X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Instant Messaging URIs
draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-03
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (lamps WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Rohan Mahy | ||
| Last updated | 2024-11-13 (Latest revision 2024-11-04) | ||
| Replaces | draft-mahy-lamps-im-keyusage | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Russ Housley | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2024-10-15 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation | |
| Action Holder | |||
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
On agenda of 2024-12-05 IESG telechat
Needs 7 more YES or NO OBJECTION positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Deb Cooley | ||
| Send notices to | [email protected] | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - Actions Needed | |
| IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK | ||
| IANA expert review comments | The SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose and SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier registrations have been approved. |
draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-03
LAMPS WG R. Mahy
Internet-Draft Rohan Mahy Consulting Services
Intended status: Standards Track 4 November 2024
Expires: 8 May 2025
X.509 Certificate Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Instant Messaging URIs
draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage-03
Abstract
RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers
(KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines
Instant Messaging (IM) identity KeyPurposeId for inclusion in the
Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 v3 public key
certificates
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://rohanmahy.github.io/mahy-lamps-im-keyusage/draft-ietf-lamps-
im-keyusage.html. Status information for this document may be found
at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-im-keyusage/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the LAMPS WG Working Group
mailing list (mailto:[email protected]), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/lamps/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lamps/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/rohanmahy/mahy-lamps-im-keyusage.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The IM URI Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix B. Change log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
Instant Messaging (IM) systems using the Messaging Layer Security
(MLS) [RFC9420] protocol can incorporate per-client identity
certificate credentials. The subjectAltName of these certificates
can be an IM URI or XMPP URI, for example.
Organizations may be unwilling to issue certificates for Instant
Message client using a general KeyPurposeId such as id-kp-serverAuth
or id-kp-clientAuth, because of the risk that such certificates could
be abused in a cross-protocol attack.
An explanation of MLS credentials as they apply to Instant Messaging
is described in [I-D.barnes-mimi-identity-arch]. These credentials
are expected to be heavily used in the More Instant Messaging
Interoperability (MIMI) Working Group.
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2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. The IM URI Extended Key Usage
This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-imUri, which MAY be
included in certificates used to prove the identity of an Instant
Messaging client. This Extended Key Usage is optionally critical.
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 }
4. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this
document. This extended key purpose does not introduce new security
risks but instead reduces existing security risks by providing means
to identify if the certificate is generated to sign IM identity
credentials.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to register the following OIDs in the "SMI Security
for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). These
OIDs are defined in Section 4.
+=========+=============+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=============+============+
| TBD1 | id-kp-imUri | This-RFC |
+---------+-------------+------------+
Table 1
IANA is also requested to register the following ASN.1
[ITU.X690.2021] module OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module
Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in
Appendix A.
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+=========+===============+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+===============+============+
| TBD2 | id-mod-im-eku | This-RFC |
+---------+---------------+------------+
Table 2
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[ITU.X680.2021]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information
Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation
X.680, 2021.
[ITU.X690.2021]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, 2021.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.barnes-mimi-identity-arch]
Barnes, R. and R. Mahy, "Identity for E2E-Secure
Communications", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
barnes-mimi-identity-arch-01, 23 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-barnes-mimi-
identity-arch-01>.
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[RFC9420] Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J.,
Omara, E., and K. Cohn-Gordon, "The Messaging Layer
Security (MLS) Protocol", RFC 9420, DOI 10.17487/RFC9420,
July 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9420>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [ITU.X680.2021]
and [ITU.X690.2021].
<CODE BEGINS>
IM-EKU
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-im-eku (TBD2) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- OID Arc
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
-- Extended Key Usage Values
id-kp-imUri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD1 }
END
<CODE ENDS>
Appendix B. Change log
RFC Editor, please remove this section on publication.
* made Proposed Standard
* added a MAY statement in Section 3
* corrected typo in registration of the ASN.1 module (Thanks Sean!)
* updated author affiliation
* added ASN.1 module
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* specified that eku is optionally critical
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Sean Turner and Russ Housley for reviews, suggestions,
corrections, and encouragement.
Author's Address
Rohan Mahy
Rohan Mahy Consulting Services
Email: [email protected]
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