Improvisation as a Method of

Composition: Reconciling the

Dichotomy
Katya Davisson

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This article builds upon existing scholarship concerning the relationship between improvisation
and composition. Sections 1 to 3 comprise an exploration into and analysis of both the traditional
understanding of improvisation and composition as opposing categories, as well as the more modern,
nuanced view of their interpenetrating natures. I conclude that the former view should be replaced by
the latter. Sections 4 and 5 present and subsequently negate two potential failings of my argument.
First, I confront the problem posed by Goehr’s work-concept, whose essence is opposed to the spirit
of improvisation, but argue that recording allows for the solidification of these improvisations into
works. Secondly, I undermine the view that composition is creation ex nihilo whilst improvisation
is the mere reworking of old material. I uncover the originality of improvisation and formulae of
composition to restore their compatibility and reinforce improvisation’s status as a method of broad-
and narrow-sense composition.

1. The Traditionally Dichotomous View

Historically, improvisation and composition have been viewed as opposing categories, but
their relationship has changed and developed over time. As Goehr writes, ‘by 1800 …
the notion of extemporisation (improvisation) acquired its modern understanding and
was seen to stand in strict opposition to composition’ (1992, p. 234). This dichotomy is
neatly expressed by ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl: ‘they are opposed concepts … the
one spontaneous, the other calculated; the one primitive, the other sophisticated; the one
natural, the other artificial’ (1974, p. 4). Although in opposition to composition, impro-
visation remained a key skill for performing virtuosi throughout the nineteenth century.
In the twentieth century, however, the increased glorification of compositions as works
led to improvisation’s cultural dismissal. According to Nettl, improvisation was seen as a
‘kind of craft, in contrast to the art of composition … it was studied as something that in
European music belongs to the realm of performance practice (as in the case of ornamen-
tation)’ (1974, p. 4). Musics outside the notated European tradition were often thought of
as improvised, ‘in the negative sense of something unprepared and unforeseen’ (Treitler,
1991, p. 66). More recently, Ted Gioia has expressed the rather critical view that states
that, ‘improvisation is doomed … to offer a pale imitation of the perfection attained by
composed music’ (1988, p. 66), although he finds positive virtues in improvisation.
The dichotomy is well-illustrated by the opposing views of Busoni and Schoenberg.
Schoenberg was a compositional determinist and glorified the thoroughly planned art
of composition, while Busoni defended the spontaneity so crucial to improvisation. The

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374 | Katya DAVISSON

latter subscribes to the view that ‘every notation is, in itself, a transcription of an abstract
idea. The instant the pen seizes it, the idea loses its original form …’ (1962, p. 84). Busoni
revered the original artistic inspiration to that improvisation was one step closer than
notated composition and employed the analogy of a portrait and its model. For Busoni,
‘notation is to improvisation as the portrait is to the living model’, and he finds significant
value in the contribution of the performer-interpreter, stating that ‘what the composer’s
inspiration necessarily loses through notation, his interpreter should restore by his own’

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(1962, p. 84). Busoni valued the art of notation and transcription as an ‘ingenious ex-
pedient for catching an inspiration’, but, for him, it pales in comparison to the vital and
living art of improvisation, which is a direct materialization of musical inspiration (1962,
p. 84). The notion that a written score does not fully determine nor encapsulate the
music is echoed by Kivy, who stated that it is the ‘performer’s task to fill this gap’ (2006,
p. 100). This resonates with Busoni’s claim that the performer-interpreter should restore
the sense of original inspiration to the music.
The aforementioned cultural dismissal of improvisation is exemplified by the opposing
view of Schoenberg, which states that ‘the portrait (the notated work) has higher artistic
life, while the model (the improvisation) has only a lower life’ (Busoni, 1962, p. 84). He
takes a Platonic stance, and sees musical works as universals, or types, and their perform-
ances as particulars, tokens or instances (Kivy, 1987, p. 245). The former are unchange-
able, abstract and unique, and, according to Dodd, universal, meaning that there is no
reason why we should regard them as being truly created by their composers. Instead,
they are discovered. The latter are concrete particulars that we can experience, such as
performances. (Types and tokens will be explored later with reference to Goehr’s work-
concept.) Schoenberg places established musical works—or what we will come to know
as narrow-sense compositions—above improvisation, which parallels his belief in the au-
thority of the composer over the performer. The former is the sole agent with artistic
licence, while the latter is only slave to his wishes. He wrote: ‘[the performer] must read
every wish from [the work]’s lips’, as, if he assumes wrongful autonomy, he will become
‘a parasite on the exterior, when he could be the artery in the circulation of the blood’
(Stuckenschmidt, 1997, p. 227).
Such idealist perfectionism is unattainable, Schoenberg believes; each performance, or
instance, of a work will necessarily be slightly different and, consequently, slightly im-
perfect. However, such idealist musical Platonism serves as a perfect contrast to Busoni’s
humanistic emphasis on the event of performance itself. Although mentioned by nei-
ther Busoni nor Schoenberg, an appropriate parallel for these views might be the ‘aes-
thetic of imperfection’, as coined by Ted Gioia. Such an aesthetic takes improvisation as
its paradigm, and the opposing ‘aesthetic of perfection’ is exemplified by the composed
work. Gioia’s aesthetic of imperfection states that true spontaneity is inextricable from
an element of risk, which inevitably introduces error into the improvisation: ‘the finished
product will show moments of rare beauty intermixed with technical mistakes and aim-
less passages’ (1988, p. 66). It is crucial to note that risk is fundamental to the aesthetic
of improvisation and, in line with Gioia’s view, the errors that creep into such impro-
visations are part of this aesthetic and not to be shied away from. Risk is also present in
IMPROVISATION AS A METHOD OF COMPOSITION: RECONCILING THE DICHOTOMY | 375

