Dual-Aspect Monism

à la Pauli and Jung

Harald Atmanspacher

Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology, Freiburg

Collegium Helveticum, Zürich

Abstract
Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives
to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both as-
sume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also
differ in definitive ways. In the 20th century, variants of both positions
have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants,
the dual-aspect monism due to Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung,
will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in
the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and material aspects is
specified in terms of a complementarity. This sounds innocent, but en-
tails a number of peculiarities distinguishing their conjecture from other
approaches.

Contents
1 Dual-Aspect Monism 1
1.1 Dual-Aspect Monism Versus Neutral Monism . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Varieties of Dual-Aspect Monism from Science . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Complementary Dual Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 The Pauli-Jung Conjecture 7

2.1 Local Realism and Holism in the Material Domain . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Consciousness and the Unconscious
in the Mental Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Archetypes and Unus Mundus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Mind-Matter Correlations and Synchronicity . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Published in Journal of Consciousness Studies 19(9-10) (2012)

1 Dual-Aspect Monism
1.1 Dual-Aspect Monism Versus Neutral Monism
The classic starting point for most contemporary discussions of mind-matter
relations is Descartes’ ontologically conceived dualism of the mental (res cogi-
tans, thought) and the material (res extensa, extended matter). In the history
of philosophy, Descartes’ position was immediately upgraded, criticized, or re-
placed by essentially three forms of thought: (i) alternative dualistic approaches
(occasionalism, parallelism), (ii) essentially monistic approaches (idealism, ma-
terialism), and (iii) approaches combining (i) and (ii) by assuming a monistic
domain underlying the mind-matter distinction. An early protagonist of this
latter view is Baruch de Spinoza.
Spinoza’s monism provides an elegant and robust sense in which mind and
matter are related to a “unity of essence”. It does so by concatenating an onto-
logical monism with an epistemological dualism, yielding an overall worldview
in which both philosophy and the sciences can find appropriate places and mu-
tual relations. This framework began to be explicitly exploited in the mid 19th
century, by both philosophers and scientists, and today we can recognize two
main reactions to Spinozism, called dual-aspect monism1 and neutral monism.
Unfortunately, there is no authoritative delineation of the two – the many
versions of dual-aspect monism and neutral monism that are around today have
a tendency to blend into each other in ways that make clear assignments to one
or the other problematic. This can be seen in Stubenberg’s (2010) excellent
overview, see also Silberstein’s (2009) taxonomy and Seager’s (2009) discus-
sion, among others. There are important commonalities but also key differences
between dual-aspect monism and neutral monism:
1. For neutral monists both mind and matter reduce to an underlying, neu-
tral domain, while for dual-aspect monists mind and matter are two basic
and irreducible aspects of that underlying domain. In both frameworks,
the underlying, ontic domain (and its elements, respectively), is mostly
characterized as neither mental nor material.
2. For neutral monists mind and matter are separate insofar as particular
configurations of elements of the neutral domain underlie the mental while
other, distinct configurations of elements of the neutral domain underlie
the material. For dual-aspect monists the underlying, ontic domain man-
ifests itself generally and equally under both aspects, tied together insep-
arably. (There are different ways in which they are tied together, leading
to different types of duality, see Sec. 1.3.)
An interesting implication of these two criteria is that the aspects in dual-
aspect monism are not a priori given, but depend on epistemic issues and
1 Other terms for dual-aspect monism are dual-aspect theory or dual-aspect approach, and

frequently “dual” is replaced by “double”. It should also be mentioned that the restriction
to two aspects is a matter of simplicity rather than canonical. For instance, for Spinoza the
number of possible aspects is infinite.

1
contexts. Distinctions of aspects are generated by “epistemic splits” of the
distinction-free, unseparated underlying domain, and in principle there can be
as many aspects as there are contexts. This is at variance with neutral monism
where the mind-matter distinction is assumed to be preformed in the neutral
domain: particular configurations of neutral elements underlie the mental while
other, distinct configurations of neutral elements underlie the material.
Moreover, the two criteria entail an interesting further dividing line between
prevalent philosophical inclications toward the underlying domain. For dual-
aspect monists this domain is apprehensible only indirectly, through the as-
pects, while neutral monists deny this restriction. Therefore, it is natural for
dual-aspect monists to nurture metaphysical conceptions of the underlying do-
main, while neutral monists typically refer to direct, basic, pure, raw modes of
apprehending it, for instance experientially or phenomenologically.
Stubenberg’s (2010) review clearly supports this observation. Ernst Mach,
William James, and Bertrand Russell, the forefront of neutral monism, refer to
“sensation”, “pure experience”, and again “sensation”, respectively, concerning
the neutral domain, and these notions are redigested by other neutral monists
such as Avenarius, Petzoldt, Perry, Holt, Sayre etc. Their empirical, hence anti-
metaphysical, inclination explains why their notions of the neutral domain all
bear the risk of confusing the neutral with some mental capacity. Assuming
that the neutral can be apprehended directly, how could it be apprehended if
not mentally?
By contrast, dual-aspect monists do not hesitate to embrace ontology and
metaphysics. Since their underlying domain (substantial or processual) is con-
ceived of metaphysically, it cannot be apprehensible in any direct way but man-
ifests itself in its aspects. Beyond the well-known historical representatives of
dual-aspect monism such as Spinoza, Fechner, Schopenhauer, and others, a
number of scientists, notably physicists and psychologists, have explored the
dual-aspect route since the mid 20th century. Needless to say, none of their
attempts has resolved all aspects of the mind-matter relation. In the follow-
ing some of these approaches will be presented. The subsequent sections will
elaborate on one of them, due to Pauli and Jung, and outline how it may be
potentially viable.

