Journal of Analytical Psychology 1982, 27, 149-161

JUNG AND FREUD

COMPARED ON TWO
TYPES OF REDUCTIONISM
NEIL WOLLMAN, North Manchester, Indiana

VARIOUS comparisons have been drawn between Jung and Freud on specific
topics, e.g., dream dynamics, personality typologies and motivational
constructs. The focus here is on their fundamentally different assumptions
regarding two important aspects of human nature. One deals with the
relationship between mind and body. The other concerns the nature of the
subjecdvity of human consciousness. The differing assumptions of the two
men emerge after comparing them on two types of reducdonism.

LOCKEAN REDUCTIONISM

Joseph Rychlak (31) has devised a useful way of categorising personality

theorists according to the philosophical viewpoints and assumptions they
hold. It entails classifying theorists as Lockean, Kandan, or mixed as regards
their views on mind and behaviour. One important difference between
these frameworks concerns views on reducdonism. John Locke (1632-1704)
espoused a reducdonistic model (LOCKE 26). Complex levels of conscious-
ness, according to him, are composed of and can be reduced to more basic,
less abstract units. Thus, for example, complex concepts (such as 'radio')
which may form in consciousness can be reduced to less abstract thoughts
(such as 'transistors', 'wires' and 'dials'). Locke's perspective may be applied
to behavioural units as well, but the concentration here will be on the
mind.
Opposed to this outlook is the stance taken by Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804). For Kant, complex aspects of consciousness cannot be reduced to
simpler imits. In conjunction with this is the idea that meaning emanates
from above, i.e., the knowledge we have about ourselves and the world
is affected by the subjecdve meaning we place on objective reality. Using
an analogy from information processing theory, this might be called a
'top-down' model (NORMAN, RUMELHART 28). We understand the various
parts of anything in reladon to how we view the whole. Widiin this con-
text, Kant spoke of specific psychological structures which shape the whole
by imposing the subjecdve frameworks of time and space upon the sensory
inputs from the objecdve world. He also spoke of 'categories of under-
0921-8774/82/020149+13 $03.00/0 149 1982 The Society of Analytical Psychology
150 N. Wollman
sunding', such as causality, which work at a higher conceptual level in
shaping our thinking.
In contrast, Locke holds that we gain our objective view of the whole
after putdng together the smaller sensory inputs relating to extension,
solidarity, and other primary qualities of objects. He does, thoi^h, speak
of secondary qualities of objects, such as colours and sounds, upon which
certain human subjective qualities enter. But he does not speak of structures
which shape our thinking or structures which shape our sensory experience
in a holisdc top-down way (ACKERMANN I , LOCKE 26, DUHANT 2). The
starting points for Locke are the building block sensory inputs. These
eventually lead to simple and then complex ideas. For Kant, the starting
point is the subjecdve structure through which sensation and conceptual-
isation are shaped. Thus the two philosophers held opposing views on the
nature of human consciousness and subjecdve reality. It is on the Kant/
Locke disdncdon on reductionism that one comparison between Jung and
Freud will be drawn.

SUBSTRATE REDUCTIONISM

There are at least two types of reducdonism which may be espoused. One
is the Lockean type discussed above. In a sense, it involves reducing com-
plex wholes to more basic units of the same fundamental nature. A second
type of reducdonism involves reducing a phenomenon to something of a
totally different nature, say, reducing energy to matter, if the latter may
be considered more underlying. A more relevant example to the present
paper would involve reducing the mind to biological processes. Such an
explanadon will be termed substrate reducdonism. Both Lockean and
substrate reducdonism involve reducdon to a more underlying structure,
but only the latter posits explanation in terms of a qualitatively different
structure.
The Lockean/Kantian distinction regarding reductionism is a good one
for classifying theories pertinent to the mind. Theorists may expound that
complex mental phenomena cannot be reduced to more basic mental units
and that the reducdon does not occur because of the 'top-down' way in
which we conceive. This issue will separate Freud and Jung on the nature
and importance of subjecdve reality.
Another good way is to classify theories in terms of substrate reduc-
tionism. Theorists may wish to reduce consciousness to biology, an issue
obviously relevant to the mind/body problem. And again, this is another
important topic on which the two men disagree. It is necessary, though,
to analyse these two dimensions separately (something Rychlak did not
do), because one type of reducdonism need not follow from the other. A
theory may be reductionistic on one dimension, but not on the other. For
instance, on a sensory level, Gestaldsts assert that there is an underlying
Two types of reductionism

(isomorphic) physiological substrate for perception; yet they do not hold

that percepdon can be broken into more basic sensory building blocks
(NEEL 27).
Through personal communication the author has learned that Rychlak
believes bodi types of reducdonism are of the same building block nature
and should both be under the same classificationthe Lockean ('consdtu-
dve') model. He further believes that, within that model, the two types
can be differendated by taking into account the concept of 'material
causadon', which he presents in his book. The reader is referred to Rych-
lak's text (31), or his newer edidon, for a fiJl presentadon of his theory.
The present author feels that substrate and the other type of reductionism
discussed are of a fundamentally different nature, and diat only the latter
should be termed Lockean, to differentiate the two types. There are also
other terms pertinent to Rychlak's framework which perhaps have been
interpreted and employed here in ways he would not. For my purposes,
the dual reducdonisdc framework is sufficient.

It is Freud's emphasis on biology that places him in the substrate reduc-

tionistic mould. Freud's biological roots evolved early in his career from
his medical-biological interests and close associations with the physiologist
Ernst Briicke and the physician Wilhelm Fliess. Freud did his pre-medical
studies under his mentor Briicke. Briicke, along with his friends Emil du
Bois Raymond, Carl Ludwig and Herman von Helmholtz, held that 'no
other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within
the organism' (JONES 13, p. 40).
An early work by Freud in 1895 made a very detailed attempt to link
psychical processes to underlying physiological ones (FREUD IO). It was
originally set out in his correspondence with Fliess and was not published
imdl Freud's death a half century later. Inidally termed 'Psychology for
neurologists', it was redtled, when published. Profect for a Scientific Psy-
chology. In it, Freud wrote: 'The intention is to furnish a psychology that
shall be a natural science that is to represent psychical processes as quanti-
tadvely determinate states of specifiable material pardcles' (FREUD IO,
p. 295). The Profect, as the work is often called, oudined a neurological
model of the mind. It (a) described three systems of brain neurones which
underlay different psychological processes; (b) set forth two physiological
laws of attention and defence; (c) interpreted consciousness as a funcdon
of perception, and (d) concluded that psychic energy was based on neural
system cUscharge.
It is generally acknowledged that one of the reasons for the late (1950)
publication of the paper is that Freud did not want it published. At one
point, he apparently destroyed his copy of it (SOLOMAN 32), and 'later in
152 N. Wollman
his life he seems to have forgotten it or at least never to have referred to
it. And when, in his old age, he was presented with it a&esh, he did his
best to destroy it' (STRACHEY 35, p. 290).
This gives evidence for the tradidonal view that Freud later came to
believe that physical processes were far from explaining all psychical ones
QoNBS 13). There is, perhaps, additional evidence that Freud's basic
neurologising was isolated to the brief period in which he wrote The
Profect. He makes little reference to biology in his work prior to The
Profect; and this is unexpected if Freud maintained the reducdonism he
leamed from Briicke. It must be stated, though, that most of this early
work involved reviews of, or prefaces to, other people's work (e.g., that
of Charcot and Bernheim). Thus there was litde chance to develop his
own perspecdves. Addidonally, commenting on the only major theme
of his early work (hypnosis), Freud stated:
It would be just as one-sided to consider only the psychological side o f the process as to
attribute the whole responsibility for the phoiomena o f hypnosis to vascular innervation
. . . w e possess no criterion which enables us to dist
process and a physiological one . . . (FBEUD 3, p. 84).

This is a fairly strong biological statement considering he wrote it in a

preface to a translation of Bemheim's book {Suggestion). Bemheim, far
more famous than Freud at the time, attributed 'all phenomena of hypnosis
[to] psychical effects' (FREUD 4, p. 97). A statement by Freud of strong
biological reducdonism would have been inappropriate for the preface
regardless of his own beliefi.
All cridcs agree that he held the biological drives (sex and aggression)
to be the principal shapers of personality, but most would not contend he
held all psychological processes accountable to physiology. Recent analyses,
though, argue that Freud kept his biological reducdonism throughout his
career (HOLT I I , WOLLHEIM 37, SOLOMAN 32, PRIBRAM, GILL 29, SULLOWAY
36). These analyses differ somewhat in the degree of reductionism they
believe Freud espoused. Reladng specifically to The Profect, correspondence
by Freud reveals that though he devalued the paper in one letter to Fliess,
'I cannot make out how I came to inflict it on you' (STRACHEY 35, p. 285),
he said soon after in another letter, that he thought even more highly of the
chemical-neurone theory. He even reworked the paper several dmes
QoNES 13). But what of Freud's attempt late in life to destroy the paper?
An attempt to destroy a very speculative, hastily written (STRACHEY 35)
early work does not necessarily consdtute an abandonment of the basic
assumpdon of biological reducdonism.
Additionally, we do see the influence of the paper on his later work.
The Editor of the Standard Edition, fzmes Strachey, notes that 'The Profect,
or rather its invisible ghost, haunts the whole series of Freud's theoretical
wridngs to the very end' (STRACHEY 35, p. 290).
Two types of reductionism

Soloman stated that 'Freud's speculative neurological theory is central

to his workfi:omthe veryfirststudies to the last summary, his endre theory
[is] dependent . . . on neurological observadons' (SOLOMAN 32, p. 25). He
notes that Freud used similar ideas and terminology in his later work to
those he used in The Profect. He also states that Freud kept his tendency to
talk of the psyche in spadal terms. Soloman concludes that rather dian
abandoning the neurological model, Freud merely felt that at the dme
there was not sufficient neuro-anatomical support to pursue the idea. He
quotes Freud in stadng that 'for the present' no reference need be made to
anatomy. In a similar vein, Freud asserts that 'In view of the indmate con-
necdon between the things that we disdnguish as physical and mental,
we may look forward to the day when paths of knowledge and, let us hope,
of influence be opened up leading from organic biology and chemistry to
the field of neurodc phenomena' (FREUD 8, p. 231).
Strachey (34) also notes the curious lack of explanation of key terms in
Freud's The Interpretation ofDreams (FREUD 5). He feels this occurred because
Freud felt he had previously defined them a few years earlier in The
Profect. Certain aspects of The Interpretation of Dreams cannot even be
interpreted without reference to the earlier work (STRACHEY 34). This is
further evidence that rather than abandoning The Profect, Freud assumed
that his master (psychological) work on dreams would be read in the con-
text of his previous work.
In Freud's Profect Re-assessed, Karl Pribram and Merton Gill quote tw
separate sets of statements made by Freud during his career (PRIBRAM,
GaL 29). In one set he is favourable to biology and in the other he is not.
After analysing his later work in relation to The Profect, Pribram and Gill
came to three conclusions: (a) Freud believed that pychoanalysis had to
be purely psychological, using behavioural observadons and verbal re-
ports; (b) Freud sometimes did not recognise the biological assumpdons
he implicidy used and, thus, at times, would deny them; (c) he felt that
ultimately a physical-biological substrate would be found, though it would
not be a simplistic reducdonism. They contend that, because The Profect
remained in reladve obscurity, cridcs have misrepresented many of Freud's
basic terms. For instance, they state that the term cathexis relates to a
'quantity held in the neurone' (PRIBRAM, GILL 29, p. 63) and that 'current'
should be defined as 'nerve impulses'.
Thus, at dmes, even when it appears that Freud is talking in strictly
psychological terms, there are biological implicadons to his statements.
But what is even more important, Freud believed that at some point in
dme a biological basis would be foimd for his theory. It is on this basis, as
well, that Freud must be considered a fairly strict biological reducdonist.
This is the case even though at times he had to speak in totally psychological
terms because neurological experimentodon lagged behind his biological
assumptions.
154 N- Wollman
This becomes quite evident in his statements that:
W e must recollect that all our provisional ideas in psychology Tvill presumably some day
be based on organic substructure. This makes it probable tlut there are special substances
and chemical processes which perform the operations of sexuality and provide for the
extension of individual life into that of the species. W e are taking this probability into
account in replacing the special chemical substances by special psychical forces (FHEUD
6. p. 78).
He does admit later in his statement (p. 79) that it is possible that future
psychoanalytic work may show that mental aspects are much more im-
portant than (but do not exclude) biological aspects of several instincts.
But more importantly he points out that:
All these speculations take us nowhere. Since we cannot wait for another science to present
us with the final conclusion on the theory of die instincts, it is far more to the purpose that
we should try to see what light may be throvm upon the basic problem of biology by a
synthesis of the psychological phenomena (FHEUD 6, p. 79).
Thus, Freud asserts a basic principle that it is necessary to talk ofa biological
problem in totally psychological terms because there is not yet enough
experimental evidence to prove the biological basis. Freud's biographer,
Ernest Jones, concurs with such an assertion, but does not feel that Freud
was a biological reductionist (JONES 13).
A controversial new volume extends the biological emphasis into a new
area (SUILOWAY 36). According to Frank Sulloway, Freud can best be
viewed as a socio-biologist. Probably the key idea in Sulloway's book is
that Freud felt that the history of the human species is repeated genetically
in the history of the individual. For example, repression is related to the
acquisition of the upright posture (Ibid., pp. 199-202), while superego
development is related in part to the killing and eating of the primal,
castrating father {Ibid., p. 372).
Critics acknowledge Freud's references to inheritance from the distant
past (REIFF 30), but Sulloway holds it is the major underpinning of his
theory. He cites as evidence diat Freud employed evolutionary biology to
explain the three principal interests of his career: repression, choice of
neurosis, and the importance of sexuality. Sulloway asserts that although
Freud never abandoned hope for an eventual neurological reduction, he
actually espoused an evolutionary and biological reductionism after his
work on The Profect. In either case, Freud is oriented to a biological sub-
strate reductionism, be it to the general neurological system or specifically
to the genes. Perhaps it was in the genetic area uiat Freud expected future
biological bases to be found. Of course, it is also possible to posit a genetic
base which translates into a particular neurological system, i.e., the two
types of biological reductionism can operate complementarily. Though
it would be improper to deduce that at all times Freud held to strict bio-
logical reductionism, it is possible to maintain that Freud had a very strong
biological emphasis that was much greater than the traditional view has
assumed.
Two types of reductionism

While Freud generally advocated substrate reductionism, his theory

cannot be categorised as fitting within either a Kantian or Lockean model.
Of the fifteen references to Kant in the Standard Edition, only two pertain
to the Kantian idea that consciousness is shaped by a priori structures (e.g.,
FREUD 9). On both these occasions he specifically denied that such structures
exist. He had only one other relevant statement concerning Kant. Freud
states that just as Kant believed that our perceptions [of the external world]
are not identical with what is perceived (FUETJD 7, p. 171), our conscious
perceptions are not identical 'with the unconscious mental processes which
are their object' (FHEUD 7, p. 171).
Therefore, Freud does give some credence to the Kantian notion of sub-
jectivity. But Freud follows this statement with the assertion that 'the
correction of internal perception will tum out not to offer such great
difficulties as the correction of external perceptionthat internal objects
are less unknowable than the external world' (FREUD 7, p. 171). In other
words, Freud believes we can and should go beyond whatever subjectivity
there is. At the end of his statement, he qualifies his assertion that our con-
scious perceptions are necessarily different from unconscious mental pro-
cesses. He sutes that 'the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it
appears to us to be' (FREUD 7, p. 171). Thus subjectivity is not an absolute.
These views will later be contrasted with those of Jung's, for whom all
experience has a priori structure and for whom the subjective experience is
what is important, real, and should be studied. Whatever subjectivity
Freud did admit to, he had great disdain for. This is true to an extent that
many existentialists have rejected Freudian-type interpretations of dreams,
phobias and other phenomena because the patients' subjective meanings
and perceptions of^ these phenomena are not considered (IZENBERG 12,
pp. 124-9). Freud believes, though, that through a rational/empirical
methodology, he (and other analysts and individuals) could reach the
objective truth.
Freud stressed the Lockean notion of association of ideas. He felt there
were 'innumerable links between one idea and another', and that emotion
could help 'in determining whether or not a chain of associations . . . could
lead automatically to a particular idea or constellation of ideas appearing
in consciousness' (STAFFORD-CLAHK 33, p. 139). But even though he stressed
that certain ideas would lead automatically to other ideas, Freud did not
accede to the Lockean notion that consciousness or individual ideas could
be reduced to simpler building blocks. Rather than analyse the make-up
of individual ideas, he was more concerned with the flow and conflict of
ideas between the conscious and unconscious structures of the id, ego and
superego. While Freud's theory essentially rejected a Kantian top-down
model, it does not fit within the Lockean reductionistic model either.
156

JUNG

In contrast to Freud's endorsement of substrate reductionism, Jung rarely

attempted to reduce psychological processes to biological ones. He states
that:
Despite the mateiialistic tendenqr to understand the psyche as a mere reflection or imprint
of physical and chemical processes there is not a single proof of this hypothesis.... There
is no ground at all for regarding the psyche as something secondary or as an epipheno-
m e n o n . . . . (JUNG 17. para. 117).
This belief extended to an even more general concem that the Western
World placed too much emphasis on materialism.
But just as an absolute statement cannot be made about Freud and
biological reductionism, the same must be said about Jung. For isolated
psychological phenomena he did employ basically biological explanations,
such as for the origin of (a) the psychological attitudes (extraversion/
introversion) (JUNG 15, para. 571) and (b) schizophrenia (JUNG 23, para.
547). Yet even in those cases he would often temper his statements else-
where in his writings: 'It is will-nigh impossible to prove even approxi-
mately that schizophrenia is an organic disease to begin with. It is equally
impossible to make its exclusively psychological origin evident' (JUNG 19,
para. 533). And in his chronologically latest statement on the matter he
seems to make psychological aspects more basic: 'To make myself clear,
I consider the aetiology of schizophrenia to be a dual one: namely, up to a
certain point psychology is indispensable in explaining the nature and
causes of the initial emotions which give rise to metabolic alterations.
These emotions seem to be accompanied by chemical processes that cause
specific temporary or chronic disturbances or lesions' (JUNG 24, Appendix,
p. 272).
The closest Jung came to a reductionistic theme was when he employed
the concept of psychic energy. The idea was elaborated by Freud and was
conceived of as biologically based. For Jung, the term is used more analogi-
cally than biologically in order to explain the mechanism of psychodynamic
forces. Jung discussed the physical energy underlying actual behaviour,
but when he talked of psychic energy, he used it more as a heuristic
(describing psychological forces, tensions and desires) than as a spatial
entity. As Rychlak states; 'If we value something highly, it has a high
concentration of libido atuched to it; this is not to say that libido really
exists as an energy, but it may be called an energy as a heuristic aid'
(RYCHLAK 32, p. 143). The psyche as an entity cannot be reduced. Jung so
held this belief that he gave credence to the possibility that under special
situations psychic processes could operate with no connection to a biological
process. He conjectures this in a discussion of synchronicity, ESP and so-
called 'out of the body experience'. Jung asserts, 'then we must ask our-
selves . .. whether the psychic processes that go on in us during loss of
Two types of reductionism

