1NC vs.

IndoPak
CP
Text: States should eliminate their nuclear arsenals, with the exception of The
Republic of India. The Republic of India should reaffirm its commitment to a no
first use policy. The United States should buy the nuclear arsenals of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan and safely transport them to the United States where they
safely get rid of them.

Indian ambiguity surrounding NFU uniquely leads to uncertainty in China and

Pakistan
Panda, 19
(Panda, Ankit (Adjunct Snr. Fellow@Defense Posture Project and Federation of American Scientists, Snr. Editor@Diplomat, Director
of Research@Diplomat Risk Intelligence, Contributing Editor@War on the Rocks, BA Wilson School of Public Affairs@Princeton
University). “From ‘No First Use’ to ‘No, First Use’?” The Diplomat, August 19, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/from-no-
first-use-to-no-first-use//SHL)

Recent remarksby Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh on nuclear policy have focused attention once
again on New Delhi’s continued commitment to the ‘ no first use’ nuclear policy enshrined in its 2003
nuclear doctrine. Speaking at Pokhran, where India had detonated weaponized nuclear devices in 1998, Singh said “Till today, our
nuclear policy is ‘no first use’.” He added: “What happens in future depends on the circumstances.” As South
Asian security scholars Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang write at the Hindustan Times, Singh’s
comment, while not an
upending of the existing nuclear doctrine in itself, effectively throws “into question India’s commitment to
adhere to what is now a crumbling pillar of India’s nuclear doctrine. ” Clary and Narang, in a longer article
for International Security, catalogued the long history of Indian officials—in office and out—questioning the wisdom of ‘no first use.’
Atal Behari Vajpayee, the country’s first prime minister, had once, before the promulgation of the 2003 doctrine, even discussed first
use: “If they (Pakistan) think we would wait for them to drop a bomb and face destruction, they are mistaken.” Singh, as they note,
has now become “the highestserving Government of India official to explicitly state that India’s no
first use policy is neither permanent nor absolute .” (Vajpayee’s above-quoted remark pre-dates the 2003
doctrine.) Unlike one of his predecessors from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first term, the late Manohar Parrikar, Singh
wasn’t speaking in his personal capacity—albeit while in office—either. This latest watering-down
of the credibility of
Indian NFU will serve to validate long-standing suspicions in Islamabad and Beijing regarding
Indian intentions.

Reaffirming NFU solves all aff escalation impacts by ending ambiguity

surrounding nuclear use
Menon, PhD, 19
(Menon, Prakash (Director of Strategic Studies Program, Prof Emeritus@Transdisciplinary University of Bangalore, Adj. Prof@Nat’l.
Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, PhD Deterrence@Madras University, Liutenant General, Military Advisor to Government,
Officer on Special Duty in National Security Council Secretariat) “Rajnath and No First Use: Tainting India's Image as a Responsible
Nuclear Power,” The Wire, August 18, 2019. https://thewire.in/security/rajnath-singh-no-first-use-nuclear-policy//SHL)

In the absence of a clarification from any other quarter so far, the first issue is whether such a statement is part of India’s strategic
communication plan or is aimed narrowly to deter Pakistan, in view of the growing tensions post India’s initiatives relating to Jammu
and Kashmir. The major thrust of any Indian nuclear strategic communications plan should be aimed
at downplaying the nuclear factor in the political and strategic equation with China and
Pakistan. China too has an NFU policy and the Sino-Indian nuclear dynamic is not yet a cause for concern .
On the contrary, in Pakistan’s case there is a continuous attempt to increase the salience of nuclear
threats so as to contain India’s reaction to terrorism and concurrently invite international attention.
Singh’s statement increases the notability of the nuclear factor and works against India’s
interests. It is therefore unlikely that the defence minister’s statement is part of a larger plan. The statement seems to be
specifically aimed at Pakistan and is problematic at several levels. A first-use approach against Pakistan or even
China lacks credibility, as it would involve nuclear weapon application for substantial destruction of the adversary’s nuclear
and economic capabilities. Even if we succeed, the long term after effects of the nuclear fallout and climate change could
pose existential threats not only to India and its neighbours, but depending on the magnitude of nuclear explosions, it
could result in an existential threat to humanity itself. Scientific studies indicate this possibility. It could be argued that an
Indian second strike on which NFU is anchored could also bring about a similar existential consequence. True, except that second
strike and NFU have relatively greater credibility, because they are premised on retaliation. The
notion that first use strengthens the power of deterrence is misplaced; it amounts to suicide for the fear
of death. There is also an argument that by creating doubts about NFU, ambiguity is enhanced and
deterrence is strengthened. But this argument overlooks that crisis stability is impacted , because once
nuclear weapons are readied for delivery there is a larger scope of wanting to hit first due to the
fear of greater damage that could be caused by being struck first. But such notions erroneously
embrace the idea that a nuclear war can be fought and won. Globally, political leaders know that it is not the
case and though political rhetoric through nuclear threats are not uncommon, strategic caution thus far has been the practical path
adopted. The Indian threat of nuclear use has rightfully been confined to the core deterrence role of retaliation against nuclear
weapons, and also retains the option against biological and chemical weapons. If India has to switch from NFU, it will have to make
substantial changes to existing nuclear structures, alert levels, deployment and command and control arrangements. This will
involve a sizeable increase in delivery systems and warheads. The pressure on India’s resources would also impact the buildup of
other kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. The impulses within the Indian strategic community to jettison NFU is driven by the
excessive focus on Pakistan, which in the post-nuclear era, barring geographically limited skirmishes and conflicts, has mainly posed
terrorist threats. Pakistan does not pose a conventional threat that India cannot counter. Given that, they are likely to persist with
terrorism, which is a low-cost option. On the other hand, India’s conventional military power, shaped to fight a limited war, is
challenged to impose its will under the nuclear shadow. Our foregoing
NFU cannot prevent Pakistan from using
terrorism as a tool of its India policy. On the contrary, it enables Pakistan to invite international
intervention in what India maintains is a bilateral issue. The main advantage of NFU is that it minimises
the probability of nuclear use. This is so because it enhances the possibility of containing the crisis
before the point of no return when miscommunications, misjudgement, misperception or the
fog of war may force either power to go first . Instead, if both are NFU powers, there is greater probability
of political leaders stepping back from the brink – for they know that a nuclear war cannot be won. NFU for India
also presents an opportunity for cooperation with China to work jointly towards a Global No
First Use (GNFU) order. Notably, there is considerable convergence regarding the belief of nuclear weapons being restricted
to the political realm. India, therefore, should take the lead on seeking a GNFU policy instead of creating doubts about its own
adherence to it. The defence minister’s statement does not provide any benefits for national security. Instead, it taints India’s image
as a responsible nuclear power. An official clarification could recover lost ground.

