How To Do Things With Words: The Project: Recognize That in Using Language We Are Doing Something. If This Is

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How to do Things with Words

The Project: Recognize that in using language we are doing something. If this is
true then we can try to bring ways of thinking about action into ways of thinking
about language. Think of descriptions of intentional action. For example, in opening
a door, there are many things we can say that youre doing. You are twisting your
wrist, opening the door, being a gentleman etc. Austin wants to talk about action
involving language and trying to draw distinctions and find relationships between
different speech actions. He wants to begin to think in terms of how we evaluate a
speech act and the norms he takes as applying to them. In thinking about speech
actions, what it is to do something is thought of in terms of what it is to
successfully perform the action. For example, what it takes to be described as
opening a door will presumably not include my kicking it down. Analogously, my
promising will presumably not include any ol series of sounds or words strung
together.
First Obstacle: Austin is interested in cases of speech in which we are doing
something. For example, if I say, I apologize or I promise, I am thereby
performing an action and not describing something about myself or the world.
However, what is it to say something? The case is analogous to asking what it is to
do something. Like in our descriptions of action, many things we can say that you
are doing we can classify along various dimensions. There are hierarchies of
descriptions. He distinguishes a group of senses of saying something which when
taken together is to say something in the full sense of doing something.

The Phonetic Act: The act of uttering certain noises.


The Phatic Act: The act of making noises of a certain type which are
certain words belonging to a vocabulary.
The Rhetic Act: The act of using these with a definite meaning.

The act of saying something in the full sense is the locutionary act. Austin is here
offering a hierarchy of descriptions. As in action theory, we are thinking about what
the relation is between these kinds of acts.
Nomenclature: What are some of the considerations which we can bring to bear on
linguistic action? We do not normally describe peoples actions by saying things like,
She raised her arm at the shoulder with a simultaneous extension of the elbow and
opening of the hand etc.. These are taking place of course, but it is not what we
normally focus on when we think or talk about our own or others actions. . We work
out the relationship between the various actions she is performing and simply say
something like, She grabbed the handle and opened the door. That is the normal
level of description and the terms we use identify the ends built into the action(s).
There is a particular nomenclature involved. There are many descriptions of
linguistic action, phonetic, phatic, rhetic etc. but we have a specific nomenclature or
vocabulary we ordinarily use to describe these actions which seem to pick out a
range of speech acts which are interesting. For example, you might make some
noises which belong to a particular vocabulary and have a certain meaning.
However, in doing so, you perform an act we can describe as asking a question for
example. There is a particular end underlying your minimum linguistic acts. The
minimum linguistic acts are not a series of unrelated noises or a series of words
which have a certain meaning. Describing you as asking a question exhibits the
relation between these acts
Like action we must keep in mind certain considerations:

Happiness/Unhappiness: For example, I may issue an apology but it might


not take; for whatever reason I may have been misunderstood.
Intended/Unintended: For example, we may be understood as issuing a
promise when we have endeavored to do no such thing. We can think here of
being unaware of a local custom.
In general, we must keep in mind that like other actions, speech action has
levels. I can apologize or attempt to apologize. I can try and persuade you
or actually persuade you.
The Illocutionary Act: For a certain range of linguistic actions, the speech acts
Austin is interested in, there are conventions or rules linking your uttering a word
with a certain meaning.

The use of the nomenclature of illocutions imports reference to the


conventions of illocutionary force as bearing on the special
circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance 114.
For example, apologizing is an illocutionary act. In saying I apologize I am thereby
engaging in the action of apologizing. Such acts have a force due to the underlying
conventions governing them. For example, if I hand you a stone it would be strange
to describe my action as apologizing even if that was my intention. Having force as
an apology obtains in meeting certain conditions.
The Perlocutionary Act:

what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as


convincing, persuading 108.
Perlocutionary acts are what we bring about or achieve by saying something. Here,
our saying something is instrumental. The consequences or effects upon others by
performing a perlocutionary act is a part of its description and the act obtains in
achieving those effects. These acts are not governed by convention.

Almost any perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off by the


issuing.. any utterance whatsoever. 109.
For example, there is no rule one might follow to intimidate or persuade. One
simply employs any particular means to do so.
More Differences: Austin distinguishes between In saying something I do
something and By saying something I do something. In saying x I did y serves
to pick out illocutionary acts. For example, In saying I am sorry I was apologizing.
This picks out the fact that in speaking those words, I was thereby performing the
act. My speaking is not the means to bringing about an apology, it just is the
apology.
On the other hand, By saying something is instrumental:

By indicates a criterion, that about what I did which enables my action be


classified (as such). 128.
For example, what about what I did enables my action to be described as deterring
you? The fact that you were deterred.
Note: Austin admits that these are not hard and fast rules, but they do highlight how
various possible descriptions of what I do are interrelated.
Consequences: While, the perlocutionary act is described in terms of what it brings
about, the consequences of an illocutionary act do not come into play in our
description of the action. When I describe myself as posing a question, I have
uttered some words with certain meanings and in doing so pose the question. That
description is not a description in terms of what it brings about. It could be that my
posing a question causes Ally to tell me I am an idiot, but, the ordinary words used
to describe such speech acts do not build that in. He is getting himself called an
idiot would be a strange answer to the question what is he doing?. However,
illocutionary acts DO have consequences.
There are consequences and consequences: The illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts have consequences that differ in kind.

Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have
been successfully performed. This is to be distinguished from saying
that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect. 115.
The consequential effects of perlocutionary acts are really
consequences, which do not include such conventional effects as, for
example, the speakers being committed by his promise. 102.
Furthermore, we must not think of the relation between the locutionary act and
illocutionary act as one of causation. For example, my making certain sounds is
not the cause of my promising any more than my twisting of the wrist is the cause
of my making an omelet.
There are 3 ways in which we can understand the illocutionary act as having
consequences:

Securing uptake: The meaning and force of the act derives in large
from the conventions underlying it. For example, an apology secures
uptake iff who we are speaking to understands what we are saying and
what we are saying can be recognized as an apology. I can hand you a
stone as sign of promising, but the act fails to secure uptake if you do
not recognize that as my issuing a promise. The act must accord with
some kind of convention to carry the force of a promise, otherwise your
description of me would simply be, He handed me a stone.
Taking effect: In saying, I promise, the act takes effect as a
promise. In taking effect, it makes it the case that certain subsequent
actions or inactions on my part would be out of order.
Inviting a response: illocutionary acts can invite a response. If they
in fact do so it is due to the conventions underlying language use. For
example, if I ask a question, Can you help me?, some kind of
response is invited by the conventions of the language. I have not
caused you to answer. Note here a stark difference with the
perlocutionary act. First off, the second act or the response does not
figure into the description of the action. Second, I can instrumentally
make use of an illocutionary act such as a question to perform a
perlocutionary act. Here there is a more straight forward sense of
causation. For example, I may ask Does G*d really exist with the
express intent of provoking outrage.

Points of discussion:

Is there really a serious distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary?


Examples, warnings and insults. Does warning have to follow a convention?
Doesnt insulting someone rely on conventions?
Austin thinks that we should make as many distinctions as are possible in
ordinary language. However, is he making distinctions which are simply not
there? Sometimes it seems yes BUT, is France hexagonal? Austin states:
We have been realizing more and more clearly that the occasion of
utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some
extent to be explained by the context in which they are designed to
be or have actually been spoken in a linguistic interchange. 100.
Does the context make France is hexagonal true or simply true enough? Or
is there no real distinction here.

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