consciousness are synchronistic phenomena, i.e., events which have no

causal connection with organic processes' (JUNG 22, para. 995).
While Freud's theory rejected basic Kantian principles, Jung's theory
endorsed them. Jung saw the mind as active and as set to perceive and
comprehend the world in predisposed ways. This is revealed in his state-
ments that 'there can be no empirical knowledge that is not already caught
and limited by the a priori structure of cognition' QUNG 18, para, ijo), dhat
this 'structure is the form into which all experience is poured* (JUNG 18,
para. 187), and that 'this necessarily results in a particular . . . pattern of
apperception' (JUNG 17, para. 136). It is through Jung's concept of the
archetype that we find the best example of his Kantian philosophy, for it
is the archetypes that help shape the structure and substance of conscious-
ness. The archetypes are mechanisms through which consciousness is
shaped, they are not inherited ideas (JUNG 14, para. 154). And it was specifi-
cally in the volume entitled The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious
(JUNG 25) that Jung referred to Kant and made the above statements re-
garding the a priori structure of the mind.
With Freud, Jung contended that constellations of ideas could form in
the mindthus giving some Lockean flavour to his theory. But even in
this case, the constellation of ideas (or complex) is usually centred around,
and shaped subjectively by, archetypes or associated psychic structures.
Even more importantly, Jang difierwl firom Freud in that he valued the
subjecdve meanings which comprise human consciousness. He did not
discount the subjective view of analysands in favour of something xaore
'objective' and real. As Jung asserts: 'What we are pleased to call illusion
may be for the psyche an extremely important Ufc fiictor, . . . for it (the
psyche), everything that works is real QUNG 16, paras. 111-13)- Qung made
that statement while giving a lecture on psjrchotherapy). For Jung, all
contoits of the mind are subjective (by a/(riwV structure) and this subjectivity
is what is 'real' and to be valued in its own right in the tlietapeudc process.
The above statement does not megn tbat Jung did not employ some
dve' knowledge o^ say, archetypes or personality iii general when
g his therapeictic analyses. Jung felt that although there was individual
jtivity it was adll possible to reach some objective, scientific state-
__aits of general validity. He felt such truiis coold be gaiiKid (and used by
the knowledgeable thoapist) because there was a common thread of
uniformity which ran thtoagh hKBTidaals'subfectivity (JUNG 16, para, i,
RYCHLAK 3 I). In a sense there are universal laws of the, psyche and its sub-
jective quaJibes. For eioinlple,. th^e are laws relatjing to the {^ration of the
archetypes. Strch kaowl^ge can be gained by analysing difiereot indi^
vidoals and studying various cultures. In Jung's view, it can then be used to
bring objectivity to the therapeutic process. This, also assusaes that to reach
objectivity, those sdentists/meraplsts examining individuals and cultures
must agree in their (sulgecdve) Interpretations.
158 N. Wollman
The collective inheritance aspect of archetypes seemingly gives them a
biological nature (similar to Freud's sociobiological leanings); and certainly
it is difficult, if not impossible, to posit inheritances without biological
underpinning. Yet even in this case, Jung is imsure about asserting their
biological nature and underlying physical base. As far as their basic nature,
he considers them something apart from both the psychic and the physical,
yet tied into both:
There is probably no alternative n o w but to describe tbeir nature in accordance with their
chiefest effect as 'spirit', . . . If so, the position of the archetype would be located beyond
the psychic sphere, analogous to the position o f physiological insdna, which is immedi-
ately rooted in the stuff of tbe organism . . . In arcbetypal conceptions and instinctual
perceptions, spirit and matter confront one another on the psychic plane . . . [and] both
appear in the psycbic realm as distinctive qualities o f conscious contents' (JUNG 21, para.
420).
Regarding a physiological base, he wavers by asserting:
I bave often been asked wbere tbe arcbetype comes from and whether it is acquired or not.
This question can not be answered directly . . . As a priori conditioning factors tbey
represent a special, psychological instance of tbe biological 'pattern o f behaviour' wbich
gives all living organisms tbeir specific quabties, . . . Empirically considered, bowever,
die arcbetype did not ever come into existence as a pbenomenon of organic life, but entered
into tbe picture witb bfe itself (JUNG 20, footnote p. 149).
Jung sometimes posits that they have an eternal nature that seemingly
could not be confined to a physical base: 'Whether this psychic structure
[the collective unconscious] and its elements, the archetypes, ever "origi-
nated" at all is a metaphysical question and therefore unanswerable'
QUNG 18, para. 187). Thus even in a situation where a physiological base
seems inherently needed (racial inheritances), Jung is far from willing to
assert it positively.
There is onefinalconcept which has not yet been introduced, but which
can vividly show the above-mentioned Freud/Jung differences on both
types of reductionism. This concept, which is often linked with the
Lockean tradition, is termed the tabula rasa. The idea is that the mind is a
blank slate at birth. This position is usually contrasted with the nativistic
idea that there is inbom structure or knowledge. Though both Freud and
Jung must be considered nadvists, a substrate and Lockean reducdonisdc/
non-reducdonisdc disdncdon can sdll be drawn between them. Jung's
nadvism is seen in structures which are analogous to Kant's, which shape
experience and may not be reducible to a biological base. Freud's nadvism
is biological-genedc. While Jung's nadvism filters downwards &om higher
structures, Freud's nadvism moves upwards from the reduced level of the
neuron up to the psyche.
We may conclude by stadng that Freud and Jung differ on several
issues concerning the basic nature of humans. They disagree on the reladon
between mind and body, with only Freud essendally maintaining that
psychological processes can be reduced to biological ones. While Jung
Two types of reductionism

