ERAN GUTER

The Good, the Bad, and the Vacuous: Wittgen

Modern and Future Musics

ABSTRACT

This article explains Wittgenstein's distinction between good, bad, and vacuous modern music which he intro
entry from January 27, 1931. I situate Wittgenstein's discussion in the context of Oswald Spengler's ideas
decline of Western culture, which informed Wittgenstein's philosophical progress during his middle period,
the music theory of Heinrich Schenker, and Wittgenstein's critique thereof, served as an immediate link bet
cultural pessimism and Wittgenstein's threefold distinction. I conclude that Wittgenstein's distinction b
vacuous modern music is analogous to Schenker's distinction between the compositional fallacies of the progr
reactionary composers of his time. Concomitantly, Wittgenstein's philosophically problematic notion of good
transcended the conceptual framework of both Schenker and Spengler. In this context, I examine Wittgen
on Gustav Mahler as well as his remark on the music of the future as monophony, which, I conclude, should
ultimately as an ellipsis of his much later view of musical meaning and intelligibility.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's impatience with the good,

mod-bad, and vacuous (2003, 66-69; henceforth
ern music of his time is well documented. He sug-
GBV). In this study I set out to answer a straight-
gested that Gustav Mahler's symphonies might be question: what did Wittgenstein mean by
forward
worthless and pondered whether the composer this threefold distinction? The answer, I argue, re-
should have burned them or else "done himself veals Wittgenstein's surprisingly nuanced, philo-
violence" (Wittgenstein 1998, 76), he thought that
sophically complex critical outlook on the modern
music of his time.
Alban Berg's music was scandalous (McGuinness
1988, 33), and he is on record as refusing to enter In
a the first section of my study, I offer an ex-
concert hall for a performance of selections fromegesis of GBV and introduce Wittgenstein's dis-
Richard Strauss' Salome (McGuinness 1988, 124). tinction between good, bad, and vacuous modern
David Pinsent, Wittgenstein's friend and compan- music.

ion during his first sojourn in Cambridge in the Sections n and ih set up the background for
years 1912-1913, noted in his diary the vehement my interpretation of GBV. In Section ii, I situate
arguments between Wittgenstein and his fellow Wittgenstein's outlook in the context of Oswald
students in Cambridge concerning modern music Spengler's ideas concerning the decline of West-
(Monk 1990, 78). Finally, in a sketch for a forward
ern culture. In Section m, I argue that the music
to a planned book titled Philosophical Remarks ,
theory of Heinrich Schenker serves as an imme-
Wittgenstein admitted that he approaches "what diate link between Spengler's cultural pessimism
is called modern music with the greatest mistrustand Wittgenstein's threefold distinction.
(without understanding its language)" (1998, 8). Sections iv and v closely examine Wittgen-
stein's assimilation of the views of Spengler and
In an interesting passage, a curious diary entry
from January 27, 1931, Wittgenstein suggested Schenker
a and his critique thereof. In Section iv,
distinction between three kinds of modern music: I argue that Wittgenstein drew the distinction
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73:4 Fall 2015
© 2015 The American Society for Aesthetics
426 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

between bad and vacuous modern music in a man- is familiar from Wittgenstein's various lectures on
ner reminiscent of Schenker's distinction between aesthetics in the 1930s, and it clearly pertains to
the progressive and reactionary composers of histhe cultural conditions of musical understanding
time. In Section v, I explain Wittgenstein's critique and intelligibility. According to Wittgenstein,
of the philosophical dogmatism of Spengler and we draw such similarities between the style of
Schenker, which results in a view of modern mu- composer and the style of a poet or a painter
sic, which I dub Wittgenstein's 'hybrid conceptionwho lived at the same time in order to make us
of musical decline.' hear the music with understanding (Wittgenstein
Sections vi and vii closely examine Wittgen-forthcoming).2 The point of drawing such similar-
stein's problematic notion of good modern music.ities for such a purpose is precisely that the two
In Section vi, I discuss Wittgenstein's complex re-artists belonged to and shared the same culture
marks concerning Gustav Mahler. In Section vii, (Wittgenstein 1966, 32 n.).
I explicate Wittgenstein's remark on the music of For Wittgenstein, the hidden connection,
the future, which, I argue, should be understood which is suggested by the pairing of Brahms and
ultimately as an ellipsis of his much later view ofKeller, cannot be asserted independently of the
musical meaning and intelligibility. actual hearing or playing of Brahms's music with
understanding which such pairing brings about
(Wittgenstein 1967a, 166). Understanding the
I. THREE KINDS OF MODERN MUSIC
music of Brahms may consist in finding a form of
verbal expression which we conceive as the verbal
On January 27, 1931, Wittgenstein wrote in his of the music (for example, 'Brahms
counterpoint
diary: is like Keller' or 'find Keller in Brahms!'). How-
ever, Wittgenstein's point is that "what happened
The music of all periods [the music of the past] always when the understanding came was that I found
appropriates certain maxims of the good and the right the word which seemed to sum it up" (1967a, 167;
of its own time. In this way we recognize the principles compare Wittgenstein 1998, 59-60). This sort of
of Keller in Brahms etc etc. And for that reason [good] cultural cohesion, exemplified by our intransitive
music, which is being conceived today or that has been understanding of Keller in Brahms (Wittgenstein
conceived recently, which is therefore modern, seems ab- 1974, 79), 3 wherein music interacts with "the
surd; for if it corresponds to any of the maxims that are rhythm of our language, of our thinking and feel-
articulated today, then it must be rubbish. This sentence ing" (Wittgenstein 1998, 59-60), is precisely that
is not easy to understand but it is so: no one is astute which seems to have been lost, in Wittgenstein's
enough to formulate today what is correct, and all for- view, in the transition to the modern.4
mulations, maxims, which are articulated are nonsense Modern music, that is, music which is being con-
[Unsinn]. The truth would sound entirely paradoxical to ceived amidst "a dissolution of the resemblances
all people. And the composer who feels this within him which unite a [culture's] ways of life" (Wright
must confront with this feeling everything that is [now] 1982, 116-117), is bound to seem deficient, or ab-
articulated and therefore [his music] must appear by the surd, Wittgenstein maintains in GBV. It is cru-
present standards absurd, timid [blödsinnig]. But not ab- cial to carefully delineate the absurdity, or rather
surd in a dressed-up sense (for after all, this is basically absurdities, involved here. At the heart of GBV
what corresponds to the present attitude) but vacuous we find Wittgenstein's conviction that the tran-
[Nichtssagend]. Labor is an example of this where he cre- sition to the modern shows itself in some sort
ated something really significant as in some few pieces. of constraint- inability to conceptualize the tran-
(Wittgenstein 2003, 66-69)1 sition away from the kind of cultural cohesion,
which the 'Keller-in-Brahms' example epitomizes.
Wittgenstein begins with a certain idea of cultural There is something to be grasped, for sure, but,
cohesion: music shows an affinity to other human Wittgenstein maintains, we are not astute enough
practices and cultural artifacts of its period. It to conceptualize it. The kind of cleverness, which
manifests mutual attunement, to use Stanley we seem to lack according to Wittgenstein, is not
Cavell's locution (1982, 131-132). The example a matter of mental capacity but rather a matter of
of recognizing the principles of the Swiss author education and tradition- acquired ability to com-
Gottfried Keller in the music of Johannes Brahms prehend cultural codes (compare Wittgenstein
Guter The Good, the Bad, and the Vacuous 427