Indian clarification of NFU prevents escalation and miscalc – three warrants

1. No hair trigger
2. Control stays with civilian government, not military
3. No miscalc due to false alarm
Bahadur, MA, 16
(Bahadur, Manmohan (Rtd. Air Vice Marshal, MA Defense and Strategic Studies@Madras University, Distinguished Fellow@Center
for Air Power Studies, Delhi). “Six Reason Why a No First Use Nuclear Doctrine is Good for India,” Hindustan Times, November 18,
2016. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/six-reasons-why-a-no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine-is-good-for-india/story-
vjiXt3Fji3ka9l7PfHfP2J.html //SHL)

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s recently articulated “personal” view that is contrary to India’s No First Use (NFU) nuclear
doctrine has come in for adverse comments from many strategists. But the current mood due Pakistan’s aid to anti-India terrorists
has led to many supporting the minister. This view is debatable because theNFU, as an enunciation of the country’s
nuclear intent, is beneficial in many ways. The advantages of an NFU policy are many. First, a hair-
trigger alert, to ensure that the other side does not get a chance to strike first, does not have to
be maintained and so forces and equipment can be in a relaxed posture; nuclear forces can be maintained in
a de-mated condition waiting for orders from higher echelons to go to a higher alert status, thus ensuring that
command and control stays firmly with the civilian political leadership, which is a very important aim.
Second, since there is no first use alert requirement, the chances of reacting to a false alarm are nullified.
Third, the onus of taking the decision to escalate to a nuclear use lies on the adversary and not on
the party having an NFU doctrine. Fourth, a first use would result in international opprobrium and
weigh heavily on a country with a first use posture. Fifth, a first use posture still requires a country to have
survivable second strike capability as there is nothing such as a “splendid” first strike implying
100% decapitation of the adversary’s assets and leadership. And last, a NFU doctrine is cheaper to
implement; for India, which has many economic targets to achieve, this is a very important factor. The questioning of India’s
NFU doctrine has been born out of the exasperation that has come about due to Pakistan’s use of sub-conventional methods under
the overhang of its nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan knows that it cannot afford to use any nuclear
weapons in a war, including its tactical nuclear weapons, as India would respond with massive nuclear retaliation as per its
doctrine. Additionally, with China heavily invested in Pakistan, it would be in Beijing’s interest to
ensure that the leadership of its geopolitical “outpost” does not take any rash decision of initiating a
nuclear exchange. As Parrikar said, India is a responsible nation; hence, India’s nuclear capability and resolve of its
leadership should be the signals that convey India’s nuclear posture through its NFU doctrine.
The avoidance of nuclear blackmail can be achieved by India demonstrating its readiness to accept risks that are not less than that of
Pakistan. This is already happening through the element of signalling in the conventional exchanges between the two armies across
the LoC in J&K. The NFU policy is just right for India as it ensures security for the nation and does not detract it from its
march towards better prosperity for its people.

Buying nukes solves Pakistani aggression which holds Pakistan accountable for
violence, deescalates the war, and solves nuclear terror while boosting its
economy.
Komireddi 11 (Kapil, author of Malevolent Republic: A Short History of the New India, 5/24, "Take Pakistan’s Nukes, Please,"
WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122939093016909205) AG

Nuclear weapons have earned Pakistan the illusion of prestige, but not security. Yet Pakistan
latches on to them. Why? There are two reasons. The first is India. Pakistan’s sense of itself as the
authentic home of India’s Muslims cannot be vindicated as long as India remains a secular state encompassing the Muslim-majority
province of Kashmir. Pakistan has waged three wars to wrest Kashmir from India, but the experience of
defeat led Islamabad to wage low-cost terror warfare. Pakistan has repeatedly dispatched highly
trained mobile teams to attack high-profile Indian targets — from the attack on India’s Parliament in 2001 to
the bombing of its embassy in Afghanistan in 2008 and the siege of Mumbai the same year — but India’s ability to
retaliate, even with surgical strikes on terrorist headquarters, is severely restricted by the threat of an all-out
nuclear war. The nuclear weapons shield Pakistan from accountability. The second reason is aid.
Pakistan’s ruling elite believes that America , terrified by the potential cost of dealing with nuclear Pakistan’s failure,
will always pay the price for its survival . It’s an extraordinary pattern: Pakistan commits a crime,
threatens instability, evades prosecution, and receives a bribe. But it cannot be sustained. Khan
once boasted about bestowing nuclear prestige on a country "where we can’t even make a bicycle chain." Take away those nuclear
weapons and Pakistan is a veritable basket case. It has no manufacturing base, and in the first four months of
2011 it managed to attract all of $50 million in equity investment — $650 million less than
Bangladesh managed in the depression year of 2009. Pakistan would benefit in more meaningful
ways if it channeled its India obsession into energizing its economy. Washington has often rushed to
assuage Islamabad that it is not after Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. But measured against the very real possibility
that they may end up in the hands of extremists, U.S. intervention would serve to help rather
than harm Pakistan. The best way to rid Pakistan of its nuclear arsenal, as the Wall Street Journal‘s Bret
Stephens has argued, is for Washington to offer to buy it. In return, Washington should offer Islamabad
trade privileges and security guarantees — even against India. Pakistan’s history of selling its nuclear
secrets to the highest bidders may, ironically, hold the key to expropriating its nuclear weapons. If
Kim Jong Il can identify, isolate, and cultivate the right individuals, why can’t the world’s sole remaining superpower? If incentives
fail to move the generals in Rawalpindi, then Washington must be prepared to threaten Pakistan with isolation through U.N.
mechanisms, including travel bans on its military leaders. Finally, Pakistan must be made to understand the cost of nuclear warfare.
If a single nuclear warhead falls into the wrong hands — or is pressed into service by the right
hands — there will be no Pakistan. Only denuclearization can now save Pakistan from itself —
and the world from Pakistan.
DA
Modi broadly popular in status quo due to “strong leader image”
India Today, 19
(India Today (Indian newspaper and broadcast network). “NaMo, uninterrupted: India stands firmly behind Narendra Modi, finds
Mood of the Nation,” India Today, August 14, 2019. https://www.indiatoday.in/mood-of-the-nation/story/narendra-modi-
popularity-bjp-congress-kashmir-economy-mood-of-the-nation-august-1580907-2019-08-14//SHL)

The country is firmly behind Narendra Modi whose popularity as a leader stands unrivaled in
recent times. In fact, Narendra Modi's 'strong leader' image was the primary driving
force behind the Bharatiya Janata Party's staggering victory in the 2019 Lok Sabha polls. And, if elections were to be held
again today, the BJP would not only win but would improve on the tally it registered in the Lok Sabha polls, the results of which were
declared in May. All this, according to the August edition of the Mood of the Nation poll. The bi-annual
survey was conducted across 97 parliamentary constituencies and 194 assembly constituencies in 19 states. A total of 12,126
interviews were conducted between July 22, 2019 and July 30, 2019 to gauge the nation's mood. And the Mood of the Nation is
pretty clear: Narendra Modi
is miles ahead of his contemporaries and stands on the cusp of going
down in history as one of India's strongest political leaders. PM Modi's approval ratings currently
stand at 71 per cent, a sharp rise compared to the 54 per cent approval he enjoyed in the January 2019 edition of the Mood
of the Nation. If elections were held today, Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party would once again emerge victorious. The
findings of the Mood of the Nation poll show that the BJP would win 308 seats -- five more than what the party won in the 2019 Lok
Sabha polls -- while the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) would win 357. Meanwhile for the Congress, it is all doom and
gloom with a majority of the respondents saying that the Grand Old Party is in terminal decline and that the party risks losing two of
the only four states where it is currently in power -- Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. Here are the top takeaways from the August
2019 Mood of the Nation poll: MODIMOST POPULAR: PM Narendra Modi remains the most popular leader
in the country, according to the Mood of the Nation poll. 30 per cent of the respondents rated his performance as outstanding
while 41 per cent rated it as good. His approval ratings as prime minister are at 71 per cent. He is also rated as the best prime
minister India has had. Indira Gandhi follows in the second spot while Atal Bihari Vajpayee ranks third. Modi's predecessor,
Manmohan Singh ranks seventh of the list of best Indian prime ministers. BJP ALL THE WAY: If elections were to be held today, the
Bharatiya Janata Party would win 308 seats -- five more than what it won in the Lok Sabha election. The Congress would win 49 --
three fewer than its 2019 Lok Sabha polls tally. In terms of alliances, the National Democratic Alliance would win 357 seats while the
United Progressive Alliance would win 92. VICTORY MYSTERY: According to the Mood of the Nation poll, Narendra Modi's
image of a 'strong leader' was the primary driving force behind the Bharatiya Janata Party's victory in
the 2019 Lok Sabha polls. 35 per cent of respondents said Modi's image was the top reason for the BJP's victory. 16 per
cent said it was the Balakot airstrike while 11 per cent credited it to the Modi government's achievements. Five per cent of
respondents said Amit Shah's election management was the top reason for the victory.