composition, but it is of a different nature due to it taking place outside of ‘real time’ and
is not considered a positive component of the practice. Alongside the opposing aesthetics
that improvisation and composition exemplify sit further parallels, neatly presented by
Hamilton:
The aesthetics of imperfection thus focuses on the moment or event of performance,
while its rival emphasises the timelessness of the work. The rival aesthetics are ten-
dencies in the rather complex thought of Busoni and Schoenberg, and the dichotomy,

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as will become clear, implies others: process and product; impermanence and per-
manence; spontaneity and deliberation. (2000, p. 170)

2. A More Nuanced Approach

While references to such dichotomies are still prevalent in contemporary scholarship
regarding the ontologies of improvisation and composition, the lines are becoming in-
creasingly blurred. The traditional view that composition and improvisation are opposing
categories of music-making might nowadays be said to demonstrate a somewhat deficient
understanding of both categories and their interaction. Consequently, recent scholarship
has sought to expose the reality of a more nuanced relationship between composition
and improvisation, in which composition has two senses: narrow and broad. The former
involves musical ‘works’, as defined by Lydia Goehr’s work-concept, which are most fre-
quently desk-produced and notated. This narrow sense of composition has a normative
value for performances. The latter is broader and involves combining musical elements in
an aesthetically rewarding form. Composition in such a broad guise includes the products
of improvisation and AI-generated composition, among others. In this sense, composition
has no normative value for performances.
Distinguishing between the broad and narrow senses of composition shows how im-
provisation and composition may not be opposites, but instead can stand in a reciprocal
relation—by which I mean that they might aspire towards one another. ‘There is a sense
in that the levels overlap; there may, for instance, be little difference between a loosely
constructed studio composition and the recording of an improvisation’ (Hamilton, 2000,
p. 172). Hamilton has also described the categories as ‘interpenetrating opposites’, which
neatly surmises the idea of ambition and aspiration (2000, p. 171). Successful improvisa-
tion has the appearance of composition—it is well-formed. At the same time, a compel-
ling interpretation of a composition has the appearance of an improvisation—it seems
spontaneously created. This is the phenomenon to which de Saram is referring when
he remarks that ‘the improvised piece [aspires to] the solidity of a written piece, the
written piece [aspires] to loosen itself up like an improvisation, to give itself spontaneity’
(2020, p. 110). Cook offers a similar, if slightly more nuanced view of improvisation and
work-performance as interpenetrating opposites, rather than improvisation and work-
composition (2013).
Like composition, improvisation has two senses as distinguished by Goehr: improvisa-
tion extempore, which refers to music-making without prior deskwork, and improvisation
impromptu, which concerns the lack of an established method (2016, p. 459). Much like
376 | Katya DAVISSON

the broader sense of composition, the improvisation impromptu has no necessary link to
music: a builder might improvise by using unique materials in place of traditional ones.
It is worth mentioning that, unlike in the case of composition, this is not a broader cat-
egory, per se, but instead a different yet occasionally overlapping one. However, despite
having no necessary relation to music, it is nonetheless interesting to conceive of impro-
visation impromptu in terms of musical improvisation, as much musical improvisation does
use an established method and therefore does not fit into such a definition. Regarding

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musical improvisation as employing established methodology, one should look at Mozart’s
improvised cadenzas, which adhered closely to the idiom of his notated works; in jazz,
improvisers often employ a set of idiomatic gestures or ‘licks’. Such a thing is not usu-
ally viewed negatively as it allows performers to establish a recognizable improvisational
style, although the question of improvisers’ genuine spontaneity will be discussed later
in this essay. The most compelling definition for improvisation asserts that it comprises
two necessary components—composition and performance—which work together or-
ganically to give rise to the spontaneous music-making Goehr refers to in her definition of
improvisation extempore. The same sentiment is captured in the New Grove Dictionary’s
definition of improvisation: ‘the creation of a musical work, or the final form of a musical
work, as it is being performed’ (Nettl, 1980, p. 31), and Tony Buck of improvising trio
The Necks agrees, stating that it is ‘no longer a dichotomy of improvising and composing
… improvisation is a methodology for composing, just like serialism, or rhythmic inter-
locking’ (Hamilton, 2020, p. 290).
The traditional understanding is hardly surprising given that the timeless work-concept
surrounding composition and the spontaneity-driven endeavour of improvisation appear
entirely incompatible. However, it seems not only possible, through our newly acquired
understanding of the multifaceted categories of composition and improvisation, but also
important to attempt to reconcile their relationship. Compositions with ‘work-status’
hold enormous legal, cultural and financial import; while the same cannot be said of im-
provisations. Therefore, the more nuanced view guided by a deeper understanding of the
musics’ multifaceted natures as they have developed and become reconciled should be rec-
ognized and seriously considered so that improvisational musicians can share in the many
benefits that those who create ‘works’ partake in.

3. Improvisation as Both Broad- and Narrow-Sense Composition

The claim that improvisation is a method of broad-sense composition—that is, that it
involves the assembly of elements in an aesthetically rewarding form—should be fairly
uncontroversial. There is no music, improvisations included, which has not, in this broad
sense, been composed. I also wish to take this argument one step further, however, to
propose that improvisation can also be a method of narrow-sense composition. This claim
is more controversial. It is clear that this ’does not apply to all improvisation as broader-
sense composition does, but it is the case that some improvisations go on to become ‘works’
from the ‘viewpoint of their reception’ (Hamilton, 2000, p. 184). Composition in this
sense does not take place at the time of the music’s creation—this is merely the start of the
compositional process. Instead, improvisations can become narrow-sense compositions
IMPROVISATION AS A METHOD OF COMPOSITION: RECONCILING THE DICHOTOMY | 377

or ‘works’ when they are solidified through recording and notation, and are subsequently
analyzed—namely, they are treated as compositions in the traditional narrow sense. The
notation affords the improvisation a parallel Platonic form, which allows for it to be sep-
arated from its performance, and learnt and performed by others. This is the case with
numerous Miles Davis solos. This essay therefore argues that improvisation is a method of
composition not only in the broader sense, but also in the narrow sense due to the inter-
dependent and inextricable relationship that links composition and improvisation.

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Alongside the earlier claim that ‘there is no music that has not, in some sense, been
composed’ sits an equally true claim: there is no (man-made) music that has not, in some
sense, been improvised. If improvisation is simultaneous broad-sense composition and
performance, how does one compose without improvising? Even in the narrowest of
senses, composition implicates performance and improvisation. Composers play a phrase
on the piano and write it down, over and over again. The process is performative and,
although it is fragmentary and somewhat stilted, it is redolent of improvisation. Even in
cases where this is not so clear, such as when composers like Mozart and Schubert hear
music in their heads and then write it down without the need of a piano to hear their ideas,
there is still a performance going on inside their heads, albeit an imaginary one. And per-
formance implicates improvisation. According to Richard Cochrane, ‘the practice of im-
provisation … exists in all musical performances’ (2000, p. 140). This is even true for the
performance of extensively prescribed compositions when the decisions concerning the
musical minutiae of vibrato, tone colour, exact tempo are made in real time. Such scope
for originality does not, however, place the works themselves on an improvisational con-
tinuum, but instead places the work’s performances on that continuum. If the compositional
process is to some extent performative, and performance implicates improvisation, then
composition must necessarily involve improvisation. This is improvisation being used as
a method of composition or, more specifically, a crucial step in the compositional process.
Despite the presence of oftentimes-strict design, the process of composition, of creating
something new, necessitates improvisation in some sense of the word, and is hence de-
pendent on it. The crucial difference between improvisation as a mere step in the method
of composition and improvisation as constituting the entire process of composition is that
the former does not take place in real time and is not performed within the constraints
and demands of a tempo. The composer will usually return to their improvisation, re-
vising and reflecting on it until she is happy. The jazz improviser, by contrast, improvises
within the inexorable passing of real time, which brings with it a considerable element of
risk, a fundamental component of improvisation.
While it is clear that all composition is linked to improvisation, Hamilton references
Giacinto Scelsi’s work as an exemplar of this process; Scelsi intended for his improvisa-
tions to be transcribed and published as compositions. He allowed higher spiritual forces
to direct his improvisations, which he recorded for subsequent transcription carried out
by Tosatti. This demonstrates improvisation being employed as a compositional method
rather than the subtly different use of improvisation to give rise to compositional works.
Even in cases unlike that of Scelsi, where intention does not support the ‘transform-
ation’ from an improvisation to a composition, this is very much possible. Hamilton
378 | Katya DAVISSON

