DELHI UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW, CAMPUS LAW CENTRE

LB-502 MOOT COURT EXERCISE,2024

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA SLP

NO. /2022

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 3(1)(r) & 3(1)(s) OF SCHEDULED CASTES AND

SCHEDULED TRIBES (PREVENTION OF ATTROCITIES) ACT,1989

IN THE MATTER OF

MOOL CHAND .................................................................. APPELLANT

VS
BALDEV............................................................................... RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONER

SUBMISSION BY:
NAME : RITIK ARYA
SEMESTER & SEC: 5TH H
EXAM ROLL NO. : 21309806738
CLASS ROLL NO. : 216738
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................... (2)

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES................................................ (3,4)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................(5)
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................(6)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES.................................................. (7)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS........................................... (8-10)
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ............................................... (11-17)
PRAYER……………………………………………………….(18)

1. WHETHER THE COURT HAS REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO

MAINTAIN THIS APPEAL........................

1.1 MAINTAINABILITY OF APPEAL…………..

1.2 IS THE CASE HAS PRIMA FACIE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT…..

2. WHETHER ALLEGATIONS TOWARDSRESPONDENT FALL WITHIN

THE PROVISION SC &ST (PREVENTION OF AUTROCITIES) ACT
1989? EVEN IF CASTIEST REMARKS GIVEN IN TELEPHONIC
CONVERSATION IN FRONT OF THIRD PERSON.....................

3. WHETHER THE ST (PREVENTION OF AUTROCITIES ACT 1989)

BEING A PANEL STATUTE WHICH CONSTRUED AND BENEFIT OF
STRICT INTERPRETATION IS GIVEN TO ACCUSED?

3.1 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PUBLIC PLACE OR PUBLIC VIEW?

4. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD WRONGLY

QUASHED THE ORDER…………………………………..

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

Anr. Another

Art. Article

s. Section

ss. Sections

HC High Court

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

v. Versus

Ors. Others

SC Schedule Caste

ST Schedule Tribes

AIR All India Report

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

ACTS & STATUTES

1. SC & ST PREVENTION OF AUTROCITITES ACT, 1989

2. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

ARTICLES
1. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f87de4b01497111427ed
2. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/157155187/
3. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b48cf2607dba348ffefcd5
4. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b48cf2607dba348ffefcd5
5. https://www.lawyerservices.in/Boologha-Pandian-Versus-State-rep-by-the-
Inspector-of-Police-2003-06-17
6. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1841482/
7. http://www.lawjournals.org/archives/2018/vol4/issue1/4-1-15
8. https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=sc/st%20act%20offence%20in%20
public%20view&pagenum=6
9. https://tribal.nic.in/actRules/preventionofAtricities.pdf
10. https://ssrana.in/litigation/special-leave-petition-
india/#:~:text=Special%20leave%20Petition%20(SLP)%20under,of%20the%20
Constitution%20of%20India&text=Under%20Article%20136%2C%20the%20
Supreme,in%20the%20territory%20of%20India.

BOOKS
1. M.P JAIN (INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW)
“EDITOR:- JUSTICE JASTI CHELAMESWAR
JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU”
2. LAW OF CRIMES I, CASE MATERIAL DU
3. K.D GAUR, INDIAN PENAL CODE, (Universal law publication company 6th
Edition, 2016)

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SITES

1. https://indiankanoon.org/

2. https://www.manupatrafast.com/

3. https://main.sci.gov.in/

4. https://indiankanoon.org/

5. https://www.casemine.com/

LIST OF CASES

S.NO JUDGEMENT CITATION

1. Prathvi raj Chauhan vs U.O.I & ors WP [c] no. 1015 of 2018
2. C.Sathiyanathan vs Veeramuthu Crl.O.P.No.23515 of 2006

3. Boologha Pandian and Kandiah Pandian v. State

C.A. No.804 of 1996

4. Taranath v. State of A.P. C.P 3020 of 2008

5. K. Venugopal Reddy and Others v. The Deputy WRIT PETITION No. 16777
Superintendent of Police and Others
OF 2009

6. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Mehul

Construction Co. Special Leave Petition (C)
Nos. 11522-11526 of 1999

7. Irupem Reddy v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, W.A. No. 2048 of 2005

Nandyal
8. Datar Swilchgears Ltd v. Tata Finance Ltd. SLP (civil) 13812 of 2000

9. Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of (1955) 1 SCR 941

Income Tax, West Bengal
10. Vishak and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2020)

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE APPELLANT HAVE THE HONOR TO SUBMIT BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, THE MEMORIAL FOR THE

APPELLANT UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

CONSTITUTION, 1950.