The plan tanks Modi’s approval – perception of nuclear strength is k2 support

Panda, 19
(Panda, Ankit (Adjunct Snr. Fellow@Defense Posture Project and Federation of American Scientists, Snr. Editor@Diplomat, Director
of Research@Diplomat Risk Intelligence, Contributing Editor@War on the Rocks, BA Wilson School of Public Affairs@Princeton
University). “At Indian General Election Rallies, Modi Beats the Nuclear Drums,” The Diplomat, April 23, 2019.
https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/at-indian-general-election-rallies-modi-beats-the-nuclear-drums//SHL)

At Indian General Election Rallies, Modi Beats the Nuclear Drums

Less than two months after India’s worst crisis with Pakistan since 2002, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
has made
repeated references to nuclear dynamics between the two countries at election rally addresses. India’s
general elections began earlier this month and will run into mid-May, with Modi’s nationally dominant Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) hoping seize on its stewardship of India’s national security to maintain a
dominant position in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India’s bicameral parliament). On April 17, at a campaign rally,
Modi touted that India had called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff . It’s unclear if the prime minister was referring to a
specific weapon. “Earlier, terrorists from Pakistan would come here and go back after conducting an attack. Pakistan would threaten
us, saying it has the nuclear bomb and will press the button,” Modi said, underscoring what had long been a dilemma for India,
whose conventionally superiority was undermined by Pakistan’s development of low-yield nuclear weapons in particular. “We have
nuclear of nuclear bombs,” Modi said, intending to highlight India’s capabilities. “I
decided to tell them, do whatever
you want to do,” Modi added, promising that India would retaliate . On April 20, at a separate rally, Modi
returned to the theme: “Every other day, they used to say ‘we have nuclear button, we have nuclear button.’ What do we have
then? Have we kept it for Diwali? (A Hindu holiday traditionally involving lights and firecrackers.)” Modi also discussed the events of
February 26 and 27, when India and Pakistan nearly went to war. Referring to the capture of the Indian pilot whose MiG-21 Bison
was shot down by Pakistan, Modi offered the first on-record Indian statement regarding a possible conventional missile strike on
Pakistan by India. Describing what a “senior American official” had said in the third person, he said: “Modi has kept ready 12 missiles
and might attack and the situation will deteriorate… Pakistan announced they would return the pilot on the second day.” In doing
so, Modi provided the first on-record Indian confirmation of reports citing Pakistani officials of possible conventional missile strikes
as retaliation after the Pakistan Air Force retaliated on February 27. Indian official sources had denied those reports. These
utterances are unusual from an Indian prime minister, but underscore the extent to which the nationalist
BJP is leaning on its national security credentials and India’s military capabilities to appeal to
voters seeking to reconstitute a government after the general elections. Immediately after its nuclear tests in 1998, India
embarked on a two-decade campaign to underscore its status as a “responsible” nuclear power. It released a draft nuclear doctrine
in 1999, which was finalized in 2003 and included the articulation of a conditional no first-use policy. Meanwhile, as India pursued
the normalization of its nuclear status, even as it remains a nonsignatory to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
senior Indian officials and diplomats would point to India’s relative restraint with nuclear weapons—a comparison that was all-the-
starker in South Asia given Pakistan’s rapidly growing arsenal, aggressive nuclear strategy predicated on first-use, and development
of low-yield nuclear weapons. Modi, of course, isn’t the first Indian prime minister to make public remarks touting India’s
nuclear capabilities. His BJP predecessor Atal Behari Vajpayee, the prime minister who directed India’s nuclear tests in 1998,
said in 2000 that India was “being threatened [by Pakistan] with a nuclear attack.” “Do they understand what it means? If they think
we would wait for them to drop a bomb and face destruction, they are mistaken,” he said in remarks that were at odds with India’s
1999 draft nuclear doctrine, which noted that “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike.” The context of Modi’s remarks
on nuclear weapons — election rallies — matter, of course. With a poor economic track record since 2014, the
BJP has rightly
decided to focus on what much of the Indian public perceives as a strength: its management of
national security and defense. Within India, the decision by Modi to retaliate using conventional air power into Pakistani
territory after the February 14 Pulwama attack was widely popular. But utterances on nuclear weapons do not take place in a
vacuum and Modi’s remarks will be heard across the world. Pakistan has already seized on the opportunity to chide India for Modi’s
comments. A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman released a statement on Monday noting that “Pakistan considers these remarks
as highly unfortunate and irresponsible.” “Such rhetoric for short-term political and electoral gains, with complete disregard to its
effects on strategic stability in South Asia is regrettable and against norms of responsible nuclear behaviour,” the statement added.

Weak Modi lashes out to shore up his support – empirics prove

Panda, 19
(Panda, Ankit (Adjunct Snr. Fellow@Defense Posture Project and Federation of American Scientists, Snr. Editor@Diplomat, Director
of Research@Diplomat Risk Intelligence, Contributing Editor@War on the Rocks, BA Wilson School of Public Affairs@Princeton
University). “Ending the India-Pakistan Crisis Requires a Courageous Narendra Modi,” The Atlantic, February 28, 2019.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/02/india-modi-pakistan-crisis/583840//SHL)

The standoff between India and Pakistan would be hard enough to resolve if the two countries did not have nuclear weapons. That’s
before you factor in a
jingoistic media scene, the rapid spread of rumors and disinformation on
messaging and social-media apps, andthe fact that India’s nationalist prime minister is heading into
parliamentary elections. The result: the worst military crisis between the countries in nearly two
decades. Stepping back from the brink now will require political courage in New Delhi and reciprocity in Islamabad. This latest
dispute has several causes. First, there’s the historical, territorial, and fundamental national-identity issues that remain unresolved
between them. Then there’s the Pakistani military-intelligence complex’s use of non-state actors against India over a span of several
years. And finally, there’s the proximal cause of today’s crisis—that after years of absorbing terrorist attacks conceived and planned
on Pakistani soil, India chose to say enough was enough. The Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed has claimed responsibility for
an attack two weeks ago that struck a convoy of Indian paramilitary personnel, killing 40 Indians. New Delhi promised retaliation,
and delivered with air strikes against what it said was a terrorist camp near the Pakistani town of Balakot—
the first such move involving the use of conventional airpower by one nuclear-armed state
against the territory of another. The Indian foreign ministry claimed the strikes were “preemptive” and the targets “non-
military.” The choice of target, similarly, was based on what the Indian foreign secretary said was credible intelligence. Above all, the
Indian side emphasized the status of Jaish-e-Mohammed as a repeat offender. India had endured a 2001 attack on its parliament
planned by the group and a January 2016 assault on an airbase—both without retaliating, even as the 2001 incident brought both
sides to the brink of war. Other attacks, in July 2015 and September 2016, had been carried out by Pakistan-based militants, with the
latter prompting India to take limited military action in the form of what it called “surgical strikes.” In November 2008, most
infamously, terrorists belonging to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba staged an attack on civilians in Mumbai. Given this history, India’s
latest strike was not, in the country’s view, an act of war, but one of self-defense. India’s broad practice of strategic restraint since
the 2002 crisis had, in a way, allowed it to accumulate years of credibility on the international stage that was, in effect, “spent” this
week with its strike at Balakot. Nevertheless, the ingress into Pakistani territory for the first time since the 1971 war between the
two countries left the Pakistani military embarrassed. Swift retaliation was promised—and Pakistan delivered with strikes of its own
across the Line of Control, the de facto border. Indian jets pursued the Pakistani fighters that had conducted the strikes, suffering
losses in the process. One Indian pilot was captured alive and remains in Pakistani custody. The ingredients are now present for an
all-out conflagration. Headlines the world over have emphasized the countries’ status as nuclear powers, underscoring the stakes.
But there’s a choice now over how this might end—and it is largely India’s to make. Pakistan’s response has reset the onus for
retaliation on New Delhi, and finding a way out that’s acceptable to both countries will not be easy. India’s action is without
precedent since the nuclear age began in South Asia. True, the two countries fought a war in 1999 under the nuclear overhang, but
that conflict took place within politically proscribed limits, with then–Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee having specifically
instructed the military to not cross the Line of Control at any cost. While New
Delhi’s latest decision to retaliate was based on
national security, its leadership had to concern itself with more mundane questions of political
expediency too. India is just weeks away from a general election that will once again see the world’s largest
exercise in democracy take place. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his nationally dominant B haratiya Janata Party
could have faced electoral trouble if they mismanaged the response . And though much about the current
crisis has its roots in familiar issues, what is different this time for the two countries rattling sabers, after their respective nuclear
breakouts, is the proliferation of social media and the growth of nationalistic television-news networks—primarily in India. The
Indian government is culpable too for egging on the sort of public opinion that now corners it
ahead of the election; the 2016 “surgical strikes” were immortalized in a Bollywood film recently. Unlike in previous cases, a
bout of American shuttle diplomacy may not be an option, either; the U.S. State Department’s South Asia desk remains manned
largely by acting officials, and the United States has no permanent ambassador to Pakistan. Other powers such as China, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, and Iran lack the credibility to serve the “honest broker” role that Washington was once able to play adeptly in South
Asia. Pakistan’s envoy in Washington has called for American involvement, but New Delhi may favor bilateral resolution. India’s best
course of action would be to focus its diplomatic energy on a long-standing campaign to isolate Pakistan until it systematically
changes its ways on the use of proxy groups, and its military energy on denying Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba access to
their targets. Yet for
Modi, an avowed nationalist, the safer course of action in the short term
appears to be erring on the side of strength and resolve. This may have been the underpinning of why
India took the sort of action it did, instead of retaliating in a less escalatory manner —such as into
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, a disputed territory. Since the 1971 war, the use of air forces between the two countries has
been seen as uniquely escalatory.

https://www.nei.org/fundamentals/nuclear-waste
NEI18

It can still be used for energy. Used

fuel has only exhausted part of the
potential energy in the uranium pellets
after five years in a reactor. Some
countries like France reprocess and
recycle nuclear fuel, extracting
elements still capable of generating
energy for use in new fuel and
encasing the radioactive byproducts in
solid glass logs for permanent
disposal. The United States currently
does not, but some advanced reactor
designs in development would be able
to run on used fuel. 
Net benefits-
A. The counterplan solves the nuke terror impact from the 1AC – only the plan
gets circumvented – that’ll be done on case.
B. Pakistan economic decline sparks war
Guthrie 2k – (Grant, J.D. candidate, 2000, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.,
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review “Nuclear Testing Rocks the Sub-Continent:
Can International Law Halt the Impending Nuclear Conflict Between India and Pakistan?”
Spring/Summer 2000, pg lexis wyo-ef)

Nuclear testing creates political instability because it requires a substantial economic

investment. One, small fission device typically costs five million U.S. dollars to manufacture. 84 Pakistan's economy is fragile
already. 85 Pakistan's total budget for 1996-1997 was $ 12.5 [*503] billion, out of which 45 percent was
spent on debt service and 24 percent on defense . 86 If Pakistan begins increasing its defense
budget there will be nothing left for its people. 87 The spending effects of continued nuclear tests
might bankrupt the Pakistani economy . One day, the Pakistani government might be forced to
sell nuclear fuel, nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to generate capital. Uncontrollable
nuclear proliferation could ensue and the world political regime might become destabilized.
There are strong political forces contending for control of Pakistan . 88 Pakistan has been ruled on
and off by the military for half of its history . 89 In October of 1999, Pakistan's democratically elected government was
overthrown and traded for a military regime. 90 If Pakistan's political climate does not eventually stabilize,

Pakistan may become divided and compartmentalized, like a warlord-ridden, nuclear Somalia.
Each faction would control nuclear weapons and a nuclear civil war could ensue. The world
could be at the mercy of a rogue nuclear state. The effect on the world could be incredibly
destabilizing.
CP: Pakistan ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenal
The Indian Parliament ought to pass a law eliminating India’s nuclear arsenal
They can do that
Khosla & Krishnaswamy 10 [SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY and MADHAV KHOSLA, Military
power and the constitution, 2010, https://www.india-
seminar.com/2010/611/611_sudhir_&_madhav.htm]
In this essay, we remedy this lack of attention with a brief sketch of the manner in which the Indian Constitution organizes civil and political control
over the use of armed force and focus on one instance of the judiciary’s failure to recognize and maintain these controls. The primary mode through
which the Indian Constitution regulates the use of armed forces is by distinguishing between military powers and law and order powers which are
conferred on the Union and state governments respectively. This distinction is ostensibly about the use of armed force outside and within the territory
of the Union and the states. In recent times, the Union has been increasingly involved in the maintenance of law and order within the territory of

India. The second mode through which the Union’s use of armed force is regulated is legislation .
The army, navy and air force are governed by separate legislation and the new paramilitary forces raised by the Union like the Border Security Force,
Central Reserve Police Force, and the Central Industrial Security Force are constituted under their respective statutes. The Cantonments Act regulates
the territorial application of these legislation and rules. The state’s law and order powers are primarily regulated by the pre-constitutional criminal
legislation: The Indian Penal Code 1860 and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. Some provisions in such legislation (for instance, Sections 130 and
131 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) allow for the use of military power to aid ordinary law and order in special circumstances. The states have
enacted Police Act’s which regulate the functioning of the law and order machinery. The Union and the states have enacted various special criminal
laws dealing with particular offences such as the Domestic Violence Act or the Organized Crime Acts.

