Syrian ‘end-game’ will change the Middle East
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – December 20, 2024
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria may have been a geopolitical loss for Iran (and Russia), but the fact that Islamists have overthrown the regime threatens both Iran and Arab states, creating prospects for their cooperation in the near future and minimising whatever gains the ‘winners’ of this ‘end-game’ may have made.
The ‘Winners’ and the ‘losers’
There are clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. But geopolitics is a very dynamic field in which gains and losses are hardly one-sided. In some ways, the fall of the Assad regime – and the inability of Iran to rescue its key ally in the region – may have been an outcome of Israel’s war on Palestine and Hezbollah, but it does not necessarily mean a permanent weakness of Iran and a permanent gain for Israel. For now, Israel is consolidating this gain by a) seizing Syrian territory, and b) bombarding the Syrian military positions to decimate its ability to launch any counter-offensive at all.
In other words, Israel’s steps show a clear direction. First, it weakened Hezbollah by engaging it in a brutal war. Second, it is now supporting the Islamist takeover of Syria. The Islamists have declared that they have no problem with Israel as their neighbour. Israel’s Netanyahu, on the other hand, has already claimed the credit for “reshaping” the Middle East.
Another clear ‘winner’ is Turkey, which had long wanted Assad to go. For years, the Turkish military had been maintaining a direct presence in Syria’s Idlib province, which also happened to be the main province under (partial) control of the so-called “rebel” Islamists. For years, Turkish forces shielded these groups from the Syrian (and Iranian and Russian) strikes and offensives. In addition, the fact that Turkey allowed these groups to conduct trade across the Turkish border provided these groups with economic support too. Now that Assad is gone, Turkey finds itself in a much better position than it was earlier to counter Kurdish groups.
But there are no ‘losers’
All of this apparently translates into crucial geopolitical gains for Israel (Washington) and Ankara, except there are no permanent ‘losers’ here. The fall of the Assad regime has brought to power a well-known Islamist group globally designated as terrorist. It is said to be only previously allied with al-Qaeda, but the way it controlled Idlib for years provides a sufficiently sound snapshot of where the group stands as an ultra-orthodox network, with serious questions remaining about whether the group was ever able to shun its ideological past.
Still, there is little denying that the ability of armed Islamists to overthrow Assad and capture power has upset not only Tehran but also Riyadh, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and even Cairo. All of these states previously faced actual, or prospects, of popular discontent during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. All of these states are Muslim-majority states, which makes them vulnerable to groups operating both regionally and domestically to overthrow monarchies and/or existing regimes. Can any of them face similar prospects as Syrians did? Let’s not forget that the “rebels” first emerged in Syria in the wake of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. If the end of the Asad regime is the continuation of the same ‘movement’, there is no denying that it can reach other states too. A clear logic for these states to cooperate with each other against this Islamist threat, backed as it is by Turkey and Israel, exists.
Therefore, while Iran may have become ‘isolated’ and the fall of the Assad regime may have blocked its ability to support Hezbollah via Syria, Iran’s prospects of developing new – and deeper – relations with the Arab world have also increased manifold. Therefore, while Netanyahu might be right in claiming that he is “reshaping” the Middle East, the new shape might not be exactly to his liking. The coming together of Iran and Arab states would directly undermine Israeli ability to defeat Iran in the short and long run.
Iran and the Arab world
They are already cooperating. Iran, Saudia, Qatar, and Iraq were all quick to oppose Israeli incursions into Syrian territory. A Saudi official statement called the Golan Heights “occupied” territory. This is not an isolated development triggered by Israeli actions. It is an outcome of an ongoing policy convergence between Riyadh and Tehran vis-à-vis Israel. On Nov. 11 at a summit of Islamic nations in Riyadh, the Saudi crown prince called on the international community, i.e., the US mainly, to compel Israel to “respect the sovereignty of the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran and not to violate its lands.” At the same gathering, he described the Israeli war on Palestine as “collective genocide.”
In Egypt, the fall of the Assad regime has brought back echoes of the fall of the Mubarak regime more than a decade ago. When the present Egyptian ruler overthrew the government of Mohammad Morsi, a Turkish ally, Erdoğan said he would never talk to Sisi. Yet, he met Sisi twice in 2024. The fact that Turkey is now backing Islamists – and it has always supported the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood – there is yet again every reason for Egypt to align its policies in ways that might help keep the Islamists at bay. This way includes closer ties with the rest of the Arab world, plus Tehran.
Quoting senior Western diplomats, a recent report in Middle East Eye described the situation as particularly unravelling for the UAE, which has “been unnerved by the US’s manoeuvring to open backchannels of communication to HTS via Turkey”. The report also mentions the UAE’s efforts to “broker talks between the government of Bashar al-Assad and the US. The UAE wanted to strike a grand bargain to keep the Assad family in power”. The only reason why the UAE wanted Assad to stay in power was that the alternative to Assad would cause more damage to Emirati interests than any potential benefits. The Islamists are that alternative now that no one, except the Turks and the Israelis, wants.
Therefore, a logical response of these states (Arab and Iran) is to develop coordinated action to thwart any prospects of an Islamist revival, including the revival of the Islamist State, which has a sizable presence in Afghanistan. This is probably the only way that the Arab states can collectively outmanoeuvre Turkey and Israel. There is also little denying that any effort to deepen Gulf-Iran cooperation will be squarely seen as a welcome development in Moscow and Beijing, both of which have vital interests in the region.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
Trump’s ‘new’ policy on Iran
By Viktor Mikhin – New Eastern Outlook – November 26, 2024
According to a report published by the Financial Times, Trump’s new team intends to ‘bankrupt’ Iran during his second presidential term. The report, citing a national security expert close to the new team, states that executive orders targeting Iran, mainly its oil exports, could be signed on the first day Trump takes office.
The so-called ‘maximum pressure campaign’ is a set of measures imposed against Iran in 2018 after Trump brazenly and illegally withdrew Washington from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement, signed in 2015, limited Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for an easing of economic and financial sanctions. Trump called the agreement a ‘disaster’ only because it was signed by Democratic President Barack Obama. He allegedly stated that he was going to make sure that Iran would never receive nuclear weapons, while promising to limit Iran’s regional influence.
In other words, the world has a very dangerous precedent in the Middle East: on the one hand, Israel has completely illegally developed and put into service nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and, on the other hand, Trump is trying to limit – and, moreover, prohibit – Iran from developing peaceful nuclear energy and oppose Tehran’s relations with its neighbours. What kind of democracy is this and what exactly does Trump mean by the word ‘democracy’? This is no longer democracy, rather a medieval-type dictatorship: if I want to, I will allow it, but it is better not to allow it at all.
What was Trump’s goal previously?
Since 1979, Iran has constantly faced US sanctions. The Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign was not so much about inventing new limitations as about dramatically expanding the scope and viciously tightening compliance with previous or existing limitations.
