The End of Military Rule (Fall of Dictatorship)
The End of Military Rule (Fall of Dictatorship)
The End of Military Rule (Fall of Dictatorship)
MILITARY RULE
THE FALL OF THE DICTATORSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION
President Ferdinand E. Marcos assumed power on December 30,1965, and become the second
president reelected to office in 1969. There were efforts to maneuver the 1971 Constitutional
Convention to permit his continuing in office. With the swell of student radicalization and
increasing number of violent demonstrations, Marcos played up middle-class fears and used
these to justify the imposition of Martial law on September 23, 1972 by virtue of Proclamation
No.1081.
Martial Law was not just an invocation of the President’s emergency powers under the 1935
Constitution – Marcos went further to assume all governing powers excluded civilian courts, and
systematically replaced the 1935 Constitution with the 1973 Constitution for his own ends. The
replacement of the Constitution was done under dubious circumstances.
First, Marcos ordered a viva voce plebiscite on January 10 – 15, 1973 in which the voting age
was reduced to 15 to ratify the new Constitution. Military men were placed prominently to
intimidate voters. Results report that 90% of the citizens have voted for the Constitution even
though some communities did not participate in the “citizens assemblies”. Over the next few
years, Marcos would hold four more plebiscites – in 1973, 1975, 1976, and 1978 - through
citizen assemblies to legitimize the continuation of martial rule.
Second, he intimidated the Supreme Court to approve it. Using the stick and carrot method
on the justices of the Supreme Court, Ferdinand Marcos was able to force the Supreme Court
to uphold martial law and the new Constitution. Previously, around 8,000 individuals ,
including senators, civil libertarians, journalists, students, and labor leaders, were arrested
and detained without due process upon the declaration of martial law. With many of them
filing petitions to the Supreme Court for habeas corpus, they challenged the constitutionality
of the proclamation. However, the Supreme Court issued its final decision and dismissed
petitions for habeas corpus by ruling that martial law was a political question beyond the
jurisdiction of the court; and that, furthermore, the court had already deemed the 1973
Constitution in full force and effect, replacing the 1935 Constitution.
Martial Law imposed government control over all forms of media. On September 22, 1972,
Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No.1, ordering the Press Secretary and Defense
Secretary to assume control over all media outlets.
Marcos issued at least eleven Presidential Decrees that suppressed press freedom.
Journalists who did not comply with the new restrictions faced physical threats, libel
suits, or forced resignation. With such stringent censorship regulations, most of the
periodicals that were allowed to operate were crony newspapers, such as Benjamin
Romualdez’s Times Journal, Hans Menzi’s Bulletin Today, and Roberto Benedicto’s
Philippine Daily Express. These newspapers offered “bootlicking reportage” on the
country’s economy while completely eschewing political issues. Hence, President
Marcos’ absolute rule had a “cloak of legality” and incontestability, making it nearly
impregnable.
However, specific factors converged and eventually led to the fall of the dictatorship
and the eventual restoration of democracy in the Philippines.
II. FACTORS THAT
LED TO THE FALL OF
THE DICTATORSHIP
THESE FACTORS INCLUDE:
-01- -02-
Opposition to Marcos’ Health and
Martial Law in the the Issue of
1970s Succession
-03- -04-
The collapse of the The assassination of
Philippine Economy Ninoy Aquino
THESE FACTORS INCLUDE:
-05- -06-
The failure of the
The coup plot by the
snap election of
RAM
1986
A. OPPOSITION TO MARTIAL
LAW IN THE 1970s
Using nonviolent tactics, they advocated political reforms. However, the reformist opposition was
not a united movement, but an amalgamation of different middle and upper class groups who had
different motives. It was for this reason that Marcos tolerated them, so long as they were incapable
of viably replacing him or attaining the support of the masses. The reformist opposition was
divided on the issue of boycotting the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) elections set for April 7.
The most prominent opposition movement that participated the IBP elections was the newly
formed Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) party of former senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., who was
imprisoned at that time. Ninoy decided to push through with his candidacy to give the populace a
chance to air out their frustration against the government. However, the elections were a total
shutout for LABAN, with Marcos’ Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) winning 91% of the seats in
the IBP.
