Or "this line quality is really poor, I'll call you back" if you got a dodgy circuit. Or crossed lines.
Every technology has its issues, we just forget them when we stop using it!
726 publicly visible posts • joined 12 Jun 2013
Potentially a hot take here, but I don't think the cloud has necessarily made things less reliable than they used to be. Online systems frequently had outages before the cloud came along. I think what the cloud has done has increased awareness of it because a significant chunk of businesses have an outage at the same time, rather than it being isolated incidents that, by themselves, weren't particularly news-worthy
Probably because they're a market that is already used to Id cards, having needed them for their day to day work. A significant number of veterans (40% of 2.4 million according to a 2020 report) are under 65, so it's more than reasonable that they're going to be able to use it for work.
> what differentiates them from online only banks.
The online banks still do all of this without needing a branch. Can pay in cash at the post office, can scan or post cheques (not sure how they'd deal with your middle name scenario), and _everything_ else is done online.
You don't end up with what I went through with Lloyd's, where the website says "call us", the person on the phone says "you need to go into a branch" (20 miles away) and the person in the branch says you need to have booked an appointment because the person (one) who deals with that is only in one day a week.
Chances are the code will only be running on the developers computer, _but_ if a developer deploys something and you are a user of aforementioned something then it's possible that it could be set up to harvest your credentials for that site, or anything linked to that site.
In my view they were (nearly) all good after a few service packs. NT4 SP4 rock solid, same for XP SP2, and even Vista SP2!
The continuous upgrade hamster wheel we're currently on doesn't seem to dedicate time to the refinement that service packs used to be (although I suppose that's what LTSC is)
I had the opposite problem at my first job. The domain controllers all ran about 2 minutes slow (they sync'd with each other rather than anything external). My smartphone (Windows CE!) talked to Exchange which meant it got the time from there rather than the network, and I kept missing my trains!
A quick trip to the sysadmin and setting up an upstream NTP server was all it took!
What do you mean by "in practice it doesn't"?
Any device here (with the WiFi password or an Ethernet cable) can join the network and be given connectivity to the wider world through IPv6. If it's a Windows device it will create itself a permanent address (so that, if you know it, you can use it to connect from the outside world) and it will create itself a temporary address that it uses for making outbound connections. Both are firewalled by default at the device level (and in most home user's case, also the router level). I can use those addresses on the same network (so if I've got a DNS record set up for the permanent address that will work from any v6 network).
The link local device can probably be ignored if you have a public address. It has the same firewall that the external address has on it so I don't understand how it's an additional vulnerability. Whether your device has 1 address or 100 addresses doesn't affect how vulnerable it is. What the link local addresses allow is for most of your network to carry on working (eg file shares on a home network) if your router is offline (which would have traditionally been your DHCP) because the devices self-organise.
If you're managing a corporate network then you can treat it the same as v4 (using DHCP, static allocations etc). If you're relying on IP addresses to keep networks separate rather than VLANs then you already have a vulnerability that you don't know about.
> If it's sufficiently better than what we have already it will be adopted
I think history has demonstrated many times that that isn't the case
IPv6 makes it easy: Routers always respond to ff02::2 with their actual IP address
ping ff02::2
PING ff02::2 (ff02::2) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from fe80::3e7c:3fff:fe6b:7ce8%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.07 ms
You can also ping ff02::1 to see what else is on your network
ping ff02::1
PING ff02::1 (ff02::1) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from fe80::468a:5bff:fe6f:c73e%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.036 ms
64 bytes from fe80::3e7c:3fff:fe6b:7ce8%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.06 ms
64 bytes from fe80::5635:42c1:2926:f0c6%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=2.65 ms
64 bytes from fe80::9fbc:ccff:9301:dbf%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=2.65 ms
64 bytes from fe80::617:b6ff:fefa:5420%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=93.0 ms
64 bytes from fe80::b424:1620:8ce3:dfe8%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=94.3 ms
64 bytes from fe80::9eee:e8cc:6ad:3c9%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=95.2 ms
64 bytes from fe80::ca4c:4072:1a35:2871%enp4s0: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=136 ms
Granted it's a lot harder to grade the naughties now you need to provide identification. On the one hand, the reduction in streaming may benefit the environment, or on the other hand the potential use of a VPN causing more international traffic and undoing the works that CDNs have been doing may make it worse...
Aside from the token use, everything else you've described can and does already happen. Having a token doesn't change any of that. Sites could already require logins, fingerprint devices, etc. Nothing to stop someone using a different token per site. Tracking issuers would be unlikely to be helpful due to the limited number of them, but even that could be worked around.
Your 12 year old example sounds pretty straightforward. Aside from the fact that it's out of scope of this law, it would be a criminal investigation. The details of the token would be acquired from the website that accepted it (which wouldn't be at fault if the token was valid) and the issuer would be quizzed on who they issued it to. Quite who would be raising this I don't know though. The 12 year old isn't going to accidentally obtain a token so either they bypassed the system or someone provided them with one. The former is a parenting issue (or possibly the issuer if they're being negligent), the latter is potentially a safeguarding issue. None of that changes that the receiving website doesn't know the identity of the bearer, and the issuing website doesn't know where it was used.
By all means repeal the law, I don't have a problem with that because I believe the responsibility lies with parents to educate and inform. I remember when the method of age verification in games was asking you a bunch of questions about things that happened 20 years prior!
What I was trying to explain was that a system _can_ be built that satisfies all the (non-stalker) requirements. If we're going to not try because someone might, at a later date, change the requirements and abuse the system then we may as well give up now. Let's not ask for proof of age when buying alcohol in the shop because someone may have fake id, or someone may remember your name / where you live.