1966, 25-26). We have become Thusconstrained by of

there is yet another kind in-absurdity hov-
commensurability between ering over GBV
us and the andpast;
anotherhence
notion of modern
we get a paradox: even if we music to be entertained:
knew the 'truth,'good modern
we music. This
probably would not have been able to
is, paradoxically, compre-
the philosophical afterimage of
hend it. Wittgenstein's irony in has
that which GBV isbeen
not yet glaring:
gained: a modern mu-
"The truth would sound entirely sic which paradoxical
is courageous (rathertothanallbeing merely
people." outrageous or timorous) in its striving to penetrate
For Wittgenstein, this condition is the onset for through what appears as dissolution of the resem-
a bifurcation and a conceptual tension in mod- blances which unite this culture's ways of life by
ern music: two sorts of music which correspond rendering this condition as expressible and intran-
to two sorts of cultural absurdity. There is music sitively understandable. While this philosophically
which consists in a constraint on seeing that we do problematic possibility remains muted in GBV ,
not comprehend (hence unsinnig , or nonsensical), Wittgenstein approached it on other occasions, as
and there is another sort of music which consists I argue in Sections v through vii below.
in a constraint on seeing what we do not com-
prehend, on seeing through (hence blödsinnig , or
timid, diffident).5 The first sort of modern musicII. OSWALD SPENGLER: SHARED CONCERNS
corresponds to the nonsensical maxims and for-
mulations which are actually articulated in con-We need to situate GBV in its proper
temporary (Western) life. Such music is absurdlectual context. In the spring of 1930, Wit
in a superficially attractive sense, and it is rub-stein read Oswald Spengler's two-volume
bish, says Wittgenstein. The other kind consists innum opus, The Decline of the West (1939). O
denouncing such nonsensical maxims and formu-6, 1930, some eight months before penning
lation, but it ends up being vacuous, or vacant- Wittgenstein wrote in his diary: "Reading
absurd, for sure, but only because it cannot passgler Decline etc. & in spite of many irrespon
as absurd in the other, "dressed-up" sense whichities in the particulars, find many real, sign
enjoys some sort of social acceptance. Such vac- thoughts. Much, perhaps most of it, is comp
uous modern music bespeaks shortsightedness. Itin touch with what I have often thought m
gropes for something that it cannot express. This is (2003, 25; compare 1998, 16).
the genuine, albeit limited- in a sense, myopic- Reading Spengler at that particular stag
significance which Wittgenstein attached in GBVonly had a significant impact on the emer
to some of the works of the blind organist Josef and formulation of some of the most distinctive
Labor.6 methodological aspects of Wittgenstein's later
Wittgenstein clearly distinguished in GBVphilosophy, but it also afforded historically
between bad (nonsensical) modern music andinformed cultural pessimism which remained
vacuous (timid) modern music. He was highly inseparable from these methodological aspects
dismissive of the former and critical of the latter,(Wright 1982; Cavell 1988, 1989; DeAngelis
albeit being sympathetic to the music of Josef 2007; Lurie 2012). Spengler's brand of cultural
Labor. Yet Wittgenstein's text does not give inpessimism is particularly evident in Wittgenstein's
to a false dichotomy between just the bad and remarks on art and on music from 1930 onward.
the vacuous. GBF begins by asserting what 'goodA striking example can be found early on, in
music' means in the present context: good musicWittgenstein's outline for a forward to Philosoph-
is good by virtue of its being emblematic of itsical Remarks (written on November 6, 1930), in
time, as demonstrated in its affinity to otherwhich he expressed his alienation from the spirit
human practices and cultural artifacts of the of European and American civilization, lamented
period, and the intransitive understanding whichthe disappearance of the arts, and mentioned his
ensues. It ends by pointing out the significancegreat mistrust of modern music (1998, 8). This line
of at least some vacuous modern music: such persisted in Wittgenstein's 1938 lectures on aes-
music may embody an awareness of our built-in thetics in which he not only commented on the de-
contemporary limitation to conceive modern terioration of high culture but also characterized
music that is good in that particular sense.7 artistic decline in terms of a breakdown of artistic
428 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

necessity related to the reproduction sion of a culture's essence, of thus

artifacts
manifesting as
and a corresponding deterioration a prime symbol ofin thatsensitivity,
culture. The importance
which he claimed leads to of these broad convictions for an(1966,
indifference account of mu-22;
compare Spengler 1939, 293-295, sical decline is quitevol. 1).while the former
obvious:
Spengler was highly critical of of
(the profundity modern music,
music) imbues the signs of such
which for him was nothing decline with morea culturalthan
acuteness,"faked
the latter (the
music, filled with artificial profunditynoisiness
of genius) lendsof
themmassed
a general form,
instruments" (1939, 194, vol.
namely, the 1). However,
dilution the
or marginalization of genius,
case against modern music, manifested
for in overintellectualized
Spengler as tinkering
well as and
for Wittgenstein, rested Mannerist on two broad convictions
reproduction.
concerning the decline of Western music, which
they shared.
First, Wittgenstein shared with Spengler the III. HEINRICH SCHENKER: THE MISSING LINK

conviction that in Western culture, music enjoys

an exalted status among the arts, reflecting human Wittgenstein could not have gleaned from S
concerns broader than any of its sister arts. This gler any theory of musical decline that enc
was in fact a commonplace feature of Romantic passes a general theory of music. Spengler's
thinking. Wittgenstein tacitly accepted this idea parative morphology of cultures had an ent
(1998, 11). Spengler pronounced this idea very different focus: his proof of musical declin
clearly in his writings. For Spengler, music is a the West was based on a comparison bet
reflection of the Western soul, its prime symbol, the development of Western music and th
the ideal medium for expressing the Faustian ideal other cultures and at other times. The ques
of striving toward infinite space. arises whether there was anything that une
Another shared conviction concerned the key ocally linked Spengler's cultural pessimism
idea of 'genius.' Of course, this idea is also Wittgenstein's concrete view of music, whic
deeply entrenched in Romantic literature and has find in GBV. Here, I suggest, we should turn t
become a commonplace feature of nineteenth- Austrian music theorist and music critic Heinrich
century thinking about music. Here Wittgen- Schenker.
stein's remarks, many of them collected in Culture Wittgenstein showed interest in Schenker's the-
and Value (1998), are quite explicit- albeit irre- ory and at some point even became familiar with it,
deemably entangled with his misgivings about the albeit by proxy (Guter 2004, 192-213; Guter 2011,
Jewish spirit (Lurie 2012, 43-52). Picking up and 117-128). This interest was kindled by the mu-
developing certain threads from Arthur Schopen- sicologist Felix Salzer, who was Ludwig Wittgen-
hauer's and Otto Weininger's arguments, Wittgen- stein's nephew (son of Helene Salzer née Wittgen-
stein contended that genius is talent embedded in stein, Lud wig's sister). Salzer began his studies
a strong character and that character (as opposed with Heinrich Schenker in 1931. He and two
to mere intellect) manifests the basic natural core other students of Schenker formed a research
of human beings, as it allows all that is singu- seminar that met weekly to discuss Schenker's
lar and authentic about the individual to shine ideas. Upon the dissolution of the seminar in
through. According to Wittgenstein, genius takes 1934, Salzer began private study with Schenker.
courage (1998, 40). Mere talent, which hinges Wittgenstein and Salzer spent some time together
discussing Salzer's own work and the music the-
upon mere intellect, is reproductive and abstract.
Courageously true to itself, artistic genius hasory
the of Schenker. These discussions began in 1926,
four
ability to contribute to the spiritual progression of years before Wittgenstein's first encounter
a culture by imbuing it with works of art thatwithare Spengler's Decline of the West , and contin-
both powerful and meaningful by virtue of their ued into the early 1930s during summers at the
authentic expression of human life. Hochreit , the Wittgenstein family country estate.
Salzer reported that Wittgenstein's judgment of
Spengler similarly conceived of genius in terms
of a conscious- albeit gracefully self-oblivious-Schenker's view of music was not entirely nega-
expression of the soul or spirit of humankind. tive.
In Apparently, in those conversations Wittgen-
stein was mostly interested in his own ideas on
Spengler's terms, artistic genius consists in a con-
sciousness that provides an unmediated expres- Schenker's theory.8
Guter The Good, the Bad, and the Vacuous 429

