Burke - (Nonsymbolic) Motion: (Symbolic) Action

(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action

Author(s): Kenneth Burke

Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer, 1978), pp. 809-838
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action
Kenneth Burke
This is the basic polarity (like the traditional pair res and verba, thing
and the words for things).
It's at the root of such distinctions as mind-body, spirit-matte
superstructure- substructure, and Descartes' dualism, thought and ex-
tension.
I say "at the root of such distinctions" though no such terms quite
match the motion-action pair.
Thus we can begin by logologically secularizing the theological

(Thomistic) view of "matter" as the "principle of individuation."
The human body, in its nature as a sheerly physiological organism,
would thus be in the realm of matter, for which our term is "motion."
In that respect it would be like a fish or a tree or one of B. F.
Skinner's operationally conditioned pigeons.
But the use of such resources as a tribal language would be in the

realm of "action."
Action, as so defined, would involve modes of behavior made possi-
ble by the acquiring of a conventional, arbitrary symbol system, a defini-
tion that would apply to modes of symbolicity as different as primitive
speech, styles of music, painting, sculpture, dance, highly developed
mathematical nomenclatures, traffic signals, road maps, or mere dreams
(insofar as a dream is interpretable as "symbolic" of the dreamer's
"psyche," or whatever such term a psychologist might prefer to work
with).
0093-1896/78/0404-0007$02.35
809
810 Kenneth Burke (Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action
Thus this present use of language is an example of symbolic action,

in which we variously participate by means of a "conventional, arbitrary
symbol system"-this particular brand of English.
Since the overall topic of the conference at which the substance of

this talk was originally given was "Self and Culture," I take it that "Self" is
meant to designate in some sense what has here been referred to as the
"principle of individuation."
I take it that, even if the "Self" were thought to merge into the
"Culture" as a whole, each member of the "Culture" would be thought of
as having in some way a "Self" different from each and every other
member.
It would be grounded in the realm of nonsymbolic motion and
would mature into what one would call a "person" in the realm of sym-
bolic action.
So far as is known at present, the only typically symbol-using animal

existing on earth is the human organism.
The intuitive signaling systems in such social creatures as bees and
ants would not be classed as examples of symbolic action.
They are not conventional, arbitrary symbol systems such as human
speech, which is not inborn but has to be learned, depending upon
where the child happens to be "thrown," an accident of birth that de-
termines whether the child learns Chinese, or French, or whatever idiom
may prevail in the given locality.
Symbol systems of that sort also differ from intuitive signaling sys-
tems in that they have a second-level (or "reflexive") aspect.
That is to say: they can talk about themselves.
Cicero could both orate and write a treatise on oratory. A dog can
bark but he can't bark a tract on barking.
Kenneth Burke is now developing the implications of the position

stated in the present essay. He is also editing his Symbolic of Motives,
a work designed to complement his Grammar of Motives and Rhetoric
of Motives. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Dancing
with Tears in My Eyes" (September 1974) and "Post-Poesque
Derivation of a Terministic Cluster" (Winter 1977). The first section of
"(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action" was presented at a sym-
posium at New York University in May 1976 and will appear in a slightly
altered version in the report of those proceedings, Psychoanalysis, Criti-
cism, and Creativity: A French-American Dialogue.
Critical Inquiry Summer 1978 811
If all typically symbol-using animals (that is, humans) were suddenly

obliterated, their realm of symbolic action would be correspondingly
obliterated.
The earth would be but a realm of planetary, geologic, meteorologi-
cal motion, including the motions of whatever nonhuman biologic or-
ganisms happened to survive.
The realm of nonsymbolic motion needs no realm of symbolic ac-
tion; but there could be no symbolic action unless grounded in the realm
of motion, the realm of motion having preceded the emergence of our
symbol-using ancestors; and doubtless the time will come when motions
go on after all our breed will have vanished.
With regard to the theory of evolution, obviously critical conditions

for the emergence of culture arose at that stage in the prehistoric past
when our anthropoid ancestors underwent a momentous mutation.
In their bodies (as physiological organisms in the realm of motion)
there developed the ability to learn the kind of tribal idiom that is here
meant by "symbolic action."
And thereby emerged what we might call a "mechanism" for the
steps from nonsymbolic motion to symbolic action.
Descartes, in his speculations on a possible bridge between his polar

realms of "thought" and "extension," proposed the possibility that a
small gland in the brain, the pineal gland, might provide the medium.
But with regard to the materials for an intermediate step between
the realms of "motion" and "action" we need not look for so recondite a
locus.
The necessary materials are implicit in the physiological nature of
sensation.
In his early essay on "Nature," Emerson described the process tran-

scendentally, tender-mindedly thus:
Words are signs of natural facts. The use of natural history is

to give us aid in supernatural history; the use of the outer creation,
to give us language for the beings and changes of the inward crea-
tion. Every word which is used to express a moral or intellectual
fact, if traced to its root, is found to be borrowed from some mate-
rial appearance. Right means straight; wrong means twisted; Spirit
primarily means wind; transgression the crossing of a line; supercil-
ious, the raising of the eyebrow. We say the heart to express emotion,
the head to denote thought; and thought and emotion are words bor-
rowed from sensible things, and now appropriated to spiritual na-
ture.
Jeremy Bentham would deal with considerations of this sort, perhaps

not tough-mindedly but at least matter-of-factly thus:
All our psychological ideas are derived from physical ones-all

mental from corporeal ones. In no other manner can they be spo-
ken of.... In the case where to the object thus spoken of, existence
is actually an object of one of the five senses, and in particular of
the sense of touch or feeling ... here there is no fiction-as this
man, this beast, this bird .... The object spoken of may be a real
entity.
On the other hand in the case in which the object is not a
tangible one, the object, the existence of which is thus asserted, not
being a real existing one, the object, if it must be termed an
entity-as on pain of universal and perpetual non-intercourse be-
tween man and man, it must be-it may, for distinction's sake, be
termed a fictitious entity.
To every word that has an immaterial import there belongs, or
at least did belong, a material one. In a word, our ideas coming, all
of them, from our senses, . . from what other source can our
language come?
Thus, if we say that a given object leans at an inclination of thirty

degrees, in Bentham's sense we should not be applying a fiction. But a
fictitious expression enters when we say that a person has an "inclina-
tion" to do such-and-such.
Or a "corporeal" reference, such as "this object is so many feet
distant from that object" would differ from a "fictitious" reference to the
"great distance" between A's position and B's.
And "corporeal" ideas such as "hot" or "cold" as terms for physical
sensations become "fictitiously" extended in words like "hothead" and
"cold-blooded" as terms for personal traits.
Bentham's position was quite in line with the scholastic formula,

"There is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses
(nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu)."
To which Leibniz had added, "except the intellect itself (nisi in-
tellectus ipse)."
Thereupon, logologically shortcutting metaphysical issues, consid-
ering the matter purely from the standpoint of nomenclature (symbolic
action), we could equate intellectus ipse with the elements of grammar and
syntax that are intrinsic to any given language and are not directly re-
ducible to the issue stressed in the quotes from Bentham and Emerson.
Though the mutation that makes speech possible is itself inherited

in our nature as physical bodies (in the realm of motion), the formation
of a nomenclature referring to sensory experiences is on the side of

symbolic action.
All such developments constitute a medium that provides motives
intrinsic to itself.
With the wider use of physicalist terms as necessary "fictions" for
reference to supposed nonphysical entities or processes, the realm of
specifically symbolic action is strongly involved, and is completed with
the formally stylistic use of metaphor, or equivocation generally.
The nature of language is such that it could not possibly be confined

to strictly literal, univocal usage.
If words did not admit of loose application, you couldn't apply the
same terms to a variety of objects, processes, circumstances.
For in its details, every situation is unique.
In his book entitled Poetic Diction: A Study in Meanings (London,