Following the unabashed withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA (an international document), Trump immediately reinstated sanctions against Iran’s energy, shipping, shipbuilding, automotive and oil sectors in accordance with a decree issued on August 6, 2018. The key difference was the aggressive implementation of so-called ‘secondary sanctions’, which punished foreign organisations for doing business with Iran, regardless of whether these transactions violated their own domestic laws. The aim was to put significant pressure on international players to comply with US sanctions. Apparently, Trump considered himself a liege lord and all others to be his vassals, the purpose of whom was to fulfill Trump’s will.
In May, 2019, the Trump administration dealt a blow to Iran’s metallurgical industry (the second largest source of export revenue) by tightening sanctions on the production of iron, steel, aluminum and copper. This included well-designed sanctions against any foreign financial institutions facilitating large transactions related to these industries. At the same time, Washington was completely uninterested in the opinions and interests of other parties involved in peaceful trade with Iran.
The third major decree issued by Trump was directed against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and any organisations or individuals conducting financial transactions with it. The stated goal was to limit Iran’s production of ballistic missiles, a weapon that, according to then-US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook, existed only in Photoshop. Nevertheless, Trump hastened to impose severe sanctions on the IRGC.
The new Biden administration that came to power, contrary to expectations, did not put an end to Trump’s policy. According to Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, all sanctions were to remain in force and hundreds more new ones were added to them. It is incomprehensible how one strong and arrogant country is trying to rule the whole world and establish its own rules of life and trade that are only beneficial to it.
Did Trump’s policy bear fruit?
“The efficacy of US sanctions against a foreign government is measured by the economic damage not caused”, said Amir Ali Abolfat, an expert on North American affairs, “and the extent to which sanctions achieve their political goals and change the behaviour of the target government”. An analysis of statistics before the start of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign shows that, although Trump made it more difficult for Iran to earn money from exporting oil and metals, he failed to reduce them so much that a brave and persistent Iran had to change its policy.
“Iran produces strategically important goods”, Abolfat explained. “As long as there is demand, these products will find their market. Although Iran no longer sells oil to Europe, it has begun supplying it to China, as evidenced by increased sales to that country, which is resisting pressure and US hegemony. The same principle applies to the export of Iranian metals”.
There is no doubt that Trump and Biden have created great difficulties for Iran, but did they manage to achieve their goals? Absolutely not. Iran’s uranium enrichment rate has increased from 3% to 60% and its military potential has expanded significantly over the past seven years. Moreover, Tehran is successfully developing friendly ties with its neighbours and has managed to create a so-called Axis of Resistance, which successfully opposes the United States and Israel in the region.
As for domestic needs, Iran has successfully reduced its dependence on European partners and former allies (such as Korea and Japan) by finding alternative suppliers. The departure of European automakers has led to a sharp increase in Chinese car imports, making Iran a major market. In addition, Iranian engineers and experts have independently completed projects to develop gas and oil fields that previously depended on Western cooperation. This self-confidence eventually spread to other industries previously dependent on imports, such as the food industry and medicine.
Sanctions and nothing else?
Central to Trump’s policy in the Middle East from 2017 to 2021 was an unsuccessful attempt to drive a wedge between Arab countries and Iran, while simultaneously positioning Israel as a key regional security partner.
Now this approach is much less viable. Iran’s improved relations with countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and ongoing efforts to normalise ties with others, such as Egypt, undermine this strategy. In addition, the successful Hamas operation on October 7 completely dispelled all notions of Israel’s invincibility and the actions of the Israeli regime to destroy the Palestinians made the continuation of the normalisation agreements concluded within the scope of Trump’s ‘Abraham Accords’ unlikely.
Experts believe that the only other untested option – the military option – to which hotheads in the United States and Israel are inclined, is fraught with enormous risk. Such actions could lead to devastating consequences for the West, potentially widespread disruption of oil supplies, attacks on Western bases in the Middle East and fundamental changes to Iran’s nuclear policy. Ultimately, Washington must recognise that enormous pressure alone will not help it achieve its goals with regard to Iran. To solve the US’ problems, Iran’s problems must also be acknowledged. It is only through returning to the JCPOA and sitting at the negotiating table that the most difficult tasks in the region can be solved. Iran is ready for this and has expressed this more than once. Is the ‘peacemaker’ Trump ready for this or is he only thinking of using force?
Saudi Arabia to expand teaching of Chinese language with 800 more teachers amid growing demand
MEMO | November 18, 2024
Saudi Arabia is set to expand the teaching of the Chinese language by creating 800 teaching positions, amid the growing demand for learning the Chinese language in the Kingdom.
According to China’s official news agency, Xinhua, the planned appointment of the 800 new teaching roles aligns with the spread of Chinese language classes across Saudi Arabia’s primary and middle schools.
The move follows the recent successful deployment of 175 Chinese language teachers in the Kingdom, who reportedly began teaching last month. It is part of a landmark agreement struck in 2023 between Riyadh and Beijing in an effort to strengthen bilateral cooperation in language education.
Under that agreement, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Education collaborated with China’s Centre for Language Education and Cooperation in launching training programs for educators, conducted at Tianjin University in China, with the aim to equip teachers with the necessary skills.
The increased language cooperation between the two countries is part of the wider expansion in their relations across a variety of sectors, including trade, military, technology and energy.
The Islamic world reorganizes the strategy in Riyadh
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | November 15, 2024
On 11 November, an emergency Arab-Islamic summit on the question of Palestine was held in Riyadh. It was an extremely important event, from which the directives of the coming months for the Middle Eastern Islamic world and beyond will take their course. A shared international strategy emerged, even if contradictions and risks are not entirely absent.
A necessary window for dialogue
On Monday, 11 November, Riyadh invited the 22 countries of the Arab League and the 50 or so states that make up the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to take part in a summit dedicated to the ongoing conflicts in the region. The meeting focused on ongoing conflicts in the region, with a particular focus on Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office.
At the opening of the summit dedicated to Israel’s wars in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman used the term ‘genocide ’ to describe Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip: ‘We call on the international community to assume its responsibility […] by immediately ending Israeli attacks against our brothers in Palestine and Lebanon’.
The assembled Arab and Muslim leaders took the same stance towards Israel, condemning the horrific and shocking crimes committed by the Israeli army in Gaza, denouncing torture, executions, disappearances and outright ethnic cleansing, as stated in the final communiqué of the meeting.
Mohammed bin Salman also called on Israel to ‘respect the territorial sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran” and to ”refrain from attacking its territory’. Most members of the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation will support these very firm statements. Although there are big differences between the countries that have normalised relations with Israel and those that oppose it, starting with the Islamic Republic of Iran. MBS explicitly said that not only the very existence of Palestine is now in question, but also the fate of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the second holiest shrine in Islam after Mecca, a statement reminiscent of the name of the Hamas operation entitled ‘Storm Al-Aqsa’. Evidently, Hamas leaders expected that such an emergency Arab-Islamic summit would convene much earlier, for instance soon after the start of Israel’s ground operation in Gaza.
