Johnson (1988) Mistake Correction
Johnson (1988) Mistake Correction
Johnson (1988) Mistake Correction
Keith Johnson
Language as skill The particular view of language, of language learning, and of language
teaching that is presented in this article is one which is prepared to make a
parallel between language and other complex skills like playing tennis,
piloting an aircraft, or playing a musical instrument. The justification for
such a parallel is that all these behaviours, including language use, involve
performing complex sequences of activities. The type of knowledge the
performer needs to develop for all these behaviours, including language
use, is knowledge concerned with how to (what Anderson 1980 calls 'pro-
cedural knowledge'), rather than knowledge about (what he calls 'declara-
tive knowledge'). The knowledge of a skilled language user and the
knowledge of a skilled oboe player have in common that they both involve
forms of procedural knowledge.
The view of language as skill, of language acquisition as skill acquisition,
and of language teaching as skill training, will offend many, who may find
the comparisons this article makes between language learning and learning
(for example) how to ride a horse, inappropriate if not offensive. The view
certainly needs more justification than can be given here.2 What may be
said here is that it is by no means a new view, though it is one which has
gone rather out of fashion in recent years (hence perhaps feelings of
inappropriateness and offence). It has gone out of fashion doubtless largely
through the influence of Chomsky and the view that language is unique
among human behaviours, acquired in a unique way by means of a
language-specific acquisition device (the LAD) which does not appear to
contribute much towards the acquisition of other, non-linguistic skills. This
view of language as 'unique and uniquely acquired' strongly suggests that if
we wish to know anything about how languages are learned, we shall get no
useful information from looking at how other skills are learned. According
to this view, the proper study of language acquisition is indeed language
acquisition.
Of course, this Chomskyian view both can be and has been challenged.
As Anderson (1980:398) says: 'little direct evidence exists to support the
view that language is a unique system'. And once language is deprived of its
unique status, then the acquisition of skills other than language becomes an
area of study likely to be of interest to the language teacher. Under the
Chomskyian influence, such interest has waned somewhat; this article is
part of an attempt to show how looking at language learning in terms of
skills may be fruitful in both theoretical and practical terms.
Error* and mistakes To consider how things might be improved, we might begin by asking why
it is that students get things wrong. There are at least two reasons.3 One is
that the student either does not have the appropriate knowledge, or has
some false knowledge. He or she may either not know how a tense of English
works, or have the wrong idea. In this case, we may say that the student's
interlanguage knowledge is faulty. The result is what Corder (1981) calls an
error.
There is, however, a second reason for a student getting something
wrong. It may be a lack ofprocessing ability. I know I should not lean forward
on the horse, and when simply trotting round the paddock I do not do so.
My problem comes when approaching a small jump. My feet may fall out of
the stirrups, the horse may begin to get difficult, and one result (there may
be other more painful ones!) is that I lean forward. It is not my 'knowledge'
that is at fault here; it is my ability to 'perform my competence' (the phrase
is taken from Ellis 1985a) in difficult operating conditions. The result is
what Corder (1981) calls a mistake.
In recent years a number of writers, dealing with different areas in the
language learning/teaching field, have made distinctions which can be
related to Corder's between errors and mistakes. Bialystok (1982), for
example, takes the area of language testing as her starting point. She
observes that we have tended to assess language mastery quantitatively,
providing statements that 'the learner simply knows more or less of the
language, or knows some of the formal properties and not others' (p. 181).
But we should also, she argues, ask qualitative questions, about the condi-
tions under which these formal properties can be correctly manipulated.4
90 Keith Johnson
Two examples, one from a non-linguistic skill and one from language
use, will illustrate. A footballer may, in normal circumstances, be a good
goal scorer. But when we assess his mastery, we will need to take into
account circumstances which are far from normal. Can he, for example,
score in the Mexico World Cup, at an altitude of six thousand feet, against a
good side, knowing that spectators at home will bay for the blood of the
defeated? Similarly, when we come to judge a student's linguistic ability, we
would be foolish to pronounce that she has mastered the present perfect
tense simply on the grounds that she has managed to use it correctly in a
Mlstmkm correction How can mistakes be eradicated? One might propose that in order to
eradicate a mistake, a student will need at least four things. These are:
a. The desire or need to eradicate the mistake. It is likely that a number of
mistakes do not get eradicated simply because students know they can get
by without eradicating them. The simple present 's' (which has little
communicative value) probably falls into this category.5
b. An internal representation of what the correct behaviour looks like. The
student needs, in other words, the 'knowledge' that makes the malforma-
tion a mistake and not an error. It is unlikely, of course, that the 'knowledge'
is possessed in a form in which the linguist will possess it; which is why it is
referred to here as an 'internal representation' (begging the question of
what that internal representation will look like).
c. A realization by the student that the performance he or she has given is
flawed. The learner needs to know that a mistake has occurred. Some form
of feedback will provide this.
d. An opportunity to repractise in real conditions.
In learning how to serve in tennis, then, the learner who has just served
badly needs (a) a desire to serve properly, (b) to know what a good service
looks and feels like, (c) a realization that the service was bad, and (d) the
chance to practise again.
