Can’t say all neg interps counter interps, rob that includes a

2
Permissibility and presumption negate: (1) It’s not an obligatory moral obligation if we
don’t have to do it, so the aff has not fulfilled their burden. (2) Absent aff offense
proving obligations, I have shown there is no truth value to the resolution, which is
sufficient to negate as per my definition. (3) The aff speaks last meaning they logically
need to extend offense through the end of the round. (4) Statements rely on infinite
assumptions to be true meaning they’re more likely true than false since any of those
assumptions can be false.
[A]1 instance on any layer of negating is sufficient to negate. Double-bind, Either the
aff already observed everything so they observed an instance in which you negate or
they haven’t observed everything so they can’t verify the aff.
Nickles, Thomas. (Philosopher @ University of Nevada, Reno) "Falsifiability." New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. 2005. ,
https://elearning.shisu.edu.cn/pluginfile.php/35320/mod_resource/content/1/Falsifiability%20%28Introduction%29.pdf ///AHS PB

Falsifiable contrasts with verifiable. A claim is empirically verifiable if possible

observation statements logically imply the truth of the claim. If actual observation
statements do imply the claim, then it is verified. "This raven is black" verifies "There
are black ravens." During the 1930s the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle proposed verifiability both as a criterion of demarcation of science
from nonscience and a criterion of meaning. Their idea was that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable in principle, and its meaning is given by its
method of verification. For the logical empiricists, only empirically verifiable claims make genuine assertions about the world and are, in this broad sense, scientific.
All other claims (metaphysical, religious, ethical, etc.) are cognitively meaningless. In his Logik der Forschung (1934; Logic of Scientific Discovery), Popper replied by

verifiability as a criterion of demarcation

rejecting the logical empiricists' concern with language and meaning and by noting that

excludes scientific law claims and thus the core of science itself. For since a law claim is universal in scope (in simplest form, "All A's
everywhere and everywhen are B's"), it cannot possibly be verified: there are always actual or potential

instances beyond those so far observed. Yet a universal claim can be falsified by a single
negative instance. The first observed black swan refuted the claim "All swans are
white." (Law claims of statistical probabilistic forms are more problematic.) Based on this logical asymmetry of verification and falsification, Popper proposed
falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation of science from nonscience, although not as a criterion of meaning. According to Popper, nonscience includes
pseudoscience (e.g., Freudian psychology and Marxism) and metaphysics, the one fraudulent, the other sometimes providing a valuable heuristic for science. Many

falsifiability, as the ongoing

deep scientific problems have their roots in metaphysics, but to be scientific, a claim must take an empirical risk. Moreover,

risk of falsification in our world, is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can

establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains

conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails fallibilism, the view that our best
epistemic efforts remain open to future revision . There can be no certain foundations
to knowledge.
[B] Dogmatism - If I know that x is true, I know that any evidence against x is evidence
against something that is true; I know that such evidence is misleading. But I should
disregard evidence that I know is misleading. So, once I know that x is true, I am in a
position to disregard any future evidence that seems to tell against x. Triggers
presumption since debate is impossible if we can never clash.
3.
The meta ethic is interest-relational theory of value, which means all normativity can
be reduced to contingent interests we hold.
1: There’s no such thing as objective goodness, even indexed to an object. A good car
for a farmer isn’t good for an Uber driver.
2: Interest-transcendent reasons are intuitively ridiculous, not real world and
phenomenologically suspect – if I asked you why you wouldn’t punch your best friend
for a dollar, you wouldn’t appeal to some deep normative obligation – you have a
strong interest in your friend’s wellbeing.
3: Centuries of indeterminable moral debate is good evidence there’s not a right
answer. Arguing morality is a lot more like arguing for your favorite song than
scientific method also means that absent using subjective interest morality collapses
4: Best for fighting oppression insofar as the root cause of all oppression is a group
claiming superiority on an objective basis, which my framework undermines by saying
there isn’t an objective morality and means oppression is caused by not looking at
interest-relations.
Negate – the resolution includes the normative term ought but isn’t indexed to any
particular set of interests, so it can never be a true statement or preferable moral
world.
4.
I advocate a methodology of reflective equilibrium – to determine if something is
moral, it must cohere with our general moral judgments, apply to particular cases, and
be consistent with specific considerations. Some normative judgments are implicitly
true- only reflective equilibrium solves.
Parfit 2K [David Parfit(Senior Research Fellow @ Oxford). The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Second Edition. February 21, 2000.
Accessed 1/8/20. https://books.google.com/books?id=FcUi2AxNW3gC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false// Recut Houston Memorial
DX]
To introduce this argument, I shall sum up some of my claims. (A) There are some irreducibly normative reason-involving truths , some of which are
moral truths. (B) Since these truths are not about natural properties, our knowledge of these truths cannot be based on perception, or on evidence provided by empirical facts. (C) Positive
substantive normative truths cannot be analytic, in the sense that their truth follows from their meaning. Therefore (D) Our normative beliefs cannot be justified unless we are able to
recognize in some other way that these beliefs are true. We do, I believe, have this ability. We have reasons to have certain normative beliefs, and we can respond to these reasons.