1928), Owen Barfield would want to deny that the step from terms for
sensation to their use in referring to nonsensory "entities" is metaphori-
cal.
He would hold that the material objects (to which such terms had
literally referred) themselves contain such a range of what Emerson
would call "supernatural" connotations.
To meet the minimum conditions of what is meant here by "sym-
bolic action" all that is necessary is the inability of words to "stay put," as
when even a proper name like "Caesar," referring to one particular
person in history, gives birth to such words as "Kaiser" and "Czar."
The purely physiological aspect of the Self (its grounding in the

realm of motion) is characterized by the centrality of the nervous system.
Its sensations are immediately its own, not thus felt by any other
organism.
Like organisms presumably have similar pleasures and pains, but
these are immediately experienced only within the centrality of each one
particular organism's nervous system, as individuated at parturition.
The Self as a "person," member of a community (Culture) charac-

terized by motives in the realm of symbolic action, is not thus differ-
entiated.
In this respect the Self becomes a product of the Culture.
Whatever may be the genetic traits differentiating one individual
from another, and whatever the distinct histories of individuals, the
nature of symbolic action shapes the Self largely in modes of role, of
sociality.
Here figure the individual's relations to family, to groups, to ever-

widening and partially conflicting organizations such as church, busi-
ness, political party, nation, "global" tentatives.
Here, in contrast with the immediacies of the body, we confront for
our overall "reality" an indeterminately interwoven complexity of sym-
bols, reports about local, national, and international affairs, about his-
tory, psychology, geology, astronomy, expectations true or false, prom-
issory or forbidding, and so forth.
Though "reality," (the "world") as thus symbolically conceived, em-
braces a potential "universe of discourse" far beyond the realm of physi-
ological sensation, the opportunities for such exercising (via resources in
the realm of "symbolic action") depend wholly on the realm of physiolog-
ical motion (the basic conditions that determine whether the individual
organism lives or dies).
In sum, when to the principle of individuation (involving the under-

lying physiology of sheer motion) there is added an organism's ability to
parallel the realm of sensations by learning to use words for them, the
concept of Self must necessarily be defined in terms of a polarity.
In terms of nonsymbolic motion, the Self is a physiological or-
ganism, separated from all others of its kind at the moment of parturi-
tion.
In terms of symbolic action, it becomes a "person" by learning the

language of its tribe, with corresponding identity and roles (beginning
with the equivalent of a proper name and expanding variously in keep-
ing with the currently available resources of symbolism and the in-
stitutional structures reciprocally made possible by them), the three cor-
responding Dramatistic axioms being:
There can be motion without action (as the sea can go on thrashing
about whether or not there are animals that have a word for it).
There can be no action without motion (as we animals could not
have words for anything except for the motions of our nervous systems
and the vibrations that carry our words from one of us to another
through the air or that make words visible on the page).
But (and this is the primary axiom that differentiates Dramatism
from Behaviorism) symbolic action is not reducible to terms of sheer
motion. (Symbolicity involves not just a difference of degree, but a moti-
vational difference in kind.)
Yet this difference in kind amounts to a primary DUPLICATION.

This is due to the fact that the nomenclature of symbolic placement
is borrowed from the materials of sensory motion.
And the terms are of such a nature that they are "fictions" or analog-
ical extensions of their beginning in reference to physical processes and
objects.
A Culture's symbolically conceived "world," or "universe of dis-

course," is thus built figuratively of terms originally grounded in refer-
ence to the nonsymbolic realm of motion.
Otherwise put: the realm of what is usually called "ideas" is con-
structed of symbolic material usually called sensory "images."
The Self, like its corresponding Culture, thus has two sources of
reference for its symbolic identity: its nature as a physiological organism,
and its nature as a symbol-using animal responsive to the potentialities of
symbolicity that have a nature of their own not reducible to a sheerly
physiological dimension.
Symbolicity itself being of a nature that can rise to higher levels of

generalization until all is headed in some all-inclusive title, we can readily
understand why psychologists like Jung are moved to talk of an overall
oneness, an Unus Mundus.
Yet in the light of the critical Dramatistic distinction between the
motives of a psychological organism as such and the motives of such a
Self as personalized by participation in its particular Culture's modes of
literal (univocal), equivocal, and analogical symbol-using, we can at least
glimpse why Jung could be exercised by such a symbolically engendered
"idea" or "ideal" of Ultimate Unity.
And by the same token we should see why the motion-action "polar-
ity" is unbridgeable in the sense that, although, in every tribal idiom
however rudimentary, there is a wholly reliable basic correspondence
between a thing and its name; never the twain shall meet.
That might seem quite obvious, as regards the kind of "polarity"

that prevails with the correspondence between a tree and the word tree.
But look how far afield from such obviousness you get when the
distinction shifts from the realm of sheer motion (as with the physicality
of a tree) to the corresponding word (which is in the realm of symbolic
action) and you confront what Dramatism would view as inaccurate
equivalents, such as "matter" and "spirit," "matter" and "mind," or even
"brain" and "mind."
There could be no total unity between the realms except along the
lines of orthodox religion's promise to the faithful that their bodies w
be restored to them in heaven.
An unchartable complexity of behavings among the cells of the body
may add up, for instance, to an overall "unitary" sense of well-being; but
no sheer term for an ideal unity (such as Jung's expression, Unus Mun-
dus) can match that purely physiological kind of "attitude."
Keats, dying, modified a passage in Shakespeare to state it thus:
"Banish money-Banish sofas-Banish Wine-Banish Music; but right
Jack Health, honest Jack Health, true Jack Health-Banish Health and
banish all the world."
Though any attitude, even in purely theoretic matters, has a sum-
marizing, unifying aspect, it must prevail only insofar as in some way it is
grounded in purely physiological behavior (as per William James'
charming and often quoted statement that we're sad because we cry).
In his chapter on "Attitudes" (The Principles of Literary Criticism

[London, 1924]), I. A. Richards was presumably speculating on a behav-
ioristic parallelism of this sort when he wrote:
Every perception probably includes a response in the form of

incipient action. We constantly overlook the extent to which all the
while we are making preliminary adjustments, getting ready to act
in one way or another. Reading Captain Slocum's account of the
centipede which bit him on the head when alone in the middle of
the Atlantic, the writer has been caused to leap right out of his chair
by a leaf which fell upon his face from a tree.
Whatever the implications of an ATTITUDE, as a kind of incipient or

future action, it must be by some means grounded in the set of the body
now; and thus, though an attitude of kindness may be but the preparation
for the doing of a kind act (a subsequent mode of behavior), it is already
"behaving" physiologically in ways of its own (as a dog's implicit way of
"conjugating the verb 'to eat' " is to begin by salivating, a bodily motion
that in effect implies the future tense, "I will eat"; the present tense of
the verb being bodily conjugated by eating; and "I have eaten" is also in
its way a now, as the dog curls up for a comfortable, satisfied snooze).
But whatever the correspondence between purely symbolic at-

titudinizing and the kind of immediacy that poor Keats, with his dying
body, confronted, his very efforts to endow his poetic attitudes with
sensuous immediacy made him all the more cruelly aware of the respects
in which the poet's modes of symbolic action were comparatively (to use
his own word for his own poetry) "abstract."
His "Ode on a Grecian Urn" symbolically enacts the "transcending" of
the body.
But that letter he wrote to Fanny Brawne while nearing death was
concerned with a situation in which the sheer nonsymbolic realm of
motion (the plight of his diseased body) was taking over; for such in
essence is the unbridgeable "polarity" between the social realm of "sym-
bolic action" and motion's "principle of individuation" whereby the
symptoms of his disease were the immediate sensations of himself and none
other.
All told, in our Selves sheerly as physiological organisms, our world

is made of what Santayana would describe as but a single line drawn
through an infinity of possible "essences."
But all of them are experienced immediately, as yours and no one
else's, though you doubtless rightly assume that others of your kind
experience similar immediate sensations.
Beyond that, in polar distinction, is the vast symbolic realm of tribal
sociality, or orientation, as shaped by the influences that you encounter
by reason of your being a symbol-using animal, whose "reality," at every
stage, is determined by such terms.
In Santayana's Realms of Being, his Realm ofMatter would correspond

to what is here called the realm of nonsymbolic MOTION (for which his
word is sometimes "flux," sometimes "action," though I must here em-
ploy a different usage).
His passionate Realm of Spirit would be much what I mean by "sym-
bolic action."
And his Realm of Essence would deal with "sensation" as the bridge
between the realms of "matter" and "spirit," though his term "intuitions"
here would ambivalently include both bodily sensations (such as color)
and purely symbolic fictions (such as the character of Hamlet).
The Self as a "person," beyond the individual's identity as a strictly

physiological organism, confronts with varying degrees of comprehen-
siveness and profoundness the interrelationships among the manifold
details of "reality" (whatever that "orientation" may be) as known and
interpreted in terms of the symbolic lore current in the Culture of that
time.
Necessarily, any individual's formal or informal version of such lore

is selective, in keeping with the limitations and engrossments besetting
that individual (as both person and physiological organism).
The interrelationships among such a conglomerate will be related
consistently (this therefore that), antithetically (this however that), adven-
titiously (this and that).
When such an aggregate is felt to fall together "holistically," the
gratification of such a purely symbolic symmetry can rise to an ecstacy of

conviction that we call "mystical."
The fall from such a state (whereby the fullness, pleroma, of purely
symbolic exercising gives way to a sense of its underlying emptiness as
tested by a similarly structured physiological counterpart) is called "ac-
cidie," acedia, sloth, torpor, drought.
Or the sense of such a confluence among motives can also have the
Allness of a pandemonium, a Pandora's box let loose, a Walpurgis Night,
a jangling conflict of all the pieces with one another, the very fullness
being felt as a drought.
In the state of contemporary Culture, I take it, the corresponding

