Judith Butler Burning Acts Injurious Speech

NYU Press

Chapter Title: Burning Acts: Injurious Speech

Chapter Author(s): Judith Butler
Book Title: Deconstruction Is/In America

Book Subtitle: A New Sense of the Political
Book Author(s): Derek Attridge, Michel Beaujour, Judith Butler, Cynthia Chase, Jonathan
Culler, Jacques Derrida, Peter Eisenman, Rodolphe Gasché, Anselm Haverkamp, Peggy
Kamuf, Perry Meisel, J. Hillis Miller, Avital Ronell, Gayatri Spivak, Barbara Vinken,
Elisabeth Weber, Samuel Weber and David Wills
Book Editor(s): Anselm Haverkamp
Published by: NYU Press. (1995)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfqqx.16
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IV
The Performanc e o f Differenc e
10
Burning Acts : Injurious Speech 1
Judith Butle r
The titl e o f J . L . Austin' s How to Do Things With Words pose s th e

question o f performativit y a s wha t i t mean s t o sa y tha t "thing s
might b e don e wit h words. " The proble m o f performativity i s thu s
immediately boun d u p wit h a questio n o f transitivity . Wha t doe s
it mea n fo r a wor d no t onl y t o name , bu t als o i n som e sens e t o
perform and , i n particular , t o perfor m wha t i t names ? O n th e on e
hand, i t ma y see m tha t th e word—fo r th e momen t w e d o no t
know whic h wor d o r whic h kin d o f word—enact s wha t i t names ;
where th e "what " o f "wha t i t names " remain s distinc t fro m th e
name itsel f an d th e performanc e o f tha t "what. " Afte r all , Austin' s
title question s ho w t o d o thing s with words , suggesting tha t word s
are instrumentalize d i n gettin g thing s done . Austin , o f course ,
distinguishes betwee n illocutionar y an d perlocutionar y act s o f
speech, betwee n action s tha t ar e performe d b y virtu e o f words ,
and thos e tha t ar e performe d a s a consequenc e o f words . Th e
distinction i s tricky, an d no t alway s stable . According t o the perlo -
cutionary view , word s ar e instrumenta l t o th e accomplishmen t o f
actions, bu t the y ar e no t themselve s th e action s whic h the y hel p
to accomplish . Thi s for m o f th e performativ e suggest s tha t th e
words an d th e thing s don e ar e i n n o sens e th e same . But accordin g
to hi s vie w o f th e illocutionar y speec h act , th e n a m e perform s
itself, and i n th e cours e o f tha t performin g become s a thin g done ;
the pronouncemen t i s th e ac t o f speec h a t th e sam e tim e tha t i t i s
149
150 Judit h Butle r
the speakin g o f an act. Of such a n act, one cannot reasonabl y as k

for a "referent," sinc e th e effect o f the act of speech i s not to refe r
beyond itself, but to perform itself , producing a strange enactmen t
of linguistic immanence .
The titl e o f Austin' s manual , How to Do Things With Words,
suggests tha t ther e i s a perlocutionary kin d o f doing, a domain of
things done , an d the n a n instrumenta l field o f "words, " indeed ,
that ther e is also a deliberation tha t precede s tha t doing , and tha t
the words will be distinct fro m th e things that the y do.
But what happen s i f we read tha t titl e with a n emphasis on the
illocutionary for m o f speech , askin g instea d wha t i t migh t mea n
for a wor d "t o do" a thing , wher e th e doin g i s les s instrumenta l
than i t is transitive. Indeed, wha t woul d i t mean fo r a thing t o be
"done by" a word or, for that matter , for a thing to be "done in by"
a word ? Whe n an d where , i n suc h a case , woul d suc h a thin g
become disentangle d fro m th e word b y whic h i t i s don e o r don e
in, an d wher e an d whe n woul d tha t conjunctio n betwee n wor d
and thin g appea r indissoluble ? I f a wor d i n thi s sens e migh t b e
said t o "do" a thing , then i t appear s tha t th e word no t only signi -
fies a thing, but that thi s signification wil l also be an enactment of
the thing . It seems here tha t th e meaning o f a performative ac t is
to b e foun d i n thi s apparen t coincidenc e o f signifyin g an d en -
acting.
And yet, it seems that thi s "act-like" quality of the performativ e
is itself a n achievement o f a different order , an d that d e Man was
clearly o n t o somethin g whe n h e aske d whethe r a trop e i s no t
animated a t th e momen t whe n w e clai m tha t languag e "acts, "
that languag e posit s itsel f i n a serie s o f distinc t acts , an d tha t
its primary functio n migh t b e understood a s this kind o f periodic
acting. Significantly , I think , th e commo n translatio n o f
Nietzsche's accoun t o f th e metalepti c relatio n betwee n doe r an d
deed rest s o n a certai n confusio n abou t th e status o f the "deed. "
For even there, Nietzsche will claim tha t certai n forms of morality
require a subject an d institute a subject a s the consequence of that
requirement. Thi s subjec t wil l be installed a s prior t o the deed in
order t o assign blam e an d accountability fo r the painful effect s of
a certai n action . A being is hurt, an d the vocabulary tha t emerge s
Burning Acts : Injurious Speec h 15 1
to moraliz e tha t pai n i s on e whic h isolate s a subjec t a s th e inten -

tional originato r o f a n injuriou s deed ; Nietzsch e understand s this ,
first, a s th e moralizatio n b y whic h pai n an d injur y ar e rendere d
equivalent and , second , a s th e productio n o f a domai n o f painfu l
effects suffuse d wit h conjecture d intention . A t suc h a momen t th e
subject i s no t onl y fabricate d a s th e prio r an d causa l origi n o f a
painful effec t tha t i s recas t a s a n injury , bu t th e actio n whos e
effects ar e injuriou s i s n o longe r a n action , th e continuou s presen t
of a doing , bu t i s reduced t o a 'singula r act. '
The followin g citatio n fro m On the Genealogy of Morals i s usu -
ally rea d wit h a n emphasi s o n th e retroactiv e positin g o f th e doe r
prior t o th e deed ; bu t not e tha t simultaneou s wit h thi s retroactiv e
positing i s a mora l resolutio n o f a continuou s "doing " int o a peri -
odic "deed" : "ther e i s no 'being' behin d doing , effecting, becoming ;
'the doer ' i s merel y a fiction adde d t o th e deed—th e dee d i s every -
thing". " . . . es gib t kei n 'Sein ' hinte r de m Tun , Wirken , Werden ;
'der Tater ' is t zu m Tu n bio s hinzugedichtet—da s Tu n is t alles. " I n
the German , ther e i s n o referenc e t o a n "act"— die Tat —but onl y
to a doing, "da s Tun, " an d t o th e wor d fo r a culpri t o r wrong-doer ,
"der Tater, " whic h translate s merel y a s a "doer." 2 Her e th e ver y
terms b y whic h "doing " i s retroactively fictionalized (hinzugedich-
tet) a s th e intentiona l effec t o f a "subject, " establishe s th e notio n
of a "doer " primaril y a s a wrong-doer . Furthermore , i n orde r t o
attribute accountabilit y t o a subject , a n origi n o f actio n i n tha t
subject i s Activel y secured . I n th e plac e o f a "doing " ther e appear s
the grammatica l an d juridica l constrain t o n though t b y whic h a
subject i s produce d first an d foremos t a s th e accountabl e origina -
tor o f a n injuriou s deed . A moral causalit y i s thu s se t u p betwee n
the subjec t an d it s ac t suc h tha t bot h term s ar e separate d of f fro m
a mor e temporall y expansiv e "doing " tha t appear s t o b e prio r an d
oblivious t o thes e mora l requirements .
For Nietzsche , th e subjec t appear s onl y a s a consequenc e o f a
demand fo r accountability ; a se t o f painfu l effect s i s take n u p b y a
moral framewor k tha t seek s t o isolat e th e "cause " o f thos e effect s
in a singula r an d intentiona l agent , a mora l framewor k tha t oper -
ates throug h a certai n econom y o f paranoi d fabricatio n an d effi -
ciency. The question, then, of who is accountable for a given injury
152 Judit h Butle r
precedes and initiates the subject, and the subject itself is formed
through being nominated to inhabit that grammatical and juridical
site.
In a sense , fo r Nietzsche , th e subjec t come s t o b e onl y withi n
the requirement s o f a mora l discours e o f accountability . Th e re -
quirements o f blam e figure th e subjec t a s th e "cause " of a n act . I n
this sense , ther e ca n b e n o subjec t withou t a blameworth y act ,
and ther e ca n b e n o "act " apar t fro m a discours e o f accountabilit y
and, accordin g t o Nietzsche , withou t a n institutio n o f pun -
ishment.
But her e i t seem s tha t Nietzsche' s accoun t o f subject-formatio n
in On the Genealogy of Morals expose s somethin g o f it s ow n impos -
sibility. Fo r i f th e "subject " i s first animate d throug h accusation ,
conjured a s th e origi n o f a n injuriou s action , the n i t woul d appea r
that th e accusatio n ha s t o com e from a n interpellatin g performa -
tive tha t precede s th e subject , on e tha t presuppose s th e prio r
operation o f a n efficaciou s speaking . Wh o deliver s tha t formativ e
judgment? If ther e i s a n institutio n o f punishmen t withi n whic h
the subjec t i s formed , i s ther e no t als o a figure o f th e la w wh o
performatively sentence s th e subjec t int o being ? I s thi s not , i n
some sense , th e conjecturin g b y Nietzsch e o f a prio r an d mor e
powerful subject ? Nietzsche' s ow n languag e elide s thi s proble m
by claimin g tha t th e " 'der Tater ' i s zum Tu n bio s hinzugedichtet. "
This passiv e ver b formation , "hinzugedichtet, " poeticall y o r Ac -
tively adde d o n to , appended , o r applied , leave s unclea r wh o o r
what execute s thi s fairl y consequentia l formation .
If, o n th e occasio n o f pain , a subjec t i s belatedl y attribute d t o
the ac t a s it s origin , an d th e ac t the n attribute d t o th e subjec t a s
its effect, thi s doubl e attributio n i s confounded b y a third , namely ,
the attributio n o f a n injuriou s consequenc e t o th e subjec t an d it s
act. In orde r t o establish injuriou s consequenc e withi n th e domai n
of accountability , i s i t necessar y no t onl y t o instal l a subject , bu t
also t o establis h th e singularit y an d discretenes s o f th e ac t itsel f
as wel l a s th e efficac y o f th e ac t t o produc e injury ? If th e injur y
can b e trace d t o a specifiabl e act , i t qualifie s a s a n objec t o f
prosecution: i t ca n b e brough t t o cour t an d hel d accountable . Bu t
this tracin g o f th e injur y t o th e ac t o f a subject , an d thi s privileg -
ing o f th e juridica l domai n a s th e sit e t o negotiat e socia l injury ,
Burning Acts: Injurious Speec h 15 3
does thi s no t unwittingl y stal l th e analysi s o f ho w precisel y dis -

course produce s injur y b y takin g th e subjec t an d it s spoke n dee d
as th e prope r plac e o f departure ? An d whe n i t i s word s tha t
wound, to borrow Richard Delgado' s phrase, how are we to under-
stand th e relatio n betwee n th e word an d th e wound? I f it i s not a
causal relation , an d no t th e materializatio n o f a n intention , i s i t
perhaps a kind o f discursive transitivit y tha t need s to be specifie d
in it s historicit y an d it s violence ? Wha t i s th e relatio n betwee n
this transitivity an d th e power to injure ?
In Rober t Cover' s impressiv e essay , "Violenc e an d th e Word, "
he elaborate s th e violenc e o f lega l interpretatio n a s "th e violenc e
that judges deplo y a s instrument s o f a moder n nation-state." 3
"Judges," h e contends , "dea l pai n an d death, " "fo r a s th e judg e
interprets, usin g th e concep t o f punishment , sh e als o acts —
through others—t o restrain , hurt , rende r helpless , eve n kil l th e
prisoner" [not e th e unfortunat e implicatio n o f libera l feminis m
when i t decide s to legislate th e feminine a s the universal]. Cover's
analysis i s relevan t t o th e questio n o f prosecutin g hat e speec h
precisely because it underscores th e power of the judiciary t o enact
violence throug h speech . Defender s o f hat e speec h prosecutio n
have ha d t o shif t th e analysi s t o acknowledg e tha t agent s othe r
than government s an d branche s o f governmen t wiel d th e powe r
to injur e throug h words . Indeed , a n analog y i s se t u p betwee n
state actio n an d citize n actio n suc h tha t bot h kind s of actions ar e
understood t o hav e th e powe r t o den y right s an d libertie s pro -
tected b y th e Equa l Protectio n Claus e o f th e Constitution . Conse -
quently, on e obstacl e t o contemporar y effort s t o legislat e agains t
hate speech is that th e "state action doctrine " qualifies recours e t o
the Equa l Protectio n Claus e i n suc h instances , presumin g a s i t
does tha t onl y government s ca n b e th e agent s o f harmfu l treat -
ment that results in a deprivation o f rights and liberties. 4 To argue
that citizen s ca n effectivel y depriv e each other of suc h right s an d
liberties throug h word s tha t woun d require s overcomin g th e re -
strictions impose d b y the state action doctrine. 5
Whereas Cove r emphasize s th e juridical powe r t o inflic t pai n
through language , recen t jurisprudenc e ha s shifte d th e term s
away fro m th e interpretiv e violenc e enacte d b y nation-state s an d
toward th e violenc e enacte d b y citizen-subject s towar d member s
154 Judit h Butle r
of minority groups . In thi s shift , i t i s not simpl y tha t citizen s ar e

said t o ac t lik e states , but th e powe r o f th e stat e i s refigured a s a
power wielde d b y a citizen-subject . B y "suspending " th e stat e
action doctrine , proponent s o f hat e speec h prosecutio n ma y als o
suspend a critica l understandin g o f stat e power , relocatin g tha t
power a s th e agenc y an d effec t o f th e citizen-subject . Indeed , i f
hate speec h prosecutio n wil l b e adjudicate d b y th e state , i n th e
form o f th e judiciary , th e stat e i s tacitl y figured a s a neutra l
instrument o f lega l enforcement . Hence , th e "suspension " o f th e
state actio n doctrin e ma y involv e bot h a suspensio n o f critica l
insight int o stat e powe r an d stat e violenc e i n Cover' s sense ,
but als o a displacemen t o f tha t powe r ont o th e citizen , figured
as a kin d o f sovereign , an d th e citizenry , figured a s sovereign s
whose speec h no w carrie s a powe r tha t operate s lik e stat e
power to deprive other "sovereigns" of fundamental right s and lib-
erties.6
In shifting th e emphasis from th e harm don e by the state t o th e
harm don e by citizen s an d non-stat e institution s agains t citizens ,
a reassessmen t o f how power operates i n and throug h discours e i s
also a t work . Whe n th e word s tha t woun d ar e no t th e action s o f
the nation-state—indeed , whe n th e nation-stat e an d it s judiciar y
are appeale d t o a s th e arbito r o f suc h claim s mad e b y citizen s
against on e another—how doe s the analysis o f the violence of th e
word change ? I s th e violenc e perpetrate d b y th e court s unwit -
tingly backgrounde d i n favo r o f a politic s tha t presume s th e fair -
ness an d efficac y o f th e court s i n adjudicatin g matter s o f hat e
speech? An d t o wha t exten t doe s th e potentia l fo r stat e violenc e
become greate r t o the degre e tha t th e stat e actio n doctrin e i s sus-
pended?
The subjec t a s sovereig n i s presumed i n th e Austinia n accoun t
of performativity; th e figure for the one who speaks and, in speak -
ing, performs wha t she/h e speaks, is the judge or some other repre-
sentative o f th e law . A judge pronounce s a sentenc e an d th e pro -
nouncement i s th e ac t b y whic h th e sentenc e first become s
binding, a s lon g a s th e judge i s a legitimat e judg e an d th e condi -
tions o f felicit y ar e properl y met . Th e performativ e i n Austi n
maintains certai n commonalitie s wit h th e Althusseria n notio n o f
interpellation, althoug h interpellatio n i s neve r quit e a s "happy "
or "effective " a s th e performativ e i s sometime s figured i n Austin .

In Althusser, i t i s the police wh o hail th e trespasse r o n th e street :
"Hey yo u there! " bring s th e subjec t int o socialit y throug h a life -
imbueing reprimand . Th e docto r wh o receive s th e chil d an d pro -
nounces—"It's a girl"—begin s tha t lon g strin g o f interpellation s
by whic h th e gir l i s transitivel y girled ; gende r i s ritualisticall y
repeated, whereb y th e repetition occasion s both th e risk of failur e
and th e congealed effect o f sedimentation. Kendal l Thomas make s
a similar argumen t tha t th e subject i s always "raced, " transitivel y
racialized b y regulatory agencie s from it s inception. 7
If performativit y require s a powe r t o effec t o r enac t wha t on e
names, the n wh o wil l b e th e "one " with suc h a power , an d ho w
will suc h a powe r b e thought ? Ho w migh t w e accoun t fo r the
injurious word withi n suc h a framework , th e wor d tha t no t onl y
names a social subject , bu t construct s tha t subjec t i n th e naming ,
and construct s tha t subjec t throug h a violatin g interpellation ? I s
it th e powe r o f a "one " t o effec t suc h a n injur y throug h th e
wielding of the injurious name , or is that a power accrued throug h
time which i s concealed at the moment tha t a single subject utter s
its injuriou s terms ? Doe s th e "one " who speak s th e ter m cite th e
term, thereby establishin g hi s or herself a s the author whil e at th e
same time establishing th e derivative status of that authorship ? I s
a communit y an d histor y o f suc h speaker s no t magicall y invoke d
at the moment i n which that utterance i s spoken? And if and whe n
that utteranc e bring s injury , i s it th e utterance o r the utterer wh o
is the cause of the injury, o r does that utteranc e perfor m it s injur y
through a transitivity tha t canno t b e reduced t o a causal o r inten -
tional process originating i n a singular subject ?
Indeed, is iterability o r citationality no t precisely this : the oper-
ation of that metalepsis by which the subject who "cites" the perform-
ative is temporarily produced as the belated and fictive origin of the
performative itself? Th e subjec t wh o utter s th e sociall y injuriou s
words is mobilized b y that lon g string of injurious interpellations :
the subject achieve s a temporary statu s i n th e citing of that utter -
ance, i n performin g itsel f a s th e origi n o f tha t utterance . Tha t
subject-effect, however , is the consequence of that ver y citation; i t
is derivative , th e effec t o f a belate d metalepsi s b y whic h tha t
invoked legac y o f interpellations i s dissimulated a s the subjec t a s
156 Judit h Butle r
"origin" of its utterance. If the utteranc e i s to be prosecuted , wher e

and whe n woul d tha t prosecutio n begin , an d wher e an d whe n
would i t end ? Woul d thi s no t b e somethin g lik e th e effor t t o
prosecute a histor y that , b y it s ver y temporality , canno t b e calle d
to trial ? I f th e functio n o f th e subjec t a s Activ e origi n i s t o occlud e
the genealog y b y whic h tha t subjec t i s formed , th e subjec t i s als o
installed i n orde r t o assum e th e burde n o f responsibilit y fo r th e
very histor y tha t subjec t dissimulates ; th e juridicalizatio n o f his -
tory, then , i s achieve d precisel y throug h th e searc h fo r subject s t o
prosecute wh o migh t b e hel d accountabl e and , hence , temporaril y
resolve th e proble m o f a fundamentall y unprosecutabl e history .
This i s no t t o sa y tha t subject s ough t no t t o b e prosecute d fo r
their injuriou s speech ; I thin k tha t ther e ar e probabl y occasion s
when the y should . Bu t wha t i s precisel y bein g prosecute d whe n
the injuriou s wor d come s t o tria l an d i s i t finally o r full y prose -
cutable?
That word s woun d seem s incontestabl y true , an d tha t hateful ,
racist, misogynist , homophobi c speec h shoul d b e vehementl y
countered seem s incontrovertibl y right . Bu t doe s understandin g
from wher e speec h derive s it s powe r t o woun d alte r ou r concep -
tion o f wha t i t migh t mea n t o counte r tha t woundin g power ? D o
we accep t th e notio n tha t injuriou s speec h i s attributabl e t o a
singular subjec t an d act ? I f w e accep t suc h a juridica l constrain t
on thought—th e grammatica l requirement s o f accountability —
as a poin t o f departure , wha t i s los t fro m th e politica l analysi s o f
injury whe n th e discours e o f politic s become s full y reduce d t o
juridical requirements ? Indeed , whe n politica l discours e i s full y
collapsed int o juridical discourse , th e meanin g o f political opposi -
tion run s th e ris k o f being reduce d t o th e ac t o f prosecution .
How i s the analysi s o f th e discursiv e historicit y o f power unwit -
tingly restricte d whe n th e subjec t i s presume d a s th e poin t o f
departure fo r suc h a n analysis ? A clearly theologica l construction ,
the postulatio n o f the subjec t a s th e causa l origi n o f th e performa -
tive ac t i s understoo d t o generat e tha t whic h i t names ; indeed ,
this divinel y empowere d subjec t i s on e fo r who m th e n a m e itsel f
is generative . Accordin g t o th e biblica l renditio n o f th e performa -
tive, "Le t ther e b e light!, " i t appear s tha t b y virtu e o f the power of
a subject or its will a phenomeno n i s name d int o being . Althoug h
the sentenc e i s delivere d i n th e subjunctive , i t qualifie s a s a 'mas -

querading' performativ e i n th e Austinia n sense . I n a critica l re -
formulation o f th e performative , Derrid a make s clea r i n relatio n
to Austin tha t thi s powe r i s not th e functio n o f a n originatin g will ,
but i s always derivative :
Could a performativ e utteranc e succee d i f it s formulatio n di d no t repea t
a "coded " o r iterabl e utterance , o r i n othe r words , i f th e formul a I pro -
nounce i n order t o open a meeting, launc h a ship or a marriage wer e no t
identifiable a s conforming wit h a n iterabl e model , i f i t wer e no t the n
identifiable i n som e wa y a s a "citation" ? . . . [i] n suc h a typology , th e
category o f intentio n wil l no t disappear ; i t wil l hav e it s place , but fro m
that plac e i t will no longer be able t o govern th e entire scene and syste m
of utterance [I'enonciation]. 8
To what exten t doe s discours e gai n th e authorit y t o bring abou t

