According to Krylov’s thinking, diaspora peoples follow a “minimal ethical system”, expecting, and thus accepting, anything at all from others, both within and without their diaspora. They tend to disavow black-and-white, good-and-evil thinking; instead, they can understand an array of different values, they’re just not judgmental about them, except in so far as they are more or less “useful” or “harmful” to them personally. They hold a certain contempt for the rigid ethical / behavioral constraints of normal societies, which they find difficult to understand. Instead, they view themselves as unabashed realists, focus on survival and profiteering, and do not hold grudges or blood feuds; they are fully capable of negotiations with people who wronged them in the past if the situation changes or they need something from them.

Because of their minimal levels of social trust, the diaspora population cannot exist as a stand-alone community and must act as a parasite on another, already existing one; the example par excellence are the Jews, though others include Armenians, Greeks, the Chinese “bamboo network” of East Asia, etc (see Amy Chua’s concept of market-dominant minorities). He acknowledges that this view may be interpreted as being anti-Semitic, but disavows it because it is not an innate characteristic of Jewishness (be it in the “ethnic, religious, or politico-conspiratorial sense”), but rather of their diasporic nature.

Indeed, he notes at the end that Israeli Jews are entirely “another people” from the classical Jewish diaspora, since they have taken up the (Western) ethical system in favor of their previous diasporic ethical system after the formation of the Israeli state. They had to, since they now constituted the majority population and could no longer parasite off themselves. Nowadays the Jews in Israel possess a great sense of national destiny / uniqueness / patriotism, education isn’t particularly valued (interestingly, on international standardized tests Israelis tend to perform rather poorly, in stark contrast to diaspora Jews), etc, – in other words, they are a conventional civilization.

He then discusses relations between the diaspora within, and its relations with its “host” society. He notes that they can be at times useful, at times neutral, and at times debilitating to the host society; furthermore, the diaspora itself remains constant, while it is the host society that leads change. He makes the interesting observation that frequently members of a diaspora are more afraid of their own, rather than of members of the host society, since the latter must act towards them under the constraints of their particular ethical system, whereas between diaspora members relations are cleanly pragmatic / exploitative – and thus they can do unto them any kind of evil if it serves their purposes. Paradoxically, this state of internal insecurity actually binds the diaspora together.

Стоит обратить внимание на внутреннее уÑ�тройÑ�тво такого рода Ñ�ообщеÑ�тв. Как правило, люди, входÑ�щие в них, боÑ�Ñ‚Ñ�Ñ� друг друга больше, чем чужих – поÑ�кольку ждут от “чужих” Ñ�тичеÑ�ки окрашенного поведениÑ�, а от “Ñ�воих” чиÑ�то прагматичеÑ�кого. Именно Ñ�то обÑ�тоÑ�тельÑ�тво может как разрушить подобное Ñ�ообщеÑ�тво, так и (как Ñ�то не парадокÑ�ально) Ñ�плотить его.

Diasporas are easily pushed around, and hesitate to stand up for themselves, preferring instead to buy off threats. He then argues that the phenomenon of diaspora peoples favoring others from amongst themselves for jobs, positions, etc – e.g. a Armenian (or Jew, etc) looking out for other Armenians at a big company – is not so much an expression of “national solidarity”, but a method of buying off potential enemies from within their own community; however, when said Armenian reaches a high management position subject to closer scrutiny, he refrains from hiring fellow Armenians, instead relying on credentialed specialists.

Diasporas sometimes have a good effect on the national economy, e.g. in nations where the host population is barred, through law or custom, from working in certain dirty or “debasing” occupations (typically those tied to finance or commerce in traditional Malthusian societies) – the Jews of medieval Europe are the archetypal example. He is also strongly against the idea that diasporas try to covertly acquire power in a country through cabals, etc – quite simply, they are not interested in it enough, nor do they understand the culture they are in (whose behavioral norms are much more complex than their own) well enough to be effective at it. Their main interest is in survival and eating.