adds that ‘Jean-Yves Thibaudet performs Bill Evans’ improvisations, and George Russell
based a composition on Miles Davis’ solo on So What’ (2020, p. 293). Jazz pianist Paul
Edis ‘[composes] so that [his] music almost sounds improvised, and yet [he seeks] to im-
provise in such a way that [his] improvisation sounds composed’ (2020, p. 144). This
idea of aspirational interpenetration is illustrative of the inextricability of the categories
and is worth exploring here. The desire for compositions to sound improvised is for
them to possess the natural and free qualities so often associated with improvisation.

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For Edis’s improvisations to sound almost composed relates more to the organization of
form and content into a coherent whole, something often forfeited by amateur impro-
visers. Benson’s view also relies on the idea of an inextricable relationship. ‘The process
by that a work comes into existence is best described as improvisatory at its very core
… improvisation is not something that precedes composition … or stands outside and
opposed to composition. Instead, I think that all the activities that we call “composing”
and “performing” are essentially improvisatory in nature’ (2003, p. 2). The remainder of
this essay will pose and then dissolve two key problems with this viewpoint: first, objec-
tions posed by Goehr’s work-concept and, second, doubts about the genuine spontaneity
of improvisers.
This chapter has established two ways in which improvisation might be said to be a
method of composition: firstly, improvisation (as an action) is a step in the process of
composition; secondly, improvisation (as a product) can be considered a work once it is
recorded and is, hence, repeatable.

4. Problem of Compatibility Posed by Goehr’s Work-Concept

According to Goehr, the work-concept appeared around 1800, and it marks the shift
in focus from the extra-musical function framed around performance to the composer
and the composition. For example, instead of dance suites that explicitly refer to and
rely on their extra-musical elements, instrumental and absolute music came into vogue,
demonstrating a new l’art pour l’art attitude towards music. This revolutionized the way in
which music was perceived, and it elevated musical works to the respected status of the
literary and visual arts, while the composer went from being considered a craftsperson
to being an artist. This increased status is referenced in the title of Goehr’s seminal essay
on the work-concept, The imaginary museum of musical works (1992). Such a title equates
musical composition and visual artwork, which together stand in her imaginary museum
as immutable finished products, there for viewing and appreciating. According to Goehr,
the works available for viewing at this museum are restricted to pieces ‘composed from
the latter half of the 18th century to the present within the European High Art tradition’
(1992, p. 234). This limited scope quite clearly excludes improvisation. However, not all
scholars sympathize with such a narrow remit. Julian Dodd, for example, proposes the
alternative criterion of a type-token theory of musical works, which employs the ideas of
types and tokens or, alternatively, universals and instances as explored earlier. This theory
comprises what he sees as two necessary qualities of a musical work. Firstly, it must be
hearable in its entirety, and, secondly, it must be intended to be, and be capable of, being
repeated (Dodd, 2007, p. 3).
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Earlier, it was proposed that improvisation might be defined as ‘simultaneous perform-

ance and composition’. The advent of the work-concept led to a rise in the importance of
the desk-composer and his production of manuscript works, and, consequently, the separ-
ation of composition and performance. Goehr suggests that the rise in control given to the
composer through the increasingly detailed score acts as a ‘guard against extemporisation
(improvisation)’ (1992, p. 234). Yet again, it seems that the rigidity of the work-concept
and the freedom of expression offered by improvisation stand in complete antithesis to