In this regard, the Crown Prince referred to Iran as a ‘sister republic’, which made the press throughout the Islamic world rejoice, signalling a detente in relations between the two countries. Diplomatic relations were officially reopened in March 2023, after a seven-year blockade, thanks to an agreement brokered by China, and after the infamous 7 October 2023, dialogue resumed and intensified. Iran supports the Palestinian Islamist movement, while Saudi Arabia tries to contain the spread of the conflict.
At the summit, Iran’s First Vice-President Mohammad Reza Aref called Israel’s assassination of the leaders of Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah ‘organised terrorism’, adding that ‘Operations misleadingly described as “targeted killings”, in which Palestinian elites and leaders of other countries in the region are killed one by one or en masse, are nothing but organised terrorism’. Similarly expressed by Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who called on the international community to continue sending aid to Lebanon. It should be noted that Mikati spoke a few days ago of ‘interference by Iran’ in Lebanon, an accusation rejected by Tehran.
It is worth noting the simultaneous involvement of Assad and Erdogan. Only recently, such crossovers were impossible. The government in Ankara has spoken increasingly strong and clear words against the extermination that Israel is perpetrating, certainly favouring a round table with the neighbouring Islamic countries, at least from the point of view of positive intentions.
Why only now?
There is almost nothing left of the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah. This is a fact to be confronted with. Such a summit would have been very different if the leaders of the Resistance were still alive.
The reason for this delay is perhaps the American elections. While the BRICS+ summit in Kazan had paved the way and pointed in a direction of international cohesion in condemning Israel’s actions and the need to restore Palestinian autonomy, it is true that the final placet was missing to move from theory to action.
Donald Trump’s victory must be framed from an Arab-Islamic perspective. Trump is a supporter of right-wing Zionism, that of Netanyahu and certain radicals such as Smotrich, Ben Gvir and Rabbi Dov Lior, who have never shied away from proclamations of massacres, sacrifices and religious destruction. For Zionists, Jerusalem is as important as Al Quds for Islamists (Al Quds is the Arabic name for Jerusalem). In the election campaign, Trump never gave an inch about his pro-Zionist position and support for the government in Tel Aviv. It was he who proposed moving the capital of the Zionist entity to Jerusalem and it was he who ordered the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. Trump’s election strengthened the prospects for US-Israeli collaboration, so much so that Smotrich immediately declared his intention to attack the Palestinians in the West Bank and blow up the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Trump has accelerated these processes. The next goal, which he personally supported and financed, is the construction of the Third Temple, an eschatological keystone for the entire American neocon world. The physical destruction of all of Israel’s enemies is not a side effect or minor harm, but a duty inherent in Jewish messianism.
The emergence of the Islamic pole in the multipolar world is acquiring an increasingly recognisable and identifiable form. Of course, there are still many problems to be solved: Saudi Arabia and Turkey do business with the US and Israel, continue to play on opposing sides, and are historically unreliable. The countries of South East Asia still have to define their position with regard to international relations with the West, in order to definitively emancipate themselves and make themselves safe from blackmail and retaliation.
The questions many are asking themselves are various: will the next American president commit himself to ending the ongoing conflicts as he has promised? Or will he be an unconditional supporter of Israel, both in the war and in his plans to torpedo any prospect of establishing a Palestinian state? Saudi Arabia makes any normalization with Israel conditional on the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The two-state solution is supported by much of the international community as a means to resolve the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab and Muslim leaders hold firm to the position, in accordance with UN resolutions and the 2002 Arab peace plan, that Israel must return all territories occupied since 1967.
The Abrahamic agreements are no longer enough. This time, however, the US can no longer decide the entire future of the Middle East on its own, because the chessboard has changed and the new positions taken by the Islamic countries will force Washington to weigh up more elements. Russia and China will not let the multipolar project be compromised. Not even the African countries, where the Palestinian cause is a deeply felt and shared issue of freedom, identity and anti-colonialism, are going to give way in the fight against this historic injustice.
The Muslim population of Islamic countries, seeing the passivity of the rulers, will not tolerate the ongoing extermination and attack on the holy places of their religion much longer.
Probably, only a common war against a common enemy can unite Muslims. And that could happen very soon.
West Asia reacts to Trump’s dalliance with Zionism
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | November 14, 2024
The election victory of Donald Trump in the November 5 election is being perceived in the West Asian region with growing anxiety as presaging the US aligning one hundred percent with the Zionist project for Greater Israel.
Although Trump has kept out vociferous neocons from his government positions, the same cannot be said for pro-Zionist figures. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claims he has spoken three times with Trump already since the election and they “see eye-to-eye regarding the Iranian threat and all of its components.”
The “components” implies that Netanyahu hopes to get a blank cheque from Trump to accelerate the ethnic cleansing in Gaza, for annexation of West Bank, violent reprisals against Palestinians and, most important, to carry the war right into Iranian territory.
Three events in as many days this week show the first signs of a backlash building up. On Monday, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei gave Tehran’s first official reaction to Trump’s election victory. Baqaei took a nuanced line saying, “What matters to us in this region is the United States’ actual behaviour and policies regarding Iran and the broader West Asia.”
Notably, Baqaei expressed “cautious optimism that the new [Trump] administration might adopt a more peace-oriented approach, reduce regional hostilities, and uphold its commitments.” (Tehran Times) Baqaei also refuted the recent allegation by Washington that Iran was involved in plots to assassinate Trump. He called the Biden Administration’s allegation as “nothing more than an attempt to sabotage relations” between Tehran and Washington by “laying traps to complicate the path for the next administration.”
Baqaei also held out an assurance to the incoming US administration that Tehran firmly adheres to a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes. He announced that Rafael Grossi, head of International Atomic Energy (IAEA) was due to arrive in Tehran on Wednesday night.
Taken together, Baqaei’s remarks suggest that Iran hopes there’s still daylight possible between Trump and Netanyahu. The clincher here would have been the remark that Trump slipped into his victory speech with great deliberation on November 6 that “I’m not going to start a war. I’m going to stop wars.”
Trump was on record during his election campaign that “I don’t want to do damage to Iran but they cannot have nuclear weapons.” Tehran’s consultations with Grossi responds to Trump’s concern. This is smart thinking. Iran’s non-provocative stance would mean there is no alibi for attacking Iran.
That said, however, the “known unknown” still remains — namely, Iran’s retaliation to the Israeli attack on October 26. On November 2, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a video released by Iranian state media, promised “a crushing response” to Israeli attack. Conceivably, the period till January 20 when Trump is sworn in, is going to be critical.
Meanwhile, this week witnessed that Iran and Saudi Arabia have given verve to their detente, which is now manifesting as Riyadh’s solidarity and open support for Iran in its growing confrontation with Israel.