Why do diaspora peoples appear to be extremely effective and successful? According to Krylov, because far from being extremely clever or devious as caricatured, the diaspora mindset is much simpler; they have little concept of social shame and simply don’t think about, or notice, many of the ingrained social customs and traditions constraining the actions of members of the host society. For instance:

Е�ли �амый дешевый �по�об получить то, что тебе нужно, от кого-то, �то публично унизить�� перед ним, то почему бы так и не по�тупить? �о е�ли проще и дешевле обхамить, надавить, в конце концов обмануть того же �амого человека, почему бы не �делать так? С такой позиции �то чи�то техниче�кий вопро�. Дл� того, чтобы его решить, не надобно большого ума, хот� �о �тороны такое поведение может казать�� чуть ли не образцом �атанин�кой изворотливо�ти.

[If the cheapest method of acquiring something you need, from someone, is to publicly lower yourself before him, then why not? If its easier and cheaper to pressure or deceive that same person, again why not? To them this is an entirely technical question with no moral overtones. To solve it one doesn’t need a great deal of intelligence, even though from the side this kind of behavior may appear to be an example of almost Satanic resourcefulness.]

Finally, he notes that short of the diaspora disappearing – either through complete assimilation into the host society, or by acquiring a new ethical system and becoming another people entirely (like modern Israelis) – the civilized state must treat them with cautious toleration.

Кроме вÑ�его прочего, не Ñ�ледует излишне демонизировать поведение “раÑ�Ñ�еÑ�нных народов”. Люди такого типа дейÑ�твительно Ñ�поÑ�обны Ñ�овершить любое зло (за что к ним Ñ�оответÑ�твующим образом и отноÑ�Ñ�Ñ‚Ñ�Ñ�), но они, по крайней мере, не Ñ�читают причинение зла другим единÑ�твенным доÑ�тойным Ñ�поÑ�обом Ñ�ущеÑ�твованиÑ�. Такие люди могут быть безупречно лоÑ�льными гражданами, еÑ�ли только гоÑ�ударÑ�тво, в котором они проживают, будет внушать им доÑ�таточные опаÑ�ениÑ� – а запугать их легко. Другое дело, что ждать от них проÑ�влений наÑ�тоÑ�щего патриотизма, чеÑ�ти, даже Ñ�лементарной порÑ�дочноÑ�ти, не имеет никакого Ñ�мыÑ�ла.

[It does not follow that we should excessively demonize the behavior of diaspora peoples. People of this type can indeed make any kind of evil (which is why host peoples tend to have such bad relations with them), but they ultimately don’t consider doing evil unto others to be the only way of earning a good existence. They can be flawlessly loyal citizens, though only if the state in which they live pressures them with substantial threats for disobedience, for they are easily cowed. It’s another thing, however, that to await expressions of real patriotism, honor, even elementary decency from them, is entirely futile.]

Are these viewpoints bigoted? Correct? Racist? Anti-Semitic? Primitive? Incisive? A combination of all of them? As someone forced into becoming a “rootless cosmopolitan” myself, I admit to finding myself nodding to almost everything he said. Here’s a recent convo I had with people at Peter Lavelle’s UT discussion group on the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall:

I realize, of course, that life under “Communism” was very bland andas the years rolled by increasingly corrupt and unfair to the peopleliving under it. I also understand that from the perspective of most East-Central Europeans, especially those of the younger generation,that system’s collapse was greeted with joy, signifying as it didnewfound social, economic, and national freedoms. Good for them, I hope they enjoy themselves.

That said. As a Russian whose parent’s livelihood basically vanished (R&D / academia) in the 1990’s, forcing him to migrate to a strangeculture whose pernicious effects made me into the historyless rootlesscosmopolitan / cultural traitor that I am today, I view the collapseof the USSR with a certain sadness and regret, despite my recognition of its manifold flaws.

You don’t have any roots in this country, You are like one of those weeds that do not develop deep roots; they grow everywhere and are native nowhere, You are a human weed without the roots, You are apiece of human trash that America collects from all over the world.

This is how a (proudly anti-Semitic, fascist) critic once described me. The thing is, he is 100% correct in my view.

In the context of this discussion, instead of living under the second, “Eastern” (collectivist) ethical system of the Soviet Union, I have been forced into living under the minimal “diaspora” ethical system described by Krylov, in which I am unaccepted by my host societies – and which I myself reciprocally do not accept either – the kitsch, or feelings of loyalty / self-sacrifice / etc, for either Britain, or the US, or even Russia. One of the replies was the following:

Your condition as described by one of your detractors and which you agree is correct –

[[“You don’t have any roots in this country, You are like one of thoseweeds that do not develop deep roots; they grow everywhere and arenative nowhere, You are a human weed without the roots, You are a pieceof human trash that America collects from all over the world”.]]