Schenker clearly maintained the and,

ground' broad con-
ultimately, to the
sical work
victions concerning the decline that digresses
of Western mu- from
sic, which Wittgenstein shared
harmonywith Spengler.9
(hence failing to demon
hierarchy
He firmly believed in the exalted which
status Schenkerian a
of mu-
is patently
sic among the arts. For Schenker, "in rejected
its linearby Schenk
progressions and comparable
ful,tonal events, or
superficial, music
altogether m
mirrors the human soul in cal depending
all its on the severity
metamorphoses
and moods" (Cook 1989, Schenker
420).seems
Heto also
have envisioned
upheld that his the-
the Romantic ideal of 'genius' as an
ory amounts to aessential fea-
fully fledged essentialist account
of music, hence entailing
ture of all great music. In Schenker's terms, in practice
mu-a clear de-
marcation between
sical genius consists in the artist's bona fide
ability tocases of music and
tran-
scend one's own individual what
will,is toso that the
be regarded, in lieuwork
of a better term, as
nonmusic.10
of music, as it were, speaks through the artist, who
Schenker's criticism
unwittingly and quite spontaneously of modern
serves asmusic
a was
medium. For Schenker, the scathing
self-realization of "Today's
across the board. the generation
genius in the masterworks of even lacks the ability
Western music just is
to the
understand the ex-
realization of human spirit. isting technique of the masters, which would be
Yet Schenker provided alsorequired as the first theory
a formidable step toward any kind of
of musical decline. According progress," he wrote. "The
to Nicholas Cook,proudest products of
Richard Strauss are inferior-
Schenker had "an almost metaphysical in terms of true mu-
conception
of music being a temporal unfolding of the
sical spirit and authentic innerover-
complexity of tex-
ture, form, and articulation-
tone series which exists as simultaneity in all to a string quartet
natu-
ral sounds. More specifically, Schenker
by Haydn, sawgrace
in which external music
hides the inner
as the temporal unfolding, or prolongation
complexity, just as color and,fragrance
of the of a flower
render mysterious
major triad- the "chord of nature," as he to humans
called the undiscovered,
it,
great partials
since it exists as the first five miracle of creation"
of the (1987, over-
xxi).11 Schenker's
tone series, and which Schenkertheory gave therefore
him concrete means saw as to di-
by which
agnose the
a specially privileged formation and disintegration
indeedofat musical
the culture on
point of junction between all what exists to
fronts. Irreverence inthenature
laws of tonal effect,
as a simultaneity and what among exists in art
performers as a tem-
and composers alike, reflected,
so he believed, a loss
poral process" (1994, 39). According toof Schenker,
musical instinct for the in-
all works of music (in particular all masterworks)
ner complexities of the masterworks of Western
music, which in turnon
are, in a sense, extended commentaries hindered
thethe ma-musician's al-
jor triad. In effect, Schenker's theory
most sacred mission embodies
to provide access an to the world
attempt to describe musical of human experience
thinking contained
itself: itinde-
such master-
scribes how we keep this "privileged
works (Snarrenebergformation"
1997, 145-150).
in mind over a period of time and how we inter-
pret configurations of notes as contributing to the
continuity of that cognition. IV. WITTGENSTEIN'S ASSIMILATION OF SPENGLER AND
However, since the major triad
SCHENKER is in itself static

and since music is a temporal art, the most back-

ground formation from which Returning any nowcomposition
to Wittgenstein's threefold disti
can be directly derived is the triad in
tion between good, motion,
bad, and vacuous as modern m
represented in Schenker's idea sic in GBVof ,Ursatz
we can see(funda-
that the last two kinds m
mental structure). This fundamental
neatly onto the structure
familiar terrain isof the very sim
famously shown in the formations
lar worldviews of of Schenker's
Spengler and Schenker, expre
bass arpeggiation of tonic-dominant-tonic (I-V-
ing Schenker's technical interpretation of them
I; Schenker 1979, 4-5, Figure which1). are According
best associated with to Spengler's Decl
Schenkerian analysis, the quality
of the West.of a musical work
depends on whether it has Accordingthe type of expan-
to Wittgenstein, bad modern mu-
sion ('middle ground' layers) sic is that
conceived could connect
in accordance with prevailing
its surface or 'foreground' to a constant
contemporary principles, which 'back-
are equally ill
430 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