Amidst the growing tensions in the region, the chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, Fayyad al-Ruwaili, visited Tehran on November 10 and met with his Iranian counterpart General Mohammad Bagheri. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian spoke on the phone with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on the phone in the context of a summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) – Arab League in Riyadh on November 11-12. Iran has extended an invitation to MbS to visit Tehran!
Two hugely significant highlights of the Riyadh summit have been, first, the Saudi prince’s inaugural address where he warned Israel against hitting Iran. This marked a historic turn by Riyadh toward Tehran-Israeli conflict, and away from US-supported normalisation with Jerusalem.
MbS told the summit that the international community should oblige Israel “to respect the sovereignty of the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran and not to violate its lands.”
Again, Saudi Arabia accused Israel for the first time of committing “genocide” in Gaza. MbS told the leaders who gathered in Riyadh, that the kingdom renewed “its condemnation and categorical rejection of the genocide committed by Israel against the brotherly Palestinian people…”
Trump has been put on notice that he’s meeting a radically different geopolitical landscape in West Asia compared to his first term as president. The Trump transition team is keeping its cards close, offering NatSec Daily a boilerplate statement that Trump will take “necessary action” to “lead our country” and “restore peace through strength.” But warning bells are ringing.
The key pillars of Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy against Tehran — isolating Iran and ramping up economic pressure while maintaining a credible threat of military force as deterrent — have become wobbly.
On the other hand, the massive Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1 and the colossal failure of the Israeli air strike on Iran twenty-six days later convey a loud message all across West Asia that Israel is no longer the dominant military power it used to be — and there is a new sheriff in town. Trump will have to navigate the fallout of both sides of this issue with diminished US diplomatic and geopolitical capital at his disposal.
Meanwhile, Tehran is also deepening its cooperation with Russia, which adds a giant new Ukraine-sized complexity to Trump’s Iran policy. While in Eurasia, the US has allies, Trump is navigating in West Asia pretty much alone.
The US’ stark isolation comes home dramatically by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s announcement on Wednesday that Turkey, a NATO member country, has severed all ties with Israel. Erdogan disclosed this to journalists aboard his plane after visiting Saudi Arabia. A regional trend to ostracise Israel is visible now and it is destined to expand and deepen.
The summit in Riyadh witnessed the African Union joining hands with the Arab League and OIC to sign a tripartite agreement on Tuesday to establish a mechanism to support the Palestinian cause, which will be coordinated through the three organisations’ secretariats as a game changer to strengthen their influence in international forums. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan noted that the three organisations will now onward speak with one voice internationally.
Even as the summit concluded in Riyadh, Crown Prince Salman had a call on Wednesday with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin readout stated that the two leaders “reaffirmed their commitment to continue the consistent expansion” of Russian-Saudi ties and specifically “stressed the importance of continuing close coordination within OPEC Plus and stated the effectiveness and timeliness of the steps being taken in this format to ensure balance on the global energy market.”
On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Kremlin readout noted with satisfaction that “the principled approaches of Russia and Saudi Arabia with regard to the Middle East settlement are essentially identical.”
MbS’ initiative to re-invigorate his conversation with Putin can only be seen against the backdrop of the profound misgivings in Riyadh regarding the Trump-Netanyahu bromance and the spectre of a possible regional war haunting the region stemming out of Israel drawing encouragement from the seamless US support expected through the coming 4-year period for the Zionist cause.
What’s Behind Saudi Crown Prince’s Demand to Israel Not to Attack Iran?
MBS Trumps Adelson
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 13.11.2024
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also referred to as MBS, warned Israel against attacking Iran at an Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation Summit in Riyadh on November 11.
The crown prince specifically said that the international community should make Israel “respect the sovereignty of the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran and not to violate its lands.”
“This is certainly an interesting development,” Mehran Kamrava, professor of government at Georgetown University Qatar, tells Sputnik.
Kamrava outlined possible reasons behind the crown prince’s move:
- Trump’s decision to appoint anti-Iran politicians to key foreign policy positions could embolden Israel to step up attacks against Iran and ignite a larger regional war. “What we’re seeing is an attempt by Saudi Arabia to signal its displeasure and disapproval of a potential expansion of the conflict,” the pundit says.
- MBS laid the groundwork for de-escalation, giving Iran the opportunity “to gracefully back out” of the conflict with Israel.
- “Iran has now renewed popularity in the proverbial Arab street because of it being the only regular army to have attacked Israel after 1973,” the professor continued, suggesting that MBS’s words were also a show of support to Tehran.
- “This is part of a broader regional sign that is being sent to Washington” with regard to its overall Middle Eastern policy, according to Kamrava.
Meanwhile, in October, Saudi Arabia and Iran held joint naval drills in the Sea of Oman. MBS and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian spoke on the phone a day before the summit. On November 10, Saudi Arabia’s top military official visited Tehran to meet with his Iranian counterparts.
These signals are “important” and “significant”, the pundit emphasizes.
Saudi crown prince demands Israel not attack Iran
MEMO | November 12, 2024
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman yesterday demanded Israel respect Iran’s sovereignty and refrain from attacking its territory, highlighting the friendly relations between Riyadh and Tehran.
Speaking at the Joint Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit in Riyadh, Bin Salman stressed that the international community must force Israel to “respect the sovereignty of the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran and not attack its territory.”
Saudi Arabia and Iran have maintained high-level contact as part of efforts to contain Israel’s war on Gaza.
That diplomatic outreach led to the first phone call between Bin Salman and then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, just five days after the war broke out.
In October, Saudi Arabia announced it had conducted naval exercises with Iran and other countries in the Gulf of Oman.
Bin Salman and current Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian spoke on the phone on Sunday ahead of yesterday’s summit.
Trump to pull US out of Paris climate agreement – NYT
RT | November 10, 2024
US President-elect Donald Trump is seeking to overhaul energy and environmental policies, aiming to dismantle the so-called “woke” agenda and eliminate programs that impede the country’s economic growth, The New York Times has reported, citing sources familiar with the matter.
Trump’s energy and environment transition team has already prepared “a slate of executive orders and presidential proclamations on climate and energy,” according to the article published on Friday. The measures reportedly include the US abandoning the Paris Agreement – an international treaty on climate change adopted in 2015.
Reshaping the boundaries of the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments in southern Utah to open up land for drilling and mining is also on the agenda. The protected area was expanded by US President Joe Biden in 2021.
Donald Trump’s team is also reportedly set to scrap Biden’s so-called environmental justice initiatives, which favor clean-energy development and pollution reduction. This involves ending the suspension of permits for new natural-gas export terminals, among other things.
The publication noted that Trump is planning to appoint an “energy czar” to replace Biden’s “climate tsar.” The role will be dedicated to streamlining policies related to oil, gas, and coal production in order to boost supply rather than limit demand. North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum, who previously helped open millions of acres of public land for fracking, and former energy secretary Dan Brouillette, are being considered for the post.