This article will not deal with the first of these conditions, important
Mistake correction 91
though it is. It will consider how the remaining three might be provided in
the classroom.
Providing internal Initial guidance should help the student to form an internal representation
representation of what the behaviour is like (for example, how a particular structure
operates and is used in English). How such guidance is best given is another
area where the skills literature has much to offer. There is extensive
discussion (for instance, in Holding 1965) on the relative merits of explana-
Realization of flawed It is interesting to note that according to Bartlett (1947:879), 'maybe the
performance best single measure of mental skill lies in the speed with which errors are
detected and thrown out. . .'. Knowing what has been done wrong (and
what to do about it) is something which, for example, distinguishes the
skilled tennis player from the novice. Six points will be made about this
stage:
92 Keith Johnson
forward. Therefore some positive action needs to be taken to make me
aware.
2 The positive action of being told by the teacher is probably not enough.
Learners seem to need to see for themselves what has gone wrong, in the
operating conditions under which they went wrong. There are various ways
of achieving this. My leaning forward on the horse is brought home best
when I see a video of myself doing it. As a second best, it is useful for me to
see others making the same mistake in the same conditions; and where
Mistake correction 93
conform to an accepted model, established over time by tradition, of what
good skating looks like. In terms of'getting by on ice' many details of the
accepted model (how the legs and body should be held, for example) are
mere frills. The same is true of language, and the rudiments of linguistic
survival can be met by a form of pidgin. The learner who says 'Please give
beer' is unlikely to go thirsty; but he or she will have failed to conform to
externally imposed norms about language behaviour, norms which in pure
survival terms are frills. The skills literature's distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic feedback (cf. Annett 1969) is relevant here. Intrinsic feed-
Opportunity to practise The sequence being discussed in this article is one of mistake occurrence
again, in real operating —* corrective action —* retrial. There is some evidence in the skill
conditions literature (e.g. Annett 1969) that the relationship between the second two is
important. In terms of time, for example, it may be more important how
soon retrial takes place after corrective action than how soon after mistake
occurrence corrective action occurs. We therefore need to speak not just
about feedback after performance, but also about feedback before retrial.
It seems important that real operating conditions should be present in
retrial. The following exemplifies why, first in relation to a non-linguistic
skill, then in relation to language.
A novice pilot may well be able to land in clear weather when the plane
has no mechanical defects. The problem may be landing the plane in fog
and when the flaps are not working correctly. In this situation, to practise
landing in clear skies in a perfect plane is clearly of restricted value. What
the pilot needs to practise is, precisely, landing in fog with faulty flaps. For
this an aircraft simulator is provided. What the simulator offers is various
configurations of operating conditions.
The student may be able to form the present perfect correctly in a gap-
filling task. His or her problem may be with getting it right over the
intercontinental telephone line referred to earlier. In this situation, simply
giving more gap-filling tasks is of as restricted a value as landing in clear
weather. What the learner needs is some form of'present perfect simulator'
which will vary the operating conditions, to simulate just those types of
conditions which are presenting difficulties.
What does a 'present perfect simulator' look like? Perhaps work like that
of Brown et ol. (1984)—which may be interpreted as an attempt to identify
some parameters of difficulty in operating conditions—will provide a way
of grading tasks in terms of operating condition complexity. Whether or not
this is so, it is clear that in important respects, free practice offers a form of
'present perfect simulator'.8 What free practice provides is ready-made sets
of operating conditions; these will vary from moment to moment, and will
place variable demands on the learner's ability to process. Sometimes the
interaction will require speedy response, sometimes not; different interac-
tions will involve different amounts of language; the demands of message
(and hence the degree of attention the learner must give to what he or she is
saying rather than how he or she is saying it) will change. There will be other
94 Keith Johnson
types of variation, not least in affective conditions (the degree of anxiety
felt, attitude towards interactant, etc.) which will affect the performer's
processing efficiency. Bad conditions along parameters like these are the
language user's equivalents of fog and faulty flaps. Free practice will go a
long way towards simulating, over time, the operating conditions in which
mistakes occur.
The stages of corrective action and retrial are both seen as crucial to
mistake eradication. It is optimistic to suppose that once corrective action
has been taken, a mistake (as opposed perhaps to an error) will disappear.
Conclusion This article begs many questions. It may be said merely to switch the focus
of attention from initial learning to feedback. The question of how to
provide successful feedback is no less perplexing than the question of how to
facilitate successful initial learning. But perhaps a willingness to pursue the
metaphor of language learning as skill learning will provide interesting new
perspectives on both these questions and many others. •
Received January 1987
Mistake correction 95
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knowing and using linguistic forms.' AppludLinguis- Reading RG6 2AA.
tics 3/3A81-206. Levenston, E. A. 1978. 'Error analysis of free com-
Bialystok, E. and M. Sharwood Smith. 1985. 'Inter- position: the theory and the practice.' Indian Journal
language is not a state of mind: an evaluation of the of Applied Linguistics 4/1:1-11.
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96 Keith Johnson