How To Do Things With Words: The Project: Recognize That in Using Language We Are Doing Something. If This Is
How To Do Things With Words: The Project: Recognize That in Using Language We Are Doing Something. If This Is
How To Do Things With Words: The Project: Recognize That in Using Language We Are Doing Something. If This Is
The Project: Recognize that in using language we are doing something. If this is
true then we can try to bring ways of thinking about action into ways of thinking
about language. Think of descriptions of intentional action. For example, in opening
a door, there are many things we can say that youre doing. You are twisting your
wrist, opening the door, being a gentleman etc. Austin wants to talk about action
involving language and trying to draw distinctions and find relationships between
different speech actions. He wants to begin to think in terms of how we evaluate a
speech act and the norms he takes as applying to them. In thinking about speech
actions, what it is to do something is thought of in terms of what it is to
successfully perform the action. For example, what it takes to be described as
opening a door will presumably not include my kicking it down. Analogously, my
promising will presumably not include any ol series of sounds or words strung
together.
First Obstacle: Austin is interested in cases of speech in which we are doing
something. For example, if I say, I apologize or I promise, I am thereby
performing an action and not describing something about myself or the world.
However, what is it to say something? The case is analogous to asking what it is to
do something. Like in our descriptions of action, many things we can say that you
are doing we can classify along various dimensions. There are hierarchies of
descriptions. He distinguishes a group of senses of saying something which when
taken together is to say something in the full sense of doing something.
The act of saying something in the full sense is the locutionary act. Austin is here
offering a hierarchy of descriptions. As in action theory, we are thinking about what
the relation is between these kinds of acts.
Nomenclature: What are some of the considerations which we can bring to bear on
linguistic action? We do not normally describe peoples actions by saying things like,
She raised her arm at the shoulder with a simultaneous extension of the elbow and
opening of the hand etc.. These are taking place of course, but it is not what we
normally focus on when we think or talk about our own or others actions. . We work
out the relationship between the various actions she is performing and simply say
something like, She grabbed the handle and opened the door. That is the normal
level of description and the terms we use identify the ends built into the action(s).
There is a particular nomenclature involved. There are many descriptions of
linguistic action, phonetic, phatic, rhetic etc. but we have a specific nomenclature or
vocabulary we ordinarily use to describe these actions which seem to pick out a
range of speech acts which are interesting. For example, you might make some
noises which belong to a particular vocabulary and have a certain meaning.
However, in doing so, you perform an act we can describe as asking a question for
example. There is a particular end underlying your minimum linguistic acts. The
minimum linguistic acts are not a series of unrelated noises or a series of words
which have a certain meaning. Describing you as asking a question exhibits the
relation between these acts
Like action we must keep in mind certain considerations:
Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have
been successfully performed. This is to be distinguished from saying
that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect. 115.
The consequential effects of perlocutionary acts are really
consequences, which do not include such conventional effects as, for
example, the speakers being committed by his promise. 102.
Furthermore, we must not think of the relation between the locutionary act and
illocutionary act as one of causation. For example, my making certain sounds is
not the cause of my promising any more than my twisting of the wrist is the cause
of my making an omelet.
There are 3 ways in which we can understand the illocutionary act as having
consequences:
Securing uptake: The meaning and force of the act derives in large
from the conventions underlying it. For example, an apology secures
uptake iff who we are speaking to understands what we are saying and
what we are saying can be recognized as an apology. I can hand you a
stone as sign of promising, but the act fails to secure uptake if you do
not recognize that as my issuing a promise. The act must accord with
some kind of convention to carry the force of a promise, otherwise your
description of me would simply be, He handed me a stone.
Taking effect: In saying, I promise, the act takes effect as a
promise. In taking effect, it makes it the case that certain subsequent
actions or inactions on my part would be out of order.
Inviting a response: illocutionary acts can invite a response. If they
in fact do so it is due to the conventions underlying language use. For
example, if I ask a question, Can you help me?, some kind of
response is invited by the conventions of the language. I have not
caused you to answer. Note here a stark difference with the
perlocutionary act. First off, the second act or the response does not
figure into the description of the action. Second, I can instrumentally
make use of an illocutionary act such as a question to perform a
perlocutionary act. Here there is a more straight forward sense of
causation. For example, I may ask Does G*d really exist with the
express intent of provoking outrage.
Points of discussion: