In philosophy, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. In a sociological sense, idealism emphasizes how human ideas—especially beliefs and values—shape society. As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit. Idealism thus rejects physicalist and dualist theories that fail to ascribe priority to the mind.
The earliest extant arguments that the world of experience is grounded in the mental derive from India and Greece. The Hindu idealists in India and the Greek Neoplatonists gave panentheistic arguments for an all-pervading consciousness as the ground or true nature of reality. In contrast, the Yogācāra school, which arose within Mahayana Buddhism in India in the 4th century CE, based its "mind-only" idealism to a greater extent on phenomenological analyses of personal experience. This turn toward the subjective anticipated empiricists such as George Berkeley, who revived idealism in 18th-century Europe by employing skeptical arguments against materialism.
During his life, Bradley was a respected philosopher and was granted honorary degrees many times. He was the first British philosopher to be awarded the Order of Merit. His fellowship at Merton College did not carry any teaching assignments and thus he was free to continue to write. He was famous for his non-pluralistic approach to philosophy. His outlook saw a monistic unity, transcending divisions between logic, metaphysics and ethics. Consistently, his own view combined monism with absolute idealism. Although Bradley did not think of himself as a Hegelian philosopher, his own unique brand of philosophy was inspired by, and contained elements of, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's dialectical method.
Bradley is an English surname derived from a place name meaning "broad wood" or "broad clearing" in Old English.
Like many English surnames Bradley can also be used as a given name and as such has become popular.
It is also an Anglicisation of the Irish Gaelic name O’Brolachán (also O’Brallaghan) from County Tyrone in Ireland. The family moved and spread to counties Londonderry, Donegal and Cork, and England.
Surname
Bradley is the surname of the following notable people:
A. C. Bradley (Andrew Cecil Bradley, 1851–1935), English Shakespearean scholar
Abraham Bradley, Jr. (1767–1838), first Assistant Postmaster-General of the U.S.
The Bradley was an automobile manufactured in Cicero, Illinois, USA, by the Bradley Motor Car Company. Production commenced in 1920 with the Model H tourer, which was powered by a 4 cylinderLycoming engine, had a 116-inch wheelbase, and a selling price of $1295.
In 1921 the Model H continued in production, but was joined by the 6 cylinder powered Model F, also available as a tourer for $1500.
In November 1920, the company went into involuntary receivership, with liabilities of approximately $100,000. Although the assets held by the company were greater, including finished and party-assembled vehicles, along with a large inventory, the company was bankrupt by the end of 1921. Total production of the Bradley automobile was 263 cars.
References
1 2 3 4 5 Kimes, Beverly Rae (1996). The Standard Catalog of American Cars: 1805-1942. Iola, IA: Krause Publications. p.1612. ISBN0873414284.
F. H. Bradley’s Absolute Idealism was in sharp contrast to that of McTaggart’s. Indeed, their conception of metaphysics was staunchly different. McTaggart saw metaphysics as a means of comfort, while Bradley sarcastically took metaphysics to be “the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.” In a more serious tone, he also expounds upon this in the following way:
Bradley’s writings include Ethical Studies, The Principles of Logic, and Essays on Truth and Reality, but perhaps his most important contribution to British Idealism was his 1893 magnum opus, Appearance and Reality. The work is divided into two books; the first being “Appearance,” and the second being “Reality.” In “Appearance,” Bradley arms himself with a sin...
F. H. Bradley’s Absolute Idealism was in sharp contrast to that of McTaggart’s. Indeed, their conception of metaphysics was staunchly different. McTaggart saw...
F. H. Bradley’s Absolute Idealism was in sharp contrast to that of McTaggart’s. Indeed, their conception of metaphysics was staunchly different. McTaggart saw metaphysics as a means of comfort, while Bradley sarcastically took metaphysics to be “the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.” In a more serious tone, he also expounds upon this in the following way:
Bradley’s writings include Ethical Studies, The Principles of Logic, and Essays on Truth and Reality, but perhaps his most important contribution to British Idealism was his 1893 magnum opus, Appearance and Reality. The work is divided into two books; the first being “Appearance,” and the second being “Reality.” In “Appearance,” Bradley arms himself with a single weapon—the Law of Non-Contradiction—and proceeds to lead the reader through a pilgrim’s progress of argumentation; wherein he exposes contradictions, inconsistencies, and paradoxes embedded deep in the heart of our everyday experiences that we take prima facie to be unquestionably and absolutely real.