what i t name s throug h citin g th e linguisti c convention s o f author -
ity, convention s tha t ar e themselve s legacie s o f citation ? Doe s a
subject appea r a s th e autho r o f it s discursiv e effect s t o th e exten t
that th e citationa l practic e b y whic h he/sh e i s conditione d an d
mobilized remain s unmarked ? Indeed , coul d i t be tha t th e produc -
tion o f th e subjec t a s originato r o f his/he r effect s i s precisel y a
consequence o f thi s dissimulate d citationality ?
If a performativ e provisionall y succeed s (an d I will sugges t tha t
"success" is always an d onl y provisional) , the n i t i s not becaus e a n
intention successfull y govern s th e actio n o f speech , bu t onl y be -
cause tha t actio n echoe s prio r actions , an d accumulates the force
of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authori-
tative set of practices. I t i s no t simpl y tha t th e speec h ac t take s
place within a practice , bu t tha t th e ac t i s itsel f a ritualize d prac -
tice. Wha t thi s means , then , i s tha t a performativ e "works " t o th e
extent tha t it draws on and covers over th e constitutiv e convention s
by whic h i t i s mobilized . I n thi s sense , n o ter m o r statemen t ca n
function performativel y withou t th e accumulatin g an d dissimu -
lating historicit y o f force .
When th e injuriou s ter m injure s (an d le t m e mak e clea r tha t I
think i t does) , i t work s it s injur y precisel y throug h th e accumula -
tion an d dissimulatio n o f it s force . Th e speake r wh o utter s th e
racial slu r i s thu s citin g tha t slur , makin g linguisti c communit y
with a histor y o f speakers . Wha t thi s migh t mean , then , i s tha t
158 Judit h Butle r
precisely th e iterabilit y b y whic h a performativ e enact s it s injur y

establishes a permanen t difficult y i n locatin g accountabilit y fo r
that injur y i n a singula r subjec t an d it s act .
In tw o recen t cases , th e Suprem e Cour t ha s reconsidere d th e dis -

tinction betwee n protecte d an d unprotecte d speec h i n relatio n t o
the phenomeno n o f "hat e speech. " Ar e certai n form s o f invidiou s
speech t o b e construe d a s "fightin g words, " an d i f so , ar e the y
appropriately considere d t o b e a kin d o f speec h unprotecte d b y
the Firs t Amendment ? I n th e first case , R.A.V. v . St. Paul, 11 2 S .
Ct. 2538 , 12 0 L . Ed . 2 d 30 5 (1992) , th e ordinanc e i n questio n wa s
one passe d b y th e St . Pau l Cit y Counci l i n 1990 , an d rea d i n par t
as follows :
Whoever place s o n publi c o r privat e propert y a symbol , object, appella -

tion, characterization o r graffiti, including , but no t limite d to , a burnin g
cross o r Naz i swastika , whic h on e know s o r ha s reasonabl e ground s t o
know arouse s anger , alarm , o r resentmen t i n other s o n th e basi s of race,
color, creed , religio n o r gende r commit s disorderl y conduc t an d shal l b e
guilty of a misdemeanor. 9
A white teenage r wa s charge d unde r thi s ordinanc e afte r burnin g

a cros s i n fron t o f a blac k family' s house . Th e charg e wa s dis -
missed b y th e tria l cour t bu t reinstate d b y th e Minnesot a Stat e
Supreme Court ; a t stak e wa s th e questio n whethe r th e ordinanc e
itself wa s "substantiall y overbroa d an d impermissabl y content -
based." Th e defens e contende d tha t th e burnin g o f th e cros s i n
front o f th e blac k family' s hous e wa s t o b e construe d a s a n exam -
ple o f protecte d speech . Th e Stat e Suprem e Cour t overturne d th e
decision o f th e tria l court , arguin g first tha t th e burnin g o f th e
cross coul d no t b e construe d a s protected speec h becaus e i t consti -
tuted "fightin g words " a s define d i n Chaplinsky v . New Hampshire,
315 U.S . 568 , 57 2 (1942) , an d second , tha t th e reac h o f th e ordi -
nance wa s permissabl e considerin g th e "compellin g governmen t
interest i n protectin g th e communit y agains t bias-motivate d
threats t o publi c safet y an d order. " In Re Welfare of R.A.V., 46 4
N.W.2d 507 , 510 (Minn. 1991) .
The Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t reverse d th e Stat e Suprem e
Court decision , reasonin g firs t tha t th e burnin g cros s wa s no t a n

instance o f "fightin g w o r d s / ' bu t a n instanc e o f a "viewpoint "
within th e "fre e marketplac e o f ideas " an d tha t suc h "viewpoints "
are categoricall y protecte d b y th e Firs t Amendment. 1 0 Th e major -
ity o n th e Hig h Cour t (Scalia , Rehnquist , Kennedy , Souter ,
Thomas) the n offere d a second reaso n fo r declarin g th e ordinanc e
unconstitutional, a judiciall y activis t contributio n whic h too k
many jurist s b y surprise : th e justice s severel y restricte d th e doc -
trinal scop e o f "fightin g words " b y claimin g i t unconstitutiona l t o
impose prohibition s o n speec h solel y o n th e basi s o f th e "content "
or "subject s addressed " i n tha t speech . I n orde r t o determin e
whether word s ar e fighting words , ther e ca n b e n o decisiv e re -
course t o th e conten t an d th e subjec t m a t t e r o f what i s said .
One conclusio n o n whic h th e justice s appea r t o concu r i s tha t
the ordinanc e impose d overbroa d restriction s o n speech , give n
that form s o f speec h not considere d t o fal l withi n th e parameter s
of fighting word s woul d nonetheles s b e banne d b y th e ordinance .
But whil e th e Minnesot a ordinanc e prove d to o broa d fo r al l th e
justices, Scalia , Thomas , Rehnquist , Kenned y an d Soute r too k th e
opportunity o f thi s revie w t o severel y restric t an y futur e applica -
tion o f th e fighting word s doctrine . A t stak e i n th e majorit y opin -
ion i s no t onl y whe n an d wher e "speech " constitute s som e compo -
nent o f a n injuriou s ac t suc h tha t i t lose s it s protecte d statu s
under th e Firs t Amendment , bu t wha t constitute s th e domai n o f
"speech" itself .
According t o a rhetorica l readin g o f thi s decision—distin -
guished fro m a readin g tha t follow s establishe d convention s o f
legal interpretation—th e cour t migh t b e understoo d a s assertin g
its state-sanctione d linguisti c powe r t o determin e wha t wil l an d
will no t coun t a s "speech " and , i n th e process , enactin g a poten -
tially injuriou s for m o f juridica l speech . Wha t follows , then , i s a
reading whic h consider s no t onl y th e accoun t tha t th e cour t give s
of ho w an d whe n speec h become s injurious , bu t consider s a s wel l
the injuriou s potentia l o f th e accoun t itsel f a s "speech " considere d
in a broa d sense . Recallin g Cover' s clai m tha t lega l decision s
can engag e th e nexu s o f languag e an d violence , conside r tha t th e
adjudication o f wha t wil l an d wil l no t coun t a s protecte d speec h
will itsel f b e a kin d o f speech , on e whic h implicate s th e stat e i n
160 Judit h Butle r
the ver y proble m o f discursiv e powe r tha t i t i s veste d withi n th e

authority t o regulate, sanction , an d restric t suc h speech .
In th e following , then , I wil l rea d th e "speech " i n whic h th e
decision i s articulate d agains t th e versio n o f "speech " officiall y
circumscribed a s protecte d conten t i n th e decision . Th e poin t o f
this kin d o f readin g i s no t onl y t o expos e a contradictor y se t o f
rhetorical strategie s a t wor k i n th e decision , bu t t o conside r th e
power o f tha t discursiv e domai n whic h no t onl y produce s wha t
will an d wil l no t coun t a s "speech, " bu t whic h regulate s th e politi -
cal field o f contestatio n throug h th e tactica l manipulatio n o f tha t
very distinction . Furthermore , I wan t t o argu e tha t th e ver y rea -
sons tha t accoun t fo r th e injuriousnes s o f suc h acts , construe d a s
speech i n a broa d sense , ar e precisel y wha t rende r difficul t th e
prosecution o f suc h acts . Lastly , I wan t t o sugges t tha t th e court' s
speech carrie s wit h i t it s own violence , an d tha t th e ver y institu -
tion tha t i s investe d wit h th e authorit y t o adjudicat e th e proble m
of hat e speec h recirculate s an d redirect s tha t hatre d i n an d a s
its ow n highl y consequentia l speech , ofte n b y coo p ting th e ver y
language tha t i t seek s t o adjudicate .
The majorit y opinion , writte n b y Scalia , begin s wit h th e con -
struction o f th e act , th e burnin g o f th e cross ; an d on e questio n a t
issue i s whethe r o r no t thi s ac t constitute s a n injury , whethe r i t
can b e construe d a s "fightin g words " o r whethe r i t communicate s
a conten t whic h is , fo r bette r o r worse , protecte d b y first amend -
ment precedents . Th e figure o f burnin g wil l b e repeate d through -
out th e opinion , first i n th e contex t i n whic h th e burnin g cros s
in construe d a s th e fre e expressio n o f a viewpoin t withi n th e
marketplace o f ideas , and second , i n th e exampl e o f th e burnin g o f
the flag, whic h coul d b e held illega l wer e i t t o violate a n ordinanc e
prohibiting outsid e fires, bu t whic h coul d no t b e hel d t o b e illega l
if i t wer e th e expressio n o f a n idea . Late r Scali a wil l clos e th e
argument throug h recours e t o ye t anothe r fire: "Le t ther e b e n o
mistake abou t ou r belie f tha t burnin g a cros s i n someone' s fron t
yard i s reprehensible. " "But, " Scali a continues , "St . Pau l ha s suf -
ficient mean s a t it s disposa l t o preven t suc h behavio r withou t
adding th e Firs t Amendmen t t o th e fire." R.A.V. v St. Paul, 11 2 S .
Ct. at 2550 , 12 0 L. Ed. 2 d a t 326 .
Significantly, Scali a her e align s th e ac t o f cross-burnin g wit h
those wh o defen d th e ordinance , sinc e bot h ar e producin g fires,

