Re: Dude's not wrong... (except where he is)
@Joe W
Tell me more about this "chess boxing" -- inquiring minds need to know.
461 publicly visible posts • joined 27 Apr 2007
So much to pick at but this:
We used to spend ₹100 crore [about $12 million] a year but we've made that 0 this month by moving completely to our in house Ola maps!"
I mean that's total bullshit, because your data centre et al doesn't run for free. Maybe you're doing some tax fiddle to get the cost to appear zero to you and a loss to some other business arm, which sounds like it's probably screwing your countries economy a little into the bargain. What a hero.
Your faith in your own infallibility will be your downfall.
I consider myself to be someone who is "aware" and "on the ball" with this sort of thing, but a number of years ago in a pre-first-cup-of-tea moment I clicked something I should have known better about on MSN messenger without thinking and sent similar spammy messages to a whole bunch of my contacts. Oops.
Been over 20 years since I was near JCL so don't have any well formed memories, but it sounds more like it doesn't actually have "comments" but just ignores control statements that don't have a valid command ... so you could perhaps standardise on something like
//* COMMENT: actual comment text
<shrug>
As otherwise commented, it seems to stand to reason that a message forwarded to the Abuse account would be visible to that account, much like a forwarded email is obviously visible to the recipient. They couldn’t realistically act on such a report with seeing it.
I’m tacitly assuming that the integrity of such a message is protected by attached meta data. Like, some sort of hash is produced from the original message (and/or it’s component parts) at the point of sending, prior to encryption. Such hash(es) would then be encapsulated with the encrypted message. Thus the message can be uniquely identified but actual content not known unless the Abuse account receives it along with the meta data. The hash could then be trivially used to confirm that Bob received the message from Alice and it was passed in unaltered. This hash could also be used to identify/filter other identical instants of the offending message sent by Alice or any given user.
If Bob changed the message before reporting, the hash of his report would differ and the chain of custody would be broken.
There are just my musings about how that sort of thing could work, I have no knowledge of the inner workings.
Seems like they didn’t entirely trust him if his computer had monitoring software taking screenshots. IANAL but I’d have thought they’d have to inform him of such surveillance?
Unless the software was not targeted at him and was in fact a standard deployment at the magazine, which seems like it could have all kinds of privacy issues attached, if it’s actively taking screenshots of journalists at work
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
A former CEO at #{ex_employer.last} was actually that likely to (legitimately) break his Blackberry in some manner (down the toilet, usually) – and had such tendency to kick up an almighty shitstorm about how imperative it was that it be replaced immediately so he could send his 4am missives – that they had a policy of keeping a stock of them fully charged and preconfigured with his account on stand by.
Various endpoint protection programs can lock down the USB ports -- there's a (slim) chance they're using something like that. Though that probably wouldn't save them from USB Kill or similar. But I suspect that deploying that would quite likely cause you to be delayed from reaching your flight, or anywhere else for that matter.
Exactly how professional does one need to be to repair the certified unrepairable?
https://www.ifixit.com/Teardown/Microsoft+Surface+Laptop+Teardown/92915
In fairness, I suspect the reporter was just rusty on the details; File Manager in Win3x seems to behave broadly in the manner described (notwithstanding the incorrectly oriented slash in the story -- tsk tsk).
http://www.guidebookgallery.org/pics/gui/system/managers/filemanager/winnt31.png
Although it's not abundantly clear from the screenshot if it's telling you the filesystem format, or the admin simply labelled the drive "FAT" -- and my first hand memory of such things is far too hazy now.
If my work laptop is anything to go by, the whole disk encryption software login interface would look entirely unfamiliar (and possibly even a bit suspicious, in a Fisher Price sort of way) to large swathes of the public. I'm assuming the Security Officer was simply looking for something Windows-ish that she could identify with to assure her this wasn't some sort of mock up.
... software support.
There's enough fragmentation due to varying hardware platforms in the Android arena (for example) at the moment. Seems to me that all the necessary virtualisation/abstraction layers it would require for everything to play nicely together (or even at all) and relying on myriad component vendors to maintain a decent level of support would make for a phone which would perform somewhere between "like shit" and "not at all".
On many fronts, implementation would be a total bitch - but I do love the idea.
In my experience the endorsements are even more trivial than described.
If you click through an endorsement notification (or click the "Endorse Connections" link from your profile page) it pops up a selection of contacts with a single skill already selected for you. All you have to do is hit the yellow button to spam them all with some profile cruft. You don't even have to read (let alone think about) who you're endorsing or what you're endorsing them with.
It utter shite.
Read your own post much?
"TBH for £22 you can't really complain ..."
Anecdotal evidence indicates that other suppliers are providing the goods in a timely fashion, while RS continues to flounder.
For £22 you are entitled to complain about shoddy service.
Hell, for £1 you are entitled to complain.