1.2 Varieties of Dual-Aspect Monism from Science

Scientifically inspired versions of dual-aspect monism have been formulated,
discussed and developed, largely unnoticed by philosophers, in the second half
of the 20th century. One of them originated from the extensive collaboration of
the physicist Wolfgang Pauli and the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung, reviewed
in depth by Atmanspacher and Primas (2006, 2009). Another one was proposed
by David Bohm, whose collaborators Basil Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen continue
working on it. Related, more recent ideas, are due to Bernard d’Espagnat, a
French physicist, Hans Primas, a Swiss chemist, and Max Velmans, a British
psychologist.
Remarkably, these approaches are, in one way or another, attached to ideas

2
and notions that emerged during the development of quantum theory. In addi-
tion to the names just mentioned, quite a number of other physicists have been
interested in relating physical processes to mental acitivity. It is impossible to
review all of them in this article, hence the reader should consult a review of
quantum approaches to consciousness (Atmanspacher 2011) for more details.
The present article deliberately focuses on dual-aspect kinds of thinking.
Apart from his unsatisfying attempts to formulate hidden variables for quan-
tum theory, David Bohm also proposed a dual-aspect approach to mind and mat-
ter. His ideas about explicate and implicate order (Bohm 1980) are particularly
relevant in this context. While the notion of an explicate order characterizes an
empirically and, thus, epistemically accessible reality, the notion of an implicate
order refers to an ontic realm. Bohm refers to the mind-matter distinction at
the level of an explicate order, which is based on an implicate order without
that distinction (Bohm 1990):
At each level of subtlety there will be a “mental pole” and a “physical
pole” . . . But the deeper reality is something beyond either mind or mat-
ter, both of which are only aspects that serve as terms for analysis.

After Bohm’s death in 1992, Basil Hiley has further developed Bohm’s pro-
posal using the formal apparatus of representations (in the mathematical sense)
of algebraic structures which can be regarded as explications of an implicate
order. Specifying the general idea laid out by Bohm and Hiley (1993), Hiley
(2001) works with a pre-space (and pre-time) algebra and attempts to generate
space and time by representations of this algebra. Paavo Pylkkänen, a Finnish
philosopher, advances the idea that so-formulated implicate and explicate orders
are always implicate or explicate relative to a “higher” or “lower” level order,
respectively (Hiley and Pylkkänen 1996, Pylkkänen 2007).2
In his more recent contributions, Bernard d’Espagnat (1999, 2006) has made
explicit indications with respect to the mind-matter problem. He uses the no-
tion of “the Real”, an independent primordial reality that is neither mental
nor material. It is “veiled” insofar as it is inaccessible to direct empirical ex-
perience.3 But d’Espagnat (2006, p. 454) speculates about its influence on the
experience of empirical reality:
I believe in the existence of an “extended causality” that acts, not between
phenomena but on phenomena from “the Real”. Clearly, since, due to
nonseparability, the said “Real” may in no sensible way be considered
constituted of localized elements embedded in spacetime, this causality
vastly differs, not only from Kantian causality but also from Einsteinian
causality. Of course it does not invoke eventlike efficient causes ... but
it may involve structural causes ... which vaguely bring to mind Plato’s
Ideas – structures of “the Real”. ...
2 This can be compared to an ontological relativity, where levels within reality are always

ontic or epistemic relative to “higher” or “lower” levels, respectively (Quine 1969, Putnam
1987, Atmanspacher and Kronz 1999).
3 For detailed comments and discussions of d’Espagnat’s “veiled reality” see Bitbol (1998)

and Zwirn (2000), both in French.

3
According to the Veiled Reality conception, “the Real” is prior to mind-
matter splitting. This expression of course refers to the coemergence ...
of consciousness and empirical reality.

So, “the Real” can be accessed indirectly and fragmentarily from conscious
experience and physical empirical reality, with empirical tools of the mental
and the material, by carving out unseparated structures of “the Real” (and
altering them by this very act). We will see later on (in Secs. 2.2 and 2.3) how
close d’Espagnat’s “extended causality of the Real” is to the picture developed
by Pauli and Jung.
The interaction of Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, from 1932 to 1958,
is particularly fascinating because, in addition to its conceptual peculiarities, it
demonstrates some practical problems of communication that arise if the mind-
matter problem is addressed in concrete interaction among different disciplinary
frameworks. I will come back to some of these differences in detail below. A
most significant novel feature of the Pauli-Jung conjecture is the suggestion
that the dual (mental and material) aspects of the underlying domain should
be understood in terms of complementary aspects (Pauli 1952, p. 164):4
The general problem of the relation between psyche and physis, between
inside and outside, can hardly be regarded as solved by the term “psy-
chophysical parallelism” advanced in the last century. Yet, perhaps, mod-
ern science has brought us closer to a more satisfying conception of this
relationship, as it has established the notion of complementarity within
physics. It would be most satisfactory if physis and psyche could be con-
ceived as complementary aspects of the same reality.

And, in a letter to Rosenfeld of April 1, 1952 (von Meyenn 1996, p. 593),

Pauli writes:
For the invisible reality, of which we have small pieces of evidence in
both quantum physics and the psychology of the unconscious, a symbolic
psychophysical unitary language must ultimately be adequate, and this
is the distant goal to which I actually aspire. I am quite confident that
the final objective is the same, independent of whether one starts from
the psyche (ideas) or from physis (matter). Therefore, I consider the old
distinction between materialism and idealism as obsolete.

In these quotations, Pauli indicates the conceptual framework that he devel-

oped with Jung and at the same time rules out virtually all historical alterna-
tives (cf. (i) and (ii) in Sec. 1.1) to dual-aspect monism. Among the approaches
mentioned in this section, the Pauli-Jung conjecture is likely the one that offers
most details, mainly in the extensive correspondence between the two and with
others. That the Pauli-Jung framework of thinking might indeed be inspiring
even for philosophers is testified by Seager (2009, p. 88):
The genesis of Pauli’s dual-aspect theory fundamentally stems from his ap-
preciation of certain insights provided by quantum theory rather than any
4 This and all other originally German quotations by Pauli and Jung have been translated

by the author.