It competes– Normal means is the The Political and Executive Council headed

by Modi
Ramana and Borja 19 [(M.V. Ramana is the Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and
Human Security with the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the School of Public Policy and Global
Affairs, University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver. Lauren Borja is Simons Postdoctoral
Research Fellow at the UBC Liu Institute for Global Issues, Vancouver.) “COMMAND AND
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN INDIA,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 8-
1-2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/command-and-control-of-nuclear-
weapons-in-india/], (vikram)]

The most elaborate official announcement about the organizational structure governing nuclear
command and control (C2) is provided in the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces in the
section titled “Nuclear Command Authority.”[36] The relevant section reads: “Nuclear weapons
shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. An effective and
survivable C2 with requisite flexibility and responsiveness is in place. The overall C2 structure
ensures maximum restraint in employment with an effective interface between civilian and
military leaders.”[37] Regarding the nuclear command authority, the NCA, the joint doctrine
says that it “is a two layered structure—the Political Council (PC) assisted by an Executive
Council (EC). The NCA is responsible for the deployment, control, and safety of nuclear assets.
Chaired by the prime minister (PM), the PC is the only body empowered to take a decision on
nuclear issues while the ultimate decision to authorize the use of nuclear weapons rests solely
with the PM. The EC is chaired by the NSA, provides the necessary inputs for effective decision
making by the PC, and is responsible for executing directives received from the PC. The Service
Chiefs are members of the EC. Alternative chains of command for retaliatory strike exists for all
eventualities.”[38] It also states that the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which “manages the
nuclear arsenal,” “comprises representatives of the three Services besides civilian staff, experts
from Indian Atomic Energy Commission, and missile experts from Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO). The tri-service SFC is the NCA’s operational arm, having its
own Commander-in-Chief reports to the COSC as well as National Security Advisor (NSA), and
controls all of India’s nuclear warheads and delivery systems.” Finally, it asserts that the
“defining issues for Nuclear C2 is to; maintain a credible deterrence; no first use; civilian
authorization; and dispersed arsenal structure to ensure option to retaliate is available.” Note
that COSC stands for Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Modi can divert the blame to Parliament.

TNN ’11-25 [Tnn, 11-25-2019, " PM Narendra Modi blames Congress for stalemate”
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/72232702.cms?-
utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst] KD

RANCHI: Raising BJP’s poll pitch, Prime Minister , in his first public meetings in before the five-
phase elections in the state begin on November 30, accused Congress for keeping the issues of
Article 370 and Ram temple pending for decades “for its vote bank ”. He also blamed the
Congress-JMM combine for “giving wings” to Naxalism in the tribal-dominated region.

At Daltonganj in Palamu district, venue of the first of his two rallies held on Monday, Modi
started his speech by paying tributes to the four policemen killed in a Maoist attack in Latehar
district on Friday.

Without mentioning JMM and other opposition parties, Modi squarely blamed Congress for the
Maoist menace in the state. “In the past 14 years, the Naxal issue became a huge problem
because of instability and effort of different political outfits to remain in power,” he said.

Modi went on to add that “Congress has a habit of stalling critical issues. For 70 years, it did
nothing about Article 370 and the Ayodhya land dispute for its vote bank. If they wanted, they
could have come up with a solution… BJP wowed to solve these issues and we fulfilled our
promises.”

He said the central government will set up a steel factory in the region, but remain committed to
protect “jal, jungal aur jameen” of the common people.
DA
Modi’s popularity is at an all time high – elections boosted his mandate
Safi 19 [(Michael Safi, International Affairs Correspondent ) “India election results 2019: Modi
claims landslide victory,” Guardian, 5-23-2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/23/india-election-results-narendra-modi-bjp-
victory], (vikram)]

India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi,

has claimed a landslide victory in national elections that cements the
Hindu nationalist leader as the country’s most formidable politician in decades. Modi’s ruling Bharatiya
Janata party (BJP) had been expected to easily form a governing coalition with smaller allies, but official results
showed the party ahead in at least 300 seats, comfortably beyond the 272 seats required for a majority in the lower house of parliament. Its main
national opponent, Congress, was leading in just 50 constituencies and its party president, Rahul Gandhi, was turfed out of his family’s bastion seat of
Amethi in Uttar Pradesh state. “Together we grow,” Modi said on Twitter as the results came in. “Together we prosper. Together we will build a strong
and inclusive India. India wins yet again!” In a later televised address, he was critical of those who had doubted the BJP could increase its majority. “The
political pundits of India have to leave behind their ideas of the past,” he said. This year’s polls, held over seven phases starting on 11 April, have been
described as a contest for the soul of India. They pitted Modi’s Hindu nationalist government against a disparate group of opposition parties including
Congress, whose secular vision has defined the country for most of the past 72 years. Votes from 542 lower-house constituencies – one fewer than
usual after authorities discovered £1.3m in unaccounted cash in a south Indian party leader’s home and cancelled the poll there – started being
counted at 8am local time (3.30am GMT), and results were released progressively throughout the day. BJP supporters in Bangalore on Thursday.
FacebookTwitterPinterest BJP supporters in Bangalore on Thursday. Photograph: Jagadeesh Nv/EPA By early Thursday evening the BJP had won in close
to 20 constituencies in the crucial state of West Bengal – up from just two seats in 2014 – while holding off a co-ordinated challenge from opposition
parties in the Hindi heartland states of north India, where its support had been expected to fall from the high watermark of five years ago. Now
it
appears 2014 was no aberration, and that Indian politics has likely entered a new era of Hindu
nationalist hegemony fuelled by Modi’s extraordinary popularity. “We are in an era where you have, once more, a
central gravitational force around which Indian politics revolves,” said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the south Asia programme at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. “I think 2019 will confirm that the BJP has replaced the Congress as that.” Nationalist agenda The
emphatic
victory will be greeted with dismay among some members of religious minority groups, who
have voiced fears that a returned BJP government would be further emboldened to prosecute
its Hindu nationalist agenda, including controversial citizenship-status checks to root out
unauthorised migrants in border states. The BJP’s president, Amit Shah, described illegal migrants in the country’s north-east as
“termites” in one speech that was widely condemned by opponents. Among the BJP candidates who won on Thursday was Pragya Singh Thakur, a
Hindu nun and terrorism accused who is still facing trial for involvement in a 2008 bombing plot that killed six Muslims and injured scores of others.
Beware of the lions: a comedian's guide to the Indian election Read more Alongside nationalism and Modi’s personal magnetism, the BJP’s victory was
also fuelled by a relentless, data-driven and highly disciplined style of campaigning. The party sent up to 20 campaigners to manage the area around
each polling booth, ensuring they knew their possible voters and what messages would resonate with them, an evolution from the older style of
courting or inducing local chieftains to bring out their villages to vote. “We had organisations sitting in every booth and that’s unprecedented,” said
Rajat Sethi, a BJP strategist. Modi the master The decisions of voters in the vast country of 1.3 billion people have been driven by innumerable local
concerns, caste and religion, or rumours and opinions traded over WhatsApp or cups of chai at a tea stand. But the figure of Modi has towered over the
contest like no prime minister since Indira Gandhi in the 1970s. “There
is no match for Modi among the opposition
parties,” said Rahul Verma, a fellow at the Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research. “He’s running
at nearly an all-time high popularity. He’s charismatic, and people still repose faith in him
despite not being very happy with the economic side of the government’s performance.” A survey
released this week by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies found that nearly one-third of people who voted for the BJP did so in support of
Modi, rather than the party or their local candidate. Modi’s popularity had actually grown compared with 2014, when he led his party to the first
majority victory in 30 years, the researchers said. The months leading to the election were bumpy for the BJP. A government survey revealed
unemployment to be the highest in 45 years. Data showing that farming incomes had plummeted to their lowest point in 18 years confirmed the
distress of agricultural workers, some of who had marched on Delhi carrying skulls that they said belonged to farmers who had committed suicide due
to drought and mounting debt. Modi’s promise on the 2014 campaign trail that “good days are coming” threatened to turn into a millstone around his
neck. Is India the frontline in big tech’s assault on democracy? John Harris John Harris Read more Then a bombing in the disputed territory of Kashmir
on 14 February helped to transform the contest. Rather than dent Modi’s strongman image, the killing of 40 Indian paramilitaries by a Pakistan-based
militant group became the stage for his response, an airstrike deeper in neighbouring territory than Indian jets had ever struck. “It really put a premium
on leadership,” said Vaishnav. “It spoke to the attributes that Modi often touts about himself: decisiveness, muscularity, nationalism and to a certain
extent people started to see the vote not about a choice between political alternatives but a vote for the nation.” Modi styled himself as
“chowkidar” – Hindi for watchman – and made national security the dominant message of the
early part of his campaign.