Normative beliefs can also be self-evident, and intrinsically credible. One such belief is (E) Torturing
children merely for fun is wrong. There are similar non-normative beliefs, such as (F) No statement can be both wholly true and wholly false. Since our normative
beliefs are neither caused by what we believe, nor based on empirical evidence, we need another word to refer to our way of forming these

beliefs. On the view that I have called Intuitionism: We have intuitive abilities to respond to reasons and to recognize some normative truths. Though it is intuitively clear that certain
acts are wrong, most of our moral beliefs cannot depend only on such separate intuitions. We must also assess the strength of various conflicting reasons, and the plausibility of various

principles and arguments, trying to reach what Rawls calls reflective equilibrium. This kind of intuitively-based reflective thinking is not only, as Scanlon writes, the
best way of making up one’s mind about moral matters . . . it is the only defensible method. We have similar abilities to recognize truths about what is rational, and
about what we have reasons to believe, and want, and do. Many recent writers reject such claims. Schiffer, for example, doubts that moral intuitions are worth

discussing, and Field and Boghossian call the idea of rational intuition ‘obscurantist’ and ‘a mystery’. But these criticisms are aimed at the view that

intuition is a special quasi-perceptual faculty. That is not the view that I am defending here. When I use the
word ‘intuitive’, I mean what Boghossian means when he describes one of his claims as ‘intuitively plausible’ and ‘intuitively quite clear’. Intuitionism can also be challenged with claims about
disagreement. When Boghossian denies that beliefs can be intrinsically credible, or self-evident, he points out that (G) different people might find conflicting beliefs self-evident. If we claim
that we have some ability, however, it is no objection that we might have lacked this ability. Different people might have conflicting visual experiences, which were like dreams and
hallucinations, and were not a source of knowledge. But that is not in fact true. Different people’s visual experiences seldom conflict, and believing what we seem to see is a fairly reliable way

of reaching the truth. It may be similarly true that, after careful reflection, different people would seldom find conflicting
beliefs self-evident. Believing what seems self- evident, after such reflection, may be another fairly reliable way of reaching the truth. When Schiffer argues that there are no
moral truths, he claims that (H) even in ideal conditions, when everyone knows the relevant facts and is reasoning equally well, we and others could rationally disagree about any moral
question. For example, Schiffer claims that, though we could rationally believe that (E) torturing children merely for fun is wrong, it would be equally rational to reject this belief. This claim
assumes that we cannot have decisive reasons to have our moral beliefs. If we had such reasons to believe (E), it would not be equally rational either to have or to reject this belief. What
Schiffer calls his error theory might be true, since we might never have decisive reasons to have any moral belief. But Schiffer cannot support this theory by claiming that we and others could
rationally disagree about any moral question, since this claim assumes that we have no such reasons. Nor could we reject Schiffer’s theory merely by claiming that we and others could not
rationally disagree.

Reflective equilibrium is the only explanation of how we come to moral judgment,

Meta-ethical arguments aren’t competitive with reflective equilibrium since they just
say how we derive our beliefs not why those beliefs are justified.