Further plans include relocating federal agencies including the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) out of Washington. Previously Trump argued that such federal departments and agencies should be moved to “places filled with patriots who love America.”
“This is how I will shatter the deep state,” he said in a campaign video last year.
While EPA employees disagree with the move, Trump’s allies say that the transition model is based on Biden administration policies in reverse, when “hundreds of staff” were hired on day one to implement climate-change initiatives.
“They have the model of what Biden did the first day, the first week, the first month,” said Myron Ebell, who led the transition of the EPA under Trump’s first term. “We’ll look at what Biden did and put a ‘not’ in front of it.”
At the United Nations climate talks last year, the US and other nations agreed on transitioning away from oil, gas, and coal to combat climate change. The initial calls for a complete “phaseout” of fossil fuels were rejected by major oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
One of Trump’s election promises was to end renewable energy projects, calling them a “hoax” and arguing that affordable energy is critical to the US economy.
Iran-Arab Rapprochement Gains Ground
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 6 2024
Israel’s escalation in Gaza and Lebanon has severely hindered U.S. efforts to expand the Abraham Accords by bringing Saudi Arabia into the fold.
When Israel began its brutal war on Gaza following Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Arab-Israel peace deal became nearly impossible. Washington, however, did not abandon its efforts to pursue expanding the Abraham Accords by getting Saudi Arabia to sign them. However, Washington’s inability to control Netanyahu’s war has undermined its efforts to convince Saudi Arabia.
Simultaneously, this overall failure has also negatively affected Washington’s ability to drive a wedge between Iran and Saudi Arabia to undo the Beijing-mediated normalisation between the two erstwhile rivals in the Middle East. Instead, this normalisation seems to have found new grounds in the wake of Israeli expansion of the war into Lebanon against Hezbollah. Riyadh, as reports show, categorically denied Israel the leeway it needed to execute its plans to attack Iran’s oil and nuclear facilities. How Saudi Arabia reached this conclusion is an outcome of, among other things, Iran’s active diplomacy.
Iran-Arab Normalisation
According to a recent report in Reuters, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE explicitly gave Washington an ‘enough is enough’ call when they asked it to stop Israel from attacking Iran’s oil and nuclear facilities. Simultaneously, all three of these states have also closed their space for Israeli jets and missiles to cross to attack Iran. As the report mentions, “the moves by the Gulf states come after a diplomatic push by non-Arab Shi’ite Iran to persuade its Sunni Gulf neighbours to use their influence with Washington amid rising concerns Israel could target Iran’s oil production facilities”.
The fact that Arab states conveyed Iran’s message – and explicitly took Tehran’s side – reveals many things. But, most importantly, it shows their ability to transcend the US-imposed narrow confines of ‘sectarian rivalry’ to follow a radically alternative line of foreign policy – one that prioritises long-term regional goals. In other words, while Arab states may have failed to bring Israel’s war on Gaza to an end, they have certainly succeeded in denying Israel an easy way to impose another war in the region – a war, if it breaks out, will affect Arab states more than the Gaza war.
It has turned out to be a source of confidence for Iran to confront Israel. The Foreign Minister of Iran recently noted Iran’s readiness to respond to any hostile actions by the Zionist regime, stating, “We are not seeking to escalate tensions or war.”
No Anti-Iran Alliance
In terms of regional politics, the Arab states’ refusal to become a party to tensions between Iran and Israel means that Washington – and Israel – will not be able to establish an anti-Iran regional alliance, which was one of the goals of The Abraham Accords. Thanks to the proactive diplomacy of China and Russia, Arab states no longer share with Washington and Israel the anti-Iran enthusiasm that, until recently, defined the very core of Arab geopolitics in the region. This is one of the reasons why the US and Saudi Arabia have not been able to finalize their otherwise ‘history making agreement’.
For one thing, if Saudi Arabia has openly declared its intentions to not engage Iran in a military fight, Washington sees no potential benefit arising out of this pact vis-à-vis the security of Israel and its ability to manipulate regional politics to its advantage and at the expense of its global rivals.
This failure, in many ways, has to do with how Washington behaved in 2019 when Saudi oil facilities came under Houthi attacks. The US failed to ‘protect’ Saudia Arabia – something that created an opening for China to push for an alternative to war.
For the Saudis as well, signing this treaty in the present context has become a lot more complicated than it would have been in a context with no Israeli war on Gaza and no prior Saudi-Iran rapprochement. Riyadh understands that tying its defence deeply with Washington via a treaty means it will have to, for instance, offer its space for the US/Israel to launch strikes on Iran. It would also mean Saudi Arabia exposing itself – once again – to Iran and Iran-backed Houthis. It also means Saudi Arabia going back to the past insofar as its ties with Iran are concerned and insofar as its plans to push for a multipolar order, both in the region and worldwide, are concerned. From the Saudi perspective, this treaty not only offers (an illusion of) protection but also comes with (the very real possibility of) a new phase of military conflict.
Alternatives to Washington
Middle Eastern states having become assertive vis-à-vis Washington’s dictates has also to do with the fact that the US is no longer the only global player in the region. Russia and China are already two major players that these states have deep ties with. Beijing, for instance, reportedly invested US$152 billion in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region between 2013 and 2021.
Russia’s sale of advanced missile and air defence systems to countries like Turkey and Iran showcases its willingness to deepen its defence with the region, presenting itself as an alternative to Washington. The availability of alternatives allows Arab states to better position themselves vis-à-vis Washington.
Will this pattern be permanent in the region? This is a key question. The Middle East, as it stands, is unlikely to see any major internal shift in terms of one state singularly dominating the region. Still, the region itself is surely moving towards a system that has multi-alignment as its central feature. It means Arab states are not necessarily becoming anti-US; it means they are diversifying in ways that give them a lot more leverage to manoeuvre and protect their interests. It means they are becoming stronger both regionally and globally.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
Neutral for now: Persian Gulf states’ gamble in the Iran-Israel showdown
With Iran’s vow to retaliate against Israel, Persian Gulf states face a delicate balancing act – caught between asserting autonomy and increasing dependence on US security, all while the Resistance Axis enjoys unprecedented popularity in the region.
By Mawadda Iskandar | The Cradle | November 4, 2024
The signs of an impending Iranian response to Israel’s airstrike on Iranian military interests last month are becoming clearer. Official statements from Tehran suggest a military retaliation is inevitable and could occur before the US elections on 5 November – with some reports indicating it may be launched from Iraqi territory to curb the cycle of back-and-forth escalations that began on 1 April following Tel Aviv’s targeting of the Iranian consulate in Damascus.
Both sides are seeking to establish a new deterrence balance, albeit with very different aims. Iran, whose sovereignty has been repeatedly violated, warns of the danger posed by Israel’s expansionist ambitions in the region, while Israel, as the aggressor, seems intent on dragging the entire region into chaos, banking on unwavering US support.