Disarmament when India currently has a superior arsenal looks like weakness–
Modi’s bases leaves him
Irfan Husain 19 [(Irfan Husain, ) “Wag the dog,” DAWN, 3-2-2019,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1467116?fbclid=IwAR1mPiQpUBG3hYhKsmL2kNF-
Qg8StAeHLUsDT7Lg_vj4Alrmx23D7n_LZnU], (vikram)]

IN the 1997 movie Wag the Dog, a US president’s re-election prospects look dim as a sex scandal
threatens to dominate media coverage of the campaign. Enter Conrad Brean (played by Robert
De Niro), a spin doctor who commissions film producer Stanley Motss (Dustin Hoffman) to
fabricate a war with Albania to divert public attention from the scandal. News clips of ‘Albanian
brutalities’ shot in a Hollywood studio are fed into the mainstream media, and soon, a shrill
jingoism dominates the public discourse. Of course there’s no fighting, but such is the power of
fake news that people soon believe America to be locked in a life or death struggle against tiny
Albania. Read: When truth is the first casualty Does any of this sound familiar? While the scenario could apply to Donald
Trump, it is currently more relevant to Narendra Modi’s India where the incumbent faces a
tough re-election battle in a few months. In an increasingly jingoistic country, a ‘pre-emptive
attack’ plays well with the electorate. Never mind that Indian bombs managed to blow up a few
trees, damage a small wheat field and slightly hurt an elderly resident near Balakot. Take a look: Experts question India’s claim of
destroying militant camp near LoC For a day, Indian euphoria was something to behold . Following events on

Twitter, I was taken aback by the amount of hatred and bile, combined with a hysterical
triumphalism, that Indians were posting. Pakistani Twitterati were more restrained, apart from some gung-ho keyboard
warriors. On NDTV, the Indian news channel, a veritable parade of retired generals, air marshals and

diplomats vented their fury, and repeatedly dema nded that ‘Pakistan be taught a lesson ’. Any
moderate voices were immediately drowned out by anchors baying for blood. It is doubtful if
the PM’s offer for talks will be accepted by India. But this chest-thumping has been scaled back following the downing of
an Indian jet and the capture of its pilot over Azad Kashmir. For the time being, Indian triumphalism has been deflated, particularly after the truth about
the Balakot raid has emerged. So what now? I don’t often agree with Prime Minister Imran Khan, but I thought his recent speech to the joint session of
parliament struck the right note of gravitas. His decision to return the captured Indian pilot was entirely appropriate, and has given Pakistan the high
moral ground. But
I doubt if his invitation for talks will be accepted by India: with Modi in full
election mode, any steps towards peace might lose him votes among Hindu nationalists who
form the bulk of his supporters. And in a tight contest against a resurgent Congress, the Indian
prime minister is unlikely to show any flexibility . The best outcome would be for both sides to
declare victory and de-escalate. The risk of cross-border incursions spiralling out of control is too
awful to contemplate. Already, the cost to Pakistan in terms of cancelled flights due to the
closure of our airspace has been very high. Tens of thousands of passengers have been
stranded, and the mobilisation of troops on the border is a very expensive business.
Modi cracks down and detains millions of Muslims to restore popularity,
endorses mob violence, and refuses to protect Muslims and Dalits
Bruenig 19 [(Matt Bruenig, ) “Modi’s Mass Muslim Detention Scheme,” No Publication, 9-27-
2019, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/india-narendra-modi-bjp-assam-bengali-muslims-
displaced], (vikram)]

The instrument stripping 1.9 million people of rights is the National Register of Citizens (NRC), a
now-arcane institution that was created in 1951 to identify who belonged to India at the time. It
was reincarnated in 2014 and completed its work in Assam this year. 1.9 million people amounts to 6 percent of
the total population of Assam and is two times the number of Rohingya refugees in neighboring Bangladesh. The current incarnation of

the NRC’s purpose was to identify undocumented immigrants from neighboring, Muslim-
majority Bangladesh. But its reach goes far beyond. The new NRC forced all of Assam’s residents to submit documentation
like passports, land records, or birth certificates to show they had been in the country or were descended from people who were in the country on or
before midnight of March 24, 1971, the day when Bangladesh went to war for independence from Pakistan, with India’s eventual armed support. Given
the paucity of paper documentation in India and the cumbersome nature of its bureaucratic machinery, an unsurprisingly large number of people have
been adversely affected. 1.9 million people, including those as old as sixty-five, are now legally forced to go to tribunals and the courts to prove that the
only country they have ever lived in should not detain them. Nativist and Nationalist Roots The
modern-day NRC’s roots lie in the
two projects of Assamese nativism and Hindu nationalism in India. The small northeastern state
of Assam has been a hotbed of opposition for more than forty years. The Assam movement
from 1979 to 1985 began as an effort to exclude the non-Assamese from the state. In 1985, the
Congress-led central government signed the Assam Accord with student groups and the state
government committing to the expulsion of alleged foreigners. It is important to note that Assam’s student
movement was not at first focused on undocumented migrants from Bangladesh but on those coming from other parts of India. However, the Hindu
right paramilitary organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) that forms the social base for the BJP helped shift the focus of the student-led
movement from the non-Assamese in general to specifically Bangladeshi undocumented migrants. As a result, a movement that began as an effort to
preserve the northeastern state’s cultural identity from outsiders — whatever one might think of such an enterprise — morphed into something far
more noxious under the auspices of the RSS: a project to define Bengali Muslims as “infiltrators,” a fifth column of Muslims who were attempting to
undermine the Hindu right’s conception of India. The
Hindu right’s project in Assam is part of a broader effort
typified by the desire to cast doubt on the loyalties of Indian Muslims (they also target their
animosity toward Christians) and their place in the country. The BJP, RSS, and their associated
Hindu right organizations — known collectively as the Sangh Parivar — are seeking to rest rict
their rights as far as possible and transform India into a Herrenvolk democracy. As the rabidly xenophobic
Shah put it recently, the alleged Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh are “termites” to them. “Every infiltrator,” he said, “will be expelled.” The true
measure of the NRC’s impact has not yet been felt. The BJP intends to expand the NRC to a nationwide initiative. Forebodingly, the rollout of the
program in Assam was accompanied by instructions from the central government to states to start building detention centers as part of a nationwide
campaign to uproot undocumented immigrants from the country. At least two are known to be in the works in addition to nearly a dozen in Assam,
including a megacomplex, and many more are likely to be built. Political Context With
a second consecutive electoral victory,
Hindu nationalists in India are emboldened. They sense an opening for the establishment of
some of their most cherished nightmares. Not only are Muslim residents of Assam being
uprooted, but India is stripping Muslim-majority Kashmir of statehood and its special
autonomous status, leaving it fully occupied, with an unsurprising escalation in reports of
human rights violations by the Indian Army . In schools, the BJP is engaged in the time-honored Indian political tradition of
rewriting textbooks, this time with the noxious agenda of Hindutva at its heart. This has now extended to dictating the syllabus in universities. The
attack on universities as spaces for open debate has also escalated with the Sangh’s recent election victory. The student wing of the Hindu right, the
Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), is slowly but surely gaining control of student unions. At
the grassroots level, mobs are
assaulting with impunity Muslims and Dalits, the lowest on the caste hierarchy. In some cases,
the victims are being forced to recite Hindutva slogans or are being lynched, and in most cases
the perpetrators are not charged. In one particularly heinous case, they were feted by a
government minister. Given the relatively deep roots the secular tradition has among sections of the population, one might expect the
equivalent of “the Resistance,” if not an effective, organized political force, to fight the dominance of Hindutva. But if you can imagine Trump instituting
his agenda without the organizing work of groups like the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) to combat it, or the presence of a strong social-
democratic left to oppose it, that’s what India looks like today. The opposition Congress party, long a dynastic relic that has no real center to its politics,
shows little inclination to stand up to Hindutva’s agenda. While it opposed the NRC in Assam, it has supported it in the central state of Haryana.
Congress official and the former chief minister of the state B. S. Hooda said that “Foreigners have to leave, it is the responsibility of the government to
identify them.” The mainstream left in India, meanwhile, headed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), is thoroughly disorganized, having lost one
of its major bases of power, in West Bengal, in the last election. In its stead rose the BJP in that eastern state for the first time in modern memory.
What’s left are a handful of local figures like West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee, who admirably stood and won against the implementation
of the NRC in the state (for now), but who is widely seen as an opportunist. Those
in India who oppose the right-wing
agenda are appalled at what is happening to their country. But with rarely seen organized
opposition on a national scale, it may be too late by the time a resistance gets mobilized to stop
Modi and his henchmen. In the absence of a repatriation treaty with Bangladesh, it is unclear what will eventually happen to those who
are held in detention for ostensibly being undocumented migrants from Bangladesh; there is currently no legal avenue for deportation. Concurrently,
the government has ordered states to build detention centers across the country in places as far flung as Assam in the northeast, Karnataka in the
south, and Maharashtra in the west (all states that have BJP majority governments, incidentally). It has indicated that its inclination is to round up
Bangladeshi undocumented migrants across the country. A Wrench in the Machinery Because this Kafkaesque effort was overseen by the Supreme
Court, the project has retained a level of statistical integrity, actually identifying more Hindus than Muslims to be stripped of their rights. By September
9, it had become clear that the vast majority of those left out of the NRC were Bengali Hindus who form the traditional voter base for the BJP in Assam
and part of its vision for a Hindu nation. Home minister Amit Shah then announced that the government would be reintroducing the Citizenship
Amendment Bill, which would allow for asylum-seeker status for only the non-Muslims excluded from the NRC. Thus,
the BJP’s true
agenda behind the project was again revealed; this was never about identifying undocumented
people at all for the Hindu right. The targets are the 200 million Muslims living in India.
1NC Spec
A. Interpretation- the affirmative must specify what is included in a nuclear
arsenal, what the timetable is, and what verification measures they allow
Harvey, PhD, 09
(Cole, Disarmament Efforts Get New Impetus, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009-03/disarmament-efforts-get-new-impetus)