conceived. Most probably, music Wittgenstein

is the product refers of repr
here to the predominant first maxim and offoremost
progress,evidence for
hence a lack
which he had the deepest mistrust, and not of character
just be- an
cause of its impact on the (43-44).
disappearance The adjectiveof the arts 'timid'
(Wittgenstein 1998, 8, 64). Such was indeed
Wittgenstein used inthe GBV in
case with those who during ize the suchfirst music two decades
making, captu
of the twentieth century theseclaimed times," to emancipate
Wittgenstein w
dissonance in the name of ters progress:
simply Wittgenstein
turn away from
clearly had no patience for & towards their senseless other things" mu- (8)
sical gesticulations, which such Schenkeťs
a composer theory to the ex- pred
plains as symptomatic of rary themaxims inability of these
is commendable
composers to bind their empty
flaccid; sonorities together
it lacks "connection w
as elaborations of a single compare
chord. Thus, 43). And for exam- it exacts a
ple, Schenker accused Richard
modern, Strauss it is bound of trying to appear
to mask the primitive design In the offinal his musicanalysis, with Wittge
heavy orchestration, with the noisenoble and yet polyphonic
vacuous rehash
clatter, and of resorting conservative
to vulgar, extramusical composer and t
narratives in order to solvetinkeringproblems with of harmony
musical of
continuity. For both Schenker
poser, and consideringWittgenstein, them both
such progressive music was sical decline.
plain "rubbish," that
is, something which, insofar as it presents itself as
nonmusical clatter, is not interesting even from a
merely technical perspective- indeed
V. A HYBRID CONCEPTION an DECLINE
OF MUSICAL 'attrac-
tive absurd' for all the wrong reasons.
So far I have
The category of 'the vacuous' focused on Wittgenstein's
( Nichtssagend ), br
'the unattractive absurd,' agreement
is exemplified with Spengler inand GBVSchenker, w
by the music of Josef Labor.
clarifies his Asposition
I noted before,
concerning the distincti
it denotes the problematic,tweensomewhat
bad and vacuous modern music. Yetsitua-
tragic in or-
der to appreciate
tion of a composer who shuns the illusion the originality
and and peril
philosophic
force of Wittgenstein's
of progress and yet is patently barred from position and also to explain
artistic
the puzzling suggestion
greatness. Schenker was similarly concerned that one might with entertain
also the idea
classicist epigones and clearly didof goodnot modern
want music,com-we need to
consider the significance
posers to start imitating Brahms in any of superficial
Wittgenstein's depar-
ture from his intellectual
sense. Interestingly, Wittgenstein forerunners.
maintained that
"music came to a full stop As Garry Hagberg
with Brahms; pointed out,
and Schenker
even was
in Brahms I can begin to ultimately
hear"the the theorist most perfectly
sound of ma- tailored
chinery" (Rhees 1984, 112).to the tradition
Here against which Wittgenstein's
Wittgenstein ex-
presses a familiar train ofmethodological
thought revolution
heldis by reacting" (Hagberg
others,
ultimately traceable back 2011,to 393).13 Yet Wittgenstein'swho
Schenker, actual critique
felt of
that the great tradition ofSchenker was nuanced, resulting not in
Austro-German wholesale
music
had come to an end with rejection
Brahms.12 but rather in an original hybrid which
Wittgenstein's conceptionretains of vacuous
some measure modern
of cultural pessimism while
jettisoning the
music corresponds to Spengler's philosophical
worry thatdogmatism
when whicha
characterizes
culture enters its final phases the intellectual projects
(civilization), of both
artists
simply work with the hollow forms
Spengler and Schenker. of
In this the
section old
I explore
and explain whatits
culture, without understanding I propose to call Wittgenstein's
essence. For
'hybrid conception
Wittgenstein, ideas, including musical of musical ideas,
decline.' can
get worn out and be no longer usable. hybrid
In a nutshell, Wittgenstein's In fact,conception
he heard that from Labor of music
himselfdecline is this: Wittgenstein accepted
(Wittgenstein
Schenkeťs idea
1998, 24). Wittgenstein wrote that all good works of
ambivalently music
else-
where: "Labor's seriousness is a of
are exfoliations very late phenomenon,
a primal musical seri-
not as a preconception
ousness" (20). For Wittgenstein, vacuous to which everything
modern must
Guter The Good , the Bad, and the Vacuous 431

( Urbild
conform, but rather as a heuristic ) possesses,
device for to setting
the object that is viewed
in its light. It
actual works of music in surveyable is noteworthy
order within that both Spengler's
our way of looking at things. morphology of world history and Wittgenstein's
This nondogmatic,
antiessentialist position is a criticism thereof found sword:
double-edged their original inspiration
it undercuts both the purportedin Johann Wolfgangimplica-
practical von Goethe's morphologi-
tion of Schenker's theory as a calguide
method, toas manifest in his conception of the
composers
and performers, which was meant"primal plant," which was famously
to reverse mu- introduced in
sical decline, and the force ofGoethe's Italian Journey
Spengler's view (Goethe
as a 1992). The pur-
pose
prediction of the inevitability of of such
Goethe'sdecline.
morphological method was to
display the
Let us turn to the two explicit essential structure
references tothat is common to
Schenker in Wittgenstein's all Nachlass
natural species,(Wittgen-
to find unity in natural diversity.
stein 2000). 14 The first appears Goethe believed
in the thatNachlass
the investigation of "primal
in MS 153b, 60v-61r (1931), phenomena" where Wittgenstein
is the general aim of any endeavor
is arguing that the meaning in of natural
music science,
is and the notion
found in of 'prototype'
the criteria for the understanding ( Urbild )of wasthesupposed to denote a clear repre-
meaning.
He mentions "considering the sentation
piece of in
a single primal phenomenon, a step
Schenker's
way" as one such possible criterion. which was necessary Theinrefer-order to set the natural
ence en passant to Schenker's phenomena
theory in order.
of music is
telling not only because Wittgenstein In the 1930s, Wittgenstein
includesconsideredit himself
naturally among the reactions to be awhich
follower of enable
Goethe's ideasone
about the meta-
to distinguish between someone morphosis who hears
of plants with
in the realm of the philosophy
understanding and someoneofwho language (Wittgenstein
merely hearsand Weismann 2003,
but also because this very inclusion 311). However, his interpretation
goes against of Goethe's
Schenker's theoretical conviction that structural ideas was decisively antirealist: he denied the sta-
hearing of the sort promoted by his theory is the tus of primal phenomena as common ancestors to
prime- if not the sole proper- manifestation of all species (in any developmental, historical, or
musical understanding. This is perhaps one sense genetic sense) and restricted the notion of Ur-
in which Wittgenstein thought that Schenker's bild to a mere regulative idea, the primacy of
theory needed to be "boiled down," as he toldwhich is due to its heuristic use in providing the
Felix Salzer. "logical space" for all possible relevant instances
The second explicit reference to Schenker ap- (Baker and Hacker 2009, 307-334; Plaud 2010).
pears in 1933 in the so-called Big Typescript This made Wittgenstein highly critical of dogmatic
(Wittgenstein 2005, 204; 2000, TS 213, 259v). It is (namely,
a essentialist, metaphysical, and illusory,
handwritten comment, saying "Schenker's way ofin Wittgenstein's eyes) uses of 'prototypes' (Ur-
looking at music," which Wittgenstein jotted down bilder), wherein "the primary phenomenon is a
next to an important passage, where he introduced preconceived idea that takes possession of us"
the concept of 'family resemblance,' by means of (Wittgenstein 1977, 47, par. 230). He diagnosed
such improper uses of 'prototypes' not only in
a critique of Spengler's principle of comparative
Spengler but also in the ideas of James George
morphology of cultural epochs. The brevity of this
Frazer (Wittgenstein 1979, 8), Sigmund Freud
reference stands in inverse relation to its signif-
icance. Its relatively clear ideational background (Wittgenstein 1977, 47, par. 230), and also, I ar-
and its razor-sharp philosophical occasion render gue, Heinrich Schenker.
it lucid and complete enough to serve as our miss- As William DeAngelis pointed out, in the Big
ing link. Here we can witness at first hand that notTypescript Wittgenstein maintains that "Spengler
only did Wittgenstein perceive a structural anal- fails to keep in mind that his prototype is a concep-
ogy between Schenker's and Spengler's proof of tual construct and, so, has a very different status
musical decline, but he also utilized his critical an-
than the concrete, historical phenomena that it is
gle on Spengler's methodology vis-à-vis Schenker.framed to elucidate. . . . His suggestion seems to
In that passage from the Big Typescript ,be that the prototype itself be either dispensed
Wittgenstein reprimands Spengler's dogmatismwith or employed very differently" (DeAngelis
in sorting cultural epochs into families, ascribing2007, 18). Wittgenstein's point is that the concep-
properties which only the prototype or paradigmtual relations within the prototype, relations that
432 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