Two distinct camps have emerged: on one side, the Israeli-US alliance and its supporters, and on the other, the countries of the Resistance Axis, which have launched the “battle of unity” in support of Gaza. Caught between these factions is a third group, one that seeks neutrality, unwilling to pick a side for fear of compromising its own interests.
The US is struggling to maintain influence, while Israel is playing what may be its final card. The question remains: where do the Persian Gulf states stand?
Airspace restrictions and Gulf diplomacy
The Persian Gulf states have unanimously condemned Israel’s 26 October strikes on Iranian sites, which came in response to Tehran’s own retaliatory missile attacks earlier last month following high-profile assassinations of resistance leaders carried out by the occupation state.
Statements from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman condemned these strikes as violations of Iranian sovereignty, escalating tensions in an already volatile West Asia.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have taken a firm stance, refusing to allow Israel to use their airspace to launch further strikes against Iran, a position echoed by Jordan, which was prompted to officially deny it had allowed Israel to use its airspace to attack the Islamic Republic.
This reassured Tehran, which had threatened a forceful response against any country that facilitated Israeli attacks. These diplomatic messages coincided with Iran opening new channels of dialogue, including President Masoud Pezeshkian’s meeting with GCC officials, followed by Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s diplomatic tour that included Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkiye.
Despite Amman’s claim that its airspace was not used in the recent attack, videos have emerged documenting Israeli fighter jets over Jordanian skies. Similarly, Saudi Arabia claimed its airspace was not used during the strikes, raising questions about how Israeli planes refueled over such long distances. Israel subsequently admitted to using refueling aircraft to bypass Persian Gulf airspace restrictions.
Speaking to The Cradle, Lebanese military analyst Omar Maarabouni contends that “In principle, and based on and in connection with the recent Israeli attack, a group of Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia, stated that they prevented the Israelis from passing through their airspace, and this is something that Iranian radar can confirm or deny, and indeed the official Iranian statement confirms that these aircraft did not pass through Gulf airspace.”
Maarabouni adds that agreements between the US and Persian Gulf states are defensive in nature, allowing these states to prevent US bases from being used offensively against Iran, especially since improved relations with Iran are now in their interest. Regarding alternative Israeli plans, Maarabouni says:
“It is quite clear that Israeli planes took the path associated with Syria and then Iraq towards Iran, and therefore we are talking about a distance of 2,000 km back and forth, and this is what Israel was keen to avoid over the issue of refueling, as F-35 and F-15 aircraft can travel distances exceeding 2,200 km without the need to refuel.”
Jordan, he says, meanwhile, finds itself in an awkward position, having claimed that Iranian missiles breached its sovereignty, despite such missiles traveling at altitudes beyond the limits recognized under international airspace law. As Maarabouni points out:
“The one who violated Jordanian sovereignty is Israel, which fired air defense missiles into Jordanian airspace to intercept Iranian missiles, but it is unclear why Jordan has adopted the responsibility of blaming the violation of its sovereignty on both Iran and Israel.”
Oil on the frontline
Persian Gulf states are wary of being dragged into the escalating conflict, especially as they attempt to close the chapter on their failing Yemen war, which backfired horribly following devastating attacks on Saudi Arabia’s prized Aramco facilities in 2019.
These strikes exposed the vulnerability of the “oil for protection” security framework under US patronage. In their recent overtures to Iran, GCC states also urged Washington to pressure Israel against targeting Iranian oil infrastructure, warning of disastrous consequences for global energy markets.
Sources in the Persian Gulf, speaking on condition of anonymity, inform The Cradle that while the Gulf states were aware of the timing of Israel’s attack, they were ready to mediate with the US if the situation escalated.
Following the attack’s failure, these states rushed to issue condemnatory statements, emphasizing their unwillingness to be drawn into direct hostilities against Tehran, despite their quiet acceptance – and even encouragement – of actions that might undermine Iranian influence or its nuclear ambitions. The Persian Gulf monarchies are eager to shield themselves from any backlash amid rising global anger over the atrocities in Gaza and Lebanon, which have put normalization efforts with Israel on hold.
US intervention: A double-edged sword
The White House has warned Iran against retaliating to Israeli strikes, stating that the US would support Israel if attacked and floating the notion that Washington “can’t restrain” Tel Aviv in the event of further attacks from Iran.
Former hawkish US national security advisor John Bolton boasted that Israel would use Persian Gulf airspace if needed, and that “these governments may complain about this, but frankly, they see Iran as a strategic threat because of its nuclear program, as well as Iran’s old support for terrorists, not only Hezbollah and Hamas, but the Houthis and Shia militias in Iraq.”
The Persian Gulf states now find themselves caught between their desire for autonomy and their dependency on US security guarantees – particularly in light of the numerous US bases spread across their territories, which primarily serve to protect Washington’s [or rather Israel’s] regional interests.
Agreements between the US and Persian Gulf states grant American forces access to airspace, ports, and military bases in these countries, providing logistical support for regional operations. While Gulf states have formally rejected offensive US operations from their territories, they still allow defensive activities.
Qatar, the only official non-NATO ally of the US, hosts the largest concentration of US forces at Al-Udeid and Al-Sailiya bases. Kuwait ranks second in terms of the quantity and quality of US assets located at four bases: Camp Doha, Arifjan, Ali al-Salem, and Buehring.
The UAE has three US bases, Al-Dhafra, Fujairah, and Jebel Ali Port, all of which provide logistical support services. As for the US facilities in Saudi Arabia, they are Eskan Village and Prince Sultan Air Base, which offer the provision of air and missile defense systems and the use of military aircraft. Bahrain hosts three bases: Juffair, Sheikh Isa, and Muharraq, and Oman hosts a similar number: Al-Masna, Thumrait, and Masira.
All of these countries fall under the domain of US Central Command (CENTCOM), which works to “counter the Iranian threat.”
Last year’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has reignited the debate over Persian Gulf security dependence on Washington. Experts argue that the current escalation between Iran and Israel will force Gulf states to find a balance between their diplomatic rapprochement with Tehran on the one hand, and their commitment to a US-led regional security alliance on the other.
The US has sought to reassure Persian Gulf leaders, offering assistance in defending against any potential Iranian aggression. To back up its words, the US approved a $440 million sale of TOW missiles to Riyadh and authorized the sale of over $2.2 billion in weapons and ammunition to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Balancing public condemnation with covert cooperation
Investigative journalist Bob Woodward’s new book War, which sheds light on recent GCC–Israeli dynamics, reveals that regional rulers, including those of the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, unanimously agree – in private – on the need to eliminate Hamas, while working quietly to minimize public backlash over their covert cooperation with Israel.
After last October’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Persian Gulf states condemned the attack but later launched diplomatic efforts to prevent regional tensions from escalating further. Notably, these developments have disrupted key projects, including normalization with Israel and economic diversification plans, particularly in Saudi Arabia.
