Banister v. Davis

![]() | |
Banister v. Davis | |
Term: 2019 | |
Important Dates | |
Argument: December 4, 2019 Decided: June 1, 2020 | |
Outcome | |
Reversed and remanded | |
Vote | |
7-2 | |
Majority | |
Elena Kagan • Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Neil Gorsuch • Brett Kavanaugh | |
Dissenting | |
Samuel Alito • Clarence Thomas |
Banister v. Davis is a case that was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on December 4, 2019, during the court's October 2019-2020 term. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.
The court reversed and remanded the decision of the 5th Circuit in a 7-2 ruling, holding that because a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court's judgment is not a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b), Banister’s appeal was timely.[1] Click here for more information.
You can review the lower court's opinion here.
Timeline
The following timeline details key events in this case:
- June 1, 2020: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the 5th Circuit's ruling.
- December 4, 2019: Oral argument
- June 24, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
- September 17, 2018: Gregory Banister, the petitioner, filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court.
- May 8, 2018: The 5th Circuit denied Banister's petition for a certificate of appealability.
Background
On September 16, 2004, a jury convicted Gregory Banister of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. On September 8, 2004, Banister filed a notice of appeal, arguing the trial court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. On September 29, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed Banister's conviction.[2]
In 2012, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to revisit certain findings, including whether trial counsel was ineffective. In October 2012, the trial court found the trial counsel was not ineffective.[2]
Banister continued to file appeals. On May 15, 2017, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas rejected Banister's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The court also denied Banister's request for a certificate of appealability (COA). Banister then filed a motion to amend or alter the district court's judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The court denied the motion in June 2017.[2][3]
Banister appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. The 5th Circuit denied the COA on the grounds that Banister's notice of appeal was not timely, relying on an earlier SCOTUS decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby. The 5th Circuit also ruled it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.[2][3]
On September 17, 2018, Banister petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case, arguing the court's rejection of his COA was unfair. The petition pointed to a circuit split in which the 4th, 5th, 8th, and 10th Circuit Courts extended the Gonzalez decision to include Rule 59(e) motions, while the 3rd, 6th, and 7th Circuits did not include extend Gonzalez to Rule 59(e) motions.[3]
Habeas corpus
- See also: Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus is a legal action, or writ, to bring a prisoner before a judge to determine the legality of his or her imprisonment.[5] The U.S. Supreme Court described the writ of habeas corpus as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action."[6]
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Banister's petition to the U.S. Supreme Court described the purpose of Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure as "to allow the district court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings."[3]
Rule 59(e) states:
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.[7] |
Gonzalez v. Crosby
Gonzalez v. Crosby is a case the U.S. Supreme Court decided on June 23, 2005. The case asked whether Gonzalez' Rule 60(b) petition counted as a second writ of habeas corpus. The court ruled that it did not constitute a second habeas petition.[8]
Questions presented
The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:
Questions presented:
|
Outcome
The court reversed and remanded the decision of the 5th Circuit in a 7-2 ruling, holding that because a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court's judgment is not a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b), Banister’s appeal was timely. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the court.[1]
Opinion
In her opinion, Justice Elena Kagan wrote:[1]
“ | A state prisoner is entitled to one fair opportunity to seek federal habeas relief from his conviction. But he may not usually make a “second or successive habeas corpus application.” 28 U.S.C. §2244(b). The question here is whether a motion brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend a habeas court’s judgment qualifies as such a successive petition. We hold it does not. A Rule 59(e) motion is instead part and parcel of the first habeas proceeding.