THE PRESENT MEMORIAL SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND

ARGUMENT IN THE PRESENT CASE.

“136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

1. Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in

its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

2. Nothing in clause ( 1 ) shall apply to any judgment, determination,

sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted
by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces”

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. That, Mool Chand, petitioner herein was elected as a ward member of ward no. 9
Rajpura town and was an elected member of an elected body of a municipality and he
belongs to Schedule Cast and the seat to which he was elected reserved for Schedule
Cast.

II. The Municipality was chaired by Baldev who belongs to general category. On
04/12/2019 Baldev wanted to meet Mool chand to discuss issues relating to
cleanliness in ward no. 09. Therefore, on December 4, 2019 Baldev sent him a
message through WhatsApp, inviting him for personal meeting in his chamber at 11.
AM. Mool chand was busy that day and therefore he read the message at 11.30 AM.
He immediately called Baldev to inform him that he would reachshortly.

III. Upon this Baldev started shouting at Mool chand for getting late. He made casteist
remarks and humiliated him. At that time, a clerk was also sitting in the chamber.
Despite insult and humiliation, Mool chand went to the Municipality to attend the
meeting. As soon as he entered into the chamber, Baldev got angry and abused him on
the name of his caste. He shouted at him saying. “Get lost from my office, otherwise I
will make you clean the streets”. At that time there was no third person inside the
chamber.

IV. Mool chand left the chamber as Baldev was not listening to him. Mool chand rushed
to the police station to register an FIR against Baldev.

V. At the initial stage of the case trial court, found that prima facie had been made out
against Baldev. Therefore, on February 4, 2020, the court framed charges under
section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the scheduled tribe (prevention of atrocities) Act. 1989.

VI. Baldev challenged the order of framing of charges before Allahabad High Court. The
High Court held that casteist aspersions made telephonically or in the absence of any
third person did not constitute the offence within the meaning of section 3(1)(r) and
3(1)(s) of the scheduled tribe (prevention of atrocities) Act. 1989.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1:-
WHETHER THE COURT HAS REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO
MAINTAIN HIS APPEAL?

ISSUE 2:-
WHETHER ALLEGATIONS TOWARDSRESPONDENT FALL WITHIN
THE PROVISION SC &ST (PREVENTION OF AUTROCITIES) ACT 1989?
EVEN IF CASTIEST REMARKS GIVEN INTO TELEPHONIC
CONVERSATION IN FRONT OF THIRD PERSON?

ISSUE 3:-
WHETHER THE ST (PREVENTION OF AUTROCITIES ACT 1989) BEING
A PANEL STATUTE WHICH CONSTRUED AND BENEFIT OF STRICT
INTERPRETATION IS GIVEN TO ACCUSED?

ISSUE 4:-
WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD WRONGLY QUASHED
THE ORDER?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1:- WHETHER THE COURT HAS REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO

MAINTAIN THIS APPEAL?
The Supreme Court of India has been given extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India. Under Article 136, the Supreme Court in its discretion may grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter, passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. This is
called Special Leave Petition (SLP). In general, an appeal can be instituted before the
Supreme Court of India from decisions of the High Courts (Articles 132 to 134). However,
there might be some cases wherein justice and equity may mandate the interference of the
Supreme Court, in such cases; the Supreme Court has been conferred with extra-ordinary
powers under Article 136 of the Supreme Court of India. The residuary provision under
Article 136 vests in the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to entertain appeals by grant of special
leave against any judgment or order passed by any Court or tribunals in the country. Under
Special Leave Petition, the Apex Court has discretionary powers to ensure that there is no
miscarriage of Justice.

ISSUE 2:- WHETHER ALLEGATIONS TOWARDSRESPONDENT FALL WITHIN

THE PROVISION SC &ST (PREVENTION OF AUTROCITIES) ACT 1989? EVEN
IF CASTIEST REMARKS GIVEN INTO TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION IN
FRONT OF THIRD PERSON?

The provisions in the act are specifically applicable in the facts and circumstances in the
present case. When the petitioner was abused through telephonic call by the respondent a
third person was also present in his chamber hence the offence was committed at a place that
was in public view. Moreover, the trial court while framing charges against the respondent
had taken into consideration the statement recorded under section 161Crpc. And that is an
admissible piece of evidence. When the respondent made castiest remarks and humiliated the
petitioner, at that time, a clerk was also sitting in the chamber hence it cannot be considered
as a private place. Despite insult and humiliation, in front of the said clerk, Mool chand went
to the Municipality to attend the meeting. As soon as he entered into the chamber,

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Respondent again got angry and abused petitioner on the name of his caste. He shouted at
him saying. “Get lost from my office, otherwise I will make you clean the streets”. At that
time there was no third person inside the chamber. The fact of the abusing in private or public
place can only be best find out during the trial and discharge of the respondent without a fair
trial is unconstitutional and ultra-virus. Therefore, the High court committed a gross error of
judgment by quashing the order passed by trial court framing charges against the respondent
under section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the scheduled tribe (prevention of atrocities) Act. 1989.