Self is likely to manifest "in principle" fragmentary aspects of all three
such symbolically engendered "fulfillments."
The fragmentary delight is in putting anything together. The
drought is usually met by purchasing some form of entertainment.
The variant of pandemoniac entanglement can even be attenua-
tively transformed into a bit of research on the problem itself.
Hart Crane is a notably pathetic example of a poet whose mode of

mysticism terminated in a corresponding drought.
While he was writing portions of The Bridge, there were times when
everything seemed to fall ecstatically into place, its many disjunctions
inspirited by one transcendent principle of unity.
But the very strength of his hopes for the work as a wholly organic
solution for his problems as a personal Self set the conditions for the
drought that was necessarily implicit in his reliance upon symbolicity
alone.
There may be drought, not as a comedown from the mystic exalta-

tion of "holistic" symbolizing, but as a kind of sloth implicit in the sheer
failure to take delight in the wonders of purely symbolistic enterprise.
For such a condition there are direct (nonsymbolic) resources avail-
able to the Self-and they are widely resorted to.
I refer to the many drugs that act directly upon the Self as a physio-
logical organism (in the realm of motion), though there are attendant
difficulties due to the fact that each such physical means of gratifying the
organism also happens to tax the health of that organism; and even if it
didn't, there is the problem that the very directness and efficiency of its
appeal to the body robs the individual Self of the human gratifications
resulting from engrossment with the manifold manifestations of purely
symbolistic enterprise.
But surely, above all, in confronting the tangle of "global" problems

that beset the current state of affairs, we should pay wan appreciative
tribute to the remarkable symbolic resources whereby "pandemonium"
can become "attenuatively transformed."
All about us there are our various Selves, each to varying degrees
tracking down the implications of his particular nomenclature.
For I take it that, just as each good poet speaks an idiom of his own,
so it is with each symbol-using animal-and there is a kind of reciprocat-
ing relationship whereby the Self selects its key words, and they in turn
become formative, to shape further developments of the Self, along with
countless such unchartable interactions, including reactions back upon
the behavior of the Self's sheer physiology.
The reference to physiology enters here in connection with the

concept of "psychogenic illness," which refers to a reverse relationship
whereby, just as drugs can produce physical effects recorded as a corre-
sponding "attitude" or "state of mind," so such attitudes or states of
mind can function suggestively to induce corresponding physiological
behavior (in the sense that, if you received some information you be-
lieved in, and the information was highly disturbing, it would affect your
bodily behavior, your blood pressure, respiration, heartbeat and the like
quite as though the situation were actually so, though the information
happened to be in error).
In this sense there is the "polar" relationship whereby an individu-
al's mode of symbolic action (his investment in a particular kind of liter-
ary style, for instance) might attain an organic replica in a kind of physi-
cal behavior that happened to be a kind of disease.
In cases of that sort there could be a mutually reinforcing re-
lationship (a "feedback"?) between the author's symbolic prowess and
corresponding processes of his body whereby the development of his
skill at his particular mode of symbolic action would be making him sick
and keeping him sick, as his symbolic exercising was reinforced by the
effects of his physiological "misbehavior."
Our attitudes toward past or future (remembrances or expectations)

are products of our symbolicity.
But their behavioral counterparts in the realm of physiological mo-
tion must be in the immediate present.
For the only way a body can possibly behave is from one present
moment to the next.
In the realm of symbolicity, there are two totally different notions of

sequence: the temporally prior (yesterday/today/tomorrow) and the
logically (nontemporally) prior (as with the syllogism, first premise/sec-

ond premise/conclusion).
Myth, being narrative, features the modes of temporal priority (as
discussed in the section on "The First Three Chapters of Genesis," in my
Rhetoric of Religion [Boston, 1961; reprinted Berkeley, 1970]).
The same work deals "logologically" with respects in which even
temporal terms can be treated as in nontemporal relationships to one
another (as per my "Cycle of Terms Implicit in the Idea of 'Order' ").
The strategic intermediate term here is IMPLICATIONS.

Thus the terms "order" and "disorder" are nontemporally related in
the sense that, being "polar," each implies the other, regardless of
whether we go from the idea of "order" to the idea of "disorder," or vice
versa.
But narrative (myth) can set up a temporal seque

story goes irreversibly "from" one "to" the other.
Insofar as IMPLICATIONS all fall harmoniously int

exercise in symbolic action approaches the feel of m
Insofar as they add up to ajangle (and though "po
"order" and "disorder" imply each other without strif
conflict when reduced to terms of irreversible story
are under the sign of pandemonium.
Insofar as, of a sudden, all such symbolic enterpr
in comparison with the immediacies of physiologica
realm of motion), we are on the slope of sloth, of dro
alternative "remedies" are either physical "dissipatio
recourse to drugs) or further study (as thus fittingly
of sloth, Dante sums up for us the entire rationale of
this very canto where we are assured that, though ra
may err, "the natural" [lo natural] is always senza err
Gershom Scholem's engrossing studies of the Kab

glimpse a further marvel with regard to the vibranc
among terms.
We see hermeneutic ways whereby, though the te
much as modify a single letter of the Torah, while
the very signature ofJHVH Himself, and considering
Creation that it was propounded before Creation (the
you), the disciple was taught modes of transformati
to see all such literalnesses double, in terms of esoteri
And thus some of us goyim can glimpse how S
exactly that, long before the Kabbalists, when scrup
0. T. letter of the Law intact, he but introduced N. T. interpretations (as

with the shift from a strictly physiological behavior of circumcision, which
obviously had its symbolic aspects, he improvised a new symbolism, "cir-
cumcision of the heart").
Much of our engrossment with all such interpretations and re-

interpretations (as exemplified, for instance, in the various schools of
psychoanalysis) stems from the vibrancy of interrelated IMPLICATIONS
that thus suggest themselves for the spinning.
And "case histories" are, as it were, the translation of such logically,
doctrinally interrelated terms into the corresponding parables of narra-
tive (the "mythic" parallel).
Thus the catalogues, or "inventories," of Whitman's poetry are un-
foldings of terms that IMPLY one another, their associative inter-
relationship being revealed in a succession of tiny plots.
Since the principle of DUPLICATION begins in the polarity of our dual

nature as symbol-using animals, the split across the two realms of non-
symbolic motion and symbolic action will necessarily manifest itself in
endless variations on the theme of DUPLICATION.
For it is the combination of bodily sensation with symbolic counter-
parts and corresponding analogical extensions that "keeps body and soul
together" until the last time.
And neither realm can be complete without the other, nor can they
be identical.
Thus ultimately, when properly discounted along "logological" lines