but wherea s th e cross-burner' s fire i s constitutionall y protecte d
speech, the ordinance maker' s languag e i s figured a s the incinera -
tion o f free speech . The analogy suggest s tha t th e ordinance itsel f
is a kin d o f cross-burning , an d Scali a the n draw s o n th e ver y
destructive implication s o f cross-burning t o underscor e hi s poin t
that th e ordinanc e itsel f i s destructive . Th e figure thu s affirm s
the destructivenes s o f th e cross-burnin g tha t th e decisio n itsel f
effectively denies , th e destructivenes s o f th e ac t tha t i t ha s jus t
elevated t o th e statu s o f protecte d verba l currenc y withi n th e
marketplace o f ideas.
The Cour t thu s transpose s th e plac e o f th e ordinanc e an d th e
place o f th e cross-burning , bu t als o figures th e Firs t Amendmen t
in a n analogou s relatio n t o th e blac k famil y an d it s hom e whic h
in th e cours e o f th e writin g ha s becom e reduce d t o "someone' s
front yard. " The stripping o f blackness an d famil y fro m th e figure
of th e complainan t i s significant , fo r i t refuse s th e dimensio n o f
social powe r tha t construct s th e so-calle d speake r an d th e ad -
dressee o f th e speec h ac t i n question , th e burnin g cross . An d i t
refuses a s wel l th e racis t histor y o f th e conventio n o f cross-burn -
ing b y th e K u Klu x Kla n whic h marked , targeted , and , hence ,
portended a furthe r violenc e agains t a give n addressee . Scali a
thus figures himself a s quenching th e fire which th e ordinance ha s
lit, an d whic h i s bein g stoke d wit h th e Firs t Amendment , appar -
ently i n its totality. Indeed, compared wit h th e admittedly "repre -
hensible" ac t o f burnin g a cros s i n "someone's " fron t yard , th e
ordinance itsel f appear s t o conflagrat e i n muc h greate r dimen -
sions, threatenin g t o bur n th e boo k whic h i t i s Scalia' s dut y t o
uphold; Scali a thu s champion s himsel f a s a n opponen t o f thos e
who woul d se t th e constitutio n o n fire, cross-burner s o f a mor e
dangerous order. 11
The lawyer s arguin g fo r th e legalit y o f th e ordinanc e base d
their appea l o n th e fighting word s doctrine . This doctrine, formu -
lated i n Chaplinsky v . New Hampshire, 31 5 U.S . 568 , 57 2 (1942) ,
argued tha t speec h act s unprotected b y th e constitutio n ar e thos e
which ar e no t essentia l t o th e communicatio n o f ideas : "suc h
utterances ar e no essential par t o f any exposition o f ideas, and ar e
of such sligh t socia l valu e a s a ste p t o trut h tha t an y benefi t tha t
162 Judit h Butle r
may b e derive d fro m the m i s clearl y outweighe d b y th e socia l

interest i n order and morality. " Scalia take s this phrasing t o legit-
imate th e following claim : "the unprotected feature s o f the word s
are, despit e thei r verba l character , essentiall y a 'nonspeech ' ele -
ment o f communication." RA.V. v. St. Paul, 11 2 S. Ct. at 2545 , 120
L. Ed. 2d at 319 . In his effort t o protect al l contents of communica-
tion fro m proscription , Scali a establishe s a distinctio n betwee n
the conten t an d th e vehicl e o f tha t expression ; i t i s th e latte r
which i s proscribable, an d th e former whic h i s not: he continues ,
"Fighting word s ar e thu s analogou s t o a nois y soun d truck. " Id.
What i s injurious, then , is the sound, but no t the message; indeed ,
"the governmen t ma y no t regulat e us e base d o n hostility—o r fa -
voritism—towards th e underlying message expressed." Id.
The connectio n betwee n th e signifyin g powe r o f th e burnin g
cross an d Scalia' s regressiv e ne w critica l distinctio n betwee n
what i s and i s not a speech element i n communication i s nowher e
marked i n th e text. 12 Scali a assume s tha t th e burnin g cros s i s a
message, an expressio n o f a viewpoint, a discussio n o f a "subject "
or "content" ; i n short , tha t th e ac t o f burnin g th e cros s i s full y
and exhaustivel y translatabl e int o a constative ac t o f speech ; th e
burning of the cross which is, after all , on the black family's lawn ,
is thu s mad e strictl y analogous—an d morall y equivalent—t o a n
individual speakin g i n public o n whether o r not ther e ought t o be
a 5 0 cen t ta x o n gasoline . Significantly , Scali a doe s no t tel l u s
what th e cros s woul d sa y i f th e cros s coul d speak , bu t h e doe s
insist tha t wha t th e burnin g cros s i s doin g i s expressin g a view -
point, discoursin g o n a conten t whic h is , admittedly , controver -
sial, but fo r tha t ver y reason, ought no t t o be proscribed. Thus th e
defense o f cross-burnin g a s fre e speec h rest s o n a n unarticulate d
analogy betwee n tha t ac t an d a publi c constation . Thi s speec h i s
not a doing, an actio n or an injury , eve n as it is the enunciation of
a se t o f "contents " tha t migh t offend. 13 Th e injur y i s thu s con -
strued a s one tha t i s registered a t th e leve l of sensibility, which i s
to say that i t is an offense tha t i s one of the risks of free speech .
That th e cros s burn s an d thu s constitute s a n incendiar y de -
struction i s not considere d a s a sig n o f the intentio n t o reproduc e
that incendiar y destructio n a t th e sit e o f the hous e o r th e family ;
the historica l correlatio n betwee n cross-burnin g an d markin g a
community, a family , o r a n individua l fo r furthe r violenc e i s als o

ignored. Ho w muc h o f tha t burnin g i s translatabl e int o a declara -
tive o r constativ e proposition ? An d ho w woul d on e kno w exactl y
what constativ e clai m i s bein g mad e b y th e burnin g cross ? I f th e
cross i s th e expressio n o f a viewpoint , i s i t a declaratio n a s in , " I
am o f th e opinio n tha t blac k peopl e ough t no t t o liv e i n thi s
neighborhood" o r eve n " I a m o f th e opinio n tha t violenc e ough t t o
be perpetrate d agains t blac k people, " o r i s i t a perlocutionar y
performative a s i n imperative s an d command s whic h tak e th e
form o f "Burn! " o r "Die!" ? I s i t a n injunctio n tha t work s it s powe r
metonymically no t onl y i n th e sens e tha t th e fir e recall s prio r
burnings whic h hav e serve d t o mar k blac k peopl e a s target s fo r
violence, bu t als o i n th e sens e tha t th e fire i s understoo d t o b e
transferable fro m th e cros s t o th e targe t tha t i s marke d b y th e
cross? Th e relatio n betwee n cross-burnin g an d torching s o f bot h
persons an d propertie s i s historicall y established . Hence , fro m
this perspective , th e burnin g cros s assume s th e statu s o f a direc t
address an d a threat and , a s such , i s construed eithe r a s th e incipi -
ent momen t o f injuriou s actio n or a s th e statemen t o f a n intentio n
to injure. 14
Although Justic e Steven s agree d wit h th e decisio n t o strik e
down th e Minnesot a ordinance , h e take s th e occasio n t o rebuk e
Scalia fo r restrictin g th e fighting word s doctrine . Steven s review s
special case s i n whic h conduc t ma y b e prohibite d b y specia l rules .
Note i n th e followin g quotatio n ho w th e cros s burnin g i s nowher e
mentioned, bu t th e displacement s o f th e figure o f fire appea r i n a
series o f example s whic h effectivel y transfe r th e nee d fo r protec -
tion from racist speech, t o th e nee d fo r protectio n from public
protest against racism. Eve n withi n Steven' s defens e o f proscribin g
conduct, a phantasmati c figure o f a menacin g rio t emerges :
Lighting a fir e nea r a n ammunitio n dum p o r a gasolin e storag e tan k i s

especially dangerous; such behavior ma y be punished mor e severely tha n
burning tras h i n a vacan t lot . Threatenin g someon e becaus e o f he r rac e
or religiou s belief s ma y caus e particularl y sever e traum a o r touc h of f a
riot, an d threatenin g a hig h publi c officia l ma y caus e substantia l socia l
disruption; suc h threat s ma y b e punishe d mor e severel y tha n threat s
against someon e base d on , say, his support o f a particular athleti c team .
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2561 , 120 L. Ed. 2d at 340.
164 Judit h Butle r
Absent fro m th e lis t o f fires abov e i s th e burnin g o f th e cros s i n

question. I n th e plac e o f tha t prio r scene , w e ar e aske d firs t t o
imagine someon e wh o woul d ligh t a fire nea r a ga s tank , an d the n
to imagin e a mor e innocuou s fire i n a vacan t lot . Bu t wit h th e
vacant lot , w e ente r th e metapho r o f povert y an d property , whic h
appears t o effec t th e unstate d transitio n t o th e m a t t e r o f black -
ness 1 5 introduce d b y th e nex t line , "threatenin g someon e becaus e
of he r rac e o r religiou s belief s . . .": because o f he r rac e i s no t th e
same a s "o n th e basi s of " he r rac e an d leave s ope n th e possibilit y
that th e rac e causall y induce s th e threat . Th e threa t appear s t o
shift mid-sentenc e a s Steven s continue s t o elaborat e a secon d
causality: thi s threa t "ma y caus e particularl y sever e t r a u m a o r
touch of f a riot " a t whic h poin t i t i s n o longe r clea r whethe r th e
threat whic h warrant s th e prohibitio n o n conduc t refer s t o th e
"threatening someon e becaus e o f her rac e o r religiou s belief " o r t o
the rio t tha t migh t resul t therefrom . Wha t immediatel y follow s
suggests tha t th e limitation s o n rioter s ha s suddenl y becom e mor e
urgent t o authoriz e tha n th e limitatio n o n thos e wh o woul d
threaten thi s "her " "becaus e o f he r race . . . ." After "o r touc h of f a
riot," th e sentenc e continues , "an d threatenin g a hig h officia l ma y
cause substantia l socia l disruptio n . . . ," as i f th e raciall y marke d
t r a u m a h a d alread y le d t o a rio t an d a n attac k o n hig h officials .
This sudde n implicatio n o f th e justice s themselve s migh t b e
construed a s a paranoi d inversio n o f th e origina l cross-burnin g
narrative. Tha t origina l narrativ e i s nowher e mentioned , bu t it s
elements hav e bee n redistribute d throughou t th e examples ; th e
fire whic h wa s th e origina l "threat " agains t th e blac k famil y i s
relocated first a s a incendiar y mov e agains t industry , the n a s a
location i n a vacan t lot , an d the n reappear s tacitl y i n th e rio t
which no w appear s t o follow fro m th e t r a u m a an d threate n publi c
officials. Th e fire whic h initiall y constitute d th e threa t agains t th e
black famil y become s metaphoricall y transfigure d a s th e threa t
that black s i n t r a u m a no w wiel d agains t hig h officials . An d thoug h
Stevens i s o n recor d a s endorsin g a constructio n o f "fightin g
words" tha t woul d includ e cross-burnin g a s unprotecte d speech ,
the languag e i n whic h h e articulate s thi s vie w deflect s th e ques -
tion t o tha t o f th e state' s righ t t o circumscrib e conduc t t o protec t
itself agains t a raciall y motivate d riot. 16
The circumscription o f content explicitl y discusse d i n the deci-

sion appear s t o emerg e throug h a productio n o f semantic exces s
in an d throug h th e metonymi c chai n o f anxiou s figuration. Th e
separability o f conten t fro m sound , fo r instance , o r o f conten t
from context , is exemplified an d illustrated throug h figures whic h
signify i n exces s o f th e thesi s whic h the y ar e mean t t o support .
Indeed, t o th e exten t that , i n th e Scali a analysis , "content " i s
circumscribed an d purifie d t o establish it s protected status , tha t
content i s secure d throug h th e productio n an d proliferatio n o f
"dangers" from whic h i t calls to be protected. Hence, the questio n
of whethe r o r no t th e blac k famil y i n Minnesot a i s entitle d t o
protection fro m publi c display s suc h a s cross-burning s i s dis -
placed ont o th e questio n o f whethe r o r no t th e "content " o f fre e
speech is to be protected fro m thos e who would burn it . The fire is
thus displace d fro m th e cross t o the legal instrumen t wielde d b y
those who would protec t th e family fro m th e fire, but the n t o the
black family itself , to blackness, to the vacant lot , to rioters in Los
Angeles wh o explicitl y oppos e th e decisio n o f a cour t an d wh o
now represen t th e incendiar y powe r o f th e traumatize d rag e o f
black peopl e wh o would bur n th e judiciary itself . Bu t of course ,
that construa l i s alread y a reversa l o f th e narrativ e i n whic h a
court deliver s a decisio n o f acquitta l fo r th e fou r policeme n in -
dicted fo r th e bruta l beatin g o f Rodne y King , a decisio n tha t
might b e said t o "spark" a riot whic h call s int o questio n whethe r
the clai m o f having bee n injure d ca n be heard an d countenance d
by a jury and a judge who are extremely susceptible to the sugges-
tion that a black person is always and only endangering, but never
endangered. An d s o th e Hig h Cour t migh t b e understoo d i n it s
decision of June 22, 1992, to be taking its revenge on Rodney King,
protecting itsel f agains t th e riot s i n Lo s Angele s an d elsewher e
which appeared t o be attacking th e system of justice itself. Hence,
the justice s identif y wit h th e blac k famil y wh o see s th e cros s
burning an d take s i t a s a threat , bu t the y substitut e themselve s
for tha t family , an d reposition blacknes s as the agency behind th e
threat itself. 17
The decisio n enact s a se t o f metonymi c displacement s whic h
might wel l b e rea d a s anxiou s deflection s an d reversal s o f th e
injurious actio n a t hand; indeed , the original scen e is successively
166 Judit h Butle r
reversed i n th e metonymi c relatio n betwee n figures suc h tha t th e

fire i s li t b y th e ordinance , carrie d ou t b y traumatize d rioter s o n
the street s o f Lo s Angele s an d threaten s t o engul f th e justice s
themselves.
Mari Matsud a an d Charle s Lawrenc e als o writ e o f thi s tex t a s
enacting a rhetorica l reversa l o f crim e an d punishment : "Th e
cross burner s ar e portraye d a s a n unpopula r minorit y tha t th e
Supreme Cour t mus t defen d agains t th e powe r o f th e state . Th e
injury t o the Jone s family i s appropriated an d th e cros s burner i s
cast a s th e injure d victim . Th e realit y o f ongoin g racis m an d
exclusion i s erase d an d bigotr y i s redefine d a s majoritaria n con -
demnation o f racist views." 18
Significantly, th e Justices revisite d R.A.V. v. St. Paul, in a mor e
recent decision , Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 11 3 S. Ct. 2194, 14 L. Ed. 2d
436 (1993) , i n whic h th e cour t unanimousl y decide d tha t racis t
speech could b e included a s evidence tha t a victim o f a crime wa s
intentionally selecte d becaus e of his/her race and coul d constitut e
one o f th e factor s tha t com e int o play i n determinin g whethe r a n
enhanced penalt y fo r th e crim e i s i n order . Wisconsin v . Mitchell
did no t addres s whethe r racis t speec h i s injurious , bu t onl y
whether speec h tha t indicate s tha t th e victim wa s selected o n th e
basis o f rac e coul d b e brough t t o bea r i n determinin g penalt y
enhancement fo r a crim e whic h i s itsel f no t a crim e o f speech , a s
it were . Oddly, th e cas e a t han d involve d a grou p o f young blac k
men, includin g Tod d Mitchell , who had jus t lef t th e film, "Missis -
sippi Burning. " The y decide d t o "mov e on " som e whit e people ,
and proceede d t o bea t a youn g whit e ma n wh o ha d approache d
them o n th e street . Rehnquis t i s quic k t o not e tha t thes e youn g
men wer e discussin g a scene from th e film, one in which " a whit e
man bea t a youn g blac k bo y wh o wa s praying. " Rehnquis t the n
goes on to quote Mitchell whose speech will become consequentia l
in th e decision : "D o you al l fee l hype d u p t o move on som e whit e
people?" an d later , "Yo u al l wan t t o fuc k somebod y up ? Ther e
goes a whit e boy : g o get him. " Wisconsin v . Mitchell, 11 3 S. Ct. a t
2196-7, 12 0 L. Ed. 2d at 442 (citing Brief for Petitioner) . Now, th e
irony o f thi s event , i t seems , is tha t th e film narrate s th e stor y of
three civi l right s worker s (tw o whit e an d on e black ) wh o ar e
murdered b y Klansme n wh o regularl y threate n wit h burnin g
crosses an d firebomb s an y townspeopl e wh o appea r t o hel p th e

Justice Departmen t i n thei r searc h fo r th e bodie s o f th e slai n civi l
rights activist s an d the n thei r murderers . Th e cour t syste m i s
first figure d withi n th e fil m a s sympatheti c t o th e Klan , refus -
ing t o impriso n th e murderin g Klansmen , an d the n a s settin g
improper restraint s o n th e interrogation . Indeed , th e Justic e De -
partment officia l i s abl e t o entra p th e Klansma n onl y b y actin g
against th e law , freel y brutalizin g thos e h e interrogates . Thi s offi -
cial i s largel y regarde d a s rehabilitatin g masculinit y o n th e sid e
of wha t i s righ t ove r an d agains t a libera l "effeminization " repre -
sented b y judicial du e process . But perhap s mos t important , whil e
the effectiv e officia l act s i n th e nam e o f th e law , h e als o act s
against th e law , an d purport s t o sho w tha t hi s unlawfulnes s i s th e
only efficaciou s wa y t o figh t racism . Th e fil m thu s appeal s t o a
widespread lac k o f fait h i n th e la w an d it s proceduralism , recon -
structing a lawles s whit e masculinit y eve n a s i t purport s t o cur b
its excesses .
In som e ways , th e fil m show s tha t violenc e i s th e consequenc e
of th e law' s failur e t o protec t it s citizens , an d i n thi s wa y allego -
rizes th e receptio n o f th e judicia l decisions . Fo r i f th e fil m show s
that th e cour t wil l fai l t o guarante e th e right s an d libertie s o f it s
citizens, an d onl y violenc e ca n counte r racism , the n th e stree t
violence tha t literall y follow s th e fil m reverse s th e orde r o f tha t
allegory. Th e blac k me n wh o leav e th e fil m an d embar k upo n
violence i n th e stree t fin d themselve s i n a cour t tha t no t onl y goe s
out o f it s wa y t o indic t th e film—whic h is , after all , an indictmen t
of th e courts—bu t implicitl y goe s o n t o lin k th e stree t violenc e t o
the offendin g representation , an d effectivel y t o lin k th e on e
through th e other .
The cour t seek s t o decid e whethe r o r no t th e selectio n o f th e
target o f violenc e i s a raciall y motivate d on e b y quotin g Tod d
Mitchell's speech . Thi s speec h i s the n take n t o b e th e effec t o f
having watche d th e film , indeed , t o b e th e ver y extensio n o f th e
speech tha t constitute s th e tex t o f th e film . Bu t th e cour t itsel f i s
implicated i n th e extende d tex t o f th e film , "indicted " b y th e
film a s complici t wit h racia l violence . Hence , th e punishmen t o f
Mitchell an d hi s friends—an d th e attributio n o f raciall y selectiv e
motives t o them—reverse s th e "charges " tha t th e fil m make s
168 Judit h Butle r
against th e court . I n R.A.V. v. St. Paul, th e cour t make s a came o

appearance i n th e decisio n a s well , reversin g th e agenc y o f th e
action, substitutin g th e injure d fo r th e injurer , an d figuring itsel f
as a site of vulnerability .
In each of these cases, the court's speec h exercise s th e power t o
injure precisel y b y virtu e o f bein g investe d wit h th e authorit y
to adjudicat e th e injuriou s powe r o f speech . Th e reversa l an d
displacement o f injury i n th e nam e o f "adjudication" underscore s
the particular violenc e of the "decision, " one which become s bot h
dissimulated an d enshrine d onc e i t become s wor d o f law . It ma y
be sai d tha t al l lega l languag e engage s thi s potentia l powe r t o
injure, bu t tha t insigh t support s onl y th e argument tha t i t will b e
all th e mor e importan t t o gai n a reflectiv e understandin g o f th e
specificities o f tha t violence . I t wil l b e necessar y t o distinguis h
between thos e kind s o f violence tha t ar e th e necessar y condition s
of the bindin g characte r o f legal language , and thos e kinds whic h
exploit tha t ver y necessit y i n orde r t o redoubl e tha t injur y i n th e
service of injustice .
The arbitrary us e of this power i s evidenced i n the contrary us e
of precedent s o n hat e speec h t o promot e conservativ e politica l
goals an d thwar t progressiv e efforts . Her e i t i s clear tha t wha t i s
needed i s not a bette r understandin g o f speec h act s o r th e injuri -
ous powe r o f speech , bu t th e strategi c an d contradictor y use s t o
which th e cour t put s thes e variou s formulations . Fo r instance ,
this sam e cour t ha s bee n willin g t o countenance th e expansio n o f
definitions o f obscenity, and t o use the very rationale propose d b y
some argument s i n favo r o f hate crim e legislatio n t o augmen t it s
case to exclude obscenity fro m protecte d speech. 19 Scali a refers t o
Miller v. California (1973 ) a s th e cas e whic h install s obscenit y
as a n exceptio n t o th e categorica l protectio n o f conten t throug h
recourse t o what i s "patently offensive, " an d the n remark s tha t i n
a late r case , New York v. Ferber, 45 8 U.S. 747 (1982), in exemptin g
child pornography fro m protection , there was no "question here of
censoring a particular literar y theme." R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 11 2 S. Ct.
at 2543 , 12 0 L . Ed . 2 d a t 318 . What constitute s th e "literary " i s
thus circumscribe d i n suc h a wa y tha t chil d pornograph y i s ex -
cluded fro m bot h th e literary an d th e thematic. Although i t seem s
that on e must be able to recognize the genre of child pornography ,
to identify an d delimit it in order to exempt it from th e categorica l

protection o f content, th e identifyin g mark s of such a product ca n
be neithe r literar y no r thematic . Indeed , th e cour t appear s i n
one par t o f it s discussio n t o accep t th e controversia l positio n o f
Catharine MacKinnon , whic h claim s tha t certai n verba l expres -
sions constitute sex discrimination, when it says "sexually deroga -
tory 'fightin g words ' . . . ma y produc e a violatio n o f Titl e VII' s
general prohibitio n agains t sexua l discriminatio n i n employmen t
practices" Id. a t 2546 , 12 0 L. Ed. 2 d a t 321 . But her e th e cour t i s
clear tha t i t doe s no t prohibi t suc h expression s o n th e basi s o f
their content, but only on the basis of the effects tha t suc h expres-
sions entail . Indeed , I woul d sugges t tha t th e contemporar y con -
servative sensibilit y exemplifie d b y th e cour t an d right-win g
members o f Congres s i s als o exemplifie d i n th e willingnes s t o
expand th e domai n o f obscenit y and , t o tha t end , t o enlarg e th e
category o f the pornographi c an d t o claim th e unprotected statu s
of both, and s o to position obscenit y t o become a species of "fight -
ing words," that is , to accept tha t graphi c sexua l representation i s
injurious. Thi s i s underscore d b y th e rational e use d i n Miller v.
California in which th e notion of "appealing t o prurience" is coun-
terposed t o th e notio n o f "literary , artistic , political , o r scientifi c
value." Her e th e representatio n tha t i s deeme d immediatel y an d
unobjectionably injuriou s i s exclude d fro m th e themati c an d th e
valuable and , hence , fro m protecte d status . Thi s sam e rational e
has bee n take n u p b y Jess e Helm s an d other s t o argu e tha t th e
National Endowmen t fo r th e Art s i s unde r n o obligatio n t o fun d
obscene materials, and then to argue that various lesbian perform -
ers and gay male photographers produc e work that i s obscene an d
lacking in literary value. Significantly, i t seems, the willingness t o
accept th e nonthemati c an d unobjectionabl y injuriou s qualit y o f
graphic sexua l representations , whe n thes e representation s can -
not b e sai d t o leav e th e pag e o r t o "act " i n som e obviou s way ,
must b e read agains t th e unwillingness t o countenance th e injuri -
ousness o f th e burnin g cros s i n fron t o f th e blac k family' s house .
That th e graphi c depictio n o f homosexuality , say , ca n b e con -
strued a s nonthemati c o r simpl y prurient , figured a s a sensu -
ousness voi d o f meaning, wherea s th e burnin g o f the cross , to th e
extent tha t i t communicate s a messag e o f racial hatred , migh t b e
170 Judit h Butle r
construed a s a sanctione d poin t i n a publi c debat e ove r admit -