ISSUE 3:- WHETHER THE ST (PREVENTION OF AUTROCITIES ACT 1989)

BEING A PANEL STATUTE WHICH CONSTRUED AND BENEFIT OF STRICT
INTERPRETATION IS GIVEN TO ACCUSED?

Every statute must be so interpreted as to give wider implications to its provisions and the
mind and intent of the legislatures must be taken into consideration. In framing of Scheduled
Tribe (prevention of atrocities) Act. 1989 the intention of the parliament must have been to
better protect the Right and dignity of the members of these classes.

The legislature has used the word „within public view‟ under section 3 (s) of The Scheduled
Castes and The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and section 3 (1) (r) of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act,
2015 instead of „public place‟. The intention of the legislature was to cover private places
also if the offence under this act is committed against the persons of Schedule Caste and
Schedule Tribes. The offence of intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a
member of Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view means the
public is able to witness the offence committed under this act. The dictionary meaning of the
word „'public‟ „is ''open to the people as a whole''. The dictionary meaning of the word ''view''
is vision or sight as from a particular position. Reading these two meanings together in the
context of the words ''public view'', it only means that the public should have viewed the
incident irrespective of the place where the offence is committed, it may be private place or
public place.

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ISSUE 4:- WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD WRONGLY
QUASHED THE ORDER?

In the present case, the petitioner belongs to the Schedule Cast and is an elected
representative in local self-Government bodies. He has been abused and a casteist remark has
been pronounced twice by the respondent. The dignity of the petitioner has been destroyed in
front of the clerk of his chamber and again he has been insulted by the respondent in his own
chamber. These two incidents while considered as a chain of events established the quilt of
the respondent beyond any doubt. Basically Hon‟ble High Court didn‟t considered the full
fact and Schedule Tribe Prevention Act 1989, the question arise here in respect of term
“Public view”, and any insult makes at private place to someone infront of any person can‟t
describes as private place.

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ARGUMENT ADVANCED

ISSUE 1:- WHETHER THE COURT HAS REQUISITE JURISDICTION TO

MAINTAIN THIS PETITION?
1.1 MAINTAIBILITY OF APPEAL.
1. “The Apex Court held that a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 would
not lie.”1
2. “it has been held that delay in appointing an arbitrator despite expiry of time
may not matter but such appointment must be made before an application
under sub-section (6) of Section 11 is made. In the said case, however, the
Apex Court, without deciding the question as regards the maintainability of
the application for grant of special leave, the Supreme Court proceeded to
deal with a matter as if an application under Article 136 is maintainable.”2

3. “The Constitutional Bench in Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal has observed that it is “not
possible to define with any precision the limitations on the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested” in the Supreme Court under Article 136 and
the limitations “are implicit in the nature and character of the power
itself”. Being an “exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be
exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary
situations”. The Court went on to state as under:
It is, however, plain that when the court reaches the conclusion that a person
has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal within the territory of
India has or given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind
like the finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of
exercise of this power because the whole intent and purpose of this article is
that it is the duty of this court to see that injustice is not perpetuated or

1
Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Mehul Construction Co, SLP (C) Nos. 11522-11526
of 1999
2
Datar Swilchgears Ltd v. Tata Finance Ltd, SLP (civil) 13812 of 2000

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perpetrated by decisions of courts and tribunals because certain laws have
made the decisions of these courts or tribunals final and conclusive”3

1.2 IS THE CASE HAS PRIMA FACIE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT

1. The Court took a prima facie view that making a casteist slur against a
person belonging to a scheduled community in their courtyard would
amount to “an insult in a place in public view”, punishable under the
SC/ST Act
The Kerala High Court has held that making a derogatory remark against a
person belonging a scheduled caste or tribe in their courtyard would
amount to “an insult in a place in public view”, punishable under
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 (Vishak and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Ors.).4

ISSUE 2:- WHETHER ALLEGATIONS TOWARDSRESPONDENT FALL WITHIN

THE PROVISION SC &ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT 1989? EVEN IF
CASTIEST REMARKS GIVEN INTO TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION IN FRONT
OF THIRD PERSON?