(whereby his "archetypes" are seen as quasi-temporal terms for terms logi-
cally prior), Plato's version of IMITATION, as a species of DUPLICATION, Will
be seen to go much deeper than Aristotle's.
Aristotle's is good common sense, inasmuch as there is a notable
difference between real victimage (as with a Roman gladiatorial contest)
and the mere IMITATION of suffering (as with the pathos of a Greek
tragedy).
But Plato was digging into the IMPLICATION that once we turn from
the realm of motion to the realm of symbolicity and try to envision
everything in terms of that ideal symbolic universe, then all actual things
in nature become in effect but partial exemplars of what they are in
essence, as no single object can fit the exact description of the countless
other and different objects classifiable under that same head.
Possibly the motion-action distinction, as conceptualized in this

statement, implies that the line of demarcation between "conscious" and
"unconscious" should be moved farther to the side of sheer motion.
That is, dreams would not be on the side of the "unconscious"

insofar as dreams, like the most mature works of science, philosophy,
literature, or the arts generally, admit of analysis as modes of symbolic-
ity.
The "unconscious" would be relegated to such processes as diges-
tion, metabolism, the healing of a wound, even if we study the physiol-
ogy of such behavior.
Thus in my chapter on "Varieties of Unconscious" (Language as

Symbolic Action [Berkeley, 1966], pp. 67-72), I begin with "the uncon-
scious aspect of sheerly bodily processes," which would be in the realm of
nonsymbolic motion.
From there I proceed to aspects of the "unconscious" in the realm of
symbolicity, with Freud as my point of departure.
Much of this could be treated as variants on the term "IMPLICATION,"
as used in this paper.
Similarly, if we locate the principle of individuation in the body as a

physiological organism (as per our logological adaptation of a Thomist
theological principle) it would seem to follow that Levi-Strauss draws the
line between "Nature" and "Culture" at the wrong place.
For both "Nature" and "Culture" would be on the symbolism side of
the line.
Thus, in effect, the case for the relation between biology and sym-
bolism would be over anthropologized, as both "Nature" and "Culture"
would be stages of "Culture," whereas "Nature" is the precultural state out
of which the human infant develops in acquiring the culture of its tribe,
however primitive.
Whatever the possible range of incidental readjustments, DUPLICA-

TION is so basic to the relation between motion and symbolicity, nothing
of moment seems quite complete unless we have rounded things out by
translation into symbols of some sort, either scientific or aesthetic, practi-
cal or ritualistic.
Sex is not complete without love lyrics, porn, and tracts on sexology.
The nonsymbolic motions of springtime are completed in the sym-
bolic action of a spring song.
The realms of nonsymbolic motion and symbolicity (with its vast

range of implications) are so related that the acquiring of skill with
symbol-systems is analogous to a kind of "fall" into a technical state of
"grace" that "perfects" nature.
2. Some Comments on William Willeford's 'Jung's Polaristic

Thought in Its Historical Setting"
WILLEFORD: "The historical trends that Jung rejected in Freud's thought

can be summed up under the names mechanism-seen, for exam-
ple, in Freud's use of the expression 'psychic apparatus'-and
positivism, the belief extolled by A. Comte, H. Spencer and others,
that culture was destined to pass through an evolutionary develop-
ment from magic through religion to science. Although Jung was
profoundly committed to the values of empirical science, he re-
garded the positivistic program as an illusion, because the religious
impulse was for him a permanent reality of the human mind, not a
stage of culture that would yield to Progress" ["Jung's Polaristic
Thought," Analytische Psychologie 6 (1975): 218-39].
COMMENT: Obviously the Dramatistic Perspective would be on Jung's
side insofar as terms like "psychic apparatus" implied a reduction of
"symbolic action" to "nonsymbolic motion." But as compared with
Behavioristic psychologies, Freud is far from any such re-
ductionism.
In the Dramatistic ("logological") Perspective represented by
the present article on the motion-action pair, regardless of the truth
or falsity of religion, Buber's "I-Thou" relation is here viewed as in
its way the "perfect" expression of the form basic to the sentence:
speaker/speech/spoken-to. One here directly addresses the most dis-
tinguished audience conceivable; and in prayer (petition, in effect
saying "Please") there is most grandly enacted the attitude of sub-
missiveness to an all-powerful magistrate. Magic by comparison
"commands." Applied science does neither, it but "contrives"
(hence, fittingly, our word "mechanism" is etymologically related to
Greek words for means, expedients, contrivances, remedy.
WILLEFORD: "I will focus upon Jung's tendency to conceive the world as
basically consisting of polarities of various kinds. Day and night, sun
and moon, heaven and earth, right and left, such mythical twins as
the Dioscuri (born of a single egg) and Romulus and Remus, the
double-headedJanus, such ornaments and cult objects as the double
spiral, twining snakes, the double-headed axe, the double-headed
eagle, pairs of horns; the wealth, antiquity and wide distribution of
such symbols suggest an archetypal basis. I will be concerned not
with these but with the attempts of certain thinkers to give their
subjective sense of polarity a philosophical form."
COMMENT: Though language does talk a lot, the very essence of its
genius is in its nature as abbreviation. A sentence such as "The man
walks down the street" is in effect a kind of title that sums up an
unchartable complexity of details involved in any particular situa-
tion to which such words might be applied. (This issue is discussed at
some length in my essay, "What Are the Signs of What? A Theory of

'Entitlement,' " reprinted in my Language as Symbolic Action.) And
what more "perfect" abbreviations are possible than the replies, Yes
and No? In fact, the choice is ideally so perfect, except with the kind
of questions artificially set up for examination papers, we usually
have to settle for a mere Maybe as the answer. Most voting says Yes
or No to a decision that is at best a Maybe. All antitheses embodied
in polarities of the sort listed by Willeford are by comparison but
weak attenuations of this "ideal" form. (An aspect of "logological"
theory is the stress upon what it calls an "entelechial" principle
underlying the trends intrinsic to the nature of symbolicity as a
realm of motives considered in its own right. Any strictly psychologi-
cal manifestation would be classed as but a special case of such
symbolic resources in general.)
But prior to such polarities of antithesis within the nature of
symbolicity, there is the incentive to DUPLICATION inherent in the
unresolvable polar relationship between symbolicity and the non-
symbolic realm of motion.
WILLEFORD: ForJung "consciousness is always subject to the unconscious
background; and the ego, no matter what pride it takes in its pow-
ers, is always subordinate to the self, the purposes of which the ego
cannot appropriate except by the difficult way of individuation."
COMMENT: To quote the presumably persuasive TV commercial on the
principle of individuation's grounding in the strictly physiological
(the realm of motion), it's "my" acid indigestion, and "my" gas, for
which I (my ego) take this medical material. But my ego is an aspect
of my Self, which is developed through modes of sociality (Culture)
made possible by the resources of symbolism. I shall reserve until
later a discussion of the "logological" equivalents for the relation
between "consciousness" and the "unconscious."
WILLEFORD: "Polaristic thinking is even present in Kant, whom Goet
(in a letter to Schweigger in 1814) acknowledged as the authority f
his own tendency to think in polarities. .... In the Farbenlehre (Th

Theory of Colors) he says that, no matter how one tries to think about
a phenomenon, one cannot escape seeing that it implies an origina
division capable of unity, or of an original unity capable of divisio
and he claims that to divide what is united, to unite what is divide
is the life of nature."
COMMENT: Yes, here is a basic correspondence between the realms of
motion and action. We can put things together and take things apart.
And as Socrates says in the Phaedrus, the dialectician is skilled in the
use of words that can perform similarly in the realm of ideas. Berg-
son has astutely shown how this very nature of words leads to
"pseudo-problems," as theorists speculate on how to "resolve" antith-
eses in nature that were already "resolved" because they didn't