can be expressed as grammatical or

stein 1998, 30). This conceptual
is yet another sense, I sug-
necessities, need to characterize
gest, in which the whole
Wittgenstein may havediscus-
thought that
Schenker's
sion and determine its form; theory needs to
however, be "boiled
they do down."
not
and cannot shape the phenomena that
Wittgenstein came are
very close being
to stating this cri-
discussed. "The only way namely
tique for
of Schenker in uswhich
a lecture, to heavoid
delivered
prejudice- or vacuity in our claims,"
in Cambridge Wittgenstein
on May 22, 1933:
wrote in 1937, "is to posit the ideal as what it is,
namely as an object of comparison- aPflanzen
Goethe in Metamorphose der measuring
, suggests that all
rod as it were -within our plants
way of looking
are variations at things
on a theme. What is the theme? ,
& not as a preconception to which
Goethe says "They everything must
all point to a hidden law." But you
conform" (1998, 30; compare 31).
wouldn't ask: What is the law? That they point, is all
Wittgenstein's critique impinges
there is to it. directly on
the philosophical dogmatism
Darwin madeof Schenker's
a hypothesis the-
to account for this.
ory of music. The Schenkerian
But you might treat Ursatz , the
it quite differently. Yourep-
might say
resentation of the primal
what ismusical phenomenon
satisfactory in Darwin is not the hypothesis, but
which has been conceived
the puttingto encapsulate
the facts in a system- helping us tothe
overlook
them.
essence of tonality, is another example of an ill-
conceived, dogmatic useYou of may the idea
ask: What of Urbild.
is in common to all music from
Hence Schenker's mistake is to
Palestrina in the
Brahms? Andway
one mightthat
answer: Theyhe start
extends the scope of statements true& of
from tonic, go to dominant, returntonality
to tonic. (Wittgen-
(in its prearticulated form) to particular instances
stein forthcoming)16
of tonal music.
The upshot of Wittgenstein's critique of Wittgenstein is actually tracing the route leading
Schenker is this: Wittgenstein is committed to from his critique of Goethe's primal phenomenon
Schenker's view concerning tonality, and he also to his critical view of Schenker's treatment of
maintains that various musical instances may bear the primal phenomenon of Western music, albeit
a greater or lesser family resemblance to one an- without naming the latter.17 Again, the upshot
other, to the extent of excluding certain instances. is clear: The great works of Western music point
Yet Wittgenstein is bound to deny that the gen- at Schenker's prototype, but "that they point,
eral validity of the concept of tonality depends on is all there is to it" (Wittgenstein forthcoming).
the claim that everything that is true only of the Like in the case of Darwin, what is satisfactory in
abstract Schenkerian Ursatz must hold true also Schenker (for Wittgenstein) is not the hypothesis
for any musical instance under consideration.15 that was made to account for musical coherence
For Wittgenstein, tonality- the way we experi- but the putting of actual works of music in a
ence and express certain relationships between system, rendering them surveyable.18
musical tones- is affected by the way we recog- But this also means that Wittgenstein has in fact
nize and describe things and ultimately by the kind unleashed some genuine Spenglerian pessimism
of beings we are, the purposes we have, our shared on whatever hope Schenker's theory may have re-
discriminatory capacities, and certain general fea- tained in the face of musical decline. As Byron
tures of the world we inhabit. The preconditions Almén pointed out, "because of [their] method-
of musical intelligibility are found in grammar. ological differences, it is clear why Schenker would
When the prototype is clearly presented for actively seek to reverse the decline by setting forth
what it really is, when we acknowledge its regula- his theories as a guide to composers and perform-
tive use, thus rendering it a mere focal point of the ers, while Spengler would consider the decline as
observation, the general validity of the concept inevitable and irreversible" (1996, 24). According
of tonality will depend on whether it character- to Nicholas Cook, what Schenker wanted was for
izes the whole of the observation and determines composers to return to the background as the only
its form. In this antiessentialist vein, the Schenke- spiritual source for musical composition: "back to
rian Ursatz becomes a useful heuristic device that the fathers, back to the masters, but ultimately
with the ear of depth!" (Cook 1989, 428). Ulti-
can be laid alongside the musical instances under
consideration as a measure, "not as a preconcep-mately, when Wittgenstein's critique of Spengler
tion to which everything must conform" (Wittgen-rebounds back to Schenker's theory of music, he
Guter The Good, , the Bad, and the Vacuous 433

Wittgenstein's
seems to suggest that Schenker's hope forward-looking
for cultural hybrid conception
of musical decline,
rejuvenation by means of a concrete, forebearer
hence of his notion of good
dog-
modern
matic U-turn in compositional music, secured
practice restsits independence
pre- from its
intellectual
cisely on Schenker's confusion parents.
between 'proto-
type' and 'object.'
Wittgenstein's decisively nondogmatic,
methodological hybrid conception of musical
VI. THE CASE OF GUSTAV MAHLER

decline puts the notion of good modern music

(insinuated in GBV) in a very It interesting
is instructive to examine
light, Wittgenstein's rem
on Gustav commitment
because it also challenges Spengler's Mahler in the context of Wittgenst
to historical inevitability. Fornotion of good modern
Spengler, "pure music. Mahler was
only truly
civilization, as a historical process, modern composer
consists in a who apparently
taking-down of forms that have significant
become enough in Wittgenstein's eyes to
inorganic
worthy of attention.
or dead" (1939, 32, vol. 1). Wittgenstein's genuine Wittgenstein's somew
worry in GBV that "no one is astute
abusive remarks enough
on Mahler exemplify a dist
to formulate today what is duality
correct" toward Mahler's musical persona that
resounds
typicalworry
strongly with Spengler's similar among Austrian
that the literati at that time.
philosophers of his day did not Schorske
have described
a real stand-this as a duality in Mah
functional
ing in actual life, that they had not relation to the classical
acquired the tradition:
an acuteof
necessary reflective understanding tension between
the time Mahler's acceptance
or
as a conductor-
its many built-in limitations which guardian of the abstract, au-
philosophizing
tonomous
in time of civilization requires music1939,
(Spengler so cherished
42, by the educated
vol. 1). elite- and his rejection as a composer, in view
In GBV , Wittgenstein voices an analogous of his subversive attempts to imbue abstract,
worry about composers of his day: given that no high-culture music with concrete vernacular
principle can be coherently articulated amid the substance (Schorske 1998, 172-174). Wittgenstein
dissolution of the resemblances that give unity to clearly had a tremendous respect for Mahler as
the ways of life of a culture, it should be equally a conductor. In 1940 he remarked on Mahler's
impossible to conceive of music that could ex- conducting: "When Mahler was himself conduct-
press the inarticulate. Thus, the precious little that ing, his private performances were excellent; the
Wittgenstein seems to have said in GBV about orchestra seemed to collapse at once if he was
the prospect of good modern music is that, as not conducting himself" (Wittgenstein 1998, 43).
things stand, such music is out of reach, and the Wittgenstein's harshly critical attitude toward
very prospect of achieving such music seems quite Mahler as a composer was more philosophically
paradoxical. complex than downright negative. He evidently
Yet Spengler maintained that civilization, as the did not like Mahler's music, but he nonetheless
most external and artificial state of which evolved attributed philosophical significance to it.
humanity is capable, is the inevitable destiny of We have four self-standing passages on
culture; death following life (Spengler 1939, 32, Mahler's music in Wittgenstein's writings. They
vol. 1). If GBFleaves open, as I suggested, the pos-can be neatly divided, chronologically and themat-
sibility of good modern music, that is, music which ically, into two groups. The first group consists of
is truly adequate to our time, then it appears that in two passages, both written in 1931 (Wittgenstein
effect Wittgenstein was entertaining- albeit sotto 2003, 93; 1998, 17), concerning Wittgenstein's puz-
voce- the strikingly absurd possibility of life af-zlement over Mahler's veering away from the cul-
ter death: the possibility of an artistic afterimage tural conditions of musical intelligibility. Wittgen-
of a wholesale rejection of the internal relations stein's emulation of Schenker's way of looking at
which hold together musical gesture and humanthe masterworks of Western music as extended
life. This idea marks not only Wittgenstein's re- commentaries on the major triad is evident in
jection of Schenker's sense of cultural rejuvena- these passages, despite Wittgenstein's nontechni-
tion by means of recoil from modern practices cal and rather idiosyncratic terminology.19 From
of composition but also a resolute break from this theoretical perspective, Wittgenstein's claim
Spengler's sense of historical inevitability. Thus, (1998, 17) that a Bruckner symphony is much
434 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