According to the Appellant, since section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of Schedule Caste and Schedule
Tribes prevention of Atrocities Act 1989, violates by Moolchand as makes castiest remarks
on Appellant in telephonic conversation as well as in chis chamber in front of third person is
not comes under term “private place”

Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of Schedule caste and Schedule Tribes Prevention of Atrocities
Act 1989 states:

3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.—

1. Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe-

r) Intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a

schedule tribe or schedule caste in any place within public view.
s) Abuses any member of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe by caste name in
any place within public view.

3
Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, (1955) 1
SCR 941
4
Vishak and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Ors .(2020)

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I. “Supreme court has observed that as a matter of fact, members of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes have suffered for long, hence, if we cannot provide them
protective discrimination beneficial to them, we cannot place them at all at a
disadvantageous position that may be causing injury to them by widening inequality
and against the very spirit of our Constitution. It would be against the basic human
dignity to treat all of them as a liar or as a crook person and cannot look at every
complaint by such complainant with a doubt.”5

II. “Madras High Court has held that an offence committed under the provisions of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of atrocities) Act, 1989 can very
well be taken cognizance of by a Magistrate on a private complaint and that hence the
challenge made to the order of the Magistrate on the ground that a private complaint
alleging commission of offences punishable under the provisions of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of atrocities) Act, 1989 is incompetent,
cannot be sustained. On the other hand, this court has also held supra, that there is
total non-application of mind on the part of the learned Judicial Magistrate taking
cognizance of the case. This court has clearly pointed out how the Magistrate has
mechanically taken a case on file without even applying his mind to find out whether
the allegations made in the complaint (of course without going into the question of the
correctness or otherwise of the same) would attract any one of the penal provisions
and if so, what exactly the penal provision or provisions under which the act or acts
on the part of the petitioner herein would amount to an offence. This court has also
pointed out that it is not obligatory on the part of the complainant to mention the penal
provision and that even if the complainant has quoted a wrong penal provision, the
Magistrate has to take cognizance of the offence citing the correct penal provision. In
this case, it has also been pointed out that the provisions mistakenly quoted by the
complainant been mechanically incorporated by the learned Judicial Magistrate in the
order taking cognizance of the case. For that reason alone, the order of the learned

5
Prathvi raj Chauhan vs U.O.I & ors, WP [c] no. 1015 of 2018

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Judicial Magistrate dated 16.06.2006 has got to be quashed. However, this court has
to consider whether complete justice can be rendered by simply.”6

ISSUE 3:- WHETHER THE ST (PREVENTION OF AUTROCITIES ACT

1989) BEING A PANEL STATUTE WHICH CONSTRUED AND
BENEFIT OF STRICT INTERPRETATION IS GIVEN TO ACCUSED?

3.1 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IN PUBLIC VIEW AND PRIVATE VIEW?

a) “The offence of intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate

a member of Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within
public view means the public is able to witness the offence committed
under this act. The dictionary meaning of the word ''public'' is ''open to the
people as a whole''. The dictionary meaning of the word ''view'' is vision or
sight as from a particular position. Reading these two meanings together in
the context of the words ''public view'', it only means that the public should
have viewed the incident irrespective of the place where the offence is
committed, it may be private place or public place.”

b) “any event, any insult, any castiest remarks made on any person of
Schedule Caste and Schedule tribes in place where no one is present to
spectre any conversion was made only between two person, either in
telephonic conversation or in person present”

I. “Madras High Court observed that the judiciary on many occasions considered the
offence within the public view and sometimes not in public view. The words used
in sub section (s) are not „in public place‟ but „within public view‟ which means
the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present and no
offence on the allegations under the said section gets attracted. The entire
allegations contained in the complaint even if taken to be true do not make out any
offence against the petitioner Accused intentionally insulted or intimidated

6
C.Sathiyanathan vs Veeramuthu, Crl.O.P.No.23515 of 2006

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complainant and caused aspersion in public place calling his caste name as
scheduled caste citizen. Place of occurrence was within public view. Prosecution
proved case beyond reasonable doubt; it was held no infirmity in Order passed by
Court.”7