4
study of the history of philosophy. In fact, I think that Pauli’s quantum
approach adds a new and very interesting argument for the dual-aspect
account of the mind-matter relation which makes it of real philosophical
interest.

At present, there are at least two developments that might lead to genuine
progress in the spirit of mind and matter as complementary dual aspects. One
of them is the work of Hans Primas (2003, 2009), who discusses the mental
and material in terms of complementary notions of mental and material time.
The other one is the “reflexive monism” of Max Velmans (1991, 2009a,b), which
explicitly introduced the complementarity of dual aspects for the first time in a
psychologically based approach.

1.3 Complementary Dual Aspects

The notion of complementarity was originally coined by William James (1890,
p. 206) and adopted by some psychologists, for instance referring to the bistable
perception of ambiguous stimuli. Bohr imported it into physics, originally with
the purpose of replacing the term wave–particle duality, in his “Como Lecture”
in 1927 (Bohr 1928, p. 566). But his extensive later writings about comple-
mentarity make it clear (cf. Kalckar 1985, 1996; Favrholdt 1999) that Bohr’s
preeminent concern was to extend the idea of complementarity beyond physics.
In the same spirit, Pauli (1950, p. 79) advanced the opinion that the “issue
of complementarity within physics naturally leads beyond the narrow field of
physics to analogous conditions of human knowledge”.
According to Bernays (1948), there are two different types of complementar-
ity already in quantum physics. One of them refers to incompatible observables,
formally grounded in the non-commutativity of corresponding operators acting
on quantum states. This non-commutativity entails all kinds of typical quantum
features such as superpositions, quantum probabilities, indeterminism, uncer-
tainty relations, and the violation of Bell inequalities.5
The significant hallmark of this first kind of complementarity is that the
sequence in which two operations A, B are carried out makes a difference. This
is the case whenever the operation carried out first, A, changes the state on
which it acts in such a way that the second operation, B, leads to a result
different from what would have resulted had B been carried out first – briefly:
5 It is obvious that non-commuting operations abound in numerous situations beyond quan-

tum physics. An example is the combined effect of successive rotations of a rigid body with
respect to different axes on the orientation of the rotated body. A number of studies of eye
movement and body rotation, starting with Hepp (1990), explores this feature as a neuro-
physiological application of non-commutative rotations.
A “generalized quantum theory” in this spirit has been introduced by Atmanspacher et
al. (2002), see also Atmanspacher et al. (2006). Within this framework, non-commutative
operations have been successfully used to model the dynamics of bistable perception (At-
manspacher et al. 2004, Atmanspacher and Filk 2010). Indeed, it is to be expected that
mental systems, uncontrollably and irreproducibly changed by virtually every operation, are
paradigm examples for non-commutative behavior (cf. Sec. 4.7 in Atmanspacher 2011).

5
AB 6= BA. This is exactly the case for measurements of canonically conjugate
observables in quantum physics.
The second kind of complementarity according to Bernays opens up a wider
scope. It refers to conceptual issues such as the quantum physical complemen-
tarity of wave and particle pictures: Two descriptions are complementary if
they mutually exclude each other, yet are both necessary to describe a situa-
tion exhaustively. Complementarity in this sense refers to incompatible aspects
which cannot be combined in a single description based on a purely Boolean,
two-valued logic. This limitation of Boolean descriptions, which is clearly rec-
ognized in quantum theory, is also relevant beyond physics.6
In a logical system which is not Boolean, the complement of a proposition dif-
fers from its negation. Pertinent examples are the complement of belief, namely
doubt rather than disbelief (James), or the complement of benignity, namely
justness rather than malignity (Bohr). Moroever, it is in principle possible that
there is more than one single complement to a given proposition. For instance,
one can discuss the theological figure of trinity in terms of three complementary
entities. (The spin matrices in quantum theory are complementary in such a
threefold fashion as well.)
Formally speaking, descriptions are systems of propositions, and in this sense
descriptions can be complementary. Beim Graben and Atmanspacher (2009)
have discussed an entire hierarchy of relations among descriptions from com-
plementarity to incompatibility, incommensurability and incomparability (and
their opposites). The key to this classification is a description of the behavior
of a system based on partitions of its phase space. In this system-theoretical
picture, incompatible descriptions arise if partitions are, in a well-defined sense,
not chosen in a proper way. Atmanspacher and beim Graben (2007) speculated
that the patchwork-kind of disunity of psychology as a science might have to do
with this kind of incompatibility.
The feature of complementarity in a non-Boolean logic means that a proposi-
tion and its complement pertain to two aspects of a situation that are incompat-
ible. They are both together necessary to describe the situation exhaustively.
Neither one of them alone is sufficient, yet observing one of them in a given
empirical context excludes observing the other one in the same context. For a
dual-aspect monism, where the underlying domain is neither physical nor men-
tal (cf. Sec. 1.1), complementarity thus implies that either the physical or the
mental aspect is accessible in a given empirical context, although both of them
are necessary for a complete picture.
When Pauli (1952, p. 164) says that “it would be most satisfactory if physis
and psyche could be conceived as complementary aspects of the same reality”,
he proposes a dual-aspect monism precisely in this sense. Velmans (2009b), who
expands on Pauli’s speculation, points out that there are two distinct ways in
which events that we normally think of as physical relate to events that we nor-
mally think of as mental. Viewed from an external observer’s third-person per-
6 First applications of this idea to concrete examples are due to Aerts et al. (1993, 1994).

For a general account of partial Boolean algebras, i.e. Boolean subalgebras pasted together in
a non-Boolean way, see Primas (2007).