closer to a Beethoven symphony

seriously qualifiesthan a Mahler
the normative force of such a
symphony is quite true. lament.
With this
Wittgenstein's critique of the caveat in mind,of
moments we now turn to the
"sim-
ple music" in Mahler (2003,
second93)
groupvoices a Mahler,
of passages on train ofwere
which
thought which is familiar written
in musicology
later and more thanregarding
a decade apart from
Mahler's compositional strategies. Mahler's
one another. This group ma-
consists of a short passage
ture works (for example,written
his in fourth
code in 1937symphony)
(Wittgenstein 2000, MS
display significant ambivalence ina long
120, 72v) and the area
passage of
from 1948har-
(Wittgen-
mony and tonal relationships. While his music
stein 1998, 76-77).
often appears deceptively conservative, These passages continue the thought that
employ-
ing undisguised dominantMahler's art is inauthentic and that
relationships relate it tostill
the fa-
play an essential structural role,
miliar hisbetween
distinction compositional
talent and genius. How-
procedures push tonality ever, to Wittgenstein's
the brink of disso-
main charge against Mahler
lution (Morgan 1991, 22). was Inthatthishe wassense,
not courageousMahler's
enough (hence he
"simple music" is indeed contrived merely shows talent,
andalbeit great talent): "Who-
disjointed,
the product of an incredibly sophisticated,
ever is unwilling re-
to know himself is writing a kind
fined, and titillating- yet ultimately
of deceit. abstract-
Whoever is unwilling to plunge into him-
design. self, because it is too painful, naturally remains
Wittgenstein maps Schenker's music- with his writing on the surface. (Whoever wants
theoretical perspective onto Spengler's scheme only the next best thing, can achieve only the sur-
of cultural decline by invoking a comparative rogate of a good thing.)" (2000, MS 120, 72v, my
image of an apple tree, a daisy, and a picture of translation).
the tree (Wittgenstein 1998, 17), which is meant Bearing in mind, as we have seen, that Wittgen-
to intimate not only the abstract nature of the stein did not adhere to Schenker's call for an
digression embodied in Mahler's art but also actual U-turn in composition practice, Wittgen-
its cultural extent. Lurie captured this nicely stein's frustration at Mahler's weakness appears
by saying that "to affiliate Mahler's music with to stem from the understanding that this prodi-
the musical tradition of the West is like putting gious composer ultimately fell short of creating
pictures of apple trees in an orchid, believing good modern music. In this sense, Mahler serves
they too can yield real apples" (Lurie 2012, 137). as a perfect example that justified Wittgenstein's
Wittgenstein's idea in this passage (1998, 17), apprehensions, expressed in GBV , concerning the
that a Mahler symphony might be a work of art prospect of good modern music: here was a prodi-
of a totally different sort, is Spenglerian in an gious artist who was still trying to create great
important sense: Wittgenstein entertains here the art at a time when that might no longer be pos-
possibility that Mahler's music, as Lurie put it, sible. In Wittgenstein's view, it would seem the
"belongs to an entirely different kind of spiritual chances that others might succeed where Mahler
enterprise that embodies civilization in the failed were slim.
modern period" (2012, 137). Schenker similarly In the 1937 passage we get another idea about
felt that "the quest for a new form of music is the kind of transgression which Mahler's purport-
a quest for a homunculus" (1979, 6). Schenker's edly inauthentic music embodies: it presents itself
metaphor of an artificial living being which as authentic, that is, as a genuine manifestation of
"embodies the outward semblance of humanity its time. The immediate charge of self-deception
but not the spirit" (Cook 1989, 427-428), captures leads to a pronouncement of an acute problem: the
not only the sense of the totality of this new inability to distinguish what is genuine ('valuable')
enterprise but also its uncanny nature. and what is false ('worthless'). This problem,
The striking thought that Mahler's music might which (Wittgenstein fears) afflicts his own think-
be genuinely adequate to the time of civilization, ing and writing as well, pertains to the cultural
that it truly approximates good modern music, presuppositions for making such a distinction in
does not negate Wittgenstein's justification (from the first place. As Wittgenstein clearly describes in
the idealized perspective of what he called "a very the 1948 passage, this is a problem of incommen-
high culture"; 1966, 7) for saying that Mahler's surability, which he already introduced in GBV
music is inauthentic and abstract. Nonetheless, it in 1931: "If today's circumstances are really so
Guter The Good, the Bad, and the Vacuous 435