exist in the first place and were but the result of symbolism's failure
to formally recognize its limitations as a medium for the discussion
of wholly nonsymbolic processes (in the realm of motion). Psycho-
logically, we encounter naivetes of this sort: according to primitive
belief, there were ceremonies in which a sacred animal could be torn
into bits, with each member of the tribe eating a portion. Here
certainly was the principle of division, separation (in early Greek
ceremonies called sparagm6s). But it was matched by a principle of
merger inasmuch as all members of the tribe were felt to be made
consubstantial by eating of this same numinous substance. The dif-
ference between a "logological" treatment of such matters and the
views too closely wedded to mythological origins of human thinking
resides in the fact that stress upon the mythic would tend to derive
the sheerly dialectical principles from their operation in such primi-
tive rites, whereas Logology would view the primitive rites as a spe-
cial case of the more general dialectical principles. A similar risk is to
be seen in some Freudian thinking, with regard to the processes of
"condensation" and "displacement" in the symbolism of dreams.
Symbolism in its most general sense permits of these two processes,
which thus are not derivable from such manifestations of them in
dreams, and are but special cases of symbolicity's resources. I bring
up this point to illustrate what I have in mind when saying that
Logology can go along wholly with Psychology insofar as Psychology
is viewed as a subdivision of symbolic processes, rather than as the
revelation of their source. True, there is a sense in which the human
ability to talk at all could be analyzed as a kind of "built-in aliena-
tion," separating us from our "natural condition" as an earthworm
presumably is not. But considerations of that sort involve philo-
sophic ironies not strictly reducible to psychological terms, though
such quandaries obviously would have profound psychological IM-
PLICATIONS (there's that word again!).
WILLEFORD: "These examples from Nietzsche, Jung, Goethe, and Schil-
ler illustrate a tendency, extremely pronounced in the early part of
the 19th century, to conceive difference as the result of division,
which is finally the expression of universal antagonistic principles.
The antagonism of these principles, and a contrary tendency to
resolve it give rise to the forms and energies of nature (Goethe), of
the human mind (Hegel, Fichte, Schelling), of art generally (Schel-
ling), and of poetry specifically (Schiller). Indeed, the influence of
this polaristic thinking is strongly present in all of the major forms
of depth psychology, but it is in some ways especially pronounced in
Jung."
COMMENT: Add Heraclitus (as Willeford does later) and the list would
have its perfect top. Apparently in his scheme, all was strife; and the
strife added up to perfect harmony. The theory of the U.S. Con-
stitution viewed a conflict of powers as a balance of powers.
WILLEFORD: "The first source of this polaristic thinking is the nature of
the human mind. .... Polaristic thought has an archetypal basis in
that the human mind is disposed to structure its experience by mak-
ing distinctions between what something is and what it is not, be-
tween a thing of one kind and a thing of another. This may be seen
in the binomial properties of language-the tendency to pair words
and concepts in various ways."
COMMENT: Logologically, the stress would be not upon "the human
mind" but upon the nature of symbolism. High among my reasons for
this statement of the case is my belief that we should not take on
more obligations than necessary. Why haggle with Behaviorists
when you don't need to? They can't deny that our kind of animal
behaves by a lot of verbalizing. So let's account for as much as we can
in such terms. To my way of thinking, in carrying out the im-
plications of that one shift of locus, we completely invalidate Skin-
ner's attacks upon the concept of what he calls "autonomous man"
(which I interpret as his own addition of a straw man).
WILLEFORD: "The individuation process described by Jung is governed
by the self which is a principle of unity and purpose in the unfolding
of the personality."
COMMENT: Though I have already "translated" Jung's nomenclature into
"logologese" on this point, one further qualification is here
suggested. In the realm of sheer motion, the individual organism is
motivated by such obvious "purposes" as the need for food. But
once you turn from the need for food to the ways of buying food
with money, you're in a realm where "purpose" involves modes of
authority, enterprise, and the like not even remotely reducible to
the sheerly physiological needs of living. And, incidentally, the con-
cern with a principle of individuation is itself a notable step in the
right direction. Since, in the last analysis, each thing is but a part of
everything, there is far too much tendency to overstress this princi-
ple of merger at the expense of concerns with a principium in-
dividuationis (such as the centrality of the nervous system so obvi-
ously supplies).
WILLEFORD: "The 'Panlogism' of Heraclitus, the idea that all things par-
take of the logos, which reconciles the opposites ..."
COMMENT: Logologically, all things partake of the Word in the sense that
all discussion of them is by the same token in the "universe of dis-
course" (the Greek word logos encompassing a range of meanings,
such as "basic principle," that favor such an extension). We have
already noted the modes of stylization whereby competition can be a
form of cooperation (as competing teams on the ball field in effect

cooperate to make a good expert game).
WILLEFORD: "Schelling was influenced by Boehme's idea of the Ungrund
as part of God."
COMMENT: Ultimate "polarity" in symbolism is made possible by the fact
that any term of highest generalization, such as "ground" or "be-
ing," can have the grammatical addition of a negative, as "un-
ground" or "non-being," for such are the resources "natural" to
dialectic. Thus, in Kant's dialectic (explicitly so named) his overall
term for the phenomenal, empirical world of the "conditioned" sets
up the purely terministic condition for the term "unconditioned" as
applied to the noumenal "ground" of this world's conditions.
Whether it means anything or not, any synonym for "everything"
can still have verbally as its ultimate "context," some synonym for
"nothing." Hegel was quite clear on that point.
WILLEFORD: "The first stage, then, in the development of mythology is
[according to Schelling] one of relative 'monotheism,' a monotheism
that includes the possibility of polytheistic development."
COMMENT: In my essay "Myth, Poetry, and Philosophy" (Language as
Symbolic Action, pp. 406-9) I discuss the sheerly terministic aspects
of this question. Suffice it here to say that any concepts of priority
with regard to mythic thinking center in an ambiguity whereby the
"logically prior" becomes confused with the "temporally prior,"
since myth is by its nature a vocabulary that states theoretic "princi-
ples" in narrative terms. Thus the issue becomes somewhat like try-
ing to decide whether the "divinity" of godhead in general is "prior"
to some one god's nature as a particular "person." One even en-
counters paradoxes whereby a monotheistic religion can become
"a-theistic" in comparison with polytheism. For instance, many in-
stitutions that monotheism treats in purely secular terms (such as
Finance or Agriculture) would merit in primitive paganism special
temples to their corresponding deities. Logology holds that, regard-
less of whether one believes or disbelieves in religious nomencla-
ture, one should study theology for the light that "words about God"
throw upon "words about words."
WILLEFORD: "Jung came to regard the archetype as 'psychoid,' as tran-
scending the psyche, and as occupying an indeterminate position
between Geist and Stoff, between spirit and matter."
COMMENT: That would be translated into "logologese" thus: since the
archetypes all have a notable imagistic feature, they relate to the role
that sensation plays in providing the material for symbolic action's
nomenclatures. And by the same token they are in an "intermediate
position" between the realms of "matter" (nonsymbolic motion) and
"spirit" (symbolicity in its full development, via the fictions of
analogical extension). Their "psychoid" identity would reside in the

fact that their role as an aspect of nomenclature could not be treated
as encompassing the full development of a human being in response
to those manifold resources and influences of sociality we sum up as
Culture.
WILLEFORD: "Jung's attempt to solve the problem of the opposites i

concerned with the archetype of the unus mundus, the unity of the
cosmos .... Jung writes that 'While the concept of the unus mundus is
a metaphysical speculation, the unconscious can be indirectly expe-
rienced via its manifestation. .. . The contents of the unconscious
... are mutually contaminated to such a degree that they cannot be
distinguished from one another and can therefore easily take one
another's place, as can be seen most in dreams. The in-
distinguishableness of its contents gives one the impression that ev-
erything is connected with everything else, and therefore, despite
their multifarious modes of manifestation, that they are at bottom a
unity. .... The psychoid nature of the archetype contains very much
more than can be included in a psychological explanation. It points
to the sphere of the unus mundus, towards which the psychologist
and the atomic physicist are converging along separate paths, pro-
ducing independently of one another, certain analogous auxiliary
concepts.' The concept of the unus mundus is, then, at the furthest
reaches of Jung's thought. And though he has tried to remove the
concept from the realm of metaphysics to that of empirical science,
we should not overlook the analogy between Jung's unus mundus,
which he sometimes treats as equivalent to the self, and Schelling's
absolute monotheism."
COMMENT: Unus isn't so clearly an "archetypal" term as images can be.
figures thus among the transcendentals, terms or properties which the
mediaeval scholastics said go with all things of whatever sort: Res
Ens, Verum, Bonum, Aliquid, Unum. In that sense anything w
look at is a one. And the obviously summarizing nature of a title i
implicit in Jung's usage, as with our wishful title, "United States.
And quite as "God" is the overall title of titles in theology, so logol
ogy looks upon any expression like Unus Mundus as high up in the
scale of "god-terms," if but in the technical sense of what Korzybsk
would have called a high level of generalization. For think of how
vastly much is encompassed by your title, "One World" if, when yo
say "I am talking about everything," you feel that you really a
talking about everything.
Since Jung equates the One World with the Self, he is in effect
trying to deny by idealistic fiat the polarity of Geist and Stoff that he
begins with.
The concept of the "collective unconscious" would seem
logologically to involve these possible sources: our responses to the
sheer physiology of our bodies, in their metabolistic processes

wholly outside our awareness except for the sensations, pleasures,
pains that we experience as kinds of summarizing titles for such
going on within us, and many of which function as signs that help us
find our way about (thereby to that extent becoming "conscious");
the vast social lore that becomes part of us, though most of it does
not explicitly engage our attention; the portions of this which,
although they explicitly engage us, involve many implications not
tracked down as when we do develop thought and conduct in some
particular channel; the implications even here, when they but begin
to emerge and exercise us greatly until we have brought them into
order; the irresolutions involving each of us differently by reason of
his own particular history; and above and behind and within all, the
goads to DUPLICATION that are intrinsic to the unbridgeable polarity
between the realms of motion and action embedded in the physio-
logical developments whereby the physical organism became genet-
ically endowed with ways to build this unbridgeable gulf.
Through Freud's stress upon the formative effects of the individu-

al's early history (the period when the physiological organism is but
beginning to acquire the symbolic rudiments of a Self), we are introduced
to a different aspect of the DUPLICATION principle; namely: the paradox
whereby the process of temporal progression can by the same token set
the conditions for a later corresponding kind of regression. Logologi-
cally, the situation would be characterized thus: since words are a major
factor in sharpening the nature of attention, the very paucity of a child's
emergent vocabulary causes many experiences to escape the clarity that
makes for the kind of observation most conducive to explicit re-
membrance. Nevertheless, the child's experiences with intimate family
relationships serve in effect to surround it with a "cast of characters" and
corresponding "plot." These roles (by reason of their temporal priority
in the individual's history) become as it were "essential," and thus "dra-
matically creative" in setting up a pattern of relationships which the
individual later DUPLICATES by unknowingly imputing similar roles in
situations that, as a matter of fact, are but remotely analogical.
But essentially Jung's difficulties with the problem of polarity in-
volve a complication of this sort:
1. There is a sense in which everything merges out of and back into the
universal context; and each of us as an individual is but part of that
whole, as a single ripple is but a moment on the water and quickly
merges back into it.
2. The very nature of language is such that we can have generalizing
titular terms (like Jung's Unus Mundus) for such ideas of overall
consubstantiality, thereby being quite handy for summing up an
attitude of sorts, though not reducible to a particular.
3. There is a kind of "collective unconscious" we share in the sense that a

common language spoken by similar kind of organisms contains a
clutter of implications which its users vaguely share parts of, though
we manage to make some of it explicit and can go along with much
that others of us track down, making other aspects of these im-
plications explicit.
4. Though our bodies are like other bodies of our species, hence could
be expected to share variously in this corresponding linguistic realm
of implications (to be called a "collective unconscious"), there is also
the principle of individuation whereby the immediacy of sensuous
experiences, pleasures and pains (demarcated by the centrality of
the nervous system), cannot be shared in its immediacy.
5. Accordingly the polarity between the two realms remains unbridge-
able, and we are thus composite creatures, of a nature that can be
called either a privilege or a privation, or a mixture of both.
3. The Polarity Poetically "Resolved"
At another meeting of the conference at which I originally pre-

sented the substance of the foregoing material there was a paper by
Norman Holland, who, in developing a thesis concerning three stages of
psychoanalysis (first a stress upon the unconscious, next the ego, and
now an "identity phase"), was especially ingenious in subjecting the same
poem to the three modes of approach. The poem he chose was
Wordsworth's two "Lucy" quatrains beginning "A slumber did my spirit
seal," to illustrate the changes of approach.
The choice was a most happy one for my purposes, since it was
almost as though deliberately designed to illustrate my notions about the
"polar" relationship between the realms of (nonsymbolic) motion and
(symbolic) action. I have situated the principle of individuation, with
regard to the Self-Culture pair, in the physiological realm of motion, as
circumscribed by the "centrality of the nervous system" (whereby the
given human individual, as a biological organism, "immediately" experi-
ences only its own sensations, as distinct from the sensations that any
other organism, each in its way, immediately and exclusively experi-
ences). The realm of symbolic action, in contrast, is characterized by
kinds of behavior (with corresponding modes of identification) that are
made possible, for example, by social relations highly dependent on
"arbitrary, conventional" symbol systems, of which a tribal language
would be the prime specimen.
I have said that the only transcending of the permanent "split"
between the two realms (of symbol and nonsymbol) would be as in some
ultimate condition like that which orthodox Western religions imagine,
in promising that the virtuous dead will regain their "purified" bodies in
heaven. Wordsworth's poem suggests a different "solution," as per the

second quatrain:
No motion has she now, no force;

She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees.
Lucy now has "no motion" in the sense of her motions as an individ-
ual biologic organism. She has "transcended" this divisive state by merg-
ing wholly with the motions of rocks and stones and trees as they move in
earth's diurnal course. And the merger with "symbolic action" is embed-
ded in the very constitution of the poetic medium that celebrates her
oneness with nature as the ground of all physiologic bodies. I mean:
though she has been reduced to terms of wordless motion, her trans-
formation is being performed in terms of poetry; hence all is as verbal as
with God's creative word in Genesis.
Our art-heavens such as Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn" and Yeats'
"Sailing to Byzantium" bridge the gap by aesthetic conceits, each in its
way inviting the realm of symbolic action to take over, in terms of image
that stand for things (materials) themselves symbolic. Thus, Yeats:
Once out of nature I shall never take

My bodily form from any natural thing,
But such a form as Grecian goldsmiths make
Of hammered gold and gold enamelling
To keep a drowsy Emperor awake;
And Keats' Urn is a viaticum, with its transcendent destiny already

imaged in its nature as a symbol-saturated object.
In sum, in his nature as the typically symbol-using animal, ma
would make an Unus Mundus by making everything symbolic, as with
Baudelaire's great sonnet Correspondances, celebrating Nature as a "tem
ple" where man passes "a travers des forets de symboles." The special po
gnancy of Yeats' poem is his (essentially hysterical?) gallantry in affirm
ing his aesthetic "solution" in the very midst of recognizing the tyrann
of sheerly physiological dimension: "An aged man is but a paltry
thing, / A tattered coat upon a stick, unless / Soul clap its hands an
sing."
In his "Intimations of Immortality" Wordsworth seems to "solve"
the problem by interpreting his confused wonder-tinged memories of
presymbolic infancy as remembrances of a still further past (a principle I
have called the "temporizing of essence" whereby the narrative way of
trying to say how things truly are is to say how they originally were). This
symbolic pressure explains why Freud felt it necessary to postulate a
placement for his "Oedipus complex" in "prehistory," whatever that is.
To sum up: the dialectical relationship between Self and Culture

centers in a nonsymbolic principle of individuation or rudimentary phys-
iological identity which becomes matched (or countered, or extended) in
the full (social) sense by symbolic identifications with both personal and
impersonal aspects of the Non-Self.
An obvious example of personal identification would be the re-
lationships involved in primitive kinship systems, membership in secular
or religious social bodies, citizenship, occupational status, and the like.
The clearest example of impersonal sources would be terminologies de-
veloped as per the "inborn psychology" of the individual body's re-
sponses to physical processes, conditions, objects, locations by the analog-
ical use of words like "sunny" and "stormy," or "distant" and "intimate,"
as "fictions" for referring not to climate or extensio (Descartes' term) but
to a "person" (a word that itself originally referred to a thing, the material
mask worn by an actor). In this sense, as Bentham and Emerson agreed,
despite their widely different ways of getting there, all terms for "psy-
chological" or "ethical" subject matter (quite like the believer's words for
the realm of heaven) can be traced back etymologically to an origin in
sheerly physicalist reference.
There is a kind of "synchronic" relationship between the realm of
"symbolic action" and its grounding in the sensations made possible by
the physiology of nonsymbolic motion. Such would seem to be at the
roots of Jung's concern (almost nostalgic concern?) with the "polar"
problem inherent in his ideal of an overall nomenclature to be formed in
the name of Unus Mundus.
Freud's concern with the temporally prior would be on the "dia-
chronic" side, having to do with the fact that the human animal develops
from speechlessness (nonsymbolic infancy) through successive stages in
the ways of symbolicity (plus corresponding difficulties in the acquisition
of such aptitudes, difficulties that cannot be wholly surmounted, if only
because the problems do not lend themselves to a wholly adequate solu-
tion in symbolic terms, since our empirical problems of life and death are
ultimately grounded in physiology, not symbolism).
In any case, both of such concerns (Jung's and Freud's) require us to
track down the ultimate implications of what it is to be the kind of animal
whose relation between its Self (as an individual) and its Culture (its
society) is infused ("inspirited") with the genius (for better or worse) of
its symbol systems, which it learns to manipulate and by which it gets
correspondingly manipulated.
But this particular paper should end on at least a paragraph or two
listing if only at random some of the many cultural forms which, what-
ever their nature in their own right, can be glimpsed as responding (in
various and even quite contradictory ways) to the principle of DUPLICA-
TION implicit in the motion-action alignment:
Most obvious are the traditional metaphysical or theological dis-