tedly controversia l issue s suggest s tha t th e rational e fo r ex -
panding th e fighting word s doctrin e t o includ e unconventiona l
depictions o f sexualit y withi n it s purvie w ha s bee n strengthened ,
but tha t th e rationale fo r invokin g fighting word s to outlaw racis t
threats i s accordingly weakened . This is perhaps a way in which a
heightened sexua l conservatism work s in tandem wit h an increas -
ing governmenta l sanctio n fo r racis t violence , bu t i n suc h a wa y
that wherea s th e "injury" claime d b y the viewer o f graphic sexua l
representation i s honore d a s fighting words , th e injur y sustaine d
by th e blac k famil y wit h th e burnin g cros s ou t front , no t unlik e
the injur y o f Rodne y King , proves to o ambiguous , to o hypotheti -
cal t o abrogat e th e ostensibl e sanctit y o f th e Firs t Amendment. 20
And i t i s not simpl y tha t prohibition s agains t graphi c sexua l rep -
resentation wil l b e supporte d b y thi s kin d o f lega l reasoning ,
whereas racis t injur y wil l b e dignifie d a s protecte d speech , bu t
that raciall y marke d depiction s o f sexuality will be most suscepti -
ble t o prosecution , an d thos e representation s tha t threate n th e
pieties an d puritie s o f rac e an d sexualit y wil l becom e mos t vul -
nerable.
Two remarks o f qualification : first, som e critica l rac e theorist s
such a s Charles Lawrenc e wil l argu e tha t cros s burning i s speech ,
but tha t no t al l speech i s to be protected, indeed , not al l speech i s
protected, an d tha t racis t speec h conflict s wit h th e Equa l Protec -
tion Claus e because i t hinders th e addressed subjec t fro m exercis -
ing his/her rights and liberties. Other legal scholars in critical rac e
studies, suc h a s Richar d Delgado , wil l argu e fo r expandin g th e
domain o f th e "fightin g words " restrictio n o n Firs t Amendmen t
rights. Matsud a an d MacKinnon , followin g th e exampl e o f sex
discrimination jurisprudence , wil l argu e tha t i t i s impossibl e t o
distinguish betwee n conduc t an d speech , that hatefu l remark s are
injurious actions . Oddl y enough , thi s las t kin d o f reasonin g ha s
reappeared i n th e recen t polic y issue d o n gay s i n th e military ,
where th e statement , " I a m a homosexual " i s considere d t o b e a
"homosexual act. " Th e wor d an d th e dee d ar e one , and th e clai m
"I a m a homosexual " i s considere d t o b e no t onl y a homosexua l
act, bu t a homosexua l offense. 21 Accordin g t o thi s policy , th e ac t
of comin g ou t i s effectivel y construe d a s fighting words . Her e i t
seems tha t on e mus t b e reminde d tha t th e prosecutio n o f hat e

speech i n a cour t run s th e ris k o f giving tha t cour t th e opportunit y
to impos e a furthe r violenc e o f it s own . An d i f th e cour t begin s t o
decide wha t i s an d i s no t violatin g speech , tha t decisio n run s th e
risk o f constituting th e mos t bindin g o f violations .
For, a s i n th e cas e wit h th e burnin g cross , i t wa s no t merel y a
question o f whethe r th e cour t know s ho w t o rea d th e threa t con -
tained i n th e burnin g cross , bu t whethe r th e cour t itsel f signifie s
along a paralle l logic . Fo r thi s ha s bee n a cour t tha t ca n onl y
imagine th e fire engulfin g th e Firs t Amendment , sparkin g th e rio t
which wil l fra y it s ow n authority . An d s o i t protect s itsel f agains t
the imagine d threa t o f tha t fire b y protectin g th e burnin g cross ,
allying itsel f wit h thos e wh o woul d see k lega l protectio n fro m a
spectre wrough t fro m thei r ow n fantasy . Thu s th e cour t protect s
the burnin g cros s a s fre e speech , figuring thos e i t injure s a s th e
site o f th e tru e threat , elevatin g th e burnin g cros s a s a deput y fo r
the court , th e loca l protecto r an d toke n o f fre e speech : wit h s o
much protection , wha t d o w e hav e t o fear ?
Postscript
MacKinnon hersel f understand s thi s ris k o f invokin g stat e power ,
but i n he r recen t book , Only Words (1993) , sh e argue s tha t stat e
power i s o n th e sid e o f th e pornographi c industry , an d tha t th e
construction o f wome n withi n pornograph y i n subordinat e posi -
tions is , effectively, a state-sanctione d construction .
MacKinnon ha s argue d tha t pornograph y i s a kin d o f hat e
speech, an d tha t th e argumen t i n favo r o f restrictin g hat e speec h
ought t o b e base d o n th e argumen t i n favo r o f restrictin g pornog -
raphy. Thi s analog y rest s upo n th e assumptio n tha t th e visua l
image i n pornograph y operate s a s a n imperative , an d tha t thi s
imperative ha s th e powe r t o realiz e tha t whic h i t dictates . Th e
problem, fo r MacKinnon , i s not tha t pornograph y reflect s o r ex -
presses a socia l structur e o f misogyny , bu t tha t i t i s a n institutio n
with th e performativ e powe r t o brin g abou t tha t whic h i t depicts .
She writes tha t pornograph y no t onl y substitute s fo r socia l reality ,
but tha t tha t substitutio n i s on e whic h create s a socia l realit y o f
its own , th e socia l realit y o f pornography . Thi s self-fulfillin g ca -
172 Judit h Butle r
pacity o f pornograph y is , fo r her , wha t give s sens e t o th e clai m

that pornograph y is it s ow n socia l context . Sh e writes ,
Pornography doe s no t simpl y expres s o r interpre t experience ; i t substi -

tutes fo r it . Beyon d bringin g a messag e fro m reality , i t stand s i n fo r
reality. . . . T o make visual pornography, and t o live up to its imperatives ,
the world, namely women, must do what the pornographers want to 'say.'
Pornography bring s it s condition s o f productio n t o th e consumer . . . .
Pornography make s th e worl d a pornographi c plac e throug h it s makin g
and use , establishin g wha t wome n ar e sai d t o exis t as , ar e see n as , ar e
treated as , constructing th e socia l realit y o f what a woman i s and ca n b e
in term s o f wha t ca n b e don e t o her , an d wha t a ma n i s i n term s o f
doing it .
In th e firs t instance , pornograph y substitute s fo r experience , im -

plying tha t ther e i s a n experienc e whic h i s supplanted , an d sup -
planted thoroughly , throug h pornography . Hence , pornograph y
takes th e plac e o f a n experienc e an d thoroughl y constitute s a
new experience , understoo d a s a totality ; b y th e secon d line , thi s
second-order experienc e i s rendere d synonomou s wit h a second -
order "reality, " whic h suggest s tha t i n thi s univers e o f pornogra -
phy ther e i s n o distinctio n betwee n a n experienc e o f realit y an d
reality, althoug h MacKinno n hersel f make s clea r tha t thi s sys -
temic conflatio n o f th e tw o take s plac e withi n a realit y whic h i s
itself a mer e substitutio n fo r anothe r reality , on e whic h i s figured
as mor e original , perhap s on e whic h furnishe s th e normativ e o r
Utopian measur e b y whic h sh e judge s th e pornographi c realit y
that ha s take n it s place . Thi s visua l field i s the n figured a s speak -
ing, indeed , a s deliverin g imperatives , a t whic h poin t th e visua l
field operate s a s subjec t wit h th e powe r t o brin g int o bein g w h a t
it names , t o wiel d a n efficaciou s powe r analogou s t o th e divin e
performative. Th e reductio n o f tha t visua l field t o a speakin g fig-
ure, a n authoritaria n speaker , rhetoricall y effect s a differen t sub -
stitution tha n th e on e tha t MacKinno n describes . Sh e substitute s
a se t o f linguisti c imperative s fo r th e visua l field, implyin g no t
only a ful l transpositio n o f th e visua l int o th e linguistic , bu t a ful l
transposition o f visual depictio n int o a n efficaciou s performative .
When pornograph y i s then describe d a s "constructin g th e socia l
reality o f wha t a woma n is, " th e sens e o f "construction " need s t o
be rea d i n ligh t o f th e abov e tw o transpositions : fo r tha t construe -
tion ca n b e sai d t o work , tha t is , "to produce th e socia l realit y o f

what a woma n is, " only i f th e visua l ca n b e transpose d int o th e
linguistically efficaciou s i n th e wa y tha t sh e suggests . Similarly ,
the analog y betwee n pornograph y an d hat e speec h work s t o th e
extent tha t th e pornographic imag e can be transposed int o a set of
efficacious spoke n imperatives . I n MacKinnon' s paraphras e o f
how th e pornographi c imag e speaks , sh e insist s tha t tha t imag e
says, "d o this, " wher e th e commande d ac t i s a n ac t o f sexua l
subordination, an d where , i n th e doin g o f tha t act , th e socia l
reality o f woma n i s constructe d precisel y a s th e positio n o f th e
sexually subordinate . Here "construction " i s not simpl y th e doin g
of th e act—whic h remains , o f course , highl y ambiguou s i n orde r
perhaps t o ward of f th e question o f an equivocal se t of readings—
but the depiction o f tha t doing , where th e depictio n i s understoo d
as th e dissimulatio n an d fulfillmen t o f th e verba l imperative , "d o
this." For MacKinnon , n o one need s t o speak suc h word s becaus e
the speaking of such words already function s a s the frame an d th e
compulsory scriptin g o f th e act ; i n a sense , t o th e exten t tha t th e
frame orchestrate s th e act , i t wield s a performativ e power ; i t i s
conceived b y MacKinno n a s encodin g th e wil l o f a masculin e
authority, and compelling a compliance with its command .
But doe s th e fram e impar t th e wil l o f a preexistin g subject , o r
is th e fram e somethin g lik e th e derealizatio n o f will , th e produc -
tion an d orchestratio n o f a phantasmatic scen e of willfulness an d
submission? I don' t mea n t o sugges t a stric t distinctio n betwee n
the phantasmatic an d th e domain o f reality, but I do mean t o ask,
to what exten t doe s th e operatio n o f the phantasmati c withi n th e
construction o f socia l realit y rende r tha t constructio n mor e frai l
and les s determinativ e tha n MacKinno n woul d suggest ? I n fact ,
although on e might wel l agre e tha t a good dea l of pornography i s
offensive, i t doe s no t follo w tha t it s offensivenes s consist s i n it s
putative powe r t o construct (unilaterally , exhaustively ) th e socia l
reality o f wha t a woma n is . To retur n fo r a momen t t o MacKin -
non's ow n language , conside r th e wa y i n whic h th e hypothetica l
insists itsel f int o th e formulation o f the imperative , a s i f the forc e
of her ow n assertion s abou t th e force o f pornographic representa -
tion tends toward it s own undoing: "pornography establishes ] . . .
what wome n ar e sai d t o exis t as, ar e see n as, ar e treate d as . . ."
174 Judit h Butle r
Then, th e sentenc e continues : "constructin g th e socia l realit y o f