Among the condemned include the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, relations, space, time, motion, change, causality, activity, individual things, the self, the body, physical nature, and many other phenomena that get caught in his snare. Bradley even goes so far as to say that “philosophy, as we shall find in our next chapter, is itself but appearance.” For Bradley, these phenomena are all “appearances” that fail to live up to the status of “Ultimate Reality.”
After entering into the second book of Appearance and Reality (i.e. “Reality”), Bradley exchanges his heavily-used battering-ram for an eidetic canvas and paintbrush, and proceeds to draft a portrait of reality. Bradley calls his “Ultimate Reality,” the “Absolute.” In like contrast to McTaggart’s “society of eternal selves,” Bradley’s Absolute is a harmonious, supra-relational whole whose contents is nothing other than sentient experience. Bradley’s arguments for monism stem from his rejection of the reality of relations. In fact, Bradley’s legacy has largely been shaped by his notorious and eponymously named “Bradley’s Regress.”
In the most dramatic passage of Appearance and Reality, Bradley calls upon the reader to perform the following ideal experiment:
“Find any piece of existence, take up anything that anyone could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything, in no sense felt or perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning. And as I cannot try to think of it without realising either that I am not thinking at all, or that I am thinking of it against my will as being experienced, I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality. The fact that falls elsewhere seems, in my mind, to be a mere word and a failure, or else an attempt at self-contradiction. It is a vicious abstraction whose existence is meaningless nonsense, and is therefore not possible.”
The radical conclusions of Bradley’s arguments for monism and a single “Absolute” that transcends, absorbs, and harmonizes all the finite and contradictory appearances of our universe, “with all its suns and galaxies,” earned him the title of “the Zeno of modern philosophy.” Bradley’s trenchant prose, humorous whit, and frequent polemics against empiricism, materialism, reductionism, and abstractionism blend together into an iconic and unique flavor of thought.
F. H. Bradley’s Absolute Idealism was in sharp contrast to that of McTaggart’s. Indeed, their conception of metaphysics was staunchly different. McTaggart saw metaphysics as a means of comfort, while Bradley sarcastically took metaphysics to be “the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.” In a more serious tone, he also expounds upon this in the following way:
Bradley’s writings include Ethical Studies, The Principles of Logic, and Essays on Truth and Reality, but perhaps his most important contribution to British Idealism was his 1893 magnum opus, Appearance and Reality. The work is divided into two books; the first being “Appearance,” and the second being “Reality.” In “Appearance,” Bradley arms himself with a single weapon—the Law of Non-Contradiction—and proceeds to lead the reader through a pilgrim’s progress of argumentation; wherein he exposes contradictions, inconsistencies, and paradoxes embedded deep in the heart of our everyday experiences that we take prima facie to be unquestionably and absolutely real.
Among the condemned include the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, relations, space, time, motion, change, causality, activity, individual things, the self, the body, physical nature, and many other phenomena that get caught in his snare. Bradley even goes so far as to say that “philosophy, as we shall find in our next chapter, is itself but appearance.” For Bradley, these phenomena are all “appearances” that fail to live up to the status of “Ultimate Reality.”
After entering into the second book of Appearance and Reality (i.e. “Reality”), Bradley exchanges his heavily-used battering-ram for an eidetic canvas and paintbrush, and proceeds to draft a portrait of reality. Bradley calls his “Ultimate Reality,” the “Absolute.” In like contrast to McTaggart’s “society of eternal selves,” Bradley’s Absolute is a harmonious, supra-relational whole whose contents is nothing other than sentient experience. Bradley’s arguments for monism stem from his rejection of the reality of relations. In fact, Bradley’s legacy has largely been shaped by his notorious and eponymously named “Bradley’s Regress.”