6
spective, phenomena in the external world can be thought of as physical, while
from the first-person perspective of a given subject they can also be thought
of as mental, being part of the subject’s experiential content – a relationship
that can be described in neutral monist terms. In contrast, the relationship
between the experiential content of a given subject’s mental state and an ex-
ternal observer’s data about that same subject’s corresponding brain activity is
considered to be complementary in the sense of dual-aspect monism.
As these relationships are explained in detail in Velmans (2012), I will not
elaborate on them here. But I should mention that at the epistemic level,
where first- and third-person perspectives are to be distinguished, Velmans’
first (neutral monist) scenario leads to a dual account where empirical access to
both physical and mental phenomena refers to the same “external” context. His
second scenario, on the other hand, yields a complementary account where either
physical or mental phenomena are empirically accessible due to the asymmetry
of “external” and “interior” contexts.
The latter scenario clearly refers to Bernays’ second interpretation: two com-
plementary descriptions mutually exclude each other although both together are
needed to describe the situation exhaustively. As emphasized in Sec. 1.1, the
underlying ontic level is conceived of as neither physical nor mental in both
scenarios, irrespective of the epistemic distinction between duality and comple-
mentarity.
Primas (2009) suggests replacing mind-matter complementarity as a general
relationship with a more restricted focus on mental time and physical time. His
picture consists of a timeless domain that splits into a domain with a tenseless
physical time, merely a parameter for dynamics, and a second domain with a
tensed mental time, with past, present and future. These time domains can be
formalized in such a way that they are complementary. A recent article by Filk
and von Müller (2007) indicates other interesting candidate topics, in addition
to time, for specifying a complementarity of mind and matter.

2 The Pauli-Jung Conjecture

Pauli and Jung began to think about mind-matter relations fairly soon after
they first met in 1932, but the intense interaction that led to their version of
dual-aspect monism happened after Pauli’s return from Princeton to Zurich in
1946. Their discussions were accompanied by an extensive exchange of ideas that
Pauli had with his colleague Fierz at Basel. Fortunately much of this material
is today accessible (in German) in von Meyenn’s masterful eight-volume edition
of Pauli’s correspondence.
Although neither Pauli nor Jung nor Fierz were strongly inclined to discuss
their ideas with contemporary academic philosophers (aside from only a few ex-
ceptions), their discussions had a distinctly philosophical flavor. However, their
usage of philosophical concepts and notions was unsystematic: It was typical
for them to avail themselves of the history of philosophy as they saw something
fit their position or intention. Nevertheless, their comprehensive letters yield

7
valuable information, allowing a fairly detailed reconstruction of their approach
in the landscape of philosophical positions. This applies in particular to how
their version of dual-aspect monism differs from neutral monism.
Pauli compares his and Jung’s views to Mach’s in a letter to Jung of March
31, 1953,7 and states “fundamental agreements” with Mach’s ideas. However,
he also distinguishes Mach’s neutral monism from his and Jung’s approach (von
Meyenn 1999, p. 96):
What Mach wanted, but what is not feasible, was the total elimination of
everything in the description of nature that is not detectable [feststellbar]
hic et nunc. But then one soon realizes that one does not understand any-
thing: neither that a psyche must be assigned to others as well (detectable
is always only one’s own) nor that different people talk about the same
(physical) object (Leibniz’s windowless monads). In order to satisfy the
requirements of both instinct and intellect, one must therefore introduce
structural elements of a cosmic order which are not detectable as such.

Interpreting “detectable” as (a precondition for) “apprehensible”, the term used

in Sec. 1.1 to delineate dual-aspect monism from neutral monism, this quotation
yields an idea of why Pauli favors the former over the latter. As we will see
below, the role of the postulated structural elements is then adopted by the
psychophysically neutral archetypes.8
In his copy of Russell’s book Human Knowledge – Its Scope and Limits of
1948, Pauli marked Russell’s credo (Russell 1948, p. 209):
My own belief is that the mental and the physical are not so disparate
as is generally thought. I should define mental occurrence as one which
someone knows otherwise than by inference; the distinction between men-
tal and the physical therefore belongs to the theory of knowledge and not
to metaphysics.

This is a clear formulation of the epistemic nature of the mind-matter distinc-

tion. Russell states that the mind-matter distinction does not exist in the ontic
domain (metaphysics), so that it does not make sense to speak of mind and
matter in this domain. And when, in The Analysis of Mind, Russell (1921,
p. 144) says that “both mind and matter are composed of a neutral-stuff which,
in isolation, is neither mental nor material”, he clearly expresses (cf. Sec. 1.1)
that the mental and the material emerge only in particular configurations of the
“neutral-stuff”.
In the following I will sketch the framework of dual-aspect monism à la Pauli
and Jung in four parts: (1) the relation between local realism and holism in
(quantum) physics, (2) the relation between consciousness and the unconscious
in Jung’s psychology, (3) the common, psychophysically neutral ground of both
7 See von Meyenn (1999), pp. 94–102. See also Jung’s reply of May 4, pp. 130–136, and

Pauli’s letter to Jaffé of April 1, pp. 104–105.

8 Here and for the rest of this paper, I will use the term “neutral” not only for the “neutral

domain” in “neutral monism” (as I did so far), but also for the psychophysically “neutral”
domain underlying the mind-matter distinction in Pauli’s and Jung’s dual-aspect monism.
The reason is that Pauli and Jung frequently used this term themselves.

8
the mental, conscious realm and the physical, local realm, and (4) the relation
between these realms as a consequence of or as mediated by their common
ground.