2.) Revolutionary Opposition
The government’s use of communist and secessionist threats as justification for Martial Law only
contributed to the growth of the political opposition and the amassing of recruits to the New
People’s Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the provinces in the
1970s. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) attempted to seize their “illegal” firearms
supplied by Libya, sparking a war that lasted from 1973 to 1977. Over the course of the war,
13,000 people were killed while over a million were displaced. In contrast, the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) strengthened as Marcos’ dictatorship weakened; as opposed to the
Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), which surrendered in 1974. Following the principle of
“centralized command, decentralized operations,” the CPP established autonomous, regional, self-
sustaining chapters all over the Philippines. Not only did this give CPP cadres more freedom to
experiment with tactics appropriate to their localities, it also helped them survive the loss of many
original leaders, either to prison or death.
3.) Revolutionary Opposition
Martial law also faced opposition from the religious sector.
Mainline Protestant churches have been vocal in their opposition of the dictatorship since 1972; by 1978,
they were holding mass protest actions and by 1981, they held boycott campaigns for the April plebiscite
and the June presidential elections. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church, which sympathized with Marcos’
anti-communism, maintained a position of “critical collaboration” while paying attention to the
opposition among its members. This allowed it a degree of autonomy when it came to carrying out their
social projects, which focused on alleviating poverty and defending the poor against communism.
However, the provincial clergy started becoming radicalized after seeing the effects of the Marcos
dictatorship on the poor. They formed Christians for National Liberation, which clandestinely used
Church “social action” programs to get foreign funding through private donor agencies that shared the
same views. On January 17, 1981, in an effort to calm the growing opposition of the Catholic Church,
President Marcos lifted martial law (if by name only) via Proclamation No. 2045 in preparation for the
first state visit of Saint Pope John Paul II on February 17, 1981.
B. MARCOS’ HEALTH AND THE
ISSUE OF SUCCESSION
As early as 1979, the health of President Marcos had been deteriorating. This was kept a secret at first,
but it was common knowledge then that Marcos was already sick, especially at the time of the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Marcos’ health status worsened by mid-November of 1984. Blas Ople,
Marcos’ Minister of Labor, divulged the situation for the first time on record on December 3, 1984,
saying that Marcos was “in control but cannot take major initiatives at this time.” He stated that, “The
health of our leader is undergoing certain vicissitudes, problems which started a year ago.”
In 1973, Marcos decided that the Philippines had to have a nuclear power plant—then
considered the hallmark of a modern nation—because it fit in with Marcos’ ostentatious
vision of himself and the country.
In the last years of the Marcos regime, the Philippine economy was almost grinding to a halt.
This was so, despite the fact that the Marcos administration implemented its three-pronged
development strategy: the green revolution in agriculture, growth and diversity in agricultural and
forestry exports, and massive external borrowing. The profit from these three strategies were
amassed disproportionately to the wealthiest in the population, thereby causing a large disparity
between the rich and the poor.
In 1973, Marcos decided that the Philippines had to have a nuclear power plant—then
considered the hallmark of a modern nation—because it fit in with Marcos’ ostentatious vision
of himself and the country.
However, such an endeavor at that time was problematic: at best, the power plant would have
generated power for only 15 percent of Luzon’s population. Security was another issue: there
were four active volcanoes located within 100 miles from the proposed site. Furthermore, the
Philippines was one of the poorest nations setting out on the nuclear path; only Japan, Taiwan,
and South Korea were building nuclear power plants in East Asia, and they were far better off
economically and technologically. The power plant was the largest and most expensive
construction project in the country’s history.
The old economic elite, whom President Marcos called the “oligarchy,” relatively
tolerated the systematic favoritism of the administration on crony companies. This
changed In 1981, when Filipino Chinese business tycoon Dewey Dee of the Binondo
Central Bank left the country for Canada, leaving nearly P600 million in debt, seriously
compromising the crony corporations. Government banks announced a rescue fund of
approximately P5 billion in credit and equity capital, which the old elite found unfair,
launching a barrage of public criticism.
The impoverishment of the economy led to the loss of support of the middle class and the
small-time landowners and farmers in the regions on the Marcos administration. Poverty,
aside from human rights violations by the military, also became a means for rebel groups
to recruit citizens to their cause. In 1978, the strength of the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) grew from 6,900 to over 20,000 regulars. In 1980, the New People’s Army
formed 26 guerrilla fronts with over 16,000 regulars, and the Communist Party of the
Philippines have attracted 40,000 mass activists.