holds that hnrrian consciousness is shaped by certain psychic structures,

Freud does not. Even more importantly, Jung, but not Freud, asserts the
'reality' of subjecdve meanings of consciousness and the value of those
meanings in the therapeudc process. These differences emerged by examin-
ing their assumpdons on two types of reducdonism.

Various philosophical contrasts can be drawn betfveen the theories of

Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. Their theories may be conlpared on two
different types of reducdonism. One type may be termed Kandatn/Lockean
reducdonism. The philosopher John Locke contended that complex levels
of consciousness are composed of less abstract building blocks. Immanuel
Kant did not feel this type of reducdon is possible. He also felt that there
is an innate mental structure which stapes consciousness and percepdon.
A second type of reducdonism may be termed substrate reducdonism. It
involves reducdon of a phenomenon to a more underlying phenomenon
of a different nature; for example, teducbg psychological processes, to
biological ones. Recent analyses reveal that Freud essendally retained his
biological (substrate) reducdonisin throughout his career. Addidonally,
though Freud did not accept Lockean type red-ocdonism, he specifically
rejected Kant's a priori ment^ structure categories. In contrast, j[ung did
not believe psychological processes could be reduced to physiological ones
except in limited instances. AdctittiMiaDy; Jong felt thart important aspects
of human consciousness were sha^d by inBom mental^ strtictures. Finally,
Jung, but not Freud, asserted the reaKty of subjecdve m e a n i i ^ of conscious-
ness and the value of these meanings in the therapeudc process.

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3. FREUD, S. (1888). 'Preface to the transladon of Bemheim's Suggestion',
S-R, I.
4- - 1889). 'Review of August Forel's Hypnotism' S.E., i.
5- - 1900). 'The inteipretidon laf dreams', 5.JB., 4, 5.
6. - 1914). 'On narcissism: an.introducdou', 5., 14.
7- - 1915). 'The unconscious', 5.E., 14.
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I wisb to tbank Tbomas Leabey of Virginia Commonwealtb University, Joseph Rycblak

ofPurdueUniversity.andDonaldColbumofMancbesterCoUegefortbeirbelpfiicomments
on earlier versions of tbis paper.