what a woman is" ; here to be treated a s a sexual subordinate i s to
be constructe d a s one , an d t o hav e a socia l realit y constitute d i n
which tha t i s precisely and only what one is. But if the "as" is read
as the assertion o f a likeness, it is not for tha t reaso n th e assertio n
of a metaphorica l collaps e int o identity . Throug h wha t mean s
does th e "as " turn int o a n "is, " and i s thi s th e doin g o f pornogra -
phy, o r i s i t th e doin g o f th e ver y depiction o f pornograph y tha t
MacKinnon provides ? Fo r th e "as " coul d als o b e rea d a s "a s if, "
"as i f on e were, " which suggest s tha t pornograph y neithe r repre -
sents no r constitute s wha t wome n are , bu t offer s a n allegor y o f
masculine willfulnes s an d feminin e submissio n (althoug h thes e
are clearl y no t it s onl y themes) , on e whic h repeatedl y an d anx -
iously rehearse s it s ow n tmrealizability . Indeed , on e migh t argu e
that pornography depict s impossible and uninhabitable positions ,
compensatory fantasie s tha t continuall y reproduc e a rift betwee n
those position s an d th e one s tha t belon g t o th e domai n o f socia l
reality. Indeed, on e migh t sugges t tha t pornograph y i s the tex t of
gender's unreality, the impossible norms by which it is compelled,
and i n th e fac e o f whic h i t perpetuall y fails . Th e imperativ e "d o
this" is less delivered tha t "depicted, " an d i f what i s depicted i s a
set o f compensator y ideals , hyperboli c gende r norms , the n por -
nography chart s a domai n o f unrealizabl e position s tha t hol d
sway over the social reality of gender positions, but do not, strictly
speaking, constitut e tha t reality ; indeed , i t i s their failur e t o con -
stitute i t tha t give s th e pornographi c imag e th e phantasmati c
power that i t has. In this sense, to the extent tha t a n imperativ e i s
"depicted" an d no t "delivered, " i t fail s t o wield th e powe r t o con -
struct th e social reality of what a woman is . This failure, however ,
is th e occasio n fo r a n allegor y o f suc h a n imperative , on e tha t
concedes the unrealizability o f that imperativ e from th e start, an d
which, finally, canno t overcom e th e unreality tha t i s its conditio n
and its lure. My call, as it were, is for a feminist readin g of pornog-
raphy tha t resist s th e literalizatio n o f thi s imaginar y scene , on e
which read s i t instea d fo r th e incommensurabilitie s betwee n gen -
der norm s an d practice s tha t i t seem s compelle d t o repea t with -
out resolution .
In thi s sense , i t make s littl e sens e t o figure th e visua l field o f
pornography a s a subjec t wh o speak s and , i n speaking , bring s

about wha t i t names ; it s authorit y i s decidedl y les s divine ; it s
power, les s efficacious . I t onl y make s sens e t o figure th e porno -
graphic tex t a s th e injuriou s ac t o f a speake r i f w e see k t o locat e
accountability a t th e prosecutabl e sit e o f th e subject . Otherwise ,
our wor k i s mor e difficult , fo r wha t pornograph y deliver s i s w h a t
it recite s an d exaggerate s fro m th e resource s o f compensator y
gender norms , a tex t o f insisten t an d fault y imaginar y relation s
that wil l no t disappea r wit h th e abolitio n o f th e offendin g text ,
the tex t tha t remain s fo r feminis t criticis m relentlessl y t o read .
Notes
1. I greatl y appreciat e th e thoughtfu l reading s give n t o thi s pape r i n
an earlie r for m b y Wend y Brown , Rober t Gooding-Williams , Morri s
Kaplan, Rober t Post , an d Ha y den White . An y inaccuracie s an d al l
misreadings are , o f course , m y responsibilit y alone . I than k Jan e
Malmo for help with preparin g th e manuscript .
2. Thi s crimina l sens e o f a n acto r i s t o b e distinguishe d bot h fro m th e
commercial an d theatrica l term s (Handlerin an d Schauspielerin, re -
spectively).
3. Rober t M . Cover, "Violence and th e Word," 95 Yale Law Journal 1595 ,
1601 n 1 (1986) .
4. "Th e [stat e action ] doctrin e hold s tha t althoug h someon e ma y hav e
suffered harmfu l treatmen t o f a kin d tha t on e migh t ordinaril y de -
scribe a s a deprivatio n o f libert y o r a denia l o f equa l protectio n o f
the laws , that occurrenc e excite s n o constitutional concer n unles s th e
proximate activ e perpetrator s o f th e har m includ e person s exercisin g
the specia l authorit y o r powe r o f th e governmen t o f a state. " Fran k
Michelman, "Conception s o f Democrac y i n America n Constitutiona l
Argument: Th e Cas e o f Pornograph y Regulation, " 5 6 Tennessee Law
Review 291, 306 (1989).
5. Charle s Lawrenc e III , "If H e Holler s Le t Hi m Go : Regulating Racis t
Speech on Campus," Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive
Speech and the First Amendment, eds . Mar i J . Matsuda , Charle s R .
Lawrence III , Richar d Delgado , an d Kimberl e William s Crenshaw ,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993 , p.65.
6. I thank Rober t Pos t fo r thi s las t analogy , suggeste d t o me i n conver -
sation.
7. Kendal l Thomas, University of Virginia La w Review, forthcoming .
8. Jacque s Derrida , "Signature , Event , Context " i n Limited, Inc., ed .
Gerald Graff , tr . Samue l Webe r an d Jeffre y Mehlma n (Evanston :
Northwestern Universit y Press, 1988), p. 18.
176 J u d i t h Butle r
9. St . Pau l Bia s Motivate d Crim e Ordinance , Sectio n 292.0 2 Minn . Le -

gis. Code (1990) .
10. Charle s R . Lawrenc e II I argue s tha t "i t i s no t jus t th e prevalenc e an d
strength o f th e ide a o f racism tha t mak e th e unregulate d marketplac e
of idea s a n untenabl e paradig m fo r thos e individual s wh o see k ful l
and equa l personhoo d fo r all . Th e rea l proble m i s tha t th e ide a o f
the racia l inferiorit y o f nonwhite s infects , skews , an d disable s th e
operation o f a market " i n "I f H e Holler s Le t Hi m Go : Regulatin g
Racist Speec h o n Campus, " i n Words that Wound, p.ll.
11. Th e lawyer s defendin g th e applicatio n o f th e ordinanc e t o th e cross -
burning episod e mad e th e followin g argument :
. . .we as k th e Cour t t o reflec t o n th e 'content ' o f th e 'expressiv e conduct '
represented b y a 'burnin g cross. ' I t i s n o les s tha n th e firs t ste p i n a n ac t o f
racial violence. It was and unfortunately stil l is the equivalent o f [the] waving
of a knife before th e thrust, th e pointing of a gun before i t is fired, the lightin g
of the match befor e th e arson, the hanging of the noose before th e lynching. It
is not a political statement , o r eve n a cowardly statemen t o f hatred. I t i s th e
first ste p i n an ac t o f assault. It can b e no more protected tha n holdin g a gu n
to a victim['s] head. It is perhaps th e ultimate expression of 'fighting words. '
R.A.V. v . St. Paul, 11 2 S . Ct . a t 2569-70 , fn . 8 , 12 0 L . Ed . 2 d a t 32 0
(App. to Brie f fo r Petitioner) .
12. Th e ne w critica l assumptio n t o whic h I refe r i s tha t o f th e separabl e
and full y forma l unit y tha t i s sai d t o characteriz e a give n text .
13. Al l o f th e justice s concu r tha t th e St . Pau l ordinanc e i s overbroa d
because i t isolate s "subject-matters " a s offensive , an d (a ) potentiall y
prohibits discussio n o f suc h subject-matter s eve n b y thos e whos e
political sympathie s ar e wit h th e ordinance , an d (b ) fail s t o distin -
guish betwee n th e subject-matter' s injuriousnes s an d th e contex t i n
which i t i s enunciated .
14. Justic e Stevens , i n a decisio n offere d separatel y fro m th e argumen t
offered b y th e majority , suggest s tha t th e burnin g cros s i s precisel y a
threat, an d tha t whethe r a give n "expression " i s a threa t ca n onl y b e
determined contextually. Steven s base s hi s conclusio n o n Chaplinsky,
which argue d tha t "on e o f the characteristic s tha t justifies " th e consti -
tutional statu s o f fighting word s i s tha t suc h word s "b y thei r ver y
utterance inflic t injur y o r ten d t o incit e a n immediat e breac h o f th e
peace." Chaplinsky v . New Hampshire, 31 5 U.S . 568, 572 (1942) .
Here Steven s argues , first, tha t certai n kind s o f content s hav e
always bee n proscribable , and , second , tha t th e fighting word s doc -
trine ha s depende d fo r it s ver y implementatio n o n th e capacit y t o
discriminate amon g kind s o f content s (i.e. , politica l speec h i s mor e
fully protecte d tha n obscen e speech , etc.) , bu t also , third , tha t fight-
ing word s tha t ar e construe d a s a threa t ar e i n themselve s injurious ,
and tha t i t i s thi s injuriou s characte r o f speech , an d no t a separabl e
"content" tha t i s a t issue . A s he continues , however , Steven s i s quic k
to point ou t tha t whethe r o r no t a n expressio n i s injuriou s i s a matte r

