Regulatory capture
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In economics and political science, the term regulatory capture is used to refer to a situation in which a regulated entity or industry exerts a strong influence over the government bodies or officials tasked with regulating that entity or industry. A government agency involved in a situation of regulatory capture may be referred to as a captured agency. The concept was originally developed and applied by professors of political science and economics during the middle of the 20th century.[1][2][3][4][5]
Background
Theories about regulatory capture were developed during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s by professors of political science and economics including Samuel Huntington, Marver Bernstein, Gary Becker, Gabriel Kolko, Sam Peltzman, Martin Sklar, George Stigler, and James Weinstein.[1][3] Literature on public choice theory authored by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock during this period also included discussions of the influence of interest groups on regulators.[3]
According to a 2006 literature review by political science professor Ernesto Dal Bó published in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, "Most of the literature that is explicitly concerned with regulatory capture has been developed in the context of utility regulation, although a literature on political influence has grown alongside it."[3]
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 The New Rambler, "What Is Regulatory Capture? Review of Preventing Regulatory Capture," accessed September 25, 2017
- ↑ A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, "Captured agency," accessed September 25, 2017
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Oxford Review of EConomic Policy, "Regulatory Capture: A Review," 2006
- ↑ Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review, "'Regulatory Capture': Sources and Solutions," 2014
- ↑ Investopedia, "Regulatory Capture," accessed September 25, 2017
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