II. “The main ingredient of Section 3(1) (s) of the act is insults or intimidates with
intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any
place „within public view‟. The offence must be committed against the member of
the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe by the person who is not a member of
Scheduled caste or scheduled tribes „within public view‟. If any offence is
committed by the member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes against the
member of Schedule Castes or Scheduled Tribes, then the provisions of this act
will not attract. In case, petitioner/accused belongs to Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe they are not punishable under section 3 of Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, as the provisions does not attract
itself [1]. The provision of Section 3(l) (s) of the Act does not use the expression
"public place", but instead the expression used is "in any place within public view".
There is a clear distinction between the two expressions. If a private place, such as
the courtyard of a residential house, can be seen by someone from road or lane
outside the boundary wall, and if the incident occurred at such a place is audible
and visible to the people, it would, indubitably constitute an offence under section
3(1) (s) of the Act, it being a place within public view. In other words, a place of
offence can be a private place, but if the remarks made, with intent to humiliate a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, are audible and/or if members
of public have viewed the incident, even if the incident occurred at a private place,
such as the courtyard of a house, in my opinion, it would constitute an offence
under section 3(1)(s) of the Act. It is evident from the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Act that it was enacted to prevent indignities, humiliation and
harassment to the members of SC/ST community. Therefore, while interpreting the

7
Boologha Pandian and Kandiah Pandian v. State, C.A. No.804 of 1996

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expression "in any place within public view", one will have to hold that occurrence
of the incident was viewed by the public. The expression “within public view" will
have to be read to mean that the offence under section 3(1)(s) of the Act, should
take place in view of the "public". If no member of the public has either seen the
incident or heard the remarks, then even if the place is a "public place" or a place
"visible to the public", it would not attract the ingredients of the offence under
section 3(1)(s) of the Act.”8

III. “Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe intentionally insults or intimidates with

intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view. It cannot make out the offence punishable under Section
3(1)(s) of the Act, as simply addressing a person by his caste without any intention
to insult or intimidate in public view [3]. In order to launch prosecution under
Section 3(1)(s) of Act, two necessary and indispensable ingredients must exist -
Victim should belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and there must be
humiliation of such person in public view”9

ISSUE WHETHER THE HIGH

4:- COURT OF ALLAHABAD
WRONGLY QUASHED THE ORDER?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the provisions in the act are
specifically applicable in the facts and circumstances in the present case. When the petitioner
was abused through telephonic call by the respondent a third person was also present in his
chamber hence the offence was committed at a place that was in public view. Moreover, the
trial court while framing charges against the respondent had taken into consideration the
statement recorded under section 161 Crpc. And that is an admissible piece of evidence.

I. “Whether the words were uttered in a public view or not is a question of fact which
will have to be decided during the trial the fact of the abusing in private or public

8
Taranath v. State of A.P. {C.P 3020 of 2008}
9
K. Venugopal Reddy and Others v. The Deputy Superintendent of Police and Others, WP
No. 16777 OF 2009

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place can only be best find out during the trial and discharge of the respondent
without a fair trial is unconstitutional and ultra-vires. Therefore, the High court
committed a gross error of judgment by quashing the order passed by trial court
framing charges against the respondent under section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the
scheduled tribe (prevention of atrocities) Act. 1989.
At the stage of framing of charge only the prima facie evidence is to be considered
and deep appreciation of evidence is made only during the procedure of trial. As per
the circumstances and allegation raised by the petitioner it is evident that there is
enough prima facie material on record to frame charges against the respondent under
section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the scheduled tribe (prevention of atrocities) Act.
1989.”10

II. “All humans are equal including in their failings. To treat SCs. and STs. as persons
who are prone to lodge false reports under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes Act for taking revenge or otherwise as monetary benefits made
available to them in the case of their being subjected to such offence, would be
against fundamental human equality. It cannot be presumed that a person of such class
would inflict injury upon himself and would lodge a false report only to secure
monetary benefits or to take revenge. If presumed so, it would mean adding insult to
injury, merely by the fact that person may misuse provisions cannot be a ground to
treat class with doubt. It is due to human failings, not due to the caste factor. The
monetary benefits are provided in the cases of an acid attack, sexual harassment of
SC/ST women, rape, murder, etc. In such cases, FIR is required to be registered
promptly.
Even though the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 is very
wide, it has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
exercised Exebio justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of
which alone, courts exist.11

10
Irupem Reddy v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nandyal, W.A. No. 2048 of 2005
11
Prathvi raj Chauhan vs U.O.I & ors, WP [c] no. 1015 of 2018

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PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments and authorities cited, it is humbly
requested that this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased to declare that:
a) The Appeal is maintainable under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India
b) That the allegations made against the respondent fall within the provisions of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
c) Should the Scheduled Tribe (prevention of atrocities Act 1989) being a penal statute
which must be seriously construed and benefit of strict interpretation is given to accused.
d) Whether the high court of Allahabad wrongly quashed the order

And pass such order Appeal or direction as the Hon‟ble Court deems fit and proper in the
Light of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTTED

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

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