacement for the other.

Thirdly, IGA and ALDI have gained market share over the period analysed. ALDI
has increased their share from 2.9% to 12.1% over the period, while IGA has
seen growth from 5.9 to 9.7%. In the same time the remaining supermarkets
have decreased from 14.1% to 8.4%. The overall reduction in the collective
market share of Coles and Woolworths, as well as the reduction in the remaining
supermarkets contributed partly to the IGA increase, but mostly can be seen in
the rise of ALDI. ALDI has seen the largest change in market share with a nearly
10% swing over eleven years, and if it weren’t for the fact of the two overbearing
leaders in the market, may be seen as a firm on their way to market dominance.

Lastly, the only major changes to market share surrounding 2007 when
amendments were made to the predatory pricing regulation appear to be a
stagnation in the drop in the market share of the other supermarkets and in the
increase of market share of IGA, and also a fall in Coles’ market share. However
the fall in Coles’ market share is part of a long run, ongoing decline. As the trend
of Coles’ market share can be seen over five years, including the 18 months
preceding the amendments, it is suggested that the amendments had no impact
on their market share. As for the aforementioned plateau in the decreasing
market share of the other supermarkets category and in IGA’s increasing market
share, it could suggest the occurrence of predatory pricing in smaller local

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markets with IGA pitting themselves against local competitors. A further,
detailed investigation of the local markets would be necessary to conclude the
existence of this behaviour in those markets.

If predatory pricing were to exist in the market, it would be likely that one of the
big firms – Coles or Woolworths – were charging below cost prices to capture
more market share. For this behaviour to be considered as predatory pricing it
would need to be anti-competitive in nature, that is it would generally have to be
ongoing and consistent, which would result in ongoing growth in market share of
the offending firm, and declining share in a majority, if not all, other firms. This is
not evident in the markets before or after the amendments to regulation, as at
any point there is no one firm which is growing while other firms are declining. If
the behavior was evident in the market share data, effective regulation would
likely see some negative repercussion to market share of the offending firm, with
other firms recouping their market share, in response to firms adjusting their
behaviour to meet regulatory standards.

13
6.0 Discussion of Findings
The data presented, showing the changes in market share over an eleven year
period in which amendments were made to regulation, demonstrates an
oligopoly market. Within this oligopoly market approximately 70% of the market
share is divided between Coles and Woolworths. These two companies often act
as a pure duopoly, competing strongly against each other, which can be seen in
the correlated fluctuations in their market shares over time. Within the
remaining supermarkets we find two standouts, IGA and ALDI. ALDI’s market
share is growing as it continues to emerge as a potential competitor to the main
duopoly players with continuous growth over the period. The overall market
does not seem to constitute any market share trends that would suggest
predatory behavior or any reaction to the new predatory pricing regulation.
However, it may be important to analyse local markets to get a better
understanding of behaviours of different market structures across Australia.

The two key players, Coles and Woolworths, seem to hold a share of the market
separate from the rest of the industry. These two companies appear to be able to
compete with each other while ‘sharing’ their own market. The trends of these
companies’ respective market shares appear to have a correlating trend, in that
when one firm loses market share, this share is captured by the other firm. It
may be suggested that these two firms together (but not as a form of collusion)
operate in a way that creates a barrier to entry for other supermarkets, or
prevents other from enjoying substantial market shares similar to them. While
this may seem like predatory behavior, the regulation requires that the firms
intend to restrict competitors and create a barrier to entry by engaging in anti-
competitive behaviour, whereas Coles and Woolworths are engaging in pro-
competitive behaviour with each other. The continual growth of ALDI’s market
share makes it apparent that any potential barrier to entry created by the
duopoly of Coles and Woolworths is not an effective one. Recent occurrences in
the industry suggest that ALDI could be a real competitor for these two main
players

There is no evidence of any change in the market share of those firms with
substantial market share (Coles and Woolworths) in reaction to changes in
regulations. This is a strong indication that the amendments had little or no
effect on the industry, whether this is due to the previous regulation already
being successful in preventing the predatory strategies, or that the companies
simply did not want to, or were not effectively able to, utilize such strategies.
This analysis then proposes further questions, which also go hand-in-hand with
recent events in the industry. Do these firms utilize strategies even more
powerful than predatory pricing to gain profits? Is there evidence of predatory
buying/bidding in the industry? Should regulators be more concerned about the
emergence of monopsony markets? Is predatory buying/bidding a loophole that

14
allows these firms to apply pressure onto suppliers to avoid pricing decisions
being considered as below cost?