2.1 Local Realism and Holism in the Material Domain

One of the central problems, if not the problem, of quantum mechanics is the pro-
cess of measurement. Although much progress has been achieved with respect
to its understanding since the early days of quantum mechanics, the problem
is still not completely solved. However, empirical results and modern formula-
tions of quantum theory allow us to state it in a way that is more precise than
ever before. From a conceptual point of view, measurement can be viewed as
an intervention decomposing a system constituting an inseparable whole9 into
locally separate parts.
The empirical cornerstone of our understanding of this decomposition in-
volves so-called nonlocal correlations (Einstein et al. 1935, Bell 1964, Aspect
et al. 1982). They are generic in any system requiring a description in terms
of non-commuting observables. These correlations can be measured in suitable
experiments and indicate post festum that the measured system was in a holis-
tic state before measurement. Conceptually, this means that one can indirectly
infer knowledge about an unmeasured state by the result of a controlled inter-
vention into that state due to measurement. At the same time, this controlled
intervention entails that the observed system changes its state in a basically
uncontrollable way (Bohr 1935).
It is tempting to say that such nonlocal correlations correlate everything
with everything else, thus suggesting a holistic concept of reality through and
through. But this would be misleading without precise qualifications. Quantum
holism is only one among two reality concepts that modern quantum theory
requires. Equally important is the (“common sense”) concept of a local reality
which was considered to be the reality for centuries of physicists from Newton
to Einstein. As Bohr has emphasized over and over, local realism is unavoidable
for a proper description of experiments and their results by Boolean (yes-no)
propositions.
Today we know that both concepts together are necessary for a compre-
hensive description of reality, neither of them is sufficient on its own.10 In the
framework of algebraic quantum theory, the difference between them can be
mathematically formalized and clearly understood by two different state con-
cepts: those of ontic and epistemic states. This distinction, originally suggested
9 The notion of inseparability derives from the fact that, technically speaking, the state φ

of the system as a whole cannot be represented as a tensor product of the separate states φ1
and φ2 of the parts. A separation of φ into states φ1 and φ2 is possible, but this abolishes the
former state φ of the system as a whole and entails nonlocal correlations between the parts.
10 The core of the well-known Bohr-Einstein discussions in the 1920s and 1930s (Jammer

1974, Chaps. 5 and 6) can be traced down to the belief that only one of the mentioned concepts
of reality can be relevant. As far as I know neither Bohr nor Einstein ever explicitly addressed
the question of whether different concepts of reality might “simply” have different ranges of
relevance.

9
by Scheibe (1973), has turned out to be powerful and attractive for under-
standing the differences and similarities of various interpretational schemes in
quantum theory. A helpful source for more details in this regard is a compre-
hensive account of epistemic and ontic quantum realities by Atmanspacher and
Primas (2003).
While epistemic states are those states to which epistemic, i.e. empirical
access is possible by measurement (and observation in general), ontic states
are supposed to characterize the system independent of its observation and our
resulting knowledge.11 One may wonder why it is useful to have an ontic level
of description for which empirical (or operational) access is no option at all.
However, a most appealing feature at this ontic level is the existence of first
principles and universal laws that are unavailable in an epistemic description.
From such an ontic level, it is possible to deduce proper epistemic descriptions
given enough details – contexts as it were – about empirically given situations.
The distinction of ontic and epistemic states provides an important clue to
understand the distinction between a holistic and a local concept of reality.
Ontic states and associated intrinsic properties refer to the holistic concept of
reality and are operationally inaccessible, whereas epistemic states and associ-
ated contextual properties refer to a local concept of an operationally accessi-
ble reality. The process of measurement represents the link between the two.
Measurement suppresses the connectedness constituting a holistic reality and
generates approximately separate local objects constituting a local reality.
Although this is a fairly modern picture, it also has a conservative aspect:
Quantum theory as of today does not at any place refer to the mental world
of human observers, to their cognitive capabilities or psychological condition
in general. The standard view in quantum theory is that measurement should
be treated in terms of an interaction between an observed system and its en-
vironment, including the observing device(s). For instance, Heisenberg (1936)
was very explicit about this, talking about a “cut between the system to be
observed and the measuring devices”. And Pauli (1957) says: “As Heisenberg
has emphasized, quantum mechanics rests on a sharp cut between observer or
instrument of observation on one hand and the system observed on the other.”
In general, the idea is that any inanimate environment can be understood
as a “measuring device”, though in a non-intentional manner. No consciousness
is necessary for measuring a quantum state. On the other hand, as soon as
controlled experiments are considered, it is clear that issues like the design of
an experiment, the choice of observables of interest, or the interpretation of the
results of a measurement play crucial roles. They depend on decisions based on
the intentions of human observers and are not part of the formalism of quantum
theory.
In this context, Pauli speculated in a letter to Fierz of August 10, 1954 (von
Meyenn 1999, pp. 742–747):
11 In a more comprehensive picture, the concepts of epistemic and ontic states need to be

considered relative to a chosen descriptive framework. This leads to the notion of relative
onticity introduced by Atmanspacher and Kronz (1999).

10
It might be that matter, for instance considered from the perspective of
life, is not treated “properly” if it is observed as in quantum mechanics,
namely totally neglecting the inner state of the “observer”. (...) The well-
known “incompleteness” of quantum mechanics (Einstein) is certainly an
existing fact somehow-somewhere, but of course it cannot be removed
by reverting to classical field physics (that is only a “neurotic misunder-
standing” of Einstein), it has much more to do with holistic relationships
between “inside” and “outside” which contemporary science does not con-
tain.

However, consciousness is not an ingredient of physical measurements, no mat-

ter whether quantum or classical. In his privately distributed manuscript on
“modern examples of background physics”, Pauli (1948) emphasized that the
measurement problem “does not indicate an incompleteness of quantum the-
ory within physics but an incompleteness of physics within the totality of life.”
Pauli’s uneasiness with the status of science in general and physics in particular
was not an odd idea but a serious criticism of great relevance. The question is
how to turn it into viable research.