of determinin g th e forc e o f an expressio n withi n a give n context . Thi s
determination wil l neve r b e full y predictable , precisel y because , on e
assumes, context s ar e als o no t firmly delimitable . Indeed , i f on e con -
siders no t onl y historica l circumstance , bu t th e historicit y o f th e
utterance itself , i t follow s tha t th e demarcatio n o f relevan t contex t
will b e a s fraugh t a s th e demarcatio n o f injuriou s content .
Stevens link s content , injuriou s performativity , an d contex t to -
gether whe n h e claims , objecting t o both Scali a an d White , tha t ther e
can b e n o categorical approac h t o th e questio n o f proscribablity: "fe w
dividing line s i n Firs t Amendmen t law s ar e straigh t an d unwavering ,
and effort s a t categorizatio n inevitabl y giv e ris e onl y t o fuzz y bound -
aries . . . th e ques t fo r doctrina l certaint y throug h th e definitio n o f
categories an d subcategorie s is , i n m y opinion , destine d t o fail. "
R.A.V. v . St. Paul, 11 2 S . Ct . a t 2561 , 12 0 L . Ed . 2d , a t 346 . Further -
more, h e argues , "th e meanin g o f an y expressio n an d th e legitimac y
of its regulatio n ca n onl y b e determine d i n context. " Id.
At this poin t i n his analysis , Steven s cite s a metaphori c descriptio n
of "th e word " b y Justic e Holmes , a ter m whic h stand s synecdochall y
for "expression " a s i t i s broadl y construe d withi n Firs t Amendmen t
jurisprudence: th e citatio n fro m Holme s run s a s follows : " a wor d i s
not a crystal , transparen t an d unchanged , i t i s th e ski n o f a livin g
thought an d ma y var y greatl y i n colo r an d conten t accordin g t o th e
circumstances an d th e tim e i n whic h i t i s used " (11-12) . W e migh t
consider thi s figure no t onl y a s a racia l metapho r whic h describe s th e
"word" a s a "skin " tha t varie s i n "color, " bu t als o i n term s o f th e
theory o f semantic s i t invokes . Althoug h Steven s believe s tha t h e i s
citing a figure whic h wil l affir m th e historicall y changin g natur e o f
an "expression's " semanti c "content, " denote d b y a "skin " tha t
changes i n colo r an d conten t accordin g t o the historica l circumstanc e
of it s use , i t i s equall y clea r tha t th e epiderma l metapho r suggest s a
living an d disembodie d though t whic h remain s dephenomenalized ,
the noumena l qualit y o f life , th e livin g spiri t i n it s skinles s form . Ski n
and it s changin g colo r an d conten t thu s denot e wha t i s historicall y
changing, bu t the y als o are , a s i t were , th e signifier s o f historica l
change. Th e racia l signifie r come s t o stan d no t onl y fo r changin g
historical circumstance s i n th e abstract , bu t fo r th e specifi c historica l
changes marke d b y explosiv e racia l relations .
15. Ton i Morriso n remark s tha t povert y i s ofte n th e languag e i n whic h
black peopl e ar e spoke n about .
16. Th e abov e readin g raise s a serie s o f question s abou t th e rhetorica l
status o f th e decisio n itself . Kendal l Thoma s an d other s hav e argue d
that th e figures an d example s use d i n judicial decision s ar e a s centra l
to it s semanti c conten t a s th e explici t propositiona l claim s tha t ar e
delivered a s th e conclusion s o f th e argumentation . I n a sense , I a m
raising tw o kind s o f rhetorica l question s here , on e ha s t o d o wit h th e

"content" o f th e decision , an d th e othe r wit h th e wa y i n whic h th e
majority ruling , writte n b y Scalia , itsel f delimit s wha t wil l an d wil l
not qualif y a s th e conten t o f a give n publi c expressio n i n ligh t o f th e
new restriction s impose d o n fighting words . I n asking , then , afte r th e
rhetorical statu s o f th e decisio n itself , w e ar e le d t o as k ho w th e
rhetorical actio n o f th e decisio n presuppose s a theor y o f semantic s
that undermine s o r work s agains t th e explici t theor y o f semantic s
argued fo r an d i n th e decisio n itself .
Specifically, i t seems , th e decisio n itsel f draw s o n a distinctio n
between th e verba l an d non-verba l part s o f speech , thos e whic h
Scalia appear s t o specif y a s "message " an d "sound. " R.A.V. v . St. Paul,
120 L . Ed . 2 d 305 , 3 1 9 - 2 1 . Fo r Scalia , onl y th e soun d o f speec h i s
proscribable or , analogously , tha t sensuou s aspec t o f speec h deeme d
inessential t o th e allege d idealit y o f semanti c content . Althoug h Jus -
tice Steven s reject s wha t h e call s thi s kin d o f "absolutism, " arguin g
instead tha t th e proscribabilit y o f conten t ca n onl y b e determine d i n
context, h e nevertheles s preserve s a stric t distinctio n betwee n th e
semantic propertie s o f a n expressio n an d th e context , includin g his -
torical circumstance , bu t als o condition s o f address . Fo r bot h Scali a
and Stevens , then, th e "content " i s understood i n it s separability fro m
both th e non-verba l an d th e historical , althoug h i n th e latte r case ,
determined i n relatio n t o it .
17. Th e decisio n mad e i n th e tria l o f th e policeme n i n Sim i Valle y relie d
on a simila r kin d o f reversa l o f position , whereb y th e jur y cam e t o
believe tha t th e policeman , i n spit e o f thei r graphi c beatin g o f King ,
were themselve s th e endangere d part y i n th e case .
18. Matsud a an d Lawrence , "Epilogue, " Words that Wound, p . 135.
19. Chaplinsky make s roo m fo r thi s ambiguit y b y stipulatin g tha t som e
speech lose s it s protected statu s whe n i t constitute s "n o essential par t
of an y expositio n o f ideas. " Thi s notio n o f a n inessentia l par t o f suc h
an expositio n form s th e basi s o f a 197 3 ruling, Miller v. California, 41 3
U.S. 15 , extending th e unprotecte d statu s o f obscenity . I n tha t rulin g
the pictur e o f a mode l sportin g a politica l tattoo , construe d b y th e
court a s "anti-governmen t speech, " i s take n a s unprotecte d precisel y
because i t i s said , "take n a s a whol e t o lac k seriou s literary , artistic ,
political, o r scientifi c value" . Suc h a representation , then , i s take n t o
be "n o essentia l par t o f an y expositio n o f ideas. " Bu t here , yo u wil l
note tha t "n o essentia l part " o f suc h a n expositio n ha s becom e "n o
valuable part. " Conside r the n Scalia' s earlie r exampl e o f wha t re -
mains unprotecte d i n speech , tha t is , th e nois y soun d truck , th e se -
mantically voi d par t o f speec h which , h e claims , i s th e "nonspeec h
element o f communication. " Her e h e claim s tha t onl y th e semanti -
cally empt y par t o f speech , it s pur e sound , i s unprotected , bu t tha t
B u r n i n g Acts : I n j u r i o u s S p e e c h 17 9
the "ideas " whic h ar e sounde d i n speec h mos t definitel y ar e pro -

tected. Thi s lou d stree t noise , then , form s n o essentia l par t o f an y
exposition but , perhap s mor e poignantly , form s n o valuabl e part .
Indeed, w e migh t speculat e tha t whateve r for m o f speec h i s unpro -
tected wil l b e reduce d b y th e justice s t o th e semanticall y empt y
sounding titl e o f "pur e noise. " Hence , th e fil m cli p o f th e ostensibl y
nude mode l sportin g a n anti-governmen t tatto o woul d b e nothin g bu t
pure noise , no t a message , no t a n idea , bu t th e valueles s sounding s o f
street noise .
20. Kimberl e Crensha w mark s thi s ambivalenc e i n th e la w i n a differen t
way, suggestin g tha t th e court s wil l discoun t African-America n form s
of artisti c expressio n a s artisti c expressio n an d subjec t suc h expres -
sion t o censorshi p precisel y becaus e o f racis t presumption s abou t
what count s a s artistic . O n th e othe r hand , sh e finds th e representa -
tion o f women i n thes e expression s t o be repellent , an d s o feels hersel f
to b e "torn " betwee n th e tw o positions . Se e "Beyon d Racis m an d
Misogyny: Blac k Feminis m an d 2 Live Crew, " i n Words That Wound.
21. Not e th e subsumptio n o f th e declaratio n tha t on e i s a homosexua l
under th e rubri c o f offensiv e conduct : "Sexua l orientatio n wil l no t b e
a ba r t o servic e unles s manifeste d b y homosexua l conduct . Th e mili -
tary wil l discharg e member s wh o engag e i n homosexua l conduct ,
which i s defined a s a homosexua l act , a statemen t tha t th e membe r i s
homosexual o r bisexual , o r a marriag e o r attempte d marriag e t o
someone o f th e sam e gender. " "Th e Pentagon' s Ne w Polic y Guideline s
on Homosexual s i n th e Military, " The New York Times, Jul y 20 , 1993 ,
p.A14.
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NYU Press

Chapter Title: Burning Acts: Injurious Speech

Book Title: Deconstruction Is/In America

The Performanc e o f Differenc e

Burning Acts : Injurious Speech 1

The titl e o f J . L . Austin' s How to Do Things With Words pose s th e

the speakin g o f an act. Of such a n act, one cannot reasonabl y as k

to moraliz e tha t pai n i s on e whic h isolate s a subjec t a s th e inten -

does thi s no t unwittingl y stal l th e analysi s o f ho w precisel y dis -

of minority groups . In thi s shift , i t i s not simpl y tha t citizen s ar e

or "effective " a s th e performativ e i s sometime s figured i n Austin .

"origin" of its utterance. If the utteranc e i s to be prosecuted , wher e

the sentenc e i s delivere d i n th e subjunctive , i t qualifie s a s a 'mas -

To what exten t doe s discours e gai n th e authorit y t o bring abou t

precisely th e iterabilit y b y whic h a performativ e enact s it s injur y

In tw o recen t cases , th e Suprem e Cour t ha s reconsidere d th e dis -

Whoever place s o n publi c o r privat e propert y a symbol , object, appella -

A white teenage r wa s charge d unde r thi s ordinanc e afte r burnin g

Court decision , reasonin g firs t tha t th e burnin g cros s wa s no t a n

the ver y proble m o f discursiv e powe r tha t i t i s veste d withi n th e

those wh o defen d th e ordinance , sinc e bot h ar e producin g fires,

may b e derive d fro m the m i s clearl y outweighe d b y th e socia l

community, a family , o r a n individua l fo r furthe r violenc e i s als o

Lighting a fir e nea r a n ammunitio n dum p o r a gasolin e storag e tan k i s

Absent fro m th e lis t o f fires abov e i s th e burnin g o f th e cros s i n

The circumscription o f content explicitl y discusse d i n the deci-

reversed i n th e metonymi c relatio n betwee n figures suc h tha t th e

crosses an d firebomb s an y townspeopl e wh o appea r t o hel p th e

against th e court . I n R.A.V. v. St. Paul, th e cour t make s a came o

to identify an d delimit it in order to exempt it from th e categorica l

construed a s a sanctione d poin t i n a publi c debat e ove r admit -

seems tha t on e mus t b e reminde d tha t th e prosecutio n o f hat e

pacity o f pornograph y is , fo r her , wha t give s sens e t o th e clai m

Pornography doe s no t simpl y expres s o r interpre t experience ; i t substi -

In th e firs t instance , pornograph y substitute s fo r experience , im -

tion ca n b e sai d t o work , tha t is , "to produce th e socia l realit y o f

Then, th e sentenc e continues : "constructin g th e socia l realit y o f

pornography a s a subjec t wh o speak s and , i n speaking , bring s

9. St . Pau l Bia s Motivate d Crim e Ordinance , Sectio n 292.0 2 Minn . Le -

to point ou t tha t whethe r o r no t a n expressio n i s injuriou s i s a matte r

raising tw o kind s o f rhetorica l question s here , on e ha s t o d o wit h th e

the "ideas " whic h ar e sounde d i n speec h mos t definitel y ar e pro -

Gunther, Geral d an d Lawrence , Charles , "Speec h tha t H a r m s : A n Ex -

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