Iranian journalist Mohammad Gharavi tells The Cradle that the events of 7 October, 2023 strained what had been positive Saudi-Iranian relations:
“The Iranians believed that a positive relationship would have a positive impact in terms of supporting the Palestinian cause, but the Saudi position was neutral despite the historical opportunity that could have been invested at home and in the Islamic environment. Unfortunately, the Palestinian issue is the prominent point of contention with the GCC, which is why we are sending messages that the opportunity is ripe to change this course.”
He describes Saudi–Iranian relations as having made significant advancements in terms of coordination and cooperation since the two neighboring states struck a rapprochement deal in Beijing last year:
“Iran’s reassuring messages, as well as warnings not to go too far in cooperating with the Americans and Israelis to antagonize Iran or using air, land and sea spaces to direct hostile action against it, were influential and positive and can be built upon in the coming stage, as it reflects the determination of the two countries to put aside differences in the interest of the security of the two countries and protect the strategic alliance with China and others for what it holds of economic dimensions.”
Ultimately, the Persian Gulf states remain neutral – for now. Their future course, however, will depend on visible and tangible US assurances. If such guarantees are secured, the Gulf may be willing to align more openly against Iran, given that their interests clash with those of the Resistance Axis, which promotes regional independence and self-determination – ideas that resonate with the Arab masses throughout West Asia.
Israel’s ‘zugzwang’ moment with Iran
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | October 28, 2024
A senior US official told Washington Post that the toned-down early morning Israeli strike Saturday on military targets in Iran was a “proportional strike,” which “was moderate enough to quiet the conflict without provoking Iran into a counterattack.”
However, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted in a speech on Sunday: “We hit hard Iran’s defence capabilities and its ability to produce missiles that are aimed at us. The attack in Iran was precise and powerful, and it achieved all its objectives.”
But within Israel itself, there is scepticism. Israel’s most popular news outlet Channel 12 called the operation insignificant and demonstrated Iran’s status as a major power in the region. Netanyahu has not released any reliable documentation to back up his claim, which he usually does.
NourNews lampooned that Israeli psychological war against Iran has not worked. Israel hoped to stir up panic that there might be an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations but normal life continues in Iran. It appears that Israel was neither inclined to carry out an extensive attack nor was incapable of conducting such an operation without greater American involvement — or both. Iran’s attack on October 1 badly exposed the weakness of Israeli air defence system.
So, the bottom line is that Israel may have succeeded in conducting a limited predawn operation against Iran without excessively increasing the chances of an all-out war.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said on Sunday that the “evil committed by the Zionist regime two nights ago should neither be downplayed nor exaggerated”. Khamenei added: “Of course, our officials should be the ones to assess and precisely apprehend what needs to be done and do whatever is in the best interests of this country and nation. They [the enemy] must be made to realize who the Iranian people are and what the Iranian youth are like.”
Khamenei’s remark suggests that an immediate military response is not planned. Indeed, Tehran has been playing down the Israeli strike, saying it caused limited damage.
The foreign ministry said in a statement on Saturday that given Iran’s “inherent right of legitimate defence” under UN Charter, “Tehran will utilise all material and spiritual capabilities of the Iranian nation to defend its security and vital interests, and firmly stand by its duties towards regional peace and security.”
The statement drew attention to Israeli operations in Gaza and Lebanon, but, notably, kept silent on any Iranian response to Saturday’s air strike.
Iran will no doubt weigh the unprecedented diplomatic support from the regional states. This is a moment that Tehran cherishes, as apparent in Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s words: “Since yesterday [Saturday] until now, we are regularly receiving messages from different countries, the statements they issued, the level of condemnation from different countries both in the region. It is really remarkable that it took place at this international level.”
Other statements at the military level played down the Israeli attack saying the air defences intercepted it successfully and only “some limited damage was caused in some areas, the dimensions of which are being investigated.” The public mood in Tehran is one of high expectations from the Pezeshkian government on the economic front.
Javad Zarif, former foreign minister and current strategic adviser to the government, also made no direct threat of retaliation, saying, “The west should move away from its outdated and dangerous paradigm. It must condemn Israel’s recent acts of aggression and join Iran in efforts to end the apartheid, genocide and violence in Palestine and Gaza, and in Lebanon. Recognising Iran’s confident resolve for peace is essential; this unique opportunity should not be missed.” [Emphasis added.]
The Israeli strike did not take Tehran by surprise. In a “scoop”, Axios reported that Israel sent a message to Iran on Friday ahead of its air strikes warning the latter not to respond in “an attempt to limit the ongoing exchange of attacks between Israel and Iran and prevent a wider escalation.”
The message from Tel Aviv conveyed through third parties “made it clear to the Iranians in advance what they [Israelis] are going to attack in general and what they are not going to attack.”
Apparently, the US pressured Israel to calibrate its proposed attack as a “proportionate response”. This becomes hugely important in the downstream, as the Biden Administration’s efforts will continue to prevent conflict between Israel and Iran escalating into a confrontation.
To be sure, Iran will press ahead on the diplomatic track. Interestingly, the Jerusalem Post newspaper highlighted that Araghchi’s hectic tours of regional capitals are “important because he is not only visiting countries that are close to Iran historically or where Iran has interests, such as Lebanon or Iraq; rather, he is doing outreach to countries that have peace with Israel and which are close to the West, such as Jordan and Egypt…
“This shows how Iran is gaining influence in Jordan and Egypt. Egypt and Iran have been on a road to reconciliation, for instance. In addition, Iran and Saudi Arabia have reconciled with China’s backing. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince was also in Cairo this week, illustrating how a triangle of ties between Cairo and Tehran is emerging.”
Meanwhile, Tehran will closely watch the November 5 presidential and Congressional elections in the US. In the event of a Kamala Harris presidency, the resumption of nuclear negotiations is highly likely. On the contrary, a Donald Trump presidency may presage a difficult 4-year period ahead, but here too, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proximity with Trump to calm down tensions between Washington and Tehran should be factored in.
A paradigm shift cannot be ruled out, either. Trump is a quintessential pragmatist who disregarded criticism to engage North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in a dramatic turnaround, and is not known to be enamoured of Zionism.
Trump boasted on Wednesday of almost daily conversations with Netanyahu. “Bibi called me yesterday, called me the day before,” Trump said. Trump had already reported a telephone conversation with Netanyahu on Saturday, claiming that the latter “wants my view on things.”
Conceivably, Trump’s repeated call for Israel to swiftly defeat Hamas and wrap up the war in Gaza, stems from the apprehension that otherwise, if he wins the upcoming November 5 election, a clash with Iran may become unavoidable.
The US is a far superior military power compared to Iran. But this is a war of attrition that is being fought on multiple fronts. And there is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare. Trump abhors open-ended US military interventions. And Iranians are known to be highly nationalistic and subjugating them is impossible.