2.2 Consciousness and the Unconscious

in the Mental Domain
According to Pauli and Jung, the role which measurement plays as a link be-
tween local and holistic realities in physics is mirrored by the act in which
subjects become consciously aware of “local mental objects”, as it were, arising
from holistic unconscious contents in psychology.12 In this sense, which will be
discussed in detail below, they postulate a parallel transition from mental and
material holistic realisms to mental and material local realisms. This idea is
most clearly elaborated in Jung’s supplement to his On the Nature of the Psy-
che (Jung 1969).13 Let me first quote from a letter by Pauli which Jung cites
in footnote 130 in this supplement (Jung 1969, par. 439):14
... the epistemological situation regarding the concepts of “consciousness”
and the “unconscious” seems to offer a close analogy to the situation of
“complementarity” in physics, sketched below. On the one hand, the un-
conscious can only be made accessible in an indirect way by its (ordering)
influence on conscious contents, on the other hand every “observation of
12 I use the term of “local mental objects” to emphasize the analogy with local material

objects, meaning that neither of them are non-local in any holistic sense. More concretely, local
mental objects should be understood as distinct mental representations or categories endowed
with a Boolean structure. They can be formally defined in a phase space representation (van
Gelder 1998, Fell 2004).
13 The German original was first published as “Der Geist der Psychologie” in 1946, and later

revised and expanded (including the supplement) as “Theoretische Überlegungen zum Wesen
des Psychischen” in 1954.
14 This letter is contained neither in the published Pauli-Jung correspondence (Meier 1992)

nor in Pauli’s correspondence edition by von Meyenn. Since Jung presents the quotation with
the remark that Pauli “was gracious enough to look over the manuscript of my supplement”,
the letter is likely of 1954.

11
the unconscious”, i.e. every attempt to make unconscious contents con-
scious, has a prima facie uncontrollable reaction back onto these uncon-
scious contents themselves (as is well known, this precludes that the un-
conscious can be “exhaustively” brought to consciousness). The physicist
will per analogiam conclude that precisely this uncontrollable backlash of
the observing subject onto the unconscious limits the objective character
of its reality and, at the same time, provides it with some subjectivity. Al-
though, moreover, the position of the “cut” between consciousness and the
unconscious is (to a certain degree) up to the free choice of the “psycho-
logical experimenter”, the existence of this “cut” remains an inevitable
necessity. Thus, the “observed system” would, from the viewpoint of
psychology, not only consist of physical objects, but rather comprise the
unconscious as well, whereas the role of the “observing device” would be
ascribed to consciousness. The development of “microphysics” has unmis-
takably led to a remarkable convergence of its description of nature with
that of the new psychology: While the former, due to the fundamental sit-
uation known as “complementarity”, faces the impossiblity to eliminate
actions of observers by determinable corrections and must therefore in
principle relinquish the objective registration of all physical phenomena,
the latter could basically complement the merely subjective psychology
of consciousness by postulating the existence of an unconscious of largely
objective reality.

This commentary describes Pauli’s position in the framework of objective

and subjective aspects of the mental, a distinction that he adopted from Jung
quite early. Already in a letter to Kronig of August 3, 1934 (letter 380 in von
Meyenn 1985, pp. 340–341), he talks about the “autonomous activity of the soul”
as “something objectively psychical that cannot and should not be explained by
material causes.” Hence, the “objective reality” at the end of the quote refers
to the holistic reality, while the “subjective” relates to its contextual, epistemic
appearances.
It is important to emphasize that the relation between holistic and local
realms in both mental and material domains is conceived as bidirectional. Un-
conscious contents can become conscious, and simultaneously this very transi-
tion changes the unconscious left behind. Analogously, physical measurement
necessitates a decomposition of the holistic realm, and simultaneously this very
measurement changes the state of the system left behind. This picture, already
outlined in Pauli’s letter to Fierz of October 3, 1951 (von Meyenn 1996, p. 377),
represents a genuine interdependence between holistic and local domains. It can
entail mind-matter correlations via the holistic realm that occur in addition to
those correlations that are due to mere dual epistemic “manifestations” of that
realm.
In order to give the reader a sense of how Jung embedded the cited Pauli
quote in his text, here is the passage by Jung (1969, par. 439) in which it
appears:
The application of statistical laws to processes of atomic dimensions in
physics has a remarkable correspondence in psychology insofar as it pur-
sues the foundations of consciousness to the point where they dim out

12
into the inconceivable and where only effects of ordering influences onto
conscious contents can be detected [here the above footnote (HA)]. The
study of these effects leads to the peculiar fact that they emerge from an
unconscious objective reality which, however, at the same time appears to
be subjective and conscious. This way, the reality underlying the effects
of the unconscious comprises also the observing subject and is therefore of
unimaginable constitution. It is in fact both most intimately subjective
and most universally true, something that does not apply to conscious
contents of personalistic nature. The elusiveness, capriciousness, haziness
and uniqueness, with which the layperson connects the conception of the
psyche, only applies to consciousness, but not to the absolute unconscious.
The efficacious elements of the unconscious, to be defined not quantita-
tively but only qualitatively, the so-called archetypes, can therefore not
with certainty be designated as psychic.

“... can thereforer not with certainty be designated as psychic”: This peculiarly
cautious formulation is understandable due to the shift that Jung’s concep-
tion with respect to archetypes underwent from early ideas about (biological)
hereditary instincts over (psychological) raw feelings and inner images to his
final notion of psychophysically neutral, transcendental (or metaphysical) prin-
ciples. The early 1950s were the time when this move became visible in Jung’s
publications.15 Since his mature understanding of archetypes embraces both
individual subjective consciousness and the impersonal objective unconscious,
Jung invented the term “psychoid” to characterize them as structural principles
beyond the conscious psyche alone.

2.3 Archetypes and Unus Mundus

While the preceding subsections described the way in which Pauli and Jung
thought that epistemically accessible physical and mental domains refer to some-
thing ontic behind the mind-matter distinction, the present subsection adresses
this “background domain” itself. One of its key features is that empirical tools of
observation and measurement, as far as they are capable of providing knowledge
about it at all, can do this only in an indirect fashion.
From the point of view of physics this “background domain” refers to the
holistic state of a system prior to the transition to a measured state. From
the point of view of psychology it refers to the mentally unconscious prior to
the transition to a conscious state. Both transitions can be described as transi-
tions from a non-Boolean domain to domains with Boolean classifications based
on binary alternatives (cf. Primas 2007). In physics these appear as classical
states actualized due to measurements; in psychology they appear as actualized
distinct mental representations.
The simple but radical idea proposed by Pauli and Jung suggests a non-
Boolean background domain from which the mental and the material are sup-
15 The background of this development is an interesting topic in itself, which I cannot go

into in detail here. See for instance Roesler (2010), who sketches the conversions and meta-
morphoses of Jung’s ideas about archetypes.