15
7.0 Conclusion
The supermarket industry is reflective of many industries in Australia, where a
few key players collectively dominate the oligopoly market amongst a number of
smaller competitors. The prominence of these markets attracts ever-changing
regulation to protect both consumers and competitors alike from firms trying to
take control of the market in a monopolistic fashion. Australian competition
regulation was amended in 2007 to ensure better protection of smaller
businesses in the light of some questionable rulings in predatory pricing cases.

In the supermarket industry, it appears that market shares have not changed in
light of these regulation changes. Where predatory pricing occurs, it is expected
that a market should see an increase in share for the predatory firm seeking
monopoly power, taking away from the market share of other firms. It follows
that increased regulation would change the behavior of the firm and see a
reversal of these changes over time. Neither of these trends are seen in the
market share changes over an eleven year period surrounding the amendments.

It would appear that the supermarket industry operates as a fairly efficient

market, with the two main levels acting in an extremely pro-competitive manner
between each other. This can sometimes create some barriers for other smaller
retailers, however this is not intentional and does not fall under the regulations.
Despite these barriers, we can see growth in some of the secondary
supermarkets, with ALDI continuing to experience strong growth and capturing
the market from Coles and Woolworths.

While this paper has raised a number of added questions regarding strategies
and regulation in the supermarket industry, it is apparent from the market share
data that predatory pricing does not exist in the market, whether recognized by
regulation or not. Furthermore, the amendments made in 2007 did not bring to
front any predatory behaviour in pricing strategies in the market.

16
8.0 References

Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2016). Retail Turnover, By Industry Group.

Retail Trade, Australia, Aug 2016. Retrieved from
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/8501.0Aug
2016?OpenDocument
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, (n.d.). Predatory pricing.
Retrieved from https://www.accc.gov.au/business/anti-competitive-
behaviour/predatory-pricing
Bariacto, N., & Di Nunzio, J. (2014). Market power in the Australian food system.
Future Directions International. Retrieved from
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Beaton-Wells, C. (2015). Harper Review: A mixed basket for Coles and
Woolworths. The Conversation. Retrieved from
http://theconversation.com/harper-review-a-mixed-basket-for-coles-
and-woolworths-39640
Bradley, M., & Bath, K. (2013). Australia: Petrol wars and predatory pricing – the
ACCC’s latest rant on the mega grocer duopoly. Retrieved from
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ces/Petrol+wars+and+predatory+pricing+the+ACCCs+latest+rant+on+th
e+mega+grocer+duopoly
Clarke, J. (2008). Australia’s radical predatory pricing reforms: What business
must know. Deakin Business Review, 1(1), 1-10. Retrieved from
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Economics Online (n.d.). Monopolies. Retrieved from
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Monopoly.html
Economics Online (n.d.). Oligopoly. Retrieved from
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Economics Online (n.d.). Perfect competition. Retrieved from
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Economics Online (n.d.). Predatory pricing. Retrieved from
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Federal Trade Commission, (n.d.). Predatory or below-cost pricing. Retrieved
from https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/predatory-or-below-cost
Ghosh, A. (2015). Predatory pricing and oil games. Retrieved from
http://alokeghosh.com/predatory-pricing-and-oil-games/

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International Competition Network, (2008). Report on predatory pricing.
Retrieved from
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Rigby, S. (n.d.). Predatory pricing: Lessons from Boral. Retrieved from
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between-coles-woolworths-while-aldi-makes-gains-201402120013
Roy Morgan Research (2016). Supermarket sweep: ALDI’s share of the Aussie
market still rising. Retrieved from:
http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6762-supermarket-sweep-aldis-
share-of-aussie-market-still-rising-201604142258
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