In a major disarmament step, Russia and the United States appear poised to negotiate a significant
new agreement on strategic arms reduction as the clock ticks toward the December 2009 expiration of the 1991 START. At
the same time, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a report detailing proposed
steps for an eventual ban on all nuclear weapons. Speaking at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy
Feb. 7, Vice President Joe Biden reiterated the Obama administration's commitment to a new strategic
arms agreement with Russia. The two countries should "renew the verification procedures in the START...and then go beyond
existing treaties to negotiate deeper cuts in our arsenals," he said. The Russian response to Biden's address and to other overtures
from the Obama administration on the issue has been largely positive. After meeting with Biden in Munich Feb. 8, Deputy Prime
Minister Sergey Ivanov said that the new administration's stance "inspires optimism." Ivanov agreed with Biden that Russia and the
United States should extend the START verification procedures and agree to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Working
out the
details of a new arms agreement between Russia and the United States promises to be a thorny process.
Ivanov, in his address to the Munich conference, argued that any new agreement should limit delivery
vehicles as well as warheads and should ban the deployment of strategic weapons beyond national borders. Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in her Jan. 13 confirmation hearing that the Obama administration "will seek deep, verifiable
reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons-whether deployed or nondeployed, strategic or nonstrategic." U.S.-Russian
relations have been strained by the Bush administration's plan to install elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the
Czech Republic, presenting an obstacle to any new arms deal. In his Munich speech, Ivanov claimed that the European sites of the
U.S. missile defense program are part of a system "aimed at deterring Russia's nuclear missile potential." U.S. officials have
maintained that the system is intended to counter a potential nuclear attack from Iran. Obama administration officials have not
explicitly backed away from deploying missile defenses in Europe but have indicated that the previous administration's policies are
up for review. In his Munich address, Biden declared that the United States will continue to develop missile defense capabilities
"provided the technology is proven to work and cost effective." Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, in a Feb.
13 interview with Interfax in Moscow, held out the possibility of a revised missile defense policy in exchange for Russian cooperation
on Iran's nuclear program. Burns stated that the Obama administration could reevaluate the need for missile defense systems in
Europe if "through strong diplomacy with Russia and our other partners, we can reduce or eliminate [the Iranian] threat." Burns also
declared that the administration is open to the possibility of "new missile defense configurations" that incorporate Russian assets as
well as those of NATO allies. In a joint press conference with the Czech foreign minister on Feb. 10, Clinton reiterated that the United
States reserves the right to develop a missile defense capability in Europe if the threat from Iran continues to mount. "If the Iranians
continue on this path," she said, "one of the options of free countries...is to defend ourselves." Separately, the
British Foreign
Office released a report Feb. 4 detailing proposed steps to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, noting that Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Obama have each pledged to
work toward a world free of nuclear weapons, wrote that the time has come to move from "a
decade of deadlock to a decade of decisions." The British report lays out six "attainable" steps
toward abolishing nuclear weapons. These steps are designed to curb proliferation, decrease stockpiles, and build
confidence. The international community must agree to more stringent measures to prevent prolif eration,
according to the report, while working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to help states develop peaceful
nuclear technology. Next, the report urges Russia and the United States to make substantial reductions in their
total nuclear stockpiles, not simply in deployed weapons. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei echoed this call in a
Feb. 16 editorial in the International Herald Tribune, suggesting that Russia and the United States could reduce their stockpiles to as
few as 500 warheads each. Fourth, the British Foreign Office calls for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), which the Obama administration supports. In her Jan. 13 testimony, Clinton said that she and President Barack
Obama are "strongly committed to Senate approval of the CTBT and to launching a diplomatic effort to bring on board other states
whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force." The CTBT has been ratified by 148 countries, but the United
States and eight other specific states must still ratify the treaty before it can take effect. In order to lay the groundwork for an
eventual ban on nuclear weapons, the report also calls for the
negotiation and implementation of a treaty
banning the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Lastly, the
report urges those states possessing nuclear weapons to begin a strategic dialogue to explore the political and
security issues that would arise during the transition from low numbers of nuclear weapons to zero nuclear
weapons. The British government has proposed a 2009 conference of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized in the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty to discuss these issues. As Russia and the United States seem prepared to negotiate substantial reductions in
their nuclear arsenals and with the Obama administration supportive of the CTBT, there is an emerging consensus on many of the
points listed in the British plan. As Ivanov noted in Munich, however, "[ T]he devil is in the details."