— is actually a blessing.

This is what has enabled you to be a truly interesting and outstanding thinker, and this is why you will be able to contribute to humanity as you go along.

Had you been “enjoying your life” in that great and fantastic USSR, and taking deep roots there, the chances are that you would grow up as an insignificant miserable cog in that self-destructive aimless machine.

I remain to be convinced.

Anyhow, back to Krylov and this time his exposition of the barbarian mentality. Whereas diasporas lie half-way between civilization and its opposite, barbarians are symmetrically opposed – an ethical system of pure parasitism, glorifying the use of violence and deceit to achieve its goals. He does not believe that barbarism merely signifies a lower level of socio-economic and cultural development than civilization; instead, it is its own world opposed to and feeding off civilization. Barbarism is tightly-interlinked with and even a product of civilization, being that it is a parasite on civilization (which he defines as a construct that aims to solve its problems by itself, problems ranging the gamut from gathering food to hosting high-minded philosophical debates).

Я буду ве�ти �еб� по отношению к другими так, как они не ведут �еб� по отношению ко мне (не могут или не хот�т). Я буду делать � другими то, чего они �о мной не делают (не могут или не хот�т).

[I will behave towards like others don’t behave towards me (either because they can’t or don’t want to). I will do unto them, what they don’t do unto me (because they can’t or don’t want to).]

It is a principled position – the barbarian chafes under any other ethical system. A barbarian society regards living off others with pride, as self-actualization of its values, etc – and the feeling is all-encompassing, even among those who can’t physically be thieves or raiders. Furthermore, a key defining trait is that barbarian elites have access to the technical and ideological products of civilization:

Ð�аÑ�тоÑ�щее варварÑ�тво еще не там, где вÑ�е ходÑ�Ñ‚ Ñ� дубинами (и каждый может Ñ�делать Ñ�ебе такую же дубину). Ð�аÑ�тоÑ�щее варварÑ�тво начинаетÑ�Ñ� там, где вÑ�е ходÑ�Ñ‚ Ñ� дубинами, но вождь и его охрана ноÑ�Ñ�Ñ‚ Ñ�тальное оружие (которого данный варварÑ�кий народ делать не умеет), а еще лучше – Ñ� автоматами и гранатометами.

[Real barbarism begins not where everyone walks with clubs (and anyone can make himself a club). Real barbarism begins where everyone walks with clubs, but the leader and his guards carry cold steel weapons (which said barbarian society can’t manufacture itself), or even better – with assault rifles and RPG’s.]

Ð�аиболее характерное внешнее проÑ�вление варварÑ�тва – нарочито примитивные и дикие нравы в Ñ�очетании Ñ� развитой чужой (купленной, краденой или отнÑ�той) материальной культурой. МонгольÑ�кий хан, кутающийÑ�Ñ� в китайÑ�кие шелка; африканÑ�кий вождь на “джипе” и Ñ� “калашниковым” на шее; пуштун Ñ�о “Ñ�тингером” на плече – вот Ñ�то и еÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒ варварÑ�тво. ВарварÑ�тво выживает, борÑ�Ñ�ÑŒ Ñ� цивилизацией Ñ�редÑ�твами Ñ�амой цивилизации.

A characteristic expression of barbarism is the presence of primitive and wild social norms in conjunction with a developed foreign (bought, stolen, or looted) material culture. A Mongol khan, wrapped in Chinese silk; a Pushtun with a Stinger [missile] on his shoulder – this is barbarism. Barbarism survives by fighting civilization using the tools of civilization itself.

Barbarians defend their barbarism eloquently using the intellectual language of civilization – “freedom”, “faith”, “human rights”, “Sharia”, etc. At heart it is a criminal enterprise (by civilizational standards), but Krylov notes that frequently it has a seductive character of its own – thanks to its avid mimicry of civilizational attributes, and the support of influential supporters within civilization. He makes the intriguing argument that the Russian intelligentsia is an essentially barbarian social group.

