気になった論文や論説あれこれ

忘れないように書き留めておこう。

＊日本経済関連

●Simon Wren-Lewis, “Japan’s consumption tax: a test of modern macro?”（mainly macro, October 1, 2013）

●Koichi Hamada, “Japan’s Tax-Hike Test”（Project Syndicate, October 24, 2013）

●Barry Eichengreen, “Japan rising? Shinzo Abe’s Excellent Adventure（pdf）”（The Milken Institute Review, Fourth Quarter 2013）

●Thomas Klitgaard, “Japan's Missing Wall of Money”（Liberty Street Economics, November 4, 2013）

●Paul Krugman, “PPP and Japanese Inflation Expectations (Extremely Wonkish)”（The Conscience of a Liberal, October 27, 2013）

クルーグマンはつい先日行われたばかりのIMFのカンファレンス（の中のマンデル＝フレミング講演）で報告を行っており（“Currency Regimes, Capital Flows, and Crises（pdf）”）、その中でアベノミクスをケーススタディーの一つとして取り上げている（pp.29〜pp.30）。

●Benjamin R Mandel, “Abenomics and the Yen – Implications of \ Depreciation for Japanese Equities and the Policy’s Success（pdf）”（Citi Research, September 20, 2013）

Mandel氏はこのエントリー（「予想インフレ率を測る新たな指標　〜日本の予想インフレ率の動きを辿る〜」）の執筆者の一人。PPP（購買力平価）のアイデアに依拠した（日本の）予想インフレ率の推計についても（比較的最近のデータまで加味した上で）言及あり。

＊金融政策関連

●Christina D. Romer, “Monetary Policy in the Post-Crisis World: Lessons Learned and Strategies for the Future（pdf）”（Sumerlin Lecture, Johns Hopkins University, October 25, 2013）

●Kenneth N. Kuttner and Adam S. Posen, “Goal Dependence for Central Banks: Is the Malign View Correct?（pdf）”（Paper presented at the 14th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, Hosted by the International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC., November 7–8, 2013）

●William B. English, J. David López-Salido and Robert J. Tetlow, “The Federal Reserve’s Framework for Monetary Policy― Recent Changes and New Questions（pdf）”（Paper presented at the 14th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, Hosted by the International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC., November 7–8, 2013）

Abstract
In recent years, the Federal Reserve has made substantial changes to its framework for monetary policymaking by providing greater clarity regarding its objectives, its intentions regarding the use of monetary policy― including nontraditional policy tools such as forward guidance and asset purchases―in the pursuit of those objectives, and its broader policy strategy. These changes reflected both a response to changes in economists’ understanding of the most effective way to implement monetary policy and a response to specific challenges posed by the financial crisis and its aftermath, particularly the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates. We trace the recent evolution of the Federal Reserve’s framework, and use a small-scale macro model and a simple static model to help illuminate the approaches taken with nontraditional monetary policy tools. A number of foreign central banks have made similar innovations in response to similar developments. On balance, the Federal Reserve has moved closer to “flexible inflation targeting,” but the Federal Reserve’s approach differs in important ways from the strict implementation of that paradigm by including a balanced focus on two objectives and the use of a flexible horizon over which policy aims to foster those objectives. Going forward, further changes in central banks’ frameworks may be needed to address issues raised by the financial crisis. For example, some have suggested that the sustained period at the effective lower bound points to the need for central banks to establish a different policy objective, such as a higher inflation target or nominal GDP targeting. We use our small-scale model of the U.S. economy to examine the potential benefits and costs of such changes. We also discuss the broad issue of how central banks should integrate financial stability policy and monetary policy.

＊フリードマン関連

●Paul Krugman, “The Friedman-Eichengreen Theory of the Great Depression（pdf）”（March 28, 2009）

●Edward Nelson, “Milton Friedman and the Federal Reserve Chairs, 1951−1979（pdf）”（October 23, 2013）

Abstract
This paper studies the interactions between Milton Friedman and the three Federal Reserve Chairmen from 1951 to 1979: William McChesney Martin, Arthur Burns, and G. William Miller. Friedman had much praise for monetary policy in the first half of Chairman Martin’s tenure, which covered the immediate post-Accord years of 1951−1960, and singled out the achievement of price stability. Friedman felt, however, that an overemphasis on interest-rate stabilization during the 1950s had led to a money growth pattern that magnified cyclical fluctuations. Friedman had considerable misgivings about the monetary policy of the 1960s, especially once a period of monetary restraint was abandoned in 1967. In the 1970s, both Chairmen Burns and Miller were at odds with Friedman on the issue of the extent to which monetary policy could restore price stability.