In the most dramatic passage of Appearance and Reality, Bradley calls upon the reader to perform the following ideal experiment:
“Find any piece of existence, take up anything that anyone could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything, in no sense felt or perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning. And as I cannot try to think of it without realising either that I am not thinking at all, or that I am thinking of it against my will as being experienced, I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality. The fact that falls elsewhere seems, in my mind, to be a mere word and a failure, or else an attempt at self-contradiction. It is a vicious abstraction whose existence is meaningless nonsense, and is therefore not possible.”
The radical conclusions of Bradley’s arguments for monism and a single “Absolute” that transcends, absorbs, and harmonizes all the finite and contradictory appearances of our universe, “with all its suns and galaxies,” earned him the title of “the Zeno of modern philosophy.” Bradley’s trenchant prose, humorous whit, and frequent polemics against empiricism, materialism, reductionism, and abstractionism blend together into an iconic and unique flavor of thought.
F. H. Bradley’s Absolute Idealism was in sharp contrast to that of McTaggart’s. Indeed, their conception of metaphysics was staunchly different. McTaggart saw metaphysics as a means of comfort, while Bradley sarcastically took metaphysics to be “the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.” In a more serious tone, he also expounds upon this in the following way:
Bradley’s writings include Ethical Studies, The Principles of Logic, and Essays on Truth and Reality, but perhaps his most important contribution to British Idealism was his 1893 magnum opus, Appearance and Reality. The work is divided into two books; the first being “Appearance,” and the second being “Reality.” In “Appearance,” Bradley arms himself with a single weapon—the Law of Non-Contradiction—and proceeds to lead the reader through a pilgrim’s progress of argumentation; wherein he exposes contradictions, inconsistencies, and paradoxes embedded deep in the heart of our everyday experiences that we take prima facie to be unquestionably and absolutely real.
Among the condemned include the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, relations, space, time, motion, change, causality, activity, individual things, the self, the body, physical nature, and many other phenomena that get caught in his snare. Bradley even goes so far as to say that “philosophy, as we shall find in our next chapter, is itself but appearance.” For Bradley, these phenomena are all “appearances” that fail to live up to the status of “Ultimate Reality.”
After entering into the second book of Appearance and Reality (i.e. “Reality”), Bradley exchanges his heavily-used battering-ram for an eidetic canvas and paintbrush, and proceeds to draft a portrait of reality. Bradley calls his “Ultimate Reality,” the “Absolute.” In like contrast to McTaggart’s “society of eternal selves,” Bradley’s Absolute is a harmonious, supra-relational whole whose contents is nothing other than sentient experience. Bradley’s arguments for monism stem from his rejection of the reality of relations. In fact, Bradley’s legacy has largely been shaped by his notorious and eponymously named “Bradley’s Regress.”
In the most dramatic passage of Appearance and Reality, Bradley calls upon the reader to perform the following ideal experiment:
“Find any piece of existence, take up anything that anyone could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything, in no sense felt or perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning. And as I cannot try to think of it without realising either that I am not thinking at all, or that I am thinking of it against my will as being experienced, I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality. The fact that falls elsewhere seems, in my mind, to be a mere word and a failure, or else an attempt at self-contradiction. It is a vicious abstraction whose existence is meaningless nonsense, and is therefore not possible.”
The radical conclusions of Bradley’s arguments for monism and a single “Absolute” that transcends, absorbs, and harmonizes all the finite and contradictory appearances of our universe, “with all its suns and galaxies,” earned him the title of “the Zeno of modern philosophy.” Bradley’s trenchant prose, humorous whit, and frequent polemics against empiricism, materialism, reductionism, and abstractionism blend together into an iconic and unique flavor of thought.
In philosophy, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. In a sociological sense, idealism emphasizes how human ideas—especially beliefs and values—shape society. As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit. Idealism thus rejects physicalist and dualist theories that fail to ascribe priority to the mind.
The earliest extant arguments that the world of experience is grounded in the mental derive from India and Greece. The Hindu idealists in India and the Greek Neoplatonists gave panentheistic arguments for an all-pervading consciousness as the ground or true nature of reality. In contrast, the Yogācāra school, which arose within Mahayana Buddhism in India in the 4th century CE, based its "mind-only" idealism to a greater extent on phenomenological analyses of personal experience. This turn toward the subjective anticipated empiricists such as George Berkeley, who revived idealism in 18th-century Europe by employing skeptical arguments against materialism.