“РуÑ�Ñ�кий интеллигент” – Ñ�то человек, решающий Ñ�вои проблемы за Ñ�чет того, что он доÑ�тавлÑ�ет общеÑ�тву неприÑ�тноÑ�ти, хотÑ� и не оружием, а Ñ�ловами. ИнтеллигенциÑ� ведет Ñ�ебÑ� по отношению к руÑ�Ñ�кому общеÑ�тву (и тем более к гоÑ�ударÑ�тву) примерно так же, как Ñ�кандалиÑ�Ñ‚ в очереди: он непрерывно оÑ�корблÑ�ет вÑ�ех приÑ�утÑ�твующих, и ждет, что его пропуÑ�Ñ‚Ñ�Ñ‚ вперед проÑ�то затем, чтобы он, наконец, замолчал. …

[The “Russian intelligent” – is a person who solves his problems by way of bringing ill to society, if not by weapons, then by words. The intelligentsia behave towards Russian society (and especially towards the Russian state) as a scandal-maker in a queue – he insults everyone present, and expects that he will be allowed to move forwards in line just so that they’d get him to shut up.]

Именно такую цель имеет тотальнаÑ� критика интеллигентами вÑ�ех аÑ�пектов руÑ�Ñ�кой жизни и целенаправленное внушение руÑ�Ñ�ким людÑ�м чувÑ�тва иррациональной вины … Как правило, Ñ�та “критика” иÑ�пользует Ñ€Ñ�д идей, Ñ�озданных на Западе (например, либеральных Ñ�оциально-Ñ�кономичеÑ�ких теорий), причем Ñ�Ñ�ылающиеÑ�Ñ� на Ñ�ти идеи лица обыкновенно не понимают Ñ�мыÑ�ла того, о чем они говорÑ�Ñ‚: Ñ�то еще один Ñ�лучай иÑ�пользованиÑ� орудий, Ñ�озданных цивилизацией, длÑ� борьбы против цивилизации …

[This is the basic underlying point behind the intelligentsia’s total criticism of all aspects of Russian life and their purposeful foisting of an irrational sense of guilt on the Russian people… As a rule, this “criticism” uses an array of ideas, created in the West (e.g., liberal socio-economic theories), furthermore in many cases the people leaning on these ideas don’t actually understand them: this is another example in which the tools created by civilization, are used in the fight against civilization.]

ПоÑ�тому не Ñ�ледует удивлÑ�Ñ‚ÑŒÑ�Ñ� тому, что вполне конÑ�труктивные западные идеи приобретают в РоÑ�Ñ�ии некую “разрушительную Ñ�илу”: они иÑ�пользуютÑ�Ñ� длÑ� заведомо деÑ�труктивных целей.

[Therefore there’s no reason to be amazed that completely valid Western ideas acquire a “destructive force” when applied to Russia: they are used for explicitly deconstructive purposes.]

I agree. The Russian intelligentsia has at large been an agent of destruction, most clearly seen in their guise as Old Bolsheviks and the 1990’s extreme liberals. Their current manifestation is in the liberasts, e.g. for examples of their arrogant intolerance and treasonous mentalities see Korchevnaya’s observations and Anatol Lieven’s article on Russia’s Limousine Liberals. Thankfully they no longer represent a real threat to Russian society and can be safely ignored.

One final thing I would note is that it is much easier for a person with a diaspora mentality to become a barbarian, considering that they’re already half-way there.

Application to the Belief Matrix

The Belief Matrix is a tool I invented to classify societies based on their degree of rationalism – irrationalism / mysticism on one axis, and sobornost / social solidarity – poshlost / internal strife on another axis. See “The Reich Loop within the Belief Matrix” section here for a more detailed description.

In this model, the diaspora mentality correlates to both rationalism and poshlost, i.e. the lower-left of the Belief Matrix; barbarism is the top-left, i.e. irrationalism and poshlost. Both are unstable states. The diaspora mentality cannot be sustained within a non-diasporic society, for a society cannot be a parasite on itself indefinitely; it will have to move upwards, towards barbarism, and start preying on others. But that too will eventually come to an end, either when it is crushed by the civilizations it makes war on – or it conquers them, and must now generate its own productive forces now that the opportunities for living off rents / confiscated surpluses have extinguished. This is the essence of the belief cycle called the Sisyphean Loop.

For more on related themes, see here (according to Mark Steyn, the Muslim community in Europe would qualify as barbarians), here (Germany), here (Russia), here (violence is reality), and here (my exposition of nihilism).