13
posed to emerge as epistemically distinguishable. Although physics and psychol-
ogy point to their common basis in different ways, the basis itself is assumed to
be of unitary nature: a psychophysically neutral domain that is neither material
nor mental and describable by a non-Boolean neutral language. Of course, this
should be understood as a “caricature” of a much more complicated scheme,
with many unexplored details left open.
Already in 1948, Pauli expressed his predilection for such a psychophysically
neutral domain beneath (or beyond) the mental and the material in a letter to
Fierz:16
The ordering and regulating factors must be placed beyond the distinction
of “physical” and “psychic” – as Plato’s “ideas” share the notion of a
concept and of a force of nature (they create actions out of themselves). I
am very much in favor of referring to the “ordering” and “regulating” fac-
tors in terms of “archetypes”; but then it would be inadmissible to define
them as contents of the psyche. The mentioned inner images (“domi-
nant features of the collective unconscious” after Jung) are rather psychic
manifestations of the archetypes which, however, would also have to put
forth, create, condition anything lawlike in the behavior of the corporeal
world. The laws of this world would then be the physical manifestations
of the archetypes. . . . Each law of nature should then have an inner corre-
spondence and vice versa, even though this is not always directly visible
today.
Now, Jung’s psychology hosts quite a selection of archetypes, to which dif-
ferent degrees of unconscious depth can be ascribed. Among Jungians there
is agreement that the shadow and the anima/animus complex are the first,
and therefore least deep-seated archetypes with whose manifestations individu-
als typically become acquainted. Candidates for more fundamental archetypes
are the self, as the goal of the individuation process, and maybe most basic the
archetype of number, expressing qualitative principles like unity, duality, trinity,
quaternity, and so forth.
The notion proposed for the ontic, psychophysically neutral domain is the
unus mundus, the one world, a notion that Jung adopted from the physician
and alchemist Gerardus Dorneus (late 16th century). In his Mysterium Coni-
unctionis of 1955/56 Jung writes (Jung 1970, par. 767):
Undoubtedly the idea of the unus mundus is founded on the assumption
that the multiplicity of the empirical world rests on an underlying unity,
and that not two or more fundamentally different worlds exist side by side
or are mingled with one another. Rather, everything divided and different
belongs to one and the same world, which is not the world of sense but a
postulate ...
Replying to a letter with some quite private excursions by Pauli, Jung relates
the unus mundus to an inner unity of an individual self with the following
remarks (letter to Pauli of 15 December 1956; von Meyenn 2001, p. 800):
16 Letter by Pauli to Fierz of January 7, 1948, von Meyenn (1993), pp. 496–497. Note that

this early account by Pauli of psychophysical neutrality emphasizes the “ordering” influence
of archetypes and disregards the backreaction from the conscious onto the unconscious.

14
As soon as an individual has managed to unify the opposites within him-
self, nothing stands in the way of realizing both aspects of the world
objectively. The inner psychic dissection becomes replaced by a dissected
world view, which is unavoidable because without such discrimination no
conscious knowledge would be possible. In reality, however, there is no
dissected world: for a unified individual there is one “unus mundus”. He
must discriminate this one world in order to be capable of conceiving it,
but he must not forget that what he discriminates is always the one world,
and discrimination is a presupposition of consciousness.

In this sense, making a distinction is a primordial principle of every episte-

mology, sometimes called an epistemic split.17 In line with Jung’s quote above,
an entirely distinction-free state of affairs must indeed be associated with the
radically unconscious, to which there is no conscious epistemic access at all.
When the holistic unus mundus is split, correlations emerge between the
resulting domains. These correlations are remnants, as it were, of the wholeness
that is lost due to the distinction made. Splitting the unus mundus as the
holistic domain into mind and matter suggests ubiquitous correlations between
mental and material states. The next section will be devoted to this topic.

2.4 Mind-Matter Correlations and Synchronicity

Conceiving the mind-matter distinction in terms of a splitting of a psychophys-
ically neutral domain implies correlations between mind and matter as a direct
and generic consequence. It is important, though, to stress right at the outset
that these correlations are not due to causal interactions (in the sense of efficient
causation as usually looked for in science) between the mental and the material.
In a dual-aspect framework of thinking it would be wrong to interpret mind (or
mental states) as directly caused by matter (or material states) or vice versa.
Pauli and Jung discussed such correlations extensively in their correspon-
dence between June 1949 and February 1951 when Jung drafted his article on
“synchronicity” for the book that he published jointly with Pauli (Jung and
Pauli 1952). In a condensed form, two (or more) seemingly accidental, but not
necessarily simultaneous events are called synchronistic if the following three
conditions are satisfied.

1. Each pair of synchronistic events includes an internally conceived and an

externally perceived component.
2. Any presumption of a causal relationship between the events is absurd or
even inconceivable.
17 In somewhat more abstract terms, distinctions can be conceived as symmetry breakings.

Symmetries in this parlance are invariances under transformations. For instance the curvature
of a circle is invariant under rotations by any arbitrary angle. A circle thus exhibits complete
rotational symmetry. Symmetry breakings are a powerful mathematical tool in large parts of
theoretical physics, but we do not know better than by pure speculation which symmetries
must be ascribed to the unus mundus.

15
3. The events correspond with one another by a common meaning, often
expressed symbolically.

