Marshall v. Barlow's
 | |
| Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. | |
| Reference: 436 US 307 (1978) | |
| Term: 1977 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: Jan 9, 1978 Decided: May 23, 1978 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States District Court for the District of Idaho affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Byron White • Warren Burger • Potter Stewart • Thurgood Marshall • Lewis Powell | |
| Concurring | |
| None | |
| Dissenting | |
| John Paul Stevens • Harry Blackmun • William Rehnquist | |
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. is a case decided on May 23, 1978, by the United States Supreme Court in which the court ruled 5-3 that the Fourth Amendment prohibited inspectors of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) from conducting warrantless searches of business premises. The court affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho and held that Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was unconstitutional.[1]
Why it matters: The United States Supreme Court held that warrantless searches by OSHA were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The decision narrowed the scope of an exception to an existing prohibition against warrantless administrative inspections that had permitted some warrantless licensing and regulatory searches of closely regulated industries.[2]
Background
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An inspector from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) attempted to enter the work area of Barlow's Inc. without a search warrant but was refused entry by Ferrol G. Barlow, the proprietor. The secretary of labor then petitioned the District Court of Idaho to issue an order compelling Barlow to admit the inspector without a warrant, which it granted. Barlow refused to obey the order and sought an injunction against Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which authorized the warrantless searches. The district court ruled in favor of Barlow, saying that a warrantless search would violate his Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure. The secretary of labor then appealed that ruling.
The prior 1967 cases Camara v. Municipal Court and See v. City of Seattle held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements applied to administrative inspections of commercial and noncommercial premises. However, OSHA and other agencies had operated under an exception to the rule drawn from Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States (1970) and United States v. Biswell (1972) that permitted warrantless licensing and regulatory inspections of closely regulated industries.[2]
Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 created the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and set guidelines for its operation. Section 8(a) of the act authorized OSHA inspectors to conduct searches of businesses to check for safety violations. As the court noted in its opinion, no search warrant or other process was expressly required by the act.
| “ | (a) In order to carry out the purposes of this Act, the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized --
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee.[3][4] |
” |
Question presented
The petitioner presented the following question to the court:[1]
Question presented:
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Oral argument
Oral argument was held on Jan 9, 1978. The case was decided on May 23, 1978.[5]
Outcome
The Supreme Court ruled 5–3 that warrantless searches by OSHA inspectors violated the Fourth Amendment, so Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was unconstitutional.
Justice Byron White wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis Powell.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Harry Blackmun and William Rehnquist.
Justice William Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Writing for the court, Justice Byron White cited the Fourth Amendment as the most relevant statute in this case.
| “ | The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes.[1][4] | ” |
White drew on the earlier ruling in Camara v. Municipal Court that held warrantless searches to be generally unreasonable, and on the ruling in See v. Seattle which extended that reasoning to businesses.[6]
| “ | The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.[7][4] | ” |
White also held that this case did not fall under the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment established in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States and United States v. Biswell for certain industries with a long history of close government supervision and regulation, as the secretary of labor had tried to argue.[8] [9]
The Secretary had maintained that warrantless searches added an element of surprise that was critical to the effectiveness of OSHA inspections. The court, however, rejected this argument.
| “ | We are unconvinced, however, that requiring warrants to inspect will impose serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, will prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or will make them less effective.[1][4] | ” |
The dangers of allowing warrantless searches were, in the court's view, too great.
| “ | The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search. A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a warrant would then and there advise the owner of the scope and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector is not expected to proceed.[1][4] | ” |
The court thus concluded that OSHA inspectors had no right to conduct warrantless searches and that Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 violated the Fourth Amendment and was unconstitutional.
| “ | We hold that Barlow's was entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent and to an injunction enjoining the Act's enforcement to that extent. The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.[1][4] | ” |
Concurring opinions
There were no concurring opinions.
Dissenting opinions
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens disagreed with two of the court's principal arguments.
| “ | Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act to safeguard employees against hazards in the work areas of businesses subject to the Act. To ensure compliance, Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to conduct routine, nonconsensual inspections. Today the Court holds that the Fourth Amendment prohibits such inspections without a warrant. The Court also holds that the constitutionally required warrant may be issued without any showing of probable cause. I disagree with both of these holdings.[1][4] | ” |
He illustrated his own view of the Fourth Amendment.
| “ | The Fourth Amendment contains two separate Clauses, each flatly prohibiting a category of governmental conduct. The first Clause states that the right to be free from unreasonable searches 'shall not be violated'; the second unequivocally prohibits the issuance of warrants except 'upon probable cause.' In this case the ultimate question is whether the category of warrantless searches authorized by the statute is 'unreasonable' within the meaning of the first Clause.[1][4] | ” |
The court, he argued, had misunderstood the relationship of the two parts of the Fourth Amendment to the case.
| “ | There is, however, also a category of searches which are reasonable within the meaning of the first Clause even though the probable-cause requirement of the Warrant Clause cannot be satisfied...The regulatory inspection program challenged in this case, in my judgment, falls within this category.
... |
” |
He concluded that the court was substituting its own judgment for that of Congress.
| “ | ...the Court today substitutes its judgment for that of Congress on the question of what inspection authority is needed to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
... |
” |
Impact
The decision reiterated the importance of the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure in American jurisprudence. It also clarified the limits on the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce, which had served as the basis for many laws and agency actions. The justices held that the exception to warrantless administrative inspections that had allowed OSHA to conduct warrantless regulatory searches was not triggered solely by the fact that the business engaged in interstate commerce:
| “ | The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the exception. The Secretary would make it the rule...It is quite unconvincing to argue that the imposition of minimum wages and maximum hours on employers who contracted with the Government under the Walsh-Healey Act prepared the entirety of American interstate commerce for regulation of working conditions to the minutest detail. Nor can any but the most fictional sense of voluntary consent to later searches be found in the single fact that one conducts a business affecting interstate commerce; under current practice and law, few businesses can be conducted without having some effect on interstate commerce.[1][4] | ” |
Justice White held that the ruling in Marshall v. Barlow's only applied to the actions of OSHA which were the focus of that case, though the Secretary of Labor had expressed concerns about the ruling's implications for inspections by other federal agencies.[10]
| “ | Finally, the Secretary urges that requiring a warrant for OSHA inspectors will mean that, as a practical matter, warrantless-search provisions in other regulatory statutes are also constitutionally infirm. The reasonableness of a warrantless search, however, will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. Some of the statutes cited apply only to a single industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply. Some statutes already envision resort to federal-court enforcement when entry is refused, employing specific language in some cases and general language in others. In short, we base today's opinion on the facts and law concerned with OSHA and do not retreat from a holding appropriate to that statute because of its real or imagined effect on other, different administrative schemes.[1][4] | ” |
See also
External links
- Full Text of the Case via Justia
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 FindLaw, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., accessed November 20, 2017
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Duke Law Journal, "OSHA Inspections after Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.," 1979
- ↑ OSHA.gov, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, accessed November 20, 2017
- ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Oyez, Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., accessed November 20, 2017
- ↑ FindLaw, Camara v. Municipal Court, accessed November 20, 2017
- ↑ FindLaw, See v. City of Seattle, accessed November 20, 2017
- ↑ Justia, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, accessed November 20, 2017
- ↑ FindLaw, United States v. Biswell, accessed November 20, 2017
- ↑ See also David Shipley, "Warrantless Administrative Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc." (1979), University of Georgia Law, accessed November 20, 2017
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