tinctions between body and mind (matter and spirit). Others: the
microcosm-macrocosm pair, "eternal recurrence," variations on a theme,
double plot, cults of the body (attempts to will that all be reduced to the
immediacy of physiological sensation), transcendence (attempts like
Jung's to have the "polarity" encompassed by an ideal unity), theories of
"imitation" (such as Plato's and Aristotle's), bisymmetry, delegation of
authority, antecedent and consequent in musical phrasing, identification
by association, ritual (which symbolically reenacts some supposedly lit-
eral event). In a case of psychogenic illness, is not the body behaving
(misbehaving?) in problematical ways of a collateral nature? Are not the
symptoms that characterize its illness contriving in spontaneously un-
charted ways to duplicate in terms of physiologic motion certain dis-
tresses imposed upon an individual socialized self that happens to be
entangled in unresolved symbolically engendered vexations? And is not
the physical disease in effect a disastrously "literal" translation of the
victim's predicament? Indeed, may not the symptoms be so radical a
physical counterpart that they in effect serve to reinforce the symbolic
burden to which they were orginally but a response?
I dare but ask that. However, I would for sure end on this family of
DUPLICATIONS:
Quid pro quo, lex talionis, Golden Rule, catego

guilty suspicion (whereby, if Mr. A has malicious de
will suspect Mr. B of having malicious designs on him
tion. And over all, JUSTICE, PROPRIETY. If you're to b
springtime (motion) is wholly complete without the (
spring song. Even if we don't know a thing's name, it
we think of it as potentially nameable.
But some readers may feel that the Behaviorist asp
ters needs further treatment, so I shall end on that.
4. Motion and Action on the Screen
The sights and sounds of a motion picture are, in themselves, wholly

in the realm of motion. But as interpreted by the audience they become a
drama, in the realm of symbolic action. These sights and sounds reach
the eyes and ears of the audience through the medium of motion. And
the audience hears, sees, and interprets them through the motions of the
bodily behavior under the control of the nervous structure without
which we could not see the sights, hear the sounds, or interpret them as a
"story." Recall our first two Dramatistic axioms. There can be motion
without action. (If the film were being played in an empty house, there
would be no drama, that is, no symbolic action.) There can be no action
without motion. (An audience could not see, hear, and interpret it as a
"symbol system" without the aid of the nervous system and its physiolog-
ical motions.)
But such purely physiological behavior on the part of the audience
can figure in a totally different kind of "communication." For instance,
consider the operations of air conditioning equipment in a movie house.
I have read that if a thriller is being played, this mechanism must work
much harder than if the plot is of a milder sort because of the effects
which the excitement of the audience has upon the conditions of the
atmosphere in the theatre. Such bodily responses as increased warmth
and accelerated respiration place a greater burden upon the air con-
ditioning device, which is equipped with mechanical "sensors" that regis-
ter the change in conditions and "behave" accordingly.
Obviously, its "sensitivity" is not to the motions on the screen as a
drama (hence a process in the realm of symbolic action) but purely to
physical conditions produced by the sheer bodies of the audience in their
responses to the motions of the film as a drama (hence in the realm of
symbolic action, for which the classic word in this connection would be
"imitation").
Obviously, the air conditioning equipment is not concerned at all
with the drama as a form of symbolic act, an "imitation." Rather it is
responding to a situation purely in the realm of motion, the state of the
atmosphere produced by the physiological motions of the audience. Its
motions would proceed in the same way even if there were no drama or
audience at all but there were some other such condition in the realm of
motion that was "communicated" to it by its "sensors."
I stress this distinction because it so clearly indicates two different
realms of "behavior" here, the one involving the interpretation of the
film as a symbolic act, the other wholly in the realm of nonsymbolic
motion (the human bodies being "composite" entities that "behave" in
both ways, whereas the film sheerly as visible shapes and sounds and the
air conditioning system with its mechanical "sensors" behave in but one).
The audience possesses such duality by meeting these two con-
ditions: first, its members are biological organisms; second, they are
endowed with the ability (and corresponding need, by our tests) to learn
an arbitrary conventional symbol system, such as a tribal language, which
also has the ability to discuss itself.
There is an admirable article much to our purposes, though we may
apply it somewhat differently than the author intended: "Explanation,
Teleology, and Operant Behaviorism," by Jon D. Ringen (Philosophy of
Science 43 [1976]). I would like to mention it in connection with the
paragraph by I. A. Richards that I previously quoted on the subject of
"attitudes." When Richards was reading of a man being bitten by a
centipede, a leaf fell against his face, causing him "to leap right out of his
chair." Richards cites the incident as an indication that "Every percep-

tion probably includes a response in the form of incipient action. We
constantly overlook the extent to which all the while we are making
preliminary adjustments, getting ready to act in one way or another."
Recall that in connection with Ringen's discussion of the difference be-
tween "respondent" behavior and Skinner's ingenious experiments with
"operant" behavior. In a typical experiment of Pavlov's, the experi-
mental animal responds by salivating when you give it a sniff of meat. Its
response is checked quantitatively by a device that can measure the flow
of saliva. Then begin ringing a bell at the same time as you give the sniff
of meat. And after having by repetition established the association be-
tween the sniff of meat and the ringing of a bell, ring the bell without the
sniff of meat, and check on the amount of salivation as a response thus
conditioned.
Skinner's "operant" conditioning proceeds quite differently. He
gives his animal a goal by setting up some condition whereby, if it pecks
at a certain form (or color) or presses a lever, it operates a mechanism
that releases a bit of food. Having been systematically starved to about
four-fifths of its normal weight, it does whatever it can in its need for
food. The laboratory conditions are so set up that there are few things it
can do. As the result of its random motions, it learns to repeat the
pressing or pecking operation that is both congruent with its "natural
endowment" and releases the food. By gradually complicating the con-
ditions, Skinner can get his pigeon to making a much more agile series of
discriminations than he could perform, without benefit of training inside
his Skinner box. The animal is thus induced not merely to "respond" to a
stimulus but to learn a set of operations that have a "purpose," as per the
term "teleology" in Ringen's title.
But note that Richards' anecdote is more in line with the earlier
Behaviorism that stressed "response." And as I interpret it, his refere
to "a response in the form of incipient action" concerns a bodily state
is collateral with what I would call the "symbolic action" of his readin
The situation is made still clearer by Ringen's reference to a distin
tion between "molar" behavior and "molecular" behavior. Skinner's ex-
perimental animals would be studied for their "molar" behavior (as, f
instance, when they learn the order of key-pecks or lever-presses need
to procure them their food). I would say that Pavlov's measuring
salivation was rather on the side of the animal's "molecular" behavior,
was Richards' behavior when the leaf startled him. Obviously, in t
sense, laughter, tears, or prurient responses would be on the slope of t
"molecular," along with the suggestion, as Richards' anecdote indicates
that there are many subtler such responses in the body of the reader w
is "symbolically reenacting" a text.
Such is my reply to Behavioristic monism. No arguments abou
"mentalism" need figure. The test is the purely empirical distinction

between behavior via symbol systems and the behavior of animals not
characterized by human ways with "symbolicity."
That's it, but let me end with a section which sums it up and adds a bit.
5. After Reading the Essay by Jon D. Ringen
The great improvement that Skinner's concern with "operant" be-