Reflective equilibrium means popular input – Striving toward omniperspectival

knowledge is the only way to be consistent with our moral judgments.
Hudgens 07[Jennifer L. Hudgens(Instructor in Philosophy at the University of Kentucky). “Perspectives on Perspectivism: Nietzsche and
His Commentators” Georgia State University Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy. Pg 32-33. 8/3/07. Accessed 1/8/20.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=philosophy_theses// Recut Houston Memorial DX]
Again, the definition I offered for omniperspectival knowledge was as follows: Striving for ‘omniperspectival knowledge’ is what Nietzsche
considers to be the only logically possible way we could even approach the inconceivable nonperspectival
position. The omniperspective, as the name implies, would include the information available from all
perspectives; thus it can serve as a goal for those who seek objectivity, in that it is the closest thing to the God’s eye view (the nonperspective) that we are
actually capable of conceiving. For comparison, let me quote Leiter’s plurality claim: “ The more perspectives we enjoy – for example, the more
interests we employ in knowing the object – the better our conception of what the object is like to be ” (Leiter, p. 345). I believe
Leiter may go a step too far in asserting that our conception of this 33 object will be “better” to Nietzsche, for Nietzsche says only that our objectivity or conception
of this object will be “more complete” (GM III:12). However, Given that I claim only that trying to reach the omniperspective can serve as a goal, Leiter’s [the]
plurality claim is subsumable under the omniperspectivity claim as part of the spectrum of truth: it is possible that the omniperspective is the best goal, and there
are other possibilities also

Comes first under reflective equilibrium since it’s the only ethical theory that is able to
fully capture our moral judgments by providing ways for agents to express
themselves.
Thus the standard is consistency with reflective equilibrium.
Prefer
A] Key to fairness Predictability- a discussion of what the institutions ought not do is
necessitated through popular opinion making it the most obvious. And there’s offense
on both sides: there are multiple valid methodologies.
B] Key to education because we analyze real world politics, which is an out of round
impact.
[2] It is impossible for us to be 100% certain any framework is true, popular support is
best because it combines perspectives to reach approximations. And, the definition of
words is determined by how they are used. The term ought has no meaning outside
people. Since what we ought do is determined by the populace, any conception of
what we should do which is not consistent with popular input would be contradicting.
If popular input fails, then you negate because every statement could be interpreted
to be false. Without social norms to determine meaning, everyone has their own
understanding and is Terminal defense to your FW and a reason to prefer mine.
[3] Moral debates are irresolvable because they have been going on for centuries
without any conclusion. Each philosopher thinks they are right and others are wrong,
meaning a 45-minute debate round could never come to a clear conclusion. Popular
input solves because it’s a stasis point based in facts. If popular input fails then
affirming is impossible because if we can never agree on anything, the judge cannot
agree with you and thus vote neg on presumption.
[4] morality must be capable of giving people reasons to act. Otherwise, people could
conclude there is no reason for them to accept standards. Morality would just be a
hypothetical imperative, which can’t produce an obligation. Polls give each actor a
way to express their interests and are the best way to justify beliefs because they
aggregate preferences. Merely justifying why an ethical theory is “true” does not
matter if a person would never bind themselves to it.
Thus the Counter-Plan text.
1. The Pakistan ought to only use nuclear arsenals in response to a nuclear attack.
2. India ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.
Its competitive – 1. Textual - The aff eliminates all nuclear arsenals but the Neg keeps
the US
2. Functionally – net benefit is consistency with reflective equilibrium and solves the
aff since pakistan can’t use their nukes since no one can use nuclear arsenals to attack
them. If they get to fiat that everyone will follow the aff, so do we.
Net benefit - Pakistani poll opposes first strike.
Gallup poll company 19[Gallup(poll company).“Pakistani opinion remains calm and unprovoked during threat of war with India.”
Gallup Pakistan. Pg 7. 3/9/19. Accessed 1/8/20. http://gallup.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Public-Opinion-Report-on-Pulwama-and-
Post-Pulwama-India-Pakistan-Relations-1.pdf// Houston Memorial DX]

PAKISTANIS RECOGNIZE NUCLEAR DANGER; OPPOSE FIRST STRIKE o 43% of Pakistanis fear India might go for a first strike in nuclear
exchange with Pakistan; 46% dispute it. o 44% believe that (if war requires) Pakistan will use its nuclear weapons; 41% believe to the contrary. o
60% oppose first strike in a nuclear engagement

Method in doc
Gallup 19[Gallup(poll company).“Pakistani opinion remains calm and unprovoked during threat of war with India.” Gallup Pakistan. Pg 47.
3/9/19. Accessed 1/8/20. http://gallup.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Public-Opinion-Report-on-Pulwama-and-Post-Pulwama-India-
Pakistan-Relations-1.pdf// Houston Memorial DX]