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one another. However, as aforementioned, the relationship between composition—as ex-
emplified by the work-concept—and improvisation is perhaps more nuanced than this.
All the works that so precisely seem to contradict the flexibility and event-orientedness of
improvisation might only do so ostensibly. They themselves were most likely conceived of
and developed in an improvisational manner, becoming a work at the time of their nota-
tion, when an ideal ‘type’ or ‘universal’ was created and immortalized.
In reality, all music incorporates these inextricable elements of composition and impro-
visation, and while it is not commonplace for improvisations to be notated and solidified,
those that are should be considered with the same degree of legitimacy as conventional
compositions. It is crucial to note that it is not the solidification of the improvisation in no-
tation itself that makes an improvisation a work but, instead, the repeatability that this so-
lidification offers. It is also worth mentioning that this ‘evolution’ (a word used lightly so
as not to imply improvement from a lower artistic plane of improvisation to a higher one
of composition) from improvisation to composition neither solely takes place in one dir-
ection nor ceases to exist once the work is notated, but instead comes into play every time
the work is repeated in performance. Few would deny that performance necessitates some
kind of improvisation, and this is the gateway to demonstrating that the work-concept is
not so remote from improvisation after all. The idea that improvisation cannot be elim-
inated from performance is put forward by Gould and Keaton (2000, pp. 143–148). It
should be clarified, however, that the kind of improvisation in performance is the uninten-
tional kind, which is distinct from the deliberate improvisation of the jazz musician’s solo
(Young and Matheson, 2000, p. 127).
There are two possible solutions to the problems that the work-concept’s rigidity poses
to the proposed resolution of the dichotomy at hand, and each will now be explored and
critiqued.
The first solution to resolve the dissonance between the work-concept and improvisa-
tion finds a way in which improvisations might be admitted to Goehr’s metaphorical mu-
seum of musical works. It involves the solidification of an improvisation over a number of
successive performances, which together might be said to constitute a developing com-
positional work, ‘incrementally altered and never wholly spontaneous’ (Hamilton, 2000,
p. 181). As jazz writer Sidney Finkelstein commented in 1948:
Improvisation is a form of composition. Improvisation is music that is not written
down, composition is music that is written down … The ability to write music makes
possible a bigness of form and richness of expression that is beyond the limits of im-
provisation … [But the] slow creation of a great jazz solo [from performance to per-
formance] is a form of musical composition. (1948, pp. 109–111)
380 | Katya DAVISSON

While ostensibly appealing, this view can be criticized. Aside from the initial perform-
ance, it is questionable to classify subsequent performances as improvisational, since they
are so closely based on something that came before them. If, on the other hand, they are
not so similar to the initial improvisation, then is it not counterintuitive to classify them
as constituting the same work? However, the existence of pure spontaneity and origin-
ality is not beyond doubt, even when considering the free improvisation of the initial
performance. The improvisations that Finkelstein argues make up the work, then, must

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fall on a continuum of originality, with the initial improvisation being more original and
the subsequent performances less original. This is preferable to the initial and subsequent
improvisations residing in separate categories of ‘improvised’ and ‘pre-determined’.
Another and possibly fatal issue with Finkelstein’s ‘incrementally altered’ work is
Goehr’s explicit requirement that ‘works’ must be immutable. If the music is under con-
stant revision and alteration then, according to Goehr, it cannot be classified as a work.
According to Dodd, because works constitute universal and immutable ‘types’, the alter-
ation of a work does not lead to an altered type but instead to an entirely new type altogether.
Following this logic, Bruckner’s 1890 revisions to his Eighth Symphony (originally pub-
lished in 1887) do not constitute changes to the work. Instead, in 1890, Bruckner com-
posed a new musical work.
Alongside the obvious counterintuitive implications of such a claim, there have been
numerous theoretical doubts levelled against this idea of work immutability present in
both Goehr and Dodd’s theories of the musical work. Eric Lewis criticizes Dodd’s notion
that when a musical work is considered as a type, it establishes a set of possible perform-
ances by virtue of laying down changeless rules for instancing the work in performance
(2019, p. 128). He argues for the ‘modal model’, elaborated on by Bertinetto, which as-
serts that ‘there is no moment when this set of possible performances is fixed, and so the
work itself is not, in this sense, completed’ (2013, p. 84). The modal model ’does not
deny the possibility that musical works can exist as changeless Platonic entities, but it does
qualify this by stating that they ‘never achieve this status since they are always in the act of
being created, and so strive for but never achieve their Platonic perfection’ (Lewis, 2019,
p. 128). If Bruckner’s Symphony of 1887 did not constitute a ‘type’, then its 1890 revision
neither alters nor replaces a type; it is simply another version of the work. Further to this,
Evnine sees musical works as made out of abstracta such as sound structures, rather than
as the discovered entities Platonists might view them as. He states:
If they can be made at all, then I do not see why they cannot change. This is one way
to think of what happens when a composer revises a work: she changes the sound
structure that constitutes the work. In that case, the view that musical works were
indicated structures would be inconsistent with the view that a composer could re-
vise a work without bringing into existence a distinct work. (Evnine, 2009, p. 209)
In this case, Bruckner’s 1890 revisions to his Eighth Symphony merely alter the materials
that make up the existing work. They do not bring into existence an entirely new work.
That said, ’Finkelstein’s ‘incrementally altered’ work does run into problems regarding
classification. How do we know what ‘counts’ as part of the work’s lineage? What happens
IMPROVISATION AS A METHOD OF COMPOSITION: RECONCILING THE DICHOTOMY | 381