D. THE ASSASSINATION OF
NINOY AQUINO
After three years of exile in the United States, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., the foremost leader of the
Marcos opposition, decided to come back to the Philippines, intending to restore democracy in the
country and convince President Marcos for an orderly succession. Previously, Aquino had been
incarcerated by the military for seven years before being released for bypass surgery in the United States.
Ninoy Aquino’s conversation with journalist Teodoro Locsin Jr. before he went back to the Philippines
was revealing. Aquino landed in the Manila International Airport via China Airlines Flight 811 at 1:05
p.m. on August 21, and was escorted by armed men out of the plane. Minutes later, gunshots were heard.
The former senator was shot dead by an assassin’s bullet to the head. When the news of Ninoy’s death
spread, approximately seven million came to his funeral procession on August 31, the biggest and
longest in Philippine history. This singular event further eroded the people’s support of the Marcos
regime.
E. THE FAILURE OF THE
SNAP ELECTION OF 1986
In the first week of November 1985, when President Marcos was interviewed in the David
Brinkley Show, he stated his intention to call for a snap election, even going so far as to
invite the members of the US Congress to observe, calling the accusation of fraud as
unfounded. This, it seems, was an attempt to consolidate support and show the United
States the legitimacy of the Marcos administration. The announcement for a snap election
within three months was ahead of schedule; the next regular elections were supposed to be
held in 1987. The President was overconfident; he disregarded the objections of his family,
his Cabinet, and his party. Meanwhile, prior to the snap election announcement, a
“Convenor Group” was formed, composed of Lorenzo Tañada, Jaime V. Ongpin, and Cory
Aquino, to select a presidential candidate for the opposition. Cory was regarded as the
rightful candidate, the “people’s choice,” who was also promoted by Jaime Cardinal Sin.
For fear of being left out, Salvador Laurel of the United Nationalist Democratic
Organization (UNIDO) and Eva Kalaw of the Liberal Party (LP) formed the National
Unification Committee’s (NUC). Laurel was nominated by the NUC’s Nominating
Convention held at the Araneta Coliseum as the presidential candidate of the opposition
party for the coming Snap elections.
Meanwhile, Cory Aquino announced her intention to run if a snap election was to be held,
and if she had the support of a million citizens. he was successful in gaining this support.
The opposition, therefore had two frontrunners: Aquino, and former Senator Salvador
“Doy” Laurel. However, in the same year, on December 7, Laurel decided to give way to
Aquino. Though initially reluctant, Laurel was eventually convinced that their tandem was
the only way the opposition stood a chance against the overwhelming influence of Marcos
and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), and decided to run as Aquino’s vice president.
In Teodoro L. Locsin Jr.’s article in the Philippine Free Press, Cory served as the “symbol
of unity.” Aquino and Laurel ran together under the United Nationalist Democratic
Organization (UNIDO).
During the 1986 snap elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos used gender as
an issue in his campaign broadcast against rival for the presidency, Corazon C.
Aquino. This broadcast warns that a woman would not be able to handle the
challenges of the post.
Massive poll fraud and rampant cheating marred the vote on the day of the
elections, February 7, 1986. Thousands of registered voters—who had voted
successfully in previous elections—found their names suspiciously missing
from the lists. On February 9, 35 COMELEC employees and computer
operators at the COMELEC Tabulation Center walked out in protest due to the
wide discrepancy between the computer tabulation and the tally board, showing
blatant manipulation of electoral results. In the countryside, precincts were
hounded by the military and ballot-rigging was rampant. NAMFREL, in turn,
showed Aquino in the lead with almost 70 percent of the votes canvassed.
By February 15, 1986, in an unprecedented announcement that was met with public
outrage, the Batasang Pambansa proclaimed Marcos and Arturo Tolentino as the winners
of the presidential and vice-presidential race respectively, by virtue of Resolution No. 38.
Opposition assemblymen walked out of the Session Hall in protest.
This led to the opposition’s indignation rally in Luneta the next day where Cory Aquino
spoke to around two million people in Luneta, in what would be known as the Tagumpay
ng Bayan rally. At the event, Aquino called for massive civil disobedience and boycott of
Marcos-crony owned companies and products. The Aquino-Laurel ticket also proclaimed
victory.
The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) emerged in 1982 as a small, secret group
intent on strengthening military rule through a coup d’état. Initially, it was composed of
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and a handful of regular officers from the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA), who harbored resentment against General Fabian Ver, the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). By early 1985, the RAM was a fully
organized group with a leadership committee of 11 men and a membership base of around
three hundred. Although relatively small, the RAM had the support of a majority of AFP
officers, especially the PMA regulars. By the middle of the year, the RAM went public, yet
popular suspicion regarding the movement’s integrity arose due to its inclusion of former
military torturers. Still, most media outlets ignored their human rights record, choosing
instead to paint the RAM as reformers.
Plans for a Christmas coup in 1985 were started in August, but when President Marcos
unexpectedly called for snap elections in November, RAM leaders had to rethink their
strategy, and the coup was postponed for the following year. When Marcos was
proclaimed the winner in the fraudulent February 7 elections, the RAM leaders agreed to
launch their coup at 2:00 a.m. (“H-hour”) on Sunday, February 23, 1986.
Yet for all the RAM leaders’ confidence in their plan, they did not have the command
experience to successfully carry out the complicated operation, after almost ten years of
sitting in air-conditioned offices. And to make matters worse, Ver knew of the coup. On
the Thursday before the planned coup, he summoned his senior officers and engineered a
trap. He ordered a navy demolition team to plant bombs and mines along the palace
riverfront.
As the rebels made their way toward the palace on rafts, Ver would blind them with
powerful spotlights. Marcos’ son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., would be brought out
with a loud hailer, giving the rebels a final chance to surrender. If the rebels did not stand
down, they would be blown sky high. The rebels only realized that their plan had been
compromised on the Friday night before the coup, when Honasan and Kapunan saw a large
number of troops amassing at Malacañang. They informed Enrile about the situation, and
the assault on the palace had to be called off.
Faced with only two options—dispersing or regrouping—Enrile chose the latter as the
“more honorable” option. He announced his defection from Marcos on Saturday night in a
press conference at Camp Aguinaldo, alongside Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos, Ver’s
deemed successor. In the first critical hours of the uprising, RAM leaders called on former
PMA classmates and comrades, pleading for support or at the very least neutrality, thus
undermining Marcos’ defenses. Aquino was at an anti-Marcos rally in Cebu City. She was
informed of the coup, but she was also suspicious of Enrile’s motives. Half a day later, she
announced her support for the rebellion and asked the people to help.
On that first night, people came to EDSA by the thousands with whatever provisions they
could offer: pans of pancit, boxes of pizza, tins of biscuits, bunches of bananas. Edwin
Lacierda, presidential spokesperson of President Benigno S. Aquino III, was there to
witness: “More than a rally,”
Thus began the four-day EDSA People Power Revolution. The revolution was a peaceful
one, with soldiers being coaxed with food, prayers, flowers, and cheers by people from all
walks of life who sat, stood, and knelt in prayer in front of the tanks. In the evening of
February 22, Marcos personally telephoned General Prospero Olivas five times, ordering
him to disperse the crowd at Camp Aguinaldo, because their presence would complicate an
assault. A mentee of Ramos, Olivas feigned compliance and countermanded Marcos’ orders.
Marcos then turned to General Alfredo Lim, the Metrocom district commander, but Lim was
also loyal to Ramos and disregarded Marcos’ orders.
On that Monday morning, government troops headed by Marine battalions
began their advance to Camp Crame from different directions as a dozen of
helicopters encircled the camp. The tensed crowd around the Constabulary
Headquarters waited with uncertainty as the helicopters approached.
The government troops broke into the rear of Camp Aguinaldo and trained their
howitzers and mortars on Camp Crame. General Josephus Ramas gave the
Fourth Marine brigade the “kill order” while civilians were still inside, but the
brigade’s commander Colonel Braulio Balbas hesitated. Ramas would ask
Balbas to attack four times, and each time, Balbas stalled. Marcos lost control
of the Marines.
However, when Marine commandant General Artemio Tadiar met with Ver
later, Ver confirmed that Marcos approved the kill order on Crame. Following a
rocket attack from the rebel helicopters, General Ver radioed the wing
commander of the F-5 fighters in Manila, ordering them to bomb Camp Crame.
Francisco Baula, the squadron leader and RAM member.
General Ver gave secret orders to Major General Vicente Piccio to launch an air
attack on Camp Crame. Marcos lost control of the air force. After Marcos lost
complete control of the military, his presidency came to an end the following
day, on February 25, 1986.
SOURCES:
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/the-fall-of-the-dictatorship/