Well Integrity

Islam Selim
Integrated Asset Modeler-Rashpetco
BARRIER DEFINITIONS AND TYPES

BARRIER
•A barrier is a mechanism that reliably contains well solids, fluids
and gases within the confines of the well pressure integrity
envelope.
NORMALLY CLOSED BARRIER
Is frequently a permanent installation in the well (e.g. a bridge
plug or cement plug, a production packer, cemented casing).
NORMALLY OPEN BARRIER
Is that which requires to be open in the normal operation of the
well but is at readiness to close. (e.g. Xmas tree valve, BOP ram,
downhole safety valve).
BARRIER CATEGORIES
•The following categories of barrier may be encountered by well
operations personnel.
•When the barrier can only be pressure tested from above, the
sealing mechanism of the barrier must be such that a pressure
test from above is a good indication of pressure integrity from
below.
Drilling Barriers

• Drilling fluid in the hole of sufficient density to overbalance

formation pressures (the drilling fluid shall be subject to
continuous monitoring to qualify).
• Tested BOP stack.
• Cemented and tested cased hole where the casing is un-
perforated and has not been drilled out.
• Cased hole with a tested cement or bridge plug in place.
• Tested liner top packer.
• Casing hanger seal.
Completion & Workover Barriers

Once adequately pressure tested:

•Slickline, electric-line or coiled tubing conveyed permanent or

retrievable plug, either locked in a nipple or slip set in the tubing /
casing.
• Xmas tree.
• DHSV, providing a positive differential pressure has been maintained
since the valve was tested.
• ASV, providing a positive differential pressure has been maintained
since the valve was tested.
• Gas lift valve check valves, providing a positive differential pressure
has been maintained since the valve was tested.\
• Completion packer.
• Seals between the tubing hanger and casing head / spool.

A two-way check valve (TWCV or Back-Pressure Valve BPV) has different sealing
faces for each direction of flow. A test from above does not indicate that it will hold
pressure from below.
Intervention Equipment Barriers

•Lubricator ball or gate valve.

•Wireline, Hydraulic Workover or Coiled Tubing BOP.
•Wireline, Hydraulic Workover or Coiled Tubing lubricator /
stuffing box assembly.
Production Barriers

• Wellhead valve.
• Casing pack-off seals.
• Cased and cemented hole.
• Completion packer.
• Xmas tree valve.
• DHSV, providing a positive differential pressure has been
maintained since the valve was tested.
• ASV, providing a positive differential pressure has been
maintained since the valve was tested.
THE DOUBLE BARRIER PHILOSOPHY

• The generally accepted, fundamental oil field practice is to provide

at least two independent barrier isolations between the reservoir
and all outlets from the Xmas tree / Wellhead.
• This is particularly important for non-routine well work or for valve
repair work when the level of well isolation required must be clearly
defined and carefully controlled.
Whilst it is generally accepted that a two barrier system provides for
safe operations, it is important to note that:
• 1. This is not legally binding.
• 2. It assumes that a well can sustain natural flow to the surface.
• 3. Provision of two barriers can increase the exposure of a well and
personnel during remedial activities due to the increased number of
well entries and chemical usage during well kills.
WELL OPERATIONS DOUBLE BARRIER POLICY

• Because barriers are protection mechanisms that allow

operations to proceed in a controlled manner, the removal or
failure of a single barrier should always be considered to have
serious potential consequences.
WELL OPERATIONS DOUBLE BARRIER POLICY

Accordingly it is important to ensure that:

1. Prior to commencing any well work and removing any
pressure control equipment, a minimum of two independent
and tested barriers shall be available or installed in each flow
path in the well. Note: that there is no DHSV on the Blake Flank
injection well.
2. The barriers shall be maintained throughout the duration of
the well work operation.
3. Neither of the two barriers shall become nullified by other
simultaneous activities.
WELL OPERATIONS DOUBLE BARRIER POLICY

