Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia

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Supreme Court of the United States
Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia
Term: 2019
Important Dates
Argument: October 8, 2019
Decided: June 15, 2020
Outcome
Reversed and remanded
Vote
6-3
Majority
Neil Gorsuch • Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan
Dissenting
Samuel Alito • Clarence Thomas • Brett Kavanaugh


Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia is a case that was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on October 8, 2019, during the court's October 2019-2020 term. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit. It was consolidated with Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC. The case concerned Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The court reversed the decision of the 11th Circuit in a 6-3 ruling, holding "an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII."[1] Click here for more information.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Gerald Bostock was an employee of Clayton County, Georgia. After his employment was terminated, Bostock sued the county for discrimination because of sexual orientation. Bostock argued his termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The federal district court dismissed the case and, on appeal, the 11th Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
  • The issue: Whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination "because of ... sex" within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
  • The outcome: The court reversed the decision of the 11th Circuit in a 6-3 ruling, holding "an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII."[1]


    • You can review the lower court's opinion here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    • June 15, 2020: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 11th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case.
    • October 8, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument.
    • April 22, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
    • May 25, 2018: Gerald Bostock filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court.
    • May 10, 2018: The 11th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Northern District of Georgia.

    Background

    Gerald Bostock was the child welfare services coordinator for the Juvenile Court of Clayton County, Georgia. Bostock was also involved with a gay recreational softball league. According to the petition, "Bostock’s participation in the gay softball league and his sexual orientation were openly criticized by someone with significant influence in the Clayton County court system." In June 2013, Bostock's employment was terminated for "conduct unbecoming of a county employee." Bostock denied he engaged in misconduct and alleged he was terminated for his sexual orientation.[2]

    Bostock filed charges against the county, alleging his termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The county moved to dismiss the case, arguing Title VII "does not protect [Mr. Bostock] (or anyone else) from discrimination due to his sexual orientation." A federal magistrate judge dismissed the case. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia affirmed the case's dismissal, holding "the Eleventh Circuit has . . . foreclosed the possibility of a Title VII action alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a form of sex discrimination."[2]

    On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the U.S. district court's judgment.[2]

    In his petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, Bostock wrote, the "Eleventh Circuit has reconfirmed the split among the Circuits on this critical question of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee on the basis of sexual orientation."[2]

    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

    See also: Civil Rights Act of 1964

    The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin in public places, employment and education. Click here for more information.

    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:

    “ It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.[3] ”

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:

    Questions presented:
    • Whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination "because of ... sex" within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.[4]

    Outcome

    In a 6-3 opinion, the court reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, holding "an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII."[1]

    Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Samuel Alito dissented joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Brett Kavanaugh also filed a dissenting opinion.

    Opinion

    In his opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote:

    “ In our time, few pieces of federal legislation rank in significance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. There, in Title VII, Congress outlawed discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Today, we must decide whether an employer can fire someone simply for being homosexual or transgender. The answer is clear. An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids. ...


    When it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employment decision. So long as the plaintiff ’s sex was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law. ...

    From the ordinary public meaning of the statute’s language at the time of the law’s adoption, a straightforward rule emerges: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. It doesn’t matter if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision. And it doesn’t matter if the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group. If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has occurred. Title VII’s message is 'simple but momentous': An individual employee’s sex is 'not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.'

    The statute’s message for our cases is equally simple and momentous: An individual’s homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions. That’s because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex. ...

    Homosexuality and transgender status are inextricably bound up with sex. Not because homosexuality or transgender status are related to sex in some vague sense or because discrimination on these bases has some disparate impact on one sex or another, but because to discriminate on these grounds requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex. ...

    At bottom, these cases involve no more than the straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings. For an employer to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender, the employer must intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of sex. That has always been prohibited by Title VII’s plain terms—and that 'should be the end of the analysis.' [3]

    		”
    —Justice Gorsuch[1]

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Alito

    Justice Samuel Alito dissented joined by Justice Clarence Thomas.

    In his dissent, Alito wrote:

    “ Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on any of five specified grounds: 'race, color, religion, sex, [and] national origin.' 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). Neither 'sexual orientation' nor 'gender identity' appears on that list. For the past 45 years, bills have been introduced in Congress to add 'sexual orientation' to the list, and in recent years, bills have included 'gender identity' as well. But to date, none has passed both Houses. ...


    Because no such amendment of Title VII has been enacted in accordance with the requirements in the Constitution (passage in both Houses and presentment to the President, Art. I, §7, cl. 2), Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of 'sex' still means what it has always meant. ...

    Even as understood today, the concept of discrimination because of 'sex' is different from discrimination because of 'sexual orientation' or 'gender identity.' And in any event, our duty is to interpret statutory terms to 'mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written.' ...

    Many will applaud today’s decision because they agree on policy grounds with the Court’s updating of Title VII. But the question in these cases is not whether discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity should be outlawed. The question is whether Congress did that in 1964.

    It indisputably did not.[3]

    		”
    —Justice Alito[1]

    Justice Kavanaugh

    Justice Brett Kavanaugh also filed a dissenting opinion.

    In his dissent, Kavanaugh wrote:

    “ The question here is whether Title VII should be expanded to prohibit employment discrimination because of sexual orientation. Under the Constitution’s separation of powers, the responsibility to amend Title VII belongs to Congress and the President in the legislative process, not to this Court. ... As written, Title VII does not prohibit employment discrimination because of sexual orientation. ...


    As enacted in 1964, Title VII did not prohibit other forms of employment discrimination, such as age discrimination, disability discrimination, or sexual orientation discrimination. ... For several decades, Congress has considered numerous bills to prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. But as noted above, although Congress has come close, it has not yet shouldered a bill over the legislative finish line. ...

    Bottom line: Statutory Interpretation 101 instructs courts to follow ordinary meaning, not literal meaning, and to adhere to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the meaning of the words in a phrase. Second, in light of the bedrock principle that we must adhere to the ordinary meaning of a phrase, the question in this case boils down to the ordinary meaning of the phrase 'discriminate because of sex.' Does the ordinary meaning of that phrase encompass discrimination because of sexual orientation? The answer is plainly no.[3]

    		”
    —Justice Kavanaugh[1]

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[5]



    Transcript

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Supreme Court of the United States, Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, decided June 15, 2020
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Supreme Court of the United States, "Petition for a writ of certiorari," May 25, 2018
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    4. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Questions presented: 17-1618 Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga," accessed June 7, 2019
    5. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio, Bostock v. Clayton County," accessed October 22, 2019
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