PART 3: METHODOLOGY SUMMARY METHODOLOGY Sample size : 1044 Household (18+ Males and
Females) Coverage : National Cross Section All Pakistan Urban and Rural Breakdown Provincial
Breakdown: Weighted Punjab 58% Sindh 24% KPK 14% Balochistan 5% Location Breakdown: Weighted
Large Cities (over 2 million) Medium Cities (over half million) 33% Towns (Population 5000 plus) Villages
67% Sampling Method : Multi Stage Stratified Sampling Error Margin : +2-3% at 95% confidence level
Interview Mode : Face to Face In home Field Dates : March 02 – March 05, 2019 Gallup Pakistan adheres
to ESOMAR/WAPOR Code of Ethics of Opinion and Marketing Research (form more details please see
detailed methodology)
6.
They don’t use the world resolved – it comes before a policy option.
Parcher: [Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html]

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about.
2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4.
Find a solution to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A
determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or
decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly
inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The
committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by
a community to do something. In their deliberations, the
topic community attempts to craft[s] a resolution which can be
ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will
serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what
they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not
the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4)
Further context: the
word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes
from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's
a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative'
support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a
question.

vote neg –
a) Presumption, the aff has a burden to move away from the status quo, but the aff
doesn’t do anything. This is independent of reasons to presume aff in the absence of
offense because this says that aff didn’t meet its burden.
b) means you aren’t topical because nothing happens – judge doesn’t have
jurisdiction to vote on a non-topical advocacy
c) small mistakes have huge consequence legislatively, worst case plan flaw turns
case, best case I win automatically.
Heath 06 Brad, reporter at USA Today. “Small mistakes cause big problems” November 21, 2006.
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-20-typo-problems_x.htm IB

In the legislative world, such small errors, while uncommon, can carry expensive consequences. In a few cases
around the nation this year, typos and other blunders have redirected millions of tax dollars or
threatened to invalidate new laws
Case
1
A. Interpretation: all arguments concerning fairness or education that the negative could violate must
be read first in the AC. To clarify, Rishimust read his theory arguments at the top of the affirmative
case before all substantive arguments.

B. Violation Rishi doesn’t read his spikes at the top of your case

C. Standards -

1. Neg strat – theory spikes and interpretations drastically change neg strategy because they operate
on the highest layer of the debate. If the aff reads all their substance and then theory, it’s super unfair
for the neg because time spent developing a substantive strategy becomes immediately nullified by
your theory spikes. The neg should have to know what they have to meet before planning a strategy.
2
Not sending the aff before 30 minutes is a voting issue. I messaged you on Facebook,
email, and discord with 0 responses exacerbated by you not having a wiki page. You
sent the aff 3 minutes after round start.

[1] Limits: the plan case-list on this topic is endless. Thousands of combinations of
countries and weapons 3 impacts that outweighs to fairness because it takes away all
negative access to the ballot b) it’s uniquely exclusive because low-resource debaters
and new programs are less likely to have random generics they can read c) anxiety—
novices and small school debaters have to deal with the prospect of negating an aff
they can’t actually negate against, in front of a panel that probably doesn’t care
whether they can engage—that’s shitty for mental health and an independent voter
for accessibility to the round.
Impacts:
a] Education: they pigeonhole the neg into generics like the Tricks every single round
since I don’t have any other prep that can apply to the aff. That leads to shallow
repetitive debates: in a world where I have an hour to look at the solvency advocate, I
can think out a case-specific strategy, cut some case answers, and read your articles to
understand the warrants more thoroughly, which leads to more nuanced, in-depth
debates
AC proper.
[1] Objective knowledge of the external world is epistemically nonsensical.
Neta, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, 2014, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-
the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, if you do have hands, then you are not merely a
brain floating in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have
the sensory experiences that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have
hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. But how could you know that you are

not such a brain? If you were such a brain, everything would seem exactly as it does
now; you would (by hypothesis) have all the same sensory experiences that you’re having
right now. Since your empirical knowledge of the world around you must somehow be based
upon your sensory experiences, how could these experiences —the very same experiences that you
would have if you were a brain in a vat—furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And

if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have
hands.
[2]Inductions fail – The only way that you can say induction works is to say that it
worked in the past, which means its circular and only justifies itself by using itself.
[3]Deductions fails
Its impossible to deduce only one conclusion, deduction allows multiple false
conclusions since No course of action could be determined by a rule, just because
every course of action Can be made out to accord with the rule.” You can fill out a
crossword with all the wrong words but consistent with the rules.