4. The two barriers shall comprise either:

• Two independent and tested mechanical devices or,
• Combination of one tested mechanical device and a
hydrostatic column.
5. Testing must be conducted to prove the integrity of each
mechanical barrier.
6. The level and quality of a hydrostatic column shall be
monitored and maintained.
7. In the event that one of the barriers fails or is lost, immediate
priority, within operational constraints, shall be given to its
reinstatement or replacement to regain the protection offered
by two barriers.
WELL OPERATIONS DOUBLE BARRIER POLICY

8. The removal of a barrier, or replacement with an alternative,

shall only be countenanced if it can be demonstrated that the
associated risks are acceptable (i.e. that they are lower than or
equal to the current situation, or manageable). Note: for the
Blake Flank injection well a risk analysis has been completed
that demonstrates that without the DHSV the risks are still
acceptable.
9. Normally open devices shall be confirmed as leaktight before
being accepted as a well intervention barrier.
10. Where normally open devices are used in combination (e.g.
tree valves, DHSVs or BOPs) a leak criterion for each individual
valve shall be achieved.
BARRIER INTEGRITY TEST PROCEDURES

The following aspects must be adequately addressed by

integrity testing procedures:
1. Pressure Differential - ΔP across the barrier should be large
enough and in the correct direction to adequately challenge the
integrity of the barrier.
2. Test Feasibility – Barrier integrity is usually measured as a
pressure change in or flow of fluid into or from a fixed volume
(flowline, annulus, cavity etc.) adjacent to the barrier. This fixed
volume must be of dimensions that allow changes of pressure or
volume due to leakage through the barrier to be assessed
relative to acceptance criteria.
3. Duration – the test period should be of adequate duration to
ensure stable test conditions apply and changes of pressure /
fluid volumes can be accurately measured.
BARRIER INTEGRITY TEST PROCEDURE

4. Frequency – the tests should be repeated at a frequency that

adequately confirms the competence of the barrier.
5. Measurement Accuracy - the tests must be conducted in a
manner which ensures accurate measurement of changing
parameters.
6. Recorded Tests - charts or printout from calibrated test
equipment should wherever possible be used to provide a
record of the test performed.
7. Acceptance Criteria – Criteria and recommended actions
should be in place in the event that barrier integrity fails to
meet the criteria.
REQUIREMENTS FOR BARRIER
INTEGRITY
The integrity of barriers is crucial to their existence.
1. The integrity of barriers shall be confirmed upon installation
and at regular intervals according to Well Operations Guidelines
& Procedures pertinent to each type of barrier.
2. Equipment intended as a barrier shall be approved as fit for
the intended purpose.
3. A fluid barrier shall only be regarded as an independent
barrier provided that the fluid level and quality can be
monitored and maintained.
4. Normally open barriers shall be regularly tested in accordance
with test procedures and test criteria.
REQUIREMENTS FOR BARRIER
INTEGRITY

5. Normally closed barriers shall be tested at the time of

installation to confirm integrity and correct positioning.
6. Barriers used in or installed for well intervention shall be
tested and confirmed as leaktight.
7. Barrier integrity should be tested in the direction of
anticipated flow or pressure differential wherever possible.
8. Where testing in the direction of anticipated flow is not
possible, supplementary measures to enhance the reliability of
the barrier shall be considered.
Leaktight