... This case requires us to choose between two rules—more specifically, to decide whether AEDPA’s §2244(b) displaces Rule 59(e) in federal habeas litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally govern habeas proceedings. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(4). They give way, however, if and to the extent "inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [habeas-specific] rules." 28 U.S.C. §2254 Rule 12; see supra, at 3–4. Here, the Fifth Circuit concluded and Texas now contends that AEDPA's limitation of repetitive habeas applications conflicts with Rule 59(e)’s ordinary operation. That argument in turn hinges on viewing a Rule 59(e) motion in a habeas case as a “second or successive application.” §2244(b); see Brief for Respondent 10. If such a motion constitutes a second or successive petition, then all of §2244(b)’s restrictions kick in—limiting the filings Rule59(e) would allow. But if a Rule 59(e) motion is not so understood—if it is instead part of resolving a prisoner’s first habeas application—then §2244(b)’s requirements never come into the picture. The phrase “second or successive application,” on which all this rides, is a “term of art,” which “is not self-defining.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943 (2007). We have often made clear that it does not “simply ‘refer’ ” to all habeas filings made “‘second or successively in time,’” following an initial application. Magwood, 561 U.S., at 332 (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S., at 944 (alteration omitted)). For example, the courts of appeals agree (as do both parties) that an amended petition, filed after the initial one but before judgment, is not second or successive. See 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §28.1, pp. 1656–1657, n. 4 (7th ed. 2017) (collecting cases); Brief for Petitioner 20–21; Brief for Respondent 16. So too, appeals from the habeas court’s judgment (or still later petitions to this Court) are not second or successive; rather, they are further iterations of the first habeas application. Chronology here is by no means all. ... Our holding means that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed Banister's appeal as untimely. Banister properly brought a Rule 59(e) motion in the District Court. As noted earlier, the 30-day appeals clock runs from the disposition of such a motion, rather than from the initial entry of judgment. See supra, at 3. And Banister filed his notice of appeal within that time. The Fifth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion because it thought that Banister’s motion was really a second or successive habeas application, and so did not reset the appeals clock. For all the reasons we have given, that understanding of a Rule 59(e) motion is wrong. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[9] |
” |
—Justice Elena Kagan |
Dissenting opinion
Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas.[1]
In his dissent, Justice Alito wrote:[1]
“ | Gregory Banister, a state prisoner, filed a federal habeas petition arguing that his conviction was invalid for 53 reasons. His arguments spanned almost 300 pages and featured an imagined retelling of the jury deliberations in the form of stage dialogue. After the District Court determined that all his claims lacked merit, he filed a motion rearguing many of them.
The question in this case is whether a state prisoner can evade the federal habeas statute’s restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions by affixing a Rule 59(e) label. The answer follows from our decision in Gonzalez, and the answer is no. If a Rule 59(e) motion asserts a habeas claim, the motion functions as a second or successive habeas petition and should be treated as such. ... I would hold that a Rule 59(e) motion that constitutes a second or successive habeas petition is subject to §2244(b) and that such a motion does not toll the time to appeal. I therefore conclude that the Fifth Circuit was correct to dismiss Banister’s untimely appeal. Because the Court holds to the contrary, I respectfully dissent.[9] |
” |
—Justice Samuel Alito |
Text of the opinion
Read the full opinion here.
Oral argument
Audio
Audio of oral argument:[10]
Transcript
See also
External links
- U.S. Supreme Court docket file - Banister v. Davis (petitions, motions, briefs, opinions, and attorneys)
- SCOTUSblog case file for Banister v. Davis
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Supreme Court of the United States, Banister v. Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, decided June 1, 2020
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, Banister v. Davis, decided May 8, 2018
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Supreme Court of the United States, Banister v. Davis: "Petition for a writ of certiorari," accessed June 26, 2019
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Supreme Court of the United States, Banister v. Davis: "Questions presented," accessed June 26, 2019
- ↑ Legal Information Institute, "Habeas Corpus," accessed December 11, 2015
- ↑ Merriam-Webster, "Habeas corpus," accessed December 11, 2015
- ↑ Federal Rules of Procedure, "Rule 59," accessed June 26, 2019
- ↑ Oyez, "Gonzalez v. Cosby," accessed June 26, 2019
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," accessed December 9, 2019
|