havior has over the earlier dispensation's study of "respondent" behavior
deflects attention from the sheer physiology of an individual organism's
response to a stimulus. My earlier reference to Richards indicates
at a glance the different kind of observation that gets lost when the
emphasis is upon "operant" conditioning. The pigeons' conduct is de-
scribed in sociological terms, not in terms of sheer motion. My Dramatis-
tic position rebukes Operant Behaviorism for not being behavioristic
enough. Through confusing action and motion, it deflects attention
from the study of the physiological motions involved in the behavior of a
conditioned subject. It's too "molar," thereby neglecting the "molecular"
aspects of a physiological organism's behavior. Ironically, the "molar" as
so conceived in effect makes Operant Behaviorism far too "spiritual."
Pavlov's study of salivation reduced behavior to quantifiable physical de-
scription (the realm of physiological motion). Skinner in effect is a puritan
who gives his pigeons a job. Richards' anecdote gives glimpses into the
ways whereby even so symbolically active a performance as reading a book is
somehow undergoing collateral operations in the realm of sheer physiolog-
ical motion. And the instance he gives suggests pretty clearly why there
would be physiological correlatives of what, "mentalistically," is called an
"attitude."
Before reading Ringen's excellent essay, I had approached the mat-
ter from a different angle; namely: my conviction that "symbolic acts"
can be performed differently in the realm of motion. Some people's
"symbolicity" makes their bodies feel good; others will turn up with
peptic ulcers, high blood pressure, secretions of adrenalin, and so forth.
(Along those lines, I incline to assume that Marx's writing of Das Kapital
helped give him liver trouble.) If "psychogenic illness" isn't a "molecu-
lar" aspect of some people's "verbal behavior," then what is it? True, one
can experimentally drive animals crazy. But not with "ideas!" I must
work on the assumption that there is a fundamental difference between
a device that removes food from a hungry animal each time (in keeping
with its "genetic endowment") it reaches for the food and the plight of a
symbol-using animal who, if he gets drunk, always says exactly what he
knows he shouldn't say. Also, the symbol-using animal has many "grada-
tions" of response. For instance, if he is a writer and is so inclined, he
might write a book in which he "idealizes" his own waywardness, and

turns out a best-seller.
By "gradations" the sort of thing I have in mind is dealt with in the
middle paragraph, page 187, of my article, "Towards Looking Back"
(Journal of General Education [Fall 1976]). I refer to the fact that, given
the resources of "symbolicity," our kind of animal can make a living by
other ways than by solving the problem. He can play variations on the
theme of trying to solve the problem. In brief, by dancing various attitudes. If
such were not the case, where would pedagogy be? And art? (Tragedy
can entertain us by transforming the theme of suffering into a market-
able source of pleasure.) The behaviorist's animal either solves the prob-
lem or doesn't. But the realm of purely symbolic action allows for a
graded series of attitudes such that we can communicate with one another
by a deflective variety of ways in which we touch upon the need for a
solution. Then, conversely, often our ways of talking about it can involve
correlative modes of physiological ("molecular") motion that culminate
in trick ailments.
Skinner's simple psychology of operant conditioning deflects atten-
tion from the possible distinctions between bodily motion and symbolic
action. His concerns are with "molar" (public?) behavior. It's a quite
legitimate field of inquiry, and he has done well by it. But it accidentally
obscures the true import of the distinction between "verbal behavior"
("symbolic action") and bodily behavior (physiological motion).
If a physicist sets up an experiment by noting how rays behave when
refracted through a prism, there is a qualitative difference between the
behavior of those rays and the behavior of the physicist who planned, set
up, and interprets the experiment. The physicist would persuade his
colleagues. If he tried to argue with his rays, you'd know he's crazy.
Thus my Dramatistic question is: Is Operational Behaviorism physio-
logical enough? Has it not confined itself to observations that are but
analogues of sociology?
But if one treats the physiological organism as the principle of in-
dividuation, then one has the conditions for a distinction between mo-
tion and some such term as "personality" or Self in its role as a social
product, developed via the human experience with the resources of
symbol systems, along with the corresponding vast, complicated struc-
ture of identifications which constitute "reality" (including the lore of the
sciences, history, mathematics, human relations, even "gossip," a motiva-
tional realm that must be different not just in degree but in kind from
that of nonhuman animals).
As I would read and apply the Ringen essay, it confirms and
sharpens my position. The distinctions between "operant" and "re-
spondent," coupled with the distinctions between "molar" and "molecu-
lar," help greatly to clarify my claim that there is a basic distinction
between verbal behavior (which I call "symbolic action") and nonverbal

processes (which I call "nonsymbolic motion"). The terms are not impor-
tant, but the distinction is, whatever be the terms one chooses. The
bodily behavior correlative to the "speech act" is quite different from the
way "words behave," with a corresponding need that one accentuate the
difference rather than obliterate it, as is in effect the case when experi-
ments in the operant conditioning of "dumb" animals are interpreted as
adequately representative of matters to do with inducement in the
specific realm of human relations. The ironically paradoxical fact is:
Skinner is able to set up so essentially "rational" a problem ("push that
lever, peck that key, or starve") that his animals can in effect behave
much more "rationally" than is the case in most human situations having
to do with welfare, complicated as they are by a vast tangle of symboli-
cally, culturally engendered "reality" above or beyond our experiences
as hungry animals confronting a device for getting food. The very di-
rectness of the issue as so set up is in itself enough to make it un-
representative of the indirectness that is typical of human dis-
criminations.

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(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action

Author(s): Kenneth Burke

Thus we can begin by logologically secularizing the theological

But the use of such resources as a tribal language would be in the

Thus this present use of language is an example of symbolic action,

Since the overall topic of the conference at which the substance of

So far as is known at present, the only typically symbol-using animal

Kenneth Burke is now developing the implications of the position

If all typically symbol-using animals (that is, humans) were suddenly

With regard to the theory of evolution, obviously critical conditions

Descartes, in his speculations on a possible bridge between his polar

In his early essay on "Nature," Emerson described the process tran-

Words are signs of natural facts. The use of natural history is

Jeremy Bentham would deal with considerations of this sort, perhaps

All our psychological ideas are derived from physical ones-all

Thus, if we say that a given object leans at an inclination of thirty

Bentham's position was quite in line with the scholastic formula,

Though the mutation that makes speech possible is itself inherited

of a nomenclature referring to sensory experiences is on the side of

The nature of language is such that it could not possibly be confined

In his book entitled Poetic Diction: A Study in Meanings (London,

The purely physiological aspect of the Self (its grounding in the

The Self as a "person," member of a community (Culture) charac-

Here figure the individual's relations to family, to groups, to ever-

In sum, when to the principle of individuation (involving the under-

In terms of symbolic action, it becomes a "person" by learning the

Yet this difference in kind amounts to a primary DUPLICATION.

A Culture's symbolically conceived "world," or "universe of dis-

Symbolicity itself being of a nature that can rise to higher levels of

That might seem quite obvious, as regards the kind of "polarity"

An unchartable complexity of behavings among the cells of the body

In his chapter on "Attitudes" (The Principles of Literary Criticism

Every perception probably includes a response in the form of

Whatever the implications of an ATTITUDE, as a kind of incipient or

But whatever the correspondence between purely symbolic at-

All told, in our Selves sheerly as physiological organisms, our world

In Santayana's Realms of Being, his Realm ofMatter would correspond

The Self as a "person," beyond the individual's identity as a strictly

Necessarily, any individual's formal or informal version of such lore

When such an aggregate is felt to fall together "holistically," the

gratification of such a purely symbolic symmetry can rise to an ecstacy of

In the state of contemporary Culture, I take it, the corresponding

Hart Crane is a notably pathetic example of a poet whose mode of

There may be drought, not as a comedown from the mystic exalta-

But surely, above all, in confronting the tangle of "global" problems

The reference to physiology enters here in connection with the

Our attitudes toward past or future (remembrances or expectations)

In the realm of symbolicity, there are two totally different notions of

logically (nontemporally) prior (as with the syllogism, first premise/sec-

The strategic intermediate term here is IMPLICATIONS.

But narrative (myth) can set up a temporal seque

Insofar as IMPLICATIONS all fall harmoniously int

Gershom Scholem's engrossing studies of the Kab

0. T. letter of the Law intact, he but introduced N. T. interpretations (as

Much of our engrossment with all such interpretations and re-

Since the principle of DUPLICATION begins in the polarity of our dual

Thus ultimately, when properly discounted along "logological" lines

Possibly the motion-action distinction, as conceptualized in this