•Leaktight is generally used to indicate that no flow or change of

pressure (build-up or leak-off) has been measured across a
barrier.
•The objective of confirming that a barrier is leaktight is to
ensure that any leak is small enough not to present a hazard
given the nature of the ventilation and the type, length and
nature of operation to take place.
•Leaktight can be a misleading (and potentially dangerous) term.
•The conditions that gave a ‘leaktight’ test result must be
carefully considered in relation to the Pressure Differential, Test
Fluid, Duration and Measurement Accuracy of the test.
SUB-SURFACE SAFETY
VALVE (SSSV) TESTING
The integrity of an SSSV shall be tested as follows:
• Testing of the SSSVs of production wells is carried out, wherever
possible, using well pressure. The well is closed in at the SSSV,
the pressure bled off above and the subsequent pressure
behaviour monitored above.
• It is not required that the SSSVs are slam shut, but this procedure
can be used in low pressure wells if it aids closure and sealing.
API Acceptable leakage rate
API RP 14B states that the allowable leakage past a closed SSSV
is as follows:
• 15 scf/min (25.5 m3/hr) for gas.
• 400 cc/min (4 x 10-4 m3/min) for liquid.
Acceptance Criteria
Options
DHSV Acceptable
• This standard Leakage
is used for DHSV’s (API 14B) and subsea valves
(API 14H), and uses the following equations for the allowable
PBU for gas and liquid:
• Gas:
DHSV Acceptable Leakage
Downstream Chamber
Volume
• Calculation of the acceptance criteria must consider the
volume of the fixed chamber in which the pressure build-up is
being measured.
• In a large volume the acceptable leak rate may result in a
small pressure change which could be difficult to measure, be
within the measurement error of the pressure recording
system or be masked by the pressure change related to
cooling. In a small volume, e.g. the volume enclosed between
the master, wing and crossover valves of the Xmas tree, the
acceptable leak rate may result in a very rapid or large
pressure change.
• A large pressure change could be difficult to measure or
provide an unreasonably conservative criterion.
Pressure Acceptance Criteria
Integrity Test
Integrity Test Procedures
1. Record pre-test flowing data i.e. annulus, tubing, test header,
gas lift header and water injection header pressure and
temperature. For naturally producing wells, the Annulus Wing
Valve (AWV) will be shut and the pressure measured will be
annulus pressure. For gas-lifted wells, the AWV will be open and
the pressure measured will be flowing gas lift pressure.
2. Ensure XOV and AMV open.
3. Close gas lift choke and AWV (ensure annulus pressurised).
4. Shut-in at the production choke.
5. Equalise test header and production header.
Integrity Test Procedures

6. Line up well to test header by-passing meter. If test header is

in use, use the production header.
7. Close DHSV.
8. Open production choke to depressurise downstream of the
DHSV.
9. Close PWV.
10. Isolate well at test header.
Integrity Test Procedures
11. Test A: Monitor PBU at PPT 9012 to test DHSV. Test B:
Monitor PBU at PPT 9014 to test XOV. Record results on the Test
Record Form.
12. Close PMV.
13. Open DHSV.
14. Test C: Monitor PBU at PPT 9012 to test PMV. Record results
on the Test Record Form.
15. Open PMV.
Integrity Test Procedures
16. Test D: Monitor PBU at PPT 9025 to test PWV (assumes no
leak at test header isolation valve). Record results on the Test
Record Form.
17. Close PMV.
18. Open header valve to depressurise tree cavity.
19. Close production choke.
20. Close PWV.
Integrity Test Procedures
21. Close AMV.
22. Close production choke.
23. Open PWV and XOV to depressure tree cavity (assumes gas
lift choke leaks).
24. Close PWV.
25. Test E: Monitor PBU at PPT 9014 to test AMV. Test F:
Monitor PBU at PPT 9014 to test AWV. Record results on the
Test Record Form.
26. Close XOV.
27. Line up well for production (pre-test conditions).
Valve Manipulations
Change-Out Period for Wireline-
Retrievable Valves
• Wireline retrievable SSSVs (WRSSSV) that have been
successfully closure tested are not required to be pulled
before three years service. If a WRSSSV is still within
specification after 2 years in service, it may remain downhole
for a further one year, based on acceptable testing before it is
replaced.
• Once a track record of how the valves survive prolonged
service has been established, then the 3 years maximum in-
service time may be re-evaluated.
• If there are indications of corrosion from coupon records,
then retrieval of valves is advised because they are safety-
critical components.