There are 5 different types of disarmament—all of which have different

processes, outcomes, and definitions
Baas 08
(Richard Baas, MA European Studies, NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS A STUDY ON THE MERIT OF
ARTICLE VI OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, March 2008,
University of Twente, https://essay.utwente.nl/59277/1/scriptie_R_Baas.pdf, JKS)

Disarmament itself is defined in a number of ways . Bull (1965) refers to disarmament as the “reduction or abolition of
armaments. It may be unilateral or multilateral; general or local, comprehensive or partial, controlled

or uncontrolled. From a military theoretical perspective, disarmament can be defined as the …most direct and in sense the crudest response
to the problem of military means. Its logic is that since weapons create the problem, the solution is to get rid of them. 5 Disarmament has

therefore often been referred to as the panacea for the problems of international conflict and as the
distraction from the difficult problems of assuring national security, some forms of disarmament actually enhance the military security for all states at
the expense of others, while other forms tend threaten the security of all states.6 In all, five different types of disarmament
states can be discerned;7

1. Local disarmament (a localised disarmed area)

2. General disarmament (the necessary participation of all states in the disarmament

process, also known as the principle of universality)8

3. Complete disarmament (involves weapon categories)9

4. Qualitative partial disarmament (some specific types of armament)

5. Quantitative partial disarmament (some percentage or absolute number of a given

armament).

The concept of disarmament can therefore be applied to all weapons (general and complete
disarmament), or to specific categories of weapons (i.e. nuclear weapons). This concept can be
applied unilaterally or multilaterally, and can involve partial or complete elimination of the
specified type(s) of weapon. Additionally, the concept refers both to the process by which
capabilities are reduced, and to the end condition of being disarmed.

Technical details are key to successful disarmament strategies

Perkovich and Acton 09
(George Perkovich is vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. James M. Acton is an associate in the Nonproliferation
Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Introduction in Abolishing Nuclear
Weapons a debate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009,
http://dar.aucegypt.edu/bitstream/handle/10526/3001/1.%20Abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.p
df?sequence=1, JKS)
What is needed now is for a conversation about disarmament to take place between officials and experts from non-nuclear-weapons states and those
from nuclear-weapons states. There has not been such a conversation for a long time. Diplomats
gather every five years at
conferences to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but they do not seriously discuss the
substantive conditions necessary to achieve the verifiable and enforceable elimination of all
nuclear arsenals. These conferences, operating by consensus rules, have often been unproductive. The sixty five-member Conference on
Disarmament, established in 1979 as a result of a UN General Assembly special session on disarmament to serve a multilateral negotiating forum, is
currently moribund. Representatives of nuclear-weapons states pay lip service to the principle of nuclear disarmament, but none of these states has an
employee, let alone an inter-agency group, tasked full time with figuring out what would be required to verifiably decommission all its nuclear
weapons. Non-nuclear-weapons states have not really engaged with the challenge either, in spite of their disarmament rhetoric. They have tended to
view disarmament as something that the nuclear-weapons states should undertake and report back on when it is accomplished. The need for non-
nuclear-weapons states to join a debate over the details of nuclear disarmament is great. The global diffusion of the technology and know-how to
produce fissile materials threatens to overwhelm the existing regime to prevent the ‘diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons’.6 Fear of nuclear proliferation is motivating some nuclear-weapons states to take nuclear disarmament more seriously,7 but neither non-
proliferation nor the abolition of nuclear weapons can be achieved without the active cooperation of non-nuclear-weapons states. Nuclear abolition
would require much more than the dismantling of all nuclear weapons in the nine states that now possess them. To make abolition feasible and to
enable the detection of rearmament, all states that possess nuclear reactors, uranium-enrichment plants, plutonium reprocessing facilities, uranium
reserves or even transshipment ports would have to accept more intrusive control measures and inspection procedures than they do today. To

build confidence that an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons would be enforced, all states
would need to demonstrate a willingness to enforce international rules with greater alacrity and
robustness than has been historically normal. Discussions of this paper’s early drafts suggested that experts in
nonnuclear-weapons states felt at times insufficiently informed on technical details and/or
that these issues were too low among their national priorities for them to be able to fruitfully
debate them with their counterparts in nuclear-weapons states. Some nuclear-weapons-state officials appear
happy to reinforce such feelings. What ensues, then, is (often heated) debate between factions within states that

possess nuclear weapons over what types of inspection protocol would be necessary to verify
nuclear disarmament, or whether the permanent members of the UN Security Council would
retain veto rights in a world without nuclear weapons. Frequently these debates are limited to the US, the UK and, to a
lesser extent, India, as nuclear policy is not a major subject for discussion in France (where there is not much public interest in the subject), and
information is tightly controlled in Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. There is little substantive give-and-take on
disarmament issues between informed citizens and officials from nuclear-weapons states and many non-nuclear weapons states,
whether the topic is, for instance, how to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel to actors that forgo
indigenous uranium enrichment, or how to deter cheating in a nuclear-weapons-free world.

Turns the case

Pifer 16
(Steven Pifer is director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and a senior
fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. He served more than 25 years as a
career Foreign Service officer, including assignments as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and special
assistant to the president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia on the National Security
Council, and with the U.S. delegation to the negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces., Nuclear
Arms Control Choices for the Next Administration, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series Paper 13 •
October 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/acnpi_20161025_arms_control_choices_final.pdf, JKS)

In May 2002, Bush and Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). A two-page
agreement with no agreed definitions , counting rules or verification measures, SORT constrained each side to no more than 1,700 to
2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads, the Bush administration’s planned number for U.S. strategic forces.8 SORT was set to expire by its
terms on December 31, 2012—the day that the limits were scheduled to take effect. Moreover, the treaty did not limit the number
of strategic missiles and bombers (though those were still constrained by the START I Treaty, whose terms lasted until 2009).
Under SORT, the United States counted the actual number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs
plus the number of bombs and nuclear-armed ALCMs at nuclear-capable bomber bases as
“operationally deployed.” It is not clear that the Russians employed the same counting rules ;
some analysts suggested that Moscow did not count bomber weapons as those weapons were not deployed on the aircraft. START I remained in force
until December 2009. Toward the end of the Bush administration, U.S. and Russian experts discussed whether some arrangement in addition to SORT
might be agreed as START I lapsed in order to maintain some of START I’s monitoring provisions. The
U.S. side, however, was not
prepared to consider limits on strategic delivery vehicles, which the Russian side sought. No
agreement was reached.

B. Violation – their vague use of the word “disarmament” without specifying

the process of disarmament is an ACTIVE choice to squirrel out of counterplans
and disads.

C. Reasons to prefer
1. Neg Ground- timeframe effects links to time sensitive disads like politics or
regional security arguments like deterrence. What is included determines the
magnitude of the link as does the process-these also effect substantive
arguments like solvency presses
2. Plan text is key- it’s the only way to provide textual competition for
counterplans, as well as pre tournament and pre round prep
3. Specification is inevitable- the 1AR can reclarify the plan to dodge our links
making being neg impossible. Forcing them to take a position in the 1AC
provides a stable stasis point for debate
4. Vote negative on presumption- arms control efforts fail when all sides can’t
agree on the specifics
5- Moving Target- They can switch out of any
time and kick any argument the neg makes
6-Limits- The aff has access to infintie amount
of arguments they can switch to in round
because they dont spec a timline
D. Evaluate the round through competing interpretations, its not what you do
its what you justify. The affirmative must win offense for why plan vagueness is
key to solve.