different, from what they This once

terse passage invites careful
were, that consideration.
you
cannot compare your work It should
with be notedearlier
right at the outset
works that, for
in respect of its genre, then you
Wittgenstein, theequally cannot
music of the future is patently
compare its value with that not modern
of the music, not music of thework"
other present day,
(1998, 77). and the idea strongly envisions the beginning of a
Ultimately, the afterimage of good modern mu- new cultural epoch (compare Wittgenstein 1998,
sic arises due to our inability to tell, as Lurie puts it, 73). 21 The influence of Spengler's Decline of the
"whether the spiritual progression of our culture West is unmistakable. For Spengler, the future al-
is still continuing (and it is us who are being left ways transcends the current epoch and it is always
behind), or whether the culture has disappeared marked by a return to the simplest, most basic ex-
(and we are the only ones left to notice it)" (2012, pression of life. Wittgenstein's suggestion that the
150). music of the future might not continue from cur-
In sum, Mahler exemplified a genuine philo- rently predominant, culturally entrenched musi-
sophical problem for Wittgenstein. From a musi- cal formats, which embody a complexity of voices,
cal perspective, with regards to Wittgenstein's dis- can be related to various passages in Spengler,
tinction between the three kinds of modern music, among them the following one: "Imitation stands
Mahler's music clearly did not belong to the cat- nearest to life and direction and therefore begins
egory of 'vacuous modern music.' It also did not with melody, while the symbolism of counterpoint
simply belong to the category of 'bad modern mu- belongs to extension and through polyphony sig-
sic' together with Richard Strauss and his ilk.20 For nifies infinite space" (1939, 229, vol. 1). Wittgen-
Wittgenstein, Mahler was a limiting case in the his- stein's suggestion reflects also Spengler's convic-
tory of Western music. "You would need to know tion that any belated return to the simplest forms
a good deal about music, its history and develop- of expression is bound to reveal also their limita-
ment, to understand him," he said (Rhees 1984, tions.
71). From the perspective of philosophical auto- As we have seen, Wittgenstein accepted that
biography, the Mahler conundrum was indicative "old large forms" have exhausted their resources
of Wittgenstein's grappling with his own predica- either by way of a hollow harking back to clas-
ment as a philosopher. Interestingly, the problem sicism (vacuous modern music) or by means of
of 'good modern music' and the problem of phi- a falsely understood freedom that sought to ab-
losophizing in the time of civilization were one stract compositional procedures from the human
and the same in Wittgenstein's mind. preconditions of musical intelligibility (bad mod-
ern music). Polyphony is inherent to Western cul-
ture, and the fate of the former is emblematic of
the fate of the latter.
VII. THE MUSIC OF THE FUTURE
However, Wittgenstein's reference to
An intriguing supplement to our discussion of here, rather than to melody (as
monophony
Wittgenstein's problematic notion of good in Spengler),
mod- is not accidental. Wittgenstein en-
ern music is found in his remark on the music of visioned that a return to musical meaningfulness
the future in yet another curious diary entry from
would take the form of monophony, or music
October 4, 1930, written only a few months beforein unison. Monophony, as distinguished from
GBV : either polyphony or heterophony, simply means
music for a single voice or part.22 An obvious
example of such unbounded musical movement
I shouldn't be surprised if the music of the future wereis plainchant, or Gregorian chant, which is also
in unison [einstimmig]. Or is that only because I cannot the standard reference for monophony. The
clearly imagine several voices? Anyway, I can't imagine intellectual context of Wittgenstein's remark on
that the old large forms (string quartet, symphony, orato-the music of the future strongly suggests that such
rio, etc.) will be able to play any role at all. If somethinga pretonal monophony is precisely what he had
comes it will have to be- I think- simple, transparent.in mind. In fact, Wittgenstein had a continuous
In a certain sense, naked. Or will this apply only to ainterest in the problem of understanding church
certain race, only to one kind of music (?) (Wittgenstein modes or Gregorian modes ( Kirchtonarten ;
2003, 49) Wittgenstein 1975, 281 par. 224; 1953, 144 par.
436 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

535; 1980, 118 par. 639).future For Wittgenstein,

we already find an ellipsis of his much later the
inflections from a reciting tone
view of musical that
meaning correspond
as an internal relation
to the actual verbalization or vocalization of the that binds together musical gesture and the whole
text in a plainchant, epitomize the "significant ir-range of our language games (Wittgenstein 1998,
regularity," which is the hallmark of "phenomena59-60). For the later Wittgenstein, as Hagberg
akin to language in music" (1998, 40; compare writes, "meaning something in music, like intend-
1967b, 29 par. 161). ing something musically or willing something
Moreover, by referring to something like pre- musically, takes place within the experiential
tonal monophony as the music of the future, preconditions of their possibility" (2011, 401).
Wittgenstein may have echoed a broad intellectual Considering the trajectory of Wittgenstein's
concern regarding the putative origins of music,thinking about music, from 1930 until his death in
which had become widespread in central Europe1951, the peculiar use of the metaphors of trans-
and also in England since the turn of the twentiethparency and nakedness in his remark on the mu-
century (Rehding 2000). Schenker himself wrotesic of the future can be interpreted in terms of
and lectured in Vienna in the late 1890s about his increasing emphasis on the idea (found also in
the origins of music, that is, from its spontaneous GBV) that music is physiognomic, intransitively
expressions by primitive peoples, its subsequent transparent to human life, to "the preconditions,
evolvement through the cultivation of singingand forthe lived, embodied realities, of musical intel-
its own sake, and the development of musical ligibility" (Hagberg 2011, 402). A musical gesture
imagination (Cook 2007, 33-38). It is impossible is transparent in the sense that it is already given
to determine whether this issue ever came up to dur-
us with a familiar physiognomy, already inter-
ing Wittgenstein's conversations with Felix Salzer; nally related to our world of thoughts and feel-
a more likely assumption is that Wittgensteinings. hadAnd so we find in Wittgenstein's much later
been exposed to these ideas during his stint as
writings the need to make sense of the convic-
a researcher in Charles Myers's laboratory of ex-
tion that "understanding music is a manifestation
perimental psychology in Cambridge in 1912-1913 of human life" (1998, 80; compare 1953, 143 par.
through his acquaintance with Myers's own work 527), that it is a measuring rod by which a culture
on primitive music and the origins of music (Myers is to be gauged, enabled by our capacity to make
1905, 1913). Either way, later on Wittgensteinincreasingly
ac- nuanced comparisons between multi-
tually employed this conjecture regarding theform ori-human practices as we chart the unexpected
gins of music: "Music has developed from singing, topography of the resemblances that give unity to
it is a kind of prolongation of language, andthe thatways of life of a culture.
is important because it shows how language trails Yet perhaps the most striking feature of
off into what no longer would be called language" Wittgenstein's remark on the music of the fu-
(Wittgenstein and Weismann 2003, 395). ture is its last sentence, which brackets the en-
There is a historical link between the discourse tire train of thoughts by a second thought, or
concerning the origins of music and the critique an of afterthought, concerning a yet unpronounced
modern music, which may be related to Wittgen- possibility of a music "of a totally different sort"
stein's focus on monophony as the music of the fu- (Wittgenstein 1998, 17). The ideational ellipsis,
ture. As Alexander Rehding observed, the search thus circumscribed, is called upon by Wittgen-
for the origins of music in the early twentieth cen-stein's final parenthetical question mark to answer
tury was not merely of archaeological interest; it its true calling. Hence I conclude that Wittgen-
became instrumental in defining the tradition stein's
of later philosophy of music can be seen as a
tonal music as the subject matter of musicology, full-fledged grammatical investigation, carried out
not coincidentally, at a time when this tradition in light of the Urbild (in the regulative, nondog-
was increasingly perceived to be under threat from matic sense), which enabled him to consider not
contemporary composition (Rehding 2000, 371- only the maladies of modern music but also, how-
380). ever gingerly, their philosophically uncanny after-
These considerations ultimately suggest that in image: the very thought of a genuine good modern
Wittgenstein's 1930 remark on the music of the music.23
Guter The Good, , the Bad , 0/id Vacuous 437