A prolonged war can result in US retrenchment from West Asia and the destruction of Israel — and may jeopardise Trump’s mesmerising MAGA movement.
Against this tumultuous backdrop, what are Israel’s options? There seems to be no way out of the war in West Asia but the catch is, it won’t be the sort of war Israel is hoping for, let alone can win.
Seymour Hersh wrote in Substack on Tuesday, “I’ve heard nothing from contacts in Beirut close to Hezbollah — whose troops are putting up a stiff fight as they did in Hezbollah’s 2006 war against Israel — that suggests anything other than a long war ahead…”
Israel is a small country and it keeps its head above water thanks to American money. It lacks the capacity to wage a war with Iran on its own steam. The Israeli planes reportedly flew to Iran through US-controlled air space in Syria and Iraq!
The situation is turning into a ‘zugzwang’ in real life for Israel. Anything that Israel does will only make the situation worse, and it doesn’t have a choice not to make a choice, either.
The Arabs are transparently displaying their crossover to multi-alignment in a US-led Middle Eastern war
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | October 12, 2024
Reuters reported on Friday quoting three sources in the Persian Gulf that the regional states are lobbying Washington to stop Israel from attacking Iran’s oil sites as “part of their attempts to avoid being caught in the crossfire.” The exclusive Reuters report singled out Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as also refusing to let Israel fly over their airspace for any attack on Iran.
These moves come after a diplomatic push by Iran to persuade its Sunni Gulf neighbours to use their influence with Washington. Saudi Arabia has drawn the bottom line to the Biden Administration that it is determined to pursue the track of normalisation with Iran that began with the rapprochement brokered by China in March 2023. This affirmation, well into the Iranian-Saudi détente’s second year, puts paid to any residual hope that Arab states may eventually join a ‘coalition of the willing’ against Iran.
The big picture here is that the Gulf states are positioning themselves to be among the key contributors to the ongoing power diffusion in their region — and globally. Tehran and Riyadh have found ways to responsibly share the neighbourhood. Suffice to say, the Arab world is already in the post-US and post-West era.
Now, this also signals Riyadh’s unease about Israel continuing its war on Gaza and Saudi frustration with the US for refusing to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government into accepting a ceasefire.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi was in Riyadh on Wednesday and was received by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The Saudi readout said they discussed bilateral relations and regional developments as well as the “efforts exerted towards them.” The meeting was attended by Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah and Minister of State and National Security Advisor Dr. Musaed bin Mohammed Al-Aiban.
Araqchi also held talks with Prince Faisal. “Discussions focused on relations and explored ways to strengthen them across various fields,” the Saudi report said. Only the previous day, Prince Khalid had spoken with his American counterpart Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin.
The Saudi Press Agency reported Tuesday that the two defence ministers “discussed the latest regional and international developments, efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region, and ways to ensure regional security and stability.”
Clearly, the Saudis are on the ball, quite aware that they can assume a pivotal role in restoring calm and preventing the spillover of the conflict into the region. The ground beneath the Israel-Iran standoff is shifting in systemic terms.
The military implications are profound when the Gulf States close their airspace to Israel (and the US) for operations against Iran. The Israeli jets will now have to take a circuitous route via the Red Sea and circumvent Arabian Peninsula to approach Iranian airspace, which of course will necessitate mid-air refuelling and all that it entails in such a sensitive operation that may have to be undertaken repeatedly. In a ‘missile war,’ Iran may prevail.
How far the coordinated move by the Persian Gulf States to get the US to de-escalate the situation will work remains to be seen, as it depends largely on Netanyahu mellowing, of which there are no signs. Nonetheless, President Joe Biden did his part by calling Netanyahu on Wednesday. But the White House readout neatly sidestepped the main talking point between them.
It stands to reason, though, that the call from Biden did have some effect on Netanyahu. The New York Times reported that Israel’s security cabinet convened on Thursday during which Netanyahu discussed with senior ministers “the overall plan for Israel’s retaliation.”
The results of the meeting were not released. And Times concluded its report by taking note that “analysts still say neither side appears interested in all-out war.” Indeed, the Gulf states’ anxiety has become a key talking point between the US officials and Israeli counterparts.
After the call from Biden, Netanyahu asked Defence Minister Gallant who was scheduled to visit Washington to stand down. Meanwhile, the US Central Command chief General Michael Kurilla came to Israel for “a situational assessment.” Lloyd Austin followed through on Thursday with a call to with Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant but the focus was on Lebanon. No doubt, the Biden administration is pulling many strings in Tel Aviv.
Netanyahu is known to be a realist himself. The point is, Tehran is explicit that Tel Aviv will pay a heavy price for any further hostile action. The warning will be taken seriously as Israeli military and intelligence — indeed, Netanyahu himself — have just had a preview of Iran’s deterrent capability.
Second, the price of oil has already begun going up and that is something Candidate Kamala Harris wouldn’t want to see happening.
Third, as for nuclear facilities, Iran has dispersed them to all parts of the country and the critical infrastructure is buried deep in the bowels of mountains that are hard to reach.
To be sure, Iran’s missile strike on October 1 carried also showed that it has superb intelligence to know what to target, where and when. In a tiny country like Israel, it is difficult to hide — although Tehran may not stoop so low as to decapitate opponents.
Suffice to say, all things taken into account, a terrible beauty is born in the Middle East: How far will the US go to rescue Israel?
The beginning of an alignment of the Arab states, as evident this week, refusing to be part of any form of attack on Iran and the signs of ‘Islamic solidarity’ bridging sectarian divides — these are, quintessentially, to be seen as tipping points. This is the first thing.
Secondly, this isn’t going to be a short, crisp war. Colonel Doug Macgregor, an astute US combat veteran in the Gulf War and former advisor to the Pentagon during the Trump administration and a noted military historian, aptly drew the analogy of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe (1618-1648), which began as a battle among the Catholic and Protestant states that formed the Holy Roman Empire but evolved in time and became less about religion and turned into a political struggle, more about which group would ultimately govern Europe, and ultimately changing the geopolitical face of Europe.
To quote from a 2017 essay by Pascal Daudin, an ICRC veteran who was deployed in major conflict situations such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Central Asia, Caucasus, Saudi Arabia and the Balkans, the Thirty Years’ War turned into “a complex, protracted conflict between many different parties –- known in modern parlance as State and non-State actors. In practice, it was a series of separate yet connected international and internal conflicts waged by regular and irregular military forces, partisan groups, private armies and conscripts.” (here)
True, a Middle Eastern War in the current setting already has combatants, bystanders and onlookers who, as the conflict evolves into a latter-day Crusade, are bound to jump in — such as Turkey and Egypt.
It will most certainly exhaust Israel — and vanquish the US presence in the Middle East — although a protracted war may prompt an intellectual upheaval that would ultimately bring about the Enlightenment to the region, as the Thirty Years’ War did to Europe.