if the various improvisations, which together form the slowly created composition, are
wildly divergent?
It seems a stronger defence of my argument is needed. This involves the use of re-
cording and notation to create narrow-sense works from improvisations, both according
to Goehr’s and Dodd’s theories of work-classification. Larson understands composition
as the ‘putting together of musical elements and storing them—whether in memory, no-
tation, or sound-recording media—in a way that allows but does not require revision’

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(2005, p. 272). Recording ‘fixes’ an improvisation for later listening and allows it to fulfil
the multi-instantiability requirement of a work, providing it a ‘type’ from which ‘tokens’,
although always and necessarily imperfect, might be formed. In this context, ‘tokens’
refer to performances, which are repeatable. Why should music solidified in recording
be of any lower artistic standing than music solidified in manuscript? It seems obsolete
to argue such a thing. Before the invention of Edison’s phonograph in 1877, it might have
been true that improvisations were solely event-oriented and not to be repeated. Since
1877, however, improvisers who intended for their improvisations to become works have
been able to create a universal type through recording. Further to this, there is no reason
why such recordings cannot be subsequently solidified in manuscript and subject to ana-
lysis and criticism just as traditional works are, and hence these improvisations can go on
to become works from the viewpoint of their reception. It is interesting to consider in-
stances in that we experience an improvisational performance and, although not recorded
and hence not repeatable in the real world, that performance somehow becomes the ex-
emplar of that piece. While I ’do not consider such a performance as work-instancing, it
does hint at the notion of an exemplar that pervades the former half of the type/token
dichotomy. Bertinetto argues that the type/token dichotomy’s (TtD) main merit is ‘the
way it succeeds in accommodating the complex relationship between a musical work and
its performances’ (2012, p. 110), but goes on to demonstrate how the TtD might be ac-
commodated in some improvisational practices. However, he avoids making the claim
that such accommodation endows improvisations with work-status.
Dodd claims that free improvisations cannot be work-instancing as ‘our interest in
them lies in their immediacy rather than in their potential repeatability’ (2007, p. 3).
While it is true that the priority we project onto improvisation is one of immediacy, this
is neither inextricable from nor necessary to the improvisation itself. Many recordings
accepted by the public as exemplary of an aesthetic of improvisation – such as Miles Davis
and Teo Macero’s Bitches Brew – are actually the fruit of extensive post-production editing.
Importantly, this example does not deny improvisational quality, but illustrates the cen-
trality of improvisation as a step in the compositional method.
To sum up, the problem of compatibility posed by Goehr’s rigid and unforgiving work-
concept might be solved by the idea of an incrementally created and altered work, al-
though this gives rise to some tricky conclusions. The conflict is better reconciled by
the solidification of improvisations through recording and notation to ensure their re-
peatability. This, as far as I am concerned, grants them every right to a spot in the work-
concept’s Hall of Fame.
382 | Katya DAVISSON

5. Problem of Originality Posed by Boulez and Benson

The second key threat to our argument is posed by the denial of improvisation’s genuine
spontaneity. If improvisation is merely the recontextualization of existing ideas rather
than the creation of new ones, which is the case for composition, how can their relation-
ship be meaningfully rectified? Benson subscribes to this view of improvisation, asserting
that improvisers are always improvising on something—whether that includes an already-
known formal structure or simply their past musical experiences. For him, there seems