ERAN GUTER Plaud, Sabine. 2010. "Synoptic Views v

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10. Consider Schenker's abrasive reaction to Arnold

by C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian
Schoenberg'sA. E. Aue.
12-tone Oxford:produces a ho-
music: "Schoenberg
Blackwell.
munculus in music; it is a machine" (Snarrenberg 1997,
89).
1933: From the Notes of G. E. Moore.11.Edited by David
It is instructive Stern,
to observe here the striking similar-
Brian Rogers, and Gabriel Citron.ity Cambridge University
between this passage and Wittgenstein's 1930 remark on
Press.
the greatness of music (Wittgenstein 1998, 11). Moreover,
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, and Friedrich Waismann. 2003. The Voices
Wittgenstein inserted the word Vordergrund (foreground),
of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle , edited by Gordon Baker.
a familiar technical term in Schenker's theory, instead of the
London: Routledge.
word Oberfläche (surface), which he wrote originally. This
Wright, Georg Henrik von. 1982. "Wittgenstein in Relation to
His Times." In Wittgenstein and His Times, edited by Brian might be an immediate result of Wittgenstein's exchanges
with Felix Salzer.
McGuinness, 108-120. University of Chicago Press.
12. Schenker famously dedicated his monograph on
Beethoven's ninth symphony to Brahms, "The last mas-
1. The standard print edition (Wittgenstein 2003) is a ter of German musical art" (Schenker 1969, dedication
bilingual edition. I present here my own translation of this page). Machine metaphors for modern music are familiar
in Schenker's writings; see, for example, note 10 above.
diary entry, which, I believe, preserves some crucial semiotic
ambiguities in Wittgenstein's original German better than 13. Hagberg argues that in the context of the debate
Klagge and Nordmann's otherwise excellent translation. I between Schenker and Arnold Schoenberg concerning non-
am indebted to Nimrod Reitman for his assistance in trans- chordal notes, Wittgenstein (of the Philosophical Investiga-
lating this diary entry and for his thoughtful clarifications, tions) should have aligned with Schoenberg. I see this dif-
which informed my discussion in this section. ferently (Guter 2011, 140-152).
2. The source for this yet unpublished material is Cam- 14. References to the Nachlass are by MS or TS number
bridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and according to Georg Henrik von Wright's catalogue followed
University Archives, George Edward Moore: Correspon- by page number.
dence and Papers, MS Add.8875, 10.7.9 p. 31. Lecture 6a, 15. According to Nicholas Cook, "the fundamental
May 22, 1933. structure [Ursatz] is an abstraction far removed from the
3. For Wittgenstein, understanding is intransitive, if listener's experience of any given piece- especially since
each form of the fundamental structure is shared between
what I understand (in a picture or in a melody) cannot be
translated into a different expression. In that sense, it is au- many thousands of different tonal pieces. In fact the funda-
tonomous. For Wittgenstein, understanding a melody is a mental structure is analytically meaningless in itself " (1994,
41).
prime example of intransitive understanding.
4. For a comprehensive description of Wittgenstein's 16. The source for this yet unpublished material is Cam-
view concerning this loss, see Lurie 2012, 125-134. bridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and
5. This is where my translation differs most substan- University Archives, George Edward Moore: Correspon-
tially from Klagge and Nordmann's. Klagge and Nordmann dence and Papers, MS Add.8875, 10.7.9 p. 33. Lecture 6a,
translated the word blödsinnig as 'stupid.' While Blödigkeit May 22, 1933.
or Blödheit is indeed a kind of stupidity, it is more a matter 17. Wittgenstein reiterates Schenker's Bassbrechung
of the intimidation of the mind; diffidence, which consists (bass arpeggiation)- the I-V-I that underpins the Urlinie
in short-sightedness. The word 'timid' captures this crucial as part of the Ursatz in Schenkerian analysis, includ-
aspect. Klagge and Nordmann also mistakenly interpreted ing any elaborations of this pattern. It is also important
to underscore Wittgenstein's reference, quite unusual in
the sentence as if the quality of timidity belongs to the com-
poser, rather than to his vacuous music. this context, to Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina (1525-
6. Labor was a rather minor turn-of-the-century conser- 1594), whose music is modal rather than tonal, preceding
vative composer who was a protégé of the Wittgenstein fam- the "common practice" era. This in itself lends Wittgen-
ily. For an extensive study of Josef Labor and the Wittgen- stein's reference a Schenkerian bias, perhaps an immedi-
stein family, see Alber 2000. ate result of Wittgenstein's exchanges with Felix Salzer
around that time. I am indebted to Inbal Guter for this
7. Wittgenstein's insertion of the word 'good' in the
elucidation.
third sentence in GBV is ambiguous. It reflects back to the
characterization of 'the music of the past' in the previous 18. In this context Wittgenstein is using the verb 'over-
look' as a literal translation of the German verb übersehen ,
sentences, but it may also anticipate Wittgenstein's lenient
attitude to the vacuous modern music of Josef Labor at the which is most often translated as 'survey' or 'overview.'
conclusion of this diary entry. Still it clearly does not render Wittgenstein's use of 'overlook' here should therefore be
Labor's music as good modern music in the sense of being understood to mean "gain a synoptic view."
adequate to its time. In any case, both the notion of good 19. For instance, the diary entry on Mahler (Wittgen-
modern music, in the sense which I explore in this study, and stein 2003, 93) is heavily edited. Wittgenstein seems to have
fluctuated between such terms as "harmonic relations" and
Labor's music seemed absurd to Wittgenstein, but in two
very different senses. "harmonic progressions" (opting for the latter eventually).
8. This was later reported by Carl Schachter, who wasHis own metaphoric term, "ancestral mother" ( Stammut-
ter ), is a placeholder for Schenker's complex terminology
Salzer's student (Koslovsky 2009, 354, n. 494). I thank Bryan
Parkhurst for this reference. for describing primary musical phenomena.
9. For a detailed comparison between the ideas of Spen- 20. Béla Szabados insists that in Wittgenstein's judg-
gler and Schenker, see Almén 1996. ment, Mahler's music was invariably bad because Mahler
Guter The Good, the Bad, and the Vacuous 439

was not incorruptible (Szabados 22. The 2007, 107).

term 'monophony' Szabados's
is not synonymous with an
reading of the 1948 passage (Wittgenstein 2000,
unaccompanied melody. A melody MS
specifically 136,
exemplifies
musical
llOa-llla) is slanted, I believe, movement that
partly is set within internal
because he did musical bound-
not
aries:of
notice that the actual appearance we hear
the that phrase
it begins, that'incorrupt-
it ends, and that it moves
ibility is everything!' on the manuscript
from its beginning toward facsimile
its end. In tonal clearly
music, this has
largely-
shows that it is a later addition, albeit not
not part exclusively-
of the to do with harmony. How-
original
ever, a monophony
flow of the paragraph. Also in referring to canthe
be melodious
1937withoutpassage having a
(MS 120, 72r), Szabados omittedmelody.the last two crucial sen-
tences, which are part of the coded 23. This study is dedicated toin
paragraph the memory
the of Jaakko
original
manuscript. Hintikka (1929-2015), my teacher and my friend. I would
21. The phrase 'the music of the future' carried a great like to thank David Stern for giving me permission to use
deal of cultural baggage in late-romantic Austro-German quotations from Wittgenstein: Lectures ; Cambridge 1930-
culture. The locus classicus for this phrase is Richard Wag- 1933, From the Notes of G. E. Moore , forthcoming from
ner's essay by the same name (Wagner 1894). We may as- Cambridge University Press. I am most grateful to Inbal
sume that Wittgenstein's choice of words here was not ac- Guter, Nimrod Reitman, Craig Fox, the editors of this jour-
cidental and, in the context of the ideas presented in this nal, and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions and
study, even somewhat ironic. critique.