The first criterion makes clear that synchronistic phenomena are psychophys-
ical phenomena, intractable when dealing with mind or matter alone. The sec-
ond criterion repeats the inapplicability of causation in the narrow sense of a
conventional cause-and-effect-relation. And the third criterion suggests the con-
cept of meaning as a constructive way to characterize mind-matter correlations.
Since synchronistic phenomena are not necessarily temporally “synchronous”
(in the sense of “simultaneous”), synchronicity is a somewhat misleading term.
For this reason Pauli preferred to speak of “meaningful correspondences” (“Sinn-
korrespondenzen”) under the influence of an archetypal “acausal ordering”. He
considered both Jung’s synchronicity and the old teleological idea of finality (in
the general sense of a process oriented toward a goal) as particular instances of
such an acausal ordering which cannot be set up intentionally. In contrast, the
mathematical notion of “blind” chance (referring to stochastically accidental
events) might be considered as the limiting case of a meaningless correspon-
dence.
Similar to their idea of complementary notions of efficient causation and
meaningful correspondence, Pauli and Jung discussed a possible complementar-
ity of statistical limit theorems and singular synchronistic events. The upshot
of this proposal is that synchronistic phenomena cannot be corroborated by
statistical methods as they are usually applied. In a letter to Fierz of June 3,
1952, Pauli wrote (von Meyenn 1996, pp. 634–635):
... synchronistic phenomena ... elude being captured in natural “laws”
since they are not reproducible, i.e., unique, and are blurred by the statis-
tics of large numbers. By contrast, “acausalities” in physics are precisely
described by statistical laws (of large numbers).

And in his “Lecture to the Foreign People” (Atmanspacher et al. 1995, p. 326),
where he sketches some of his ideas about biological evolution, he states his
impression that
external physical circumstances on the one hand and corresponding adap-
tive hereditary alterations of genes (mutations) on the other are not con-
nected causally-reproducibly, but occur – correcting the “blind” chance
fluctuations of the mutations – meaningfully and purposefully as insep-
arable wholes together with the external circumstances.
According to this hypothesis, which differs from both Darwin’s and La-
marck’s conception, we encounter the requested third type of natural laws,
consisting of corrections of the fluctuations of chance due to meaningful
or purposeful coincidences of non-causally connected events.

What Pauli here postulates is a kind of lawful regularity beyond both deter-
ministic and statistical laws, based on the notion of meaning and, thus, entirely
outside the natural sciences of his time and also, more or less, of today. It re-
mains to be explored how this key issue of meaning can be implemented in an
expanded worldview not only comprising but rather exceeding both psychology

16
and physics. A comprehensive substantial account of psychophysical phenom-
ena needs to address them beyond the distinction of the psychological and the
physical.
For the mindset of a psychologist like Jung, the issue of meaning is of primary
significance anyway. For a long time, Jung insisted that the concept of syn-
chronicity should be reserved for cases of distinctly numinous character, when
the experience of meaning takes on existential dimensions. With this under-
standing synchronistic correlations would be extremely rare, thus contradicting
their supposedly generic nature. Only in later years, Jung opened up toward
the possibility that synchronicity might be a notion that should be conceived
as ubiquitous as indicated above (Jung 1969, par. 440):
As soon as a psychic content transgresses the threshold to consciousness,
its synchronistic byproducts disappear. Space and time resume their ac-
customed sway, and consciousness is again isolated in its subjectivity. This
is one of those cases which can best be captured by the term “comple-
mentarity”, known from physics. When an unconscious content trespasses
into consciousness, its synchronistic manifestation ceases and, conversely,
synchronistic phenomena can be elicited by putting a subject into an
unconscious state (trance). The same relation of complementarity can
be observed in those frequent medical cases in which particular clinical
symptoms disappear when their corresponding unconscious contents be-
come conscious. We also know that a number of psychosomatic phenom-
ena, otherwise outside the control of volition, can be induced by hypnosis,
i.e. by an attenuation of consciousness.

Meier (1975) has later amplified this idea in an article about psychosomatics
from a Jungian perspective.
In this regard, the development of Pauli’s and Jung’s views about archetypes
and their role in manifesting synchronicities suggests a distinction between two
different kinds of synchronistic events which I suggest to denote as “structural”
versus “induced”.18 Structural synchronicity refers to the role of archetypes
as ordering factors with a strictly unidirectional influence on the material and
the mental (Pauli’s letter to Fierz of 1948, see Sec. 2.3). Induced synchronicity
refers to the uncontrollable backreaction that changes of consciousness induce
in the unconscious and, consequently, in the physical world as well. This way,
the picture is extended to a bidirectional relation (Pauli’s letter to Jung of 1954,
see Sec. 2.2).
It is important to keep in mind that even in induced synchronicity, not only
in structural synchronicity, there is no direct causal relation from the mental to
the physical (i.e. no direct “mental causation”) or vice versa. The problem of an
“interaction” between categorically distinct regimes is thus avoided. Moreover,
I should stress that the “meaning” connecting synchronistic events, although
being subjectively ascribed (by the experiencing subject), is not completely
18 One may ask whether the term “synchronicity” is the best choice for them; as mentioned

above, Pauli proposed to replace it by “meaningful correspondence”. I am ready to adopt an

improved terminology, should one come up in the future.

17
arbitrary. It depends on the situation as a whole, including conditions that are
not consciously available to the subject.
Insofar as structural synchronicity defines a baseline of ordinarily robust
psychophysical correlations (such as mind-brain correlations or psychosomatic
correlations), induced synchronicity may be responsible for alterations and im-
pairments above or below this baseline (cf. Jung’s quote above). Correlations
above the baseline could be characterized as “salience” phenomena (Kapur 2003,
van Os 2009) where coincidences appear overemphasized, while correlations be-
low the baseline are experienced as dissociative with respect to ordinary corre-
lations.
The rich material of extraordinary psychophysiological correlations compre-
hensively reviewed by Kelly (2007) suggests various concrete applications of this
idea. Moreover, a recent statistical analysis of a huge body of documented cases
of extraordinary human experiences (Fach 2011) provides significant evidence
that such a framework of thinking fits existing empirical material surprisingly
well. In the present article, space limitations prohibit a more detailed discussion
of this direction of research. However, this will certainly be explored in more
detail in the future.

Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Hans Primas, Max Velmans, Karl von Meyenn, and Jiri Wack-
ermann for many inspiring and insightful discussions about the topics of this
article.

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