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to be something unavoidably mimetic about improvisation (2003, p. 2). Modernist com-
poser Pierre Boulez asserted that ‘if the player were an inventor of primary forms or ma-
terial, he would be a composer … if you do not provide him with sufficient information
to perform a work, what can he do? He can only turn to information he has been given on
some earlier occasion, in fact to what he has already played’ (1986, p. 461). This view is
redolent of Schoenberg’s sentiment that the performer should be slave to the composer’s
wishes, and if these wishes are not expressed fully enough, the performer, unable to
create material like the composer, will play existing material, albeit recontextualized.
It seems that Boulez appears to be ignorant to the essence of improvisation, which, ac-
cording to Hamilton, ‘precisely constitutes a denial of the view that if the player were an
“inventor of primary form or material,” he or she would be the composer’ (2000, p. 180).
Jazz musicians up to the Swing Era would agree with the views of Boulez and Benson
outlined above. They pre-planned their solos and had no misgivings about passing their
performance off as ‘improvised’. However, post-Swing Era improvisers vehemently de-
fend the originality of their art, claiming that they practise precisely to be spontaneous
and to avoid falling back on standard clichés. Carl Woideck said of Charlie Parker that it
was his lack of practice from the late 1940s that led to a decline in his spontaneity (1996,
pp. 175-176, 199-200). Hamilton also mentions pianist Keith Tippett who, in his prac-
tising and performing, attempted to exclude phrases he had played before (2000, p. 182).
In the minds of many, therefore, including many improvisers, improvisation is spur-of-
the-moment artistic expression with no prior precedent. The appeal of such a romanti-
cized view is clear: improvisers can create music, ex nihilo, before our very eyes in live
performance. Before I debunk the myths of originality that surround improvisation and
composition, it is crucial to recognize the importance of the practices’ aesthetic ideals.
Even if musical works are not actually fixed, they are often viewed in this way, and the
aesthetic ideal of free improvisation has often been heralded to propose an artistic practice
of spontaneity, free from the rigidity of the musical work. These are not fact but, instead,
merely aesthetic ideals. Nevertheless, they are the ideals that have structured the artistic
character of some important musical trends.
However, the reality is that regardless of how original and free the musicians think
their music is, it will always resemble something that came before, even if that is solely
because of the rules that one follows when they are improvising, or the standard use of
scales and arpeggios. The claim that improvisers practice precisely so that they ’do not
fall back on standard clichés also limits their creative freedom and, hence, originality, as
it necessarily rules out possible improvisational paths. Often, such reliance on established
patterns is a subconscious phenomenon, but the improviser’s awareness of this in no way
IMPROVISATION AS A METHOD OF COMPOSITION: RECONCILING THE DICHOTOMY | 383

affects the end product of improvisation. Conscious or subconscious, it is clear that im-
provisers follow certain conventions, and convention necessitates a lack of originality,
at least to an extent. To take this one step further, the notes and the tonal system that
are used by the improviser come with rules and consequent expectations: the use of the
Western diatonic system would encourage the resolution of a tritone using one of two
established techniques, or the ending of a section on the tonic. They are also constrained
by their instrument (its range, quality, and timbre) and their virtuosic capability in the

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sense that they might hear an improvisation in their head that they wish to recreate but,
because of their lack of ability, they cannot accurately convey this idea. It is crucial at this
point to make clear that the lack of total spontaneity and freedom in improvisation is not
detrimental to the effect that the art can have, nor is it undermining of the skills that im-
provisers possess and showcase when they play—in fact, it is quite the contrary. If every
improvisation were wholly original and musicians relied on neither old material nor their
established methods of developing this material, they would not be able to establish an im-
provisational idiom, for which many improvisers are so popular. According to Hamilton,
‘an improviser’s individuality precisely resides in, among other things, their creative de-
velopment of favourite stylistic or structural devices, without which they risk incoherence
and non-communication’ (2000, p. 182).
If composition is truly musical creation ex nihilo, then improvisations’ lack of com-
plete originality stands in stark opposition to it, leaving little room for improvisation to
be understood as a method of composition. However, this is not the case: the aforemen-
tioned use and reuse of conventional patterns such as scales and arpeggios in improvisa-
tion are mirrored in composition. Regarding improvisers’ reliance on old ideas and the
consequent development of a musical idiom, this is just as true for composers who often
return to a successful compositional formula, time and time again. This was especially
prevalent in the work of Haydn and Mozart in the Classical era, whose impressive out-
puts owe to such formulae, at least in part. Benson, who previously undermined the
originality seen in improvisation, agrees that composition is equally as reliant on ex-
isting material, stating that ‘to refer to what the composer does as creation or discovery
is to mischaracterize it … a better way to understand such processes of reworking,
transforming and putting together previously existing materials is as essentially impro-
visatory’ (2003, p. 37).
Benson not only redeems my argument by undermining the originality of composition
and hence placing it on the same creative plane as improvisation, but he draws a crucial
parallel between the two, implying that improvisation is a method that composers use
to compose music. It is worth mentioning that once traditional desk-composers have
completed the improvisational step of their process, they have an opportunity to eradi-
cate cliché, a luxury not afforded by improvisers due to their art’s immediacy. At the
very least, then, it is clear that improvisation and composition do not fall into the sep-
arate and opposing categories of ‘original’ and ‘recycled’, but instead are better under-
stood as residing on a continuum of originality, allowing improvisation to once again be
considered a method of both broad- and narrow-sense composition. Although Davies’
view that improvisations cannot constitute works does not align with the essay’s line
384 | Katya DAVISSON

of argument, his account of ‘thin’ vs ‘thick’ works is relevant here (2001, p. 6). These
works sit on a continuum: the former allows for more improvisation through the sparse
instructions given by the score, and the latter requires little improvisation due to a
comprehensive and prescriptive score.

6. Conclusion

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To conclude, then, improvisation is indeed a method of composition in two key senses:
firstly, improvisation (as an action) is a step in the process of composition; secondly,
improvisation (as a product) can be considered a work once it is recorded and is, hence,
repeatable. Regarding the creation of works, Dodd’s work-concept merely requires
that the music be repeatable. This is certainly achieved through recording and notation,
which provide the music with a universal ‘type’. However, the complete reconcili-
ation of improvisation as a compositional method of works as defined by Goehr’s work-
concept might require some alterations of the work-concept to be made as improvised
jazz, for example, does not have its origin in the European High Art tradition. Such
alterations might include eliminating this arguable outdated and elitist criterion, which
would have a positive impact beyond the mere acceptance of improvisation into Goehr’s
imaginary museum. If the ‘museum’ is to hold any weight, it should be kept up to date
with contemporary aesthetic priorities of diversification. After all, the link made be-
tween improvisation and performance has demonstrated that improvisation is not so far
removed from the European High Art tradition, and many conventional ‘works’ feature
improvisational cadenzas. By removing the necessity of a direct High Art origin, the
previously ingrained dichotomy of composition and improvisation can begin to dis-
solve. In its place now sit improvisations that have been solidified in recording, repeated
by others and analyzed by musicologists, which can now assume ‘work-status’ and ex-
emplify narrow- as well as broad-sense composition. It is crucial that we consider the
alteration of established concepts and theories such as Goehr’s work-concept to ensure
continued relevance to the sphere of musical practice, which ultimately is its reason for
and origin of existence.
It is true that the perceived dichotomy is not where it was in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, but misunderstandings about the nature of improvisation and its rela-
tionship to composition are still prevalent in this field. The distinction made in Section
3 between improvisation as a compositional step that contributes to a finished compos-
itional product, which is often carried out in private, and improvisation that is incorp-
orated into an oftentimes public performance, which is itself the end product, should
be returned to briefly. Bruno Nettl suggests that we ‘create a taxonomy that explores
the intersection of improvisation and what one might best call pre-composition’ (2013).
A line between improvisation as one of many steps towards an end-goal and improvisation
as the end-goal itself is a line that is important to draw and explore. Looking at how the
relationship between improvisation and composition compare on either side of such a line
would also be fruitful. Although he distinguishes between two types of improvisation, he
is careful not to assert that they are isolated categories—after all, he explicitly refers to
their intersection—but, although beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting
IMPROVISATION AS A METHOD OF COMPOSITION: RECONCILING THE DICHOTOMY | 385

to consider the criteria for each of these improvisational categories and the possibility of a
grey area that resides between them.
Finally, a note on value. My efforts to reconcile the existing dichotomy of impro-
visation and composition is in no way related to a view of improvisation as aesthetically
inferior to composition, nor to a view that improvisations should be afforded greater aes-
thetic attention if they are to be considered as musical works. This view, however, is not
the prevailing view among the elite in music academia, for whom the work-concept holds

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real weight, and to whom improvisation is a lesser art. My endeavour, therefore, is for the
reconciliation of the improvisation/composition dichotomy to be widely accepted across
the academic community so that improvisers might share in the many legal, cultural,
and financial benefits enjoyed by conventional ‘paper’ composers as they themselves can
create musical works of comparable import.

Katya